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Hypostatic union and Monotheletism: The dyothelite christology of St. Maximus the Confessor

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Fordham University, 1994

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HYPOSTATIC UNION AND MONOTHELETISM:
THE DYOTHELITE CHRISTOLOGY
OF ST. MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

BY

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B. A., University of Dallas, 1983
M. A., University of Dallas, 1986

DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THEOLOGY
AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK
September, 1993

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

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
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
has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in the Department of Theology

Rev. Gerard H. Ettlinger, S.J. (Mentor)

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ABBREVIATIONS FOR THE WORKS OF MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR

Amb   *Ambiguorum Liber*

Cap 15   *Capita 15 (= Loci Communes 1.1–15)*

Char   *Capita de Charitate*

CE   *Computus Ecclesiasticus*

DB   *Disputatio Bizyae*

Ep   *Epistolae*

LA   *Liber Asceticus*

Myst   *Mystagogia*

PN   *Orationis Dominicae Expositio*

Ps 59   *Expositio in Psalmum 59*

Pyrr   *Disputatio cum Pyrrho (= TP 28)*

QD   *Questiones et Dubia*

RM   *Relatio Motionis*

Schol   *Scholia on Dionysius the Areopagite.*

Thal   *Quaestiones ad Thalassium*

Theop   *Quaestiones ad Theopemptum*

ThOec   *Capita Theologica et Oeconomica (= Gnostic Centuries)*

TP   *Opuscula Theologica et Polemica*

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PREFACE

A. Purpose and Overview

As is probably the case with many longer works, this dissertation does not resemble what it started out to be. Originally, my work was to focus on the theory of gnomic will in the writings of Maximus the Confessor, not only in its Christological aspects, but also in the way it was used in his anthropological, ascetical-mystical, and eschatological writings. This project would have allowed me broad access to the whole corpus of Maximus' literary output and to most of the themes presented in it. After seven years of research, I can say with conviction that such a grand scheme is no project for a dissertation. Maximus' thought is both too broad and too deep to be comprehended in so short a time. However, in the course of my research, I made a discovery which led me to the present, more circumscribed, topic.

That discovery concerned a disagreement in the scholarly literature over the question of Maximus' theological pedigree: to which school of thought does he belong, if he belongs to any? In addition to this question, a further one emerged as to how Neo-Chalcedonianism is to be interpreted, since the Neo-Chalcedonian school is the one to which Maximus seems most likely to belong. If scholars could not agree on the basic Christological presuppositions that informed the Confessor's

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thought, how could they agree on anything that he said? It was in working out the paradigms of both Neo-Chalcedonian Christology and the Christology it sought to correct that I was able to distil the present thesis: "Hypostatic Union and Monotheletism: The Dyothelite Christology of Maximus the Confessor."

Building upon the Christological insights of the Neo-Chalcedonian and "Paleo-Chalcedonian" schools of the generation that preceeded Maximus', I was able to establish the Confessor's basic Christological presuppositions. Having done that, it was possible then to move on to a direct consideration of his Christology as an embodiment—and a deepening—of a clearly defined school of thought. To be sure that I had interpreted Maximus' Christology rightly, I sought to test my interpretation, and what better test-case could there be than the Christological heresy he spent the last half of his life combatting: Monotheletism? The research I had already done on his theory of gnomic will had opened up the Monothelite controversy for me, so it was not difficult to move to a direct consideration of Monotheletism and the Dyothelite Christology of its chief opponent, Maximus. That is how the present work came to be written.

As it now stands, the purpose of this dissertation is simple: first, to lay out in broad terms the chief aspects of the Confessor's notion of the hypostatic union in Christ; and second, to present the several principles of Monotheletism that Maximus addresses in his extant works and show how his Christology offers not only an adequate response to Monothelite claims, but also furnishes a coherent, integrated and orthodox

Christology of its own that, moreover, is consistent with the tradition of orthodox thinkers gone before him.

In order to fulfill this purpose, we will have recourse primarily to the *Opuscula Theologica et Polemica* and to the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, which are Maximus' chief anti-Monenergist and anti-Monothelite works. Many of these texts will be translated and analyzed here for the first time; others will be presented for the first time in English. All of them will be set within a perspective that I believe does them the most justice.[1] In addition to a presentation of heretofore unexamined texts, we shall analyze in detail all of the principles of Monotheletism that Maximus undertakes to refute in the *Disputation*. This is something that has not yet been done. Not only does the analysis of these principles stand on its own as a worthwhile scholarly endeavor, but the analysis will also give us the opportunity to contrast Maximus' Dyothelite

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[1]That is to say, having worked through the debate over how Neo-Chalcedonian Christology (i.e. the post-Chalcedonian Christology of the Byzantine Church) is to be interpreted, I am comfortable maintaining the view first articulated by John Meyendorff (see *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought* [St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974], 29-31) and developed at length by Patrick T. R. Gray (*The Defense of Chalcedon in the East [451-553]*, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 20 [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979]). Briefly, this view states that the Council of Chalcedon subscribed broadly to the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, and that there subsequently arose a school of thought the purpose of which was to demonstrate the fidelity of Chalcedon to Cyril in the face of Mono-physite objections to the contrary. This school of thought was the Neo-Chalcedonian, and its formulations were endorsed by the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. My own work provides evidence that this school of thought continued viably and intact up through the time of Maximus the Confessor and that Maximus himself was a fluent expositor of it. For reasons of brevity, I have not given in these pages the case for the interpretation of Neo-Chalcedonianism I have adopted. Those who are interested in the debate over Neo-Chalcedonianism will find all of the relevant literature given in the Bibliography.

Christology with that of his Monothelite opponents, and it will serve to establish the veracity of our exposition of Maximus' Christology.

The dissertation contains eight chapters. In Chapter I, there is an historical account of the politics, religious policy, and theological movements in the Byzantine Empire in the early part of the seventh century, the period of time when Maximus came to maturity and was active in the life of the Church. Beginning with an historical narrative has two advantages: it establishes the place and importance of Monotheletism in the history of dogma, and it gives us the opportunity to introduce all of the characters who will turn up from time to time throughout the remainder of the dissertation. In addition to the broad historical account, Chapter I also includes a theological overview of how Monotheletism arose and presents an analysis of several of the more important texts in the development of Monothelite Christology.

Chapter II introduces the issue of hypostatic union in Maximus and considers two of the metaphors for unmixed union that occur frequently in the Confessor's writings. We then go on to examine the formula, "the two natures from which, in which and which Christ is" (Chapter III); the distinction between logos and tropos (Chapter IV); the enhypostaton (Chapter V); and perichoresis (Chapter VI). In each of these chapters, some of Maximus' antecedents will be considered so that we will be able better to appreciate both his fidelity to the tradition of which he was an heir and the ways in which he went beyond his predecessors in his understanding and application of their insights.

Chapter VII turns from the broad consideration of Maximus' Christology to the specific application of his insights in the Monothelite debates. We will consider the principles of Monotheletism individually. Because the *Disputation with Pyrrhus* is a debate in which most of the principles of both Monenergism and Monotheletism are argued, we will follow the course of the *Disputation* and offer a rather comprehensive analysis of the first half of it. Chapter VII, then, presents nine principles of Monotheletism along with Maximus' response to them.

Finally, the Conclusion (Chapter VIII) will review the dissertation with an eye toward reiterating the veracity and the significance of the project and its findings, and we will be able to suggest other avenues of inquiry opened up by the work of the dissertation.

B. Notes on the Translations

Except where noted, all of the translations in the dissertation are my own. With regard to the works of Maximus, several of the *Opuscula* have been translated into French and Italian, and I have used these translations as aids in my own rendition of the original Greek. The *Disputation* has appeared in English, but the translation is not satisfactory, and though I have been aided by it, I have opted for my own translation of the *Disputation*, as well. As indicated in the Bibliography, published critical texts have been used where available.

Something ought to be said about the translation of a key word in this dissertation. That word is ἐνέργεια. Greek admits both nominative and verbal forms of the word, a luxury that English does not have.

Thus, a literal translation of the word gives us "energy," which is not bad in itself; but to speak of "energizer" and "energizing" is tiresome and silly. "Operation" is convenient, though "operator" and "operating" are both stilted. "Act," "actor," "acting," and "action," gives us the homogeneity we would like, but certain ambiguities involve us directly in Monenergism and make this set of words troublesome (e.g., is "act" a noun or a verb?).

Arbitrarily, I have chosen "operation" to translate ἐνέργεια. The one performing a given operation may be the "subject" or the "agent," and the act of performing it may be, variously, "operating," "acting," "working," etc. as the context demands.

The problem of translating ἐνέργεια is compounded by the fact that no one scholar translates Maximus' technical vocabulary in the same way.[2] And I have made no attempt to force the quotations of other scholars into a uniform canon of my own invention. Thus, one must simply recognize that what Scholar A calls "energy," Scholar B will call "operation," and Scholar C will call "act;" and that all three are talking about the same thing. Part of the reason I have included in the footnotes the original Greek text of all translated passages is to forstall the confusion that may arise because of this lack of uniformity.

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[2]This is a good argument for retaining many Greek words in English precisely as technical terms. A strong case can be made that Greek and Latin theological terms are as important to theology as Latin legal terms are to law. To abandon the professional jargon is to risk ambiguity where ambiguity is inadmissable.

C. References to the *Disputation with Pyrrhus.*

Maximus' twenty-eighth *Opuscule, The Disputation with Pyrrhus,* will figure prominently in this dissertation since it is perhaps the most important anti-Monothelite work we have from the Confessor. While I was conducting my research, I developed the convention of citing the *Disputation* by section numbers. Since the work is a dialogue with a strict alternation of speakers, the paragraphs are easily numbered, and this method of citation, in conjunction with the column numbers in Migne, allows for quick and easy reference. I have used this convention in all of the references to the *Disputation* in the text of the dissertation, and I would like to see it become standard in Maximian studies.

While Dr. Joseph Farrell was preparing his English translation of the *Disputation* for publication, I suggested to him that he incorporate this convention into his text, which he did. However, Farrell had subdivided some of the longer speeches into shorter paragraphs, which he then proceeded to number, thus obscuring the clarity of the convention. In future editions, I expect to see this lapse corrected. Nevertheless, since Farrell's is the only published translation of the *Disputation* at the time of this writing, I have thought it best to give the section numbers both according to the alternation of speakers as found in Migne, and as they are given in Farrell's translation. Thus, where Farrell's numbering differs from the "standard," I have given it in parentheses after the "standard" numbering, like this: *Pyrr* §148 (171).

D. Acknowledgements

A number of people, whom I would like to thank by name, have contributed to the work of this dissertation.

Dr. Joseph P. Farrell, who first introduced me to Maximus the Confessor, and who provided me with his rough translations of the *Opuscula* and the *Disputation*, without which generous gift, the work of this dissertation would have been considerably prolonged.

Dr. Basil Markesinis, University of Leuven, for providing me with a copy of his manuscript of the critical text of several of the *Opuscula*, which is to appear in the *Corpus christianorum, Series graeca*.

The Rev. Cyprian Davis, O.S.B., Archivist, St. Meinrad's Archabbey, for providing me with an inventory of the personal effects of the late Polycarp Sherwood, O.S.B., and for sending me photocopies of several of Dom Polycarp's unpublished papers and notes on Maximus.

Mr. Joseph LoSchiavo of Duane Library at Fordham University, and Mrs. Alice Puro of William D. Blakely Library at the University of Dallas, for their great patience and skill in locating and obtaining some of the more obscure materials for my work.

The administration of the Bridwell Library, Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, for extending to me the courtesy of access to and the use of their excellent facilities.

Dr. Eric D. Perl, University of Dallas, a fellow disciple of Maximus, with whom I spent many happy hours discussing the *minutiae* of the Confessor's thought, who loaned me the manuscript of his dissertation on Maximus, and who graciously read through the draft of this

dissertation, whose insights and suggestions I have been pleased to incorporate wherever possible.

And finally, the Very Reverend Protopresbyter John Meyendorff, under whom I began the work of this dissertation. He saw the greater part of it completed before his sudden and unexpected death in the summer of 1992. His approval of my work was by far the greatest compliment I have could have received for my efforts.

"Grant rest, O Lord, to the soul of Thy servant

in a place of verdure, a place of repose,

whence all sickness, sorrow and sighing have fled away,

and make his memory to be eternal."

CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL CLIMATE

OF BYZANTIUM IN THE EARLY SEVENTH CENTURY

A. Introduction

Maximus the Confessor was very much a man of his times and a man
wholly immersed and actively involved in the affairs of his day. Not
only were his later years taken up with Monenergism and Monotheletism,
but his earlier monastic years saw him involved him in controversy,
namely the Origenist dispute. Much of Maximus' literary output
addresses, at least indirectly, problems, situations, and controversies
which must be acknowledged (if not exhaustively scrutinized) before one
can begin to penetrate the Confessor's thought and intent. For example,
among the early works, the *Centuries on Charity* contain an extensive
synthesis of Evagrian asceticism; the first ten chapters of the *Theolo-
gical and Economic Centuries* (or the "*Gnostic Centuries,*" as they are
sometimes called) are a concentrated, distilled reinterpretation of Origen;
and long portions of the *Ambigua*--particularly *Ambigua* 7 and 15--
confront the theories of latter-day Origenism, which was still a nuisance
in certain monastic circles of the day.

The rise of Monenergism and Monotheletism presented Maximus with
a situation of wider ramifications. No longer did the problem concern a

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few Origenists tucked away in monasteries (troublesome as they might be). This time it was a matter for the many: the stakes included not only the purity of the Faith and the defense of Chalcedonian Orthodoxy, but also the unity of the Church and broadly-conceived imperial policy involving the whole of the Byzantine Empire. Without some inkling of this background, the controversy over Monenergism and Monotheletism loses much of its immediacy and significance. Indeed, the political backdrop is essential to understanding its development at all.

Maximus was at the vanguard of the Orthodox response to the theological side of this trend. Without it, Dyotheletism would not have been formulated, and without Dyotheletism, the whole theological tradition to which Maximus belonged would have died out and the course of Christology would have been radically different. Thus, for an adequate understanding of Maximus' theory of the hypostatic union, we shall not go amiss if we begin our inquiry with an overview of the political and theological climate of early seventh century Byzantium and see the forces, secular and sacred, which together spawned the great theological battle of the seventh century, with which the name of Maximus the Confessor will be forever tied.

B. Political and Historical Overview

1. The reign of Maurice

At the end of the sixth century, during the reign of the Emperor Maurice (582-602), the Byzantine Empire found itself theologically divided and in a political situation bordering on the disastrous. The theological

division raged over the acceptance or rejection of the Council of Chalcedon: most of the Eastern provinces of the Empire, in particular Armenia, Syria, and Egypt, had rejected Chalcedon, and their populations were Monophysite by a large majority.[1] Constantinople itself was teeming with Monophysite clerics, bishops and monks, thanks largely to the benefactions which the Empress Theodora had shown them during Justinian's reign. In the West, Rome viewed the persistent Monophysite Church and Constantinople's unwillingness--or incapacity--to do anything about it with continuous umbrage. Emperor and Patriarch, therefore, walked a shaky tightrope to maintain Chalcedonian Orthodoxy without offending Monophysite in the East or Pope in the West. It was not an easy path to tread, as most of Byzantine theology in the sixth century bears witness.

From the days of Justinian (d. 565), through those of his successors, Justin II (565-78) and Tiberius II (578-82), Chalcedonians and Monophysites remained on speaking terms, and a reconciliation between the two groups was regarded as a real, if elusive, possibility. This irenic atmosphere prevailed in spite of a rather nasty episode of persecution of Monophysites in Constantinople, instigated by Patriarch John III Scholasticus (565-77) in 571. Upon John III's death, the retired Patriarch, Eutychius, was restored to the throne, and having excom-

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[1]Werner Elert reckons that the Monophysites of Egypt numbered some five to six million, as compared with 300,000 Chalcedonian Orthodox. The figures for Syria were comparable (*Der Ausgang der altkirchlichen Christologie: Eine Untersuchung über Theodore von Pharan und seine Zeit als Einführung in die alte Dogmengeschichte* [Berlin: Lutherisches Verlaghaus, 1957], 214).

municated his predecessor, reestablished the broad toleration of both Chalcedonian and Monophysite which had been *de rigeur* before John III's zeal got the better of him.[2]

Maurice was a staunch Chalcedonian, and no overtures for reunion were made with the Monophysites during the twenty years of his reign. Though widely respected by most all of the elements of Byzantine society, he did inaugurate a mild persecution of Monophysites in Constantinople, which spread to Egypt and Syria, and ultimately to Armenia. This persecution was overshadowed, however, in 599 by the vigorous persecution which the Emperor's nephew, Domitian, Bishop of Melitene, began in Syria and conducted into the province of Mesopotamia. Vividly described by the chronographers of the day, this persecution lodged in the minds of many, and Domitian's efforts at promoting Orthodoxy succeeded mostly in tarnishing the Emperor's image in the Eastern provinces.[3]

As for the political situation, the Byzantine Empire in Maurice's day had been fighting battles on three fronts: in Italy, to preserve what was left of the conquests of Justinian from the Lombard advances; in Asia Minor, to prevent the Persians from any further encroachments westward; and along the Danube, to secure Byzantine territories from the interminable raids of the Avars and Slavs, and to prevent their

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[2]John Meyendorff, *Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1989), 260-62.

[3]Ibid., 265.

settlement on Byzantine soil.[4] Thus divided, the Imperial forces could accomplish little. Fortuitously, trouble began to brew in Persia, and by supporting the restoration of Chosroes II Parviz (his own son-in-law) to the Persian throne, Maurice was able to conclude a quick peace treaty with the Persian king (591).[5] Part of the treaty included the extension of Byzantine hegemony over a substantial part of Armenia. In the newly-gained territory, Maurice did manage to restore Chalcedonian Orthodoxy to Georgia and to confirm all of the Armenian bishops in Imperial territory in the confession of Chalcedon as well.[6]

Having eased military tension on the Persian front, Maurice could turn his attention to the Balkans, and in 592 he began a major campaign to put an end to the barbarian raids which had menaced the Empire's northern frontier. The Byzantines were largely successful in a number of campaigns across the Danube, but the Slavic hordes showed no sign of relenting, and the war dragged on. In 602 the army was ordered to sit out the winter on the far side of the Danube, that is, in barbarian territory, and as the imperial treasury was almost exhausted, Maurice ordered the weary troops "to live off the land." It did not take long for revolt to break out. A half-barbarian junior officer, Phocas, was raised on the shield, proclaimed Emperor, and led the mutinous troops on Constantinople. Aided by a revolution of the political Blues and

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[4]Dimitri Obolensky, *The Byzantine Commonwealth* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1971), 76.

[5]George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 79-80.

[6]Meyendorff, *Imperial Unity*, 183.

Greens within the City, Maurice was overthrown, and Phocas was acclaimed Emperor with the Senate's approval.[7]

2. The reign of Phocas

Phocas' reign (602-10) was one of terror. Beginning with the murder of Maurice and his sons, Phocas inaugurated an indiscriminate slaughter of potential political rivals and members of the nobility. Monophysites were persecuted in the Eastern provinces; Jews suffered everywhere. Internal crises multiplied, and anarchy and civil war eventually broke out in all parts of the Empire. The turbulent state of Byzantine affairs resulted in the complete breakdown of military defenses. Slavs and Avars poured into Byzantine territory and overran the whole of the Balkan peninsula. The Persian king, Chosroes II, also took advantage of the situation, and, on the pretext of avenging the murder of Maurice, surged through the Eastern defenses and occupied most of Asia Minor as far west as Chalcedon.

The Empire, now facing one of its darkest hours, was saved by the Carthaginian Exarch, Heraclius, who revolted against the tyranny of Phocas. Correctly discerning the heady scent of political gain, and with the support of the province of Egypt, the Exarch sent his son, also named Heraclius, with a fleet to Constantinople to overthrow Phocas. The younger Heraclius was greeted as a savior at every port along the way. He reached the City on 3 October 610. Phocas was apprehended,

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[7]Ostrogorsky, 82-83.

cut into pieces, and his body burned. Two days later, Heraclius was crowned Emperor by the Patriarch Sergius.[8]

3. The reign of Heraclius

For those Byzantinists who see the reign of Heraclius as the beginning of the Byzantine Empire properly so called, the reign of Phocas was certainly a convincing death rattle for the old Roman Empire. When Heraclius became Emperor (610-41), Byzantium was in administrative, financial, and military shambles. The Slavic deluge continued unabated. The Persians defeated the Byzantine army at Antioch in 613 and then seized and sacked the Eastern provinces of the Empire. They plundered and laid waste to Syria and Jerusalem, sold 90,000 Christians to the Jews, and bore the Patriarch Zacharias of Jerusalem into captivity. They even went so far as to capture the Holy Cross and carry off Christendom's most cherished relic to the Persian capitol of Ctesiphon. By 619, the Persians had taken Egypt, imperilling the corn supply of the Empire, and wrapping up in the process their conquest of the entire Near East.[9]

In order to gain some time and recollect his troops for a major offensive, Heraclius negotiated a truce with the Avars, paying them a huge tribute, and organized a campaign against Persia, which began in

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[8]Ostrogorsky, 83-85.

[9]Ostrogorsky, 95.

622. After some serious setbacks—one almost catastrophic[10]—and some substantial victories, the Emperor fought his way to Nineveh (December 627). There he annihilated the Persian forces and pressed on into the heart of Persia. In the face of the Byzantine invasion, Chosroes' son led a palace revolt and overthrew his father in the spring of 628. The new Persian ruler, Kavadh-Shiroe, sued for terms of peace, which terms included the return of Armenia, Roman Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt to Byzantine hegemony. Heraclius returned to Constantinople triumphant, and on 21 March 630, he crowned his victory by restoring the Holy Cross to Jerusalem.[11]

a. Religious policy under Heraclius. It is during the reign of Heraclius that religious policy comes to play a role in Byzantine affairs reminiscent of the role it played in Justinian's day. In part, the reemphasis on religious policy was due to the very capable ecclesiastical administration of Patriarch Sergius (610-38); in part, it was due to political expediency and opportunity. The political opportunity can be summarized briefly: the Persians were sophisticated enough to recognize the political advantage to be gained by supporting non-Chalcedonian

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[10]Namely, the Avar and Persian siege of Constantinople. In 626, the Avar Khan led a force of some 80,000 men and a fleet against the City. At the same time, the Persian army was encamped just across the Bosphorus on the Asiatic side. The Avars laid siege on 29 July. On 10 August, the Slavic fleet was defeated by the Byzantine, and that defeat was soon followed by a decisive rout of the land forces. With the Avar menace eliminated, the threatened Persian invasion never materialized. The Emperor was campaigning in Lazica in eastern Asia Minor at the time, and Patriarch Sergius took upon himself the task of keeping up Byzantine morale (Ostrogorsky, 102-03; Obolensky, 77-78).

[11]Ostrogorsky, 103-04.

groups, both within their territory and beyond it, as a way of fomenting discontent and dissension within the Byzantine Empire. The Nestorians had permanently established themselves in Persia and were somewhat out of Byzantine reach; however, the Persian conquests under Chosroes II had brought most of the Monophysites in the Eastern provinces under Persian rule. Therefore, Chalcedonians in the East suffered as Monophysites and Nestorians basked in Persian favor.[12] With the recapture of these provinces during the Heraclian campaigns, the problem arose for the Imperial government of how to reconcile large Monophysite populations to Byzantine rule, populations which had been persecuted both by the Chalcedonian Byzantine Church and by previous Emperors, and which were subsequently favored by the Persians. The problem was as acute as it was pressing. At this point, the brilliance of the Patriarch—for better or for worse—rises to prominence, and we come at last to the roots of Monenergism and Monotheletism.

The events between Sergius' accession in 610 and ca. 623, the period during which Monenergism was hatched, are not entirely clear, and modern scholarship has interpreted the events somewhat differently.[13] Maximus, in his *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, gives us an account of

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[12]Cf. J. M. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 15. Hans-Georg Beck quotes the historian Michael the Syrian as saying, "The memory of the Chalcedonians was wiped out from the Euphrates eastward" ("The Early Byzantine Church," in *The Imperial Church from Constantine to the Middle Ages. History of the Church* vol. 2, Hubert Jedin & John Dalan, eds. [New York: Seabury Press, 1980], 458).

[13]The present author has in mind chiefly the differences of opinion over who was the originator of Monenergism in these years, Sergius of Constantinople, or Theodore of Pharan. The thesis of Werner Elert, that

the theological interplay which went on during this time and the

persons involved. In the relevant passage which follows, Maximus is

responding to the accusation of ex-Patriarch Pyrrhus (638-41) that it

was Sophronius, Patriarch of Jerusalem, who was responsible for stirring

up Monenergism:

> Tell me, in the name of Truth itself, when Sergius wrote to
> Theodore of Pharan and sent him the *Libellus* of Menas through
> the mediation of Sergius Makaronas, bishop of Arsinoë, urging
> him to speak his mind concerning the one operation and one will
> [taught] in the *Libellus*, and he wrote back accepting it, where
> was Sophronius? Or [where was Sophronius] when [Sergius]
> was in Theodosiopolis [and] wrote to Paul the One-Eyed of the
> Monophysites, sending him also the *Libellus* of Menas, and his
> assent to it and that of the Pharanite? Or [where was Sophro-
> nius] when he wrote to George, called Arsan, a Paulianist,
> asking that [Patristic] references concerning the one operation
> be sent to him, and suggesting in his letter that by means of
> these things he would also effect the union of the Church with
> them? But the blessed John, the Pope of Alexandria, took this
> letter away from the Arsan with [his own] hand and wanted, by
> means of it, to effect his deposition, but he was hindered from
> doing so at that time because of the Persian attack. Or [where
> was Sophronius] when he wrote back to Cyrus of Phasis about
> the one and two operations, having been asked [about it] by

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it was Theodore of Pharan (as the third session of the Fourth Lateran
Council in 549 indicates), seems not to have gained universal acceptance
as, for example, witnessed by Hussey (p. 15), who grants the arch-
heretical honors to Sergius. Charles Moeller also raises some objections
to Elert's presentation ("Le chalcédonisme et le neo-chalcédonisme en
Orient de 451 à la fin du VIᵉ siècle." *Das Konzil von Chalkedon.* A.
Grillmeier & H. Bacht, eds. [Würzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951], 695 note
167). It is probably safer to say with H. G. Beck that "Theodore of
Pharan was, if not the initiator, at least the first important represen-
tative of Monenergism" (*Kirche und theologische Literatur in byzantinis-
chen Reich* [Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1959], 430).
In the subsequent discussion, we shall follow Meyendorff, *Imperial Unity*,
339, who, with Hussey, 14ff., follows Francis-Xavier Murphy and Polycarp
Sherwood (*Constantinople II et Constantinople III.* Histoire des conciles
oecuméniques 3. [Paris: Éditions de l'Orante, 1973], 143-46, 303-04).

him, and sending to him the aforementioned *Libellus* of Menas?[14]

For the purposes of this chapter, we may note principally that (a) Sergius himself is accused of being the perpetrator of the notion that there is only one operation in Christ; (b) that he presented this formula to various ecclesiastical personalities in different parts of the Empire along with a copy of the *Libellus;*[15] and (c) that the rationale for undertaking this series of steps in the first place was to find a formula that would be acceptable to Chalcedonian and Monophysite alike and which could stand as the basis of a union between the two parties. Of the addressees, we may note that Theodore of Pharan was probably

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[14]*Pyrr* §137 (154) (PG 91.332B13–33A12): Εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, πρὸς τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτῆς, ὅτε Σέργιος ἔγραψε πρὸς τὸν τῆς Φαρὰν Θεόδωρον, πέμψας καὶ ὅν φησι λίβελλον Μηνᾶ διὰ τῆς μεσιτείας Σεργίου τοῦ Μακαρωνᾶ τοῦ Ἀρσινόης ἐπισκόπου, προτρεπόμενος αὐτὸν περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ λιβέλλῳ μιᾶς ἐνεργείας καὶ ἑνὸς θελήματος τὰ δοκοῦντα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἀντέγραψεν, ἀποδεχόμενος αὐτά, ποῦ οὖν τότε Σοφρόνιος· ἢ ἡνίκα ἐν Θεοδοσιουπόλει πρὸς Παῦλον τον Μονόφθαλμον καὶ ἀπὸ Σεβηριτῶν ἔγραψε, πέμψας καὶ αὐτῷ λίβελλον Μηνᾶ, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Φαρανίτου καὶ ἑαυτοῦ συγκατάθεσιν· ἢ ὅτε πρὸς Γεώργιον τὸν ἐπίκλην Ἀρσᾶν, Παυλιανιστὴν ὄντα, ἔγραψε, χρήσεις αὐτῷ πεμφθῆναι περὶ μιᾶς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν, ἐνθέμενος καὶ τοῦτο τῇ ἐπιστολῇ, ὅτι ἐν ταύταις, καὶ τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖ ἕνωσιν; Ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ὁ μακάριος Ἰωάννης ὁ πάπας Ἀλεξανδρείας ἀφείλετο χειρὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀρσᾶ ὅθεν καὶ βουληθεὶς δι' αὐτὴν ποιῆσαι τὴν καθαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ, ἐκωλύθη ἐκ τῆς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τηνικαῦτα γενομένης τῶν Περσῶν ἐπιδρομῆς. Ἢ ὅτε πρὸς Κῦρον τόν Φάσιδος ἀντέγραψε περὶ μιᾶς ἐνεργείας καὶ δύο, ἐρωτηθεὶς παρ' αὐτοῦ, πέμψας καὶ αὐτῷ τὸν ῥηθέντα λίβελλον Μηνᾶ;

[15]The *Libellus* of Menas, mentioned in the passage just quoted, was supposedly a memorandum sent by Patriarch Menas of Constantinople (536-52) to Pope Vigilius of Rome (537-55) in which the phrase "one operation and one will" was to be found. The *Libellus* was a forgery, perhaps by the hand of Sergius himself, and it was recognized as such during the subsequent controversies. Maximus questions its authenticity in *Pyrr* §127 (144) (PG 91.328B1-9), and the forgery was denounced at Constantinople III during the Fourteenth Session.

Orthodox;[16] Sergius Makaronas, the bishop of Arsinoë, was an Egyptian Monophysite; Paul the One-eyed was the Monophysite Patriarch of Antioch, George Arsan was a "scholarly Egyptian Monophysite" in Alexandria, and Cyrus of Phasis (in Armenia) was also Orthodox.[17]

The military successes of the Emperor provided the first opportunity to test the new formula. Heraclius' campaign against the Persians, which began in 622, launched the successful Byzantine counter-offensive for which the Empire had long hoped. The Emperor set out for Asia Minor, where his newly established system of "themes" (the administrative and military provinces into which he divided the Empire) provided the men for the campaign. From Asia Minor, Heraclius marched into Armenia (622-23), where he won decisive victories.[18] While in Armenia, the Emperor met with a certain Monophysite bishop, Paul (the One-eyed?), and during talks with him, the one operation formula, i.e., that there is only one operation, or energy, in Christ, was

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[16]C. J. Hefele, (*A History of the Councils of the Church from the Original Documents*, vol. 2, trans. William R. Clark [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1896, rpr. AMS Press, 1972], 4, 6) thinks he was Orthodox on the grounds that Sergius would need to curry some Orthodox support for the Monenergist formula in addition to Monophysite support. Elert (pp. 185-229) considers him Orthodox, as do Beck ("Byzantine Church," 459) and François-Marie Léthel (*Théologie de l'agonie du Christ: La liberté humaine du fils du Dieu et son importance soteriologique mise en lumière par saint Maxime le Confesseur*, Théologie historique 53 [Paris: Beauchesne, 1979], 25), and Venance Grumel ("Recherches sur l'histoire du monothélisme," *Échos d'Orient* 27 [1928]: 262-64). Moeller (p. 695, note 167), however, does not. We shall have more to say about Theodore below (see p. 55).

[17]Meyendorff, *Imperial Unity*, 338-39.

[18]Ostrogorsky, 100-02.

presented.[19] Thus, Heraclius was aware of Sergius' formula before 622/623, and seeing its potential, tried it out with Paul. Paul did not take the bait, however, and union was not realized.

In 626, the Emperor was campaigning in Lazica and had occasion to discuss the one operation formula with Bishop Cyrus of Phasis. Cyrus wrote to Sergius for clarification and elaboration of the formula,[20] and Sergius wrote back, as Maximus says in the *Disputation*, with a copy of Menas' *Libellus* and his own explanation of the formula.[21] Herein, with the debates between Paul and Cyrus, we see the meticulous working out of the religious side of the "Eastern question" which Heraclius faced: how to reconcile these provinces to the restored Byzantine hegemony. Heraclius stands as a most shrewd ruler in pursuing in his course of action a religious expedition hand in hand with a political one. These sparse seeds sown in Armenia were soon to bear copious fruit.

b. **Heraclius' religious successes and opposition to them.** In 630/631, the Patriarch of Alexandria died, and Heraclius appointed Cyrus of Phasis to the post. Via the Monenergist formula, Cyrus was able to

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[19]See the *Epistle* of Sergius to Pope Honorius of Rome, Mansi 11.530C. Hefele, 13, speculates that the Emperor's debate with Paul occurred during a reunion council, the Synod of Garin at Theodosiopolis, which Sergius himself attended as a representative of the Orthodox. Maximus' remark in *Pyrr* §137 (154) (PG 91.332C6-7), that "Sergius, in Theodosiopolis, wrote . . ." lends some support for this speculation.

All of the Epistles mentioned in the next several pages which are found in Mansi, vol. 11, are preserved in the Acts of the Third Council of Constantinople, in either the Twelfth or the Thirteenth Session.

[20]*Epistle* of Cyrus of Phasis to Sergius of Constantinopole, Mansi 11.558E-559A.

[21]*Epistle* of Sergius of Constantinople to Cyrus of Phasis, Mansi 11.525B-28C.

bring about nothing less than the reunion of the Severan Monophysites in Egypt with the Imperial Orthodox Church.[22] He wrote to Sergius,

> I notify you that all those of the dogma of the so-called
> Theodosians around the Christ-loving city of Alexandria, clerics,
> together with the civil and military dignitaries, and many
> thousands of the people, on the third of June, were united to
> our most holy Catholic Church of God, and partook with us of
> the most pure Mysteries, led there through the good will of
> Almighty God, by the teaching communicated to me by our
> benign and gloriously triumphant Emperor.[23]

To this letter, Cyrus appended a copy of nine chapters, or κεφάλαια, which served as the basis of the union. Besides castigating every shade of Nestorianism in their affirmation of Chalcedon, the chapters are predictably Cyrillian in sense and vocabulary. Part of the seventh chapter deserves to be quoted, for it summarizes Monenergism and is the key to the whole document:

> If anyone [does not confess] . . . this one and the same Christ
> and Son worked [both] the divine and the human by one

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[22]If we recall that Monophysites outnumbered Chalcedonians twenty to one in Egypt (see note 1 above), and that Monenergism provided the best hope for their reconciliation, Heraclius' gamble with appointing Cyrus to the See of Alexandria is seen to have had high stakes. And Heraclius won.

[23]The text is found in Mansi 11.561D-64C. Only the pertinent part, Mansi 11.561E5-64A5, is translated here: Δῆλον γὰρ ποιοῦμαι, ὡς ἅπαντες οἱ τοῦ δόγματος τῶν λεγομένων Θεοδοσιανῶν κατὰ ταύτην τὴν Ἀλεξανδρέων φιλόχριστον πόλιν κληρικοί, ἅμα καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀξίαις καὶ στρατείαις διαλάμπουσιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς εἰς δῆμον τελοῦσιν, εἰς χιλιάδας συντείνοντες κατὰ τὴν τρίτην τοῦ Ἰουνίου μηνὸς ἐνωθέντες τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἁγιωτάτῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ καθολικῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῶν ἀχράντων τοῦ Θεοῦ σὺν ἡμῖν μυστηρίων μετέλαβον· ὁδηγηθέντες πρὸς τοῦτο, ἡγουμένης προδήλως τῆς τοῦ παντοδυνάμου Θεοῦ εὐδοκίας, τῇ χορηγηθείσῃ μοι διδαχῇ παρά τε τῶν φιλαγάθων, καὶ καλλινίκων ἡμῶν δεσποτῶν.

theandric operation, as St. Dionysius says, . . . let him be anathema.[24]

At this point we introduce a new character into the unfolding drama: Sophronius (ca. 550 - 638/639), who in 633 was a well-respected monk from Palestine, and who was in Alexandria when Cyrus effected the union. According to the report of Maximus, who was with Sophronius at the time, Cyrus gave Sophronius the nine chapters of union to read, whereupon the old man

> gave out a loud, plaintive cry, and shedding a fountain of tears, fervently implored, entreated, and demanded, throwing himself on the ground at his feet, that he in no wise proclaim from the ambon against the Catholic Church of God: for this certainly is the impious dogma of Apollinaris.[25]

Thus was the controversy over Monenergism and subsequent Monotheletism engaged. Sophronius took himself to Constantinople, to Sergius, in order that the Patriarch might arbitrate the difference between the one operation, which Cyrus held, and the two operations, which Sophronius held.

Needless to say, Sergius was not persuaded to change his own position, but correctly discerning Sophronius' status and authority (he was widely revered), and not wishing to stir up trouble now that a

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[24]Mansi 11.565C4, D6-8, E10: Εἰ τις [οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ] . . . τὸν αὐτὸν ἕνα Χριστὸν καὶ υἱὸν ἐνεργοῦντα τὰ θεοπρεπῆ, καὶ ἀνθρώπινα μιᾷ θεανδρικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, κατὰ τὸν ἐν ἁγίοις Διονύσιον . . . ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.

[25]TP 12, PG 91.143C14-D5: fontes emittebat lacrymarum illum fervide obsecrans, supplicans, expostulans, in pavimento ipsius pedibus provolutus, quo nihil horum super ambonem contra catholicam Dei Ecclesiam praedicaret: quippe cum haec liquido impii essent Apollinarii dogmata.

See Christoph von Schönborn, *Sophrone de Jerusalem: Vie monastique et confession dogmatique,* Théologie historique 20 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 72, 78-79.

union had finally been wrought, the Patriarch persuaded Sophronius to be silent on the matter, while Cyrus was ordered to say nothing about either one operation or two operations, once the union was settled. Sergius wrote to Cyrus in June of 626. The text of this letter, prohibiting any discussion of the number of operations, is called the *Psephos* and is an important landmark in our history.[26] In that year or the next (634), Sophronius was elected Patriarch of Jerusalem, and soon after, Sergius began his correspondence with Pope Honorius of Rome, outlining the achievements of Cyrus in Egypt and garnering support for the prohibitions of the *Psephos*. Honorius gave it.[27] In 634, Sophronius issued his *Synodal Tome*, as was expected of all newly-consecrated Patriarchs, in which he set forth his Faith. The *Synodal Tome* clearly supports two operations and denounces Monenergism, all while remaining within the strictures set by the *Psephos*.[28] We will examine the contents of the *Tome* below.

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[26]The original text of the *Psephos* is lost; however, in the *Epistle* of Sergius to Pope Honorius of Rome, Mansi 11.529A-37B, the substance of the *Psephos* is related, if not actually reproduced. A translation of the *Epistle* to Honorius is given in Hefele, 23-27. See also Schönborn, 79-83.

[27]The first *Epistle* of Honorius to Sergius, Mansi 11.537B-44C. It is not germane to this dissertation to elaborate on whether the Pope's response is a matter of indiscretion, culpability, or heresy, and the present author is unwilling to pass judgement either way *in causa Honorii*.

[28]The text of the *Tome* is found in Migne, PG 87.3148-3200 and in Mansi 11.461B-509A. A substantial portion of it is translated in Hefele, 41-49, and in Schönborn, 201-09. Schönborn (p. 91) notes that Sophronius sent his *Tome*, not to all four of the other Patriarchs, but only to two: Constantinople and Rome, because Antioch was presided over by a Monophysite at the time, and Cyrus was still in Alexandria. Sergius rejected the *Tome* (Beck, *Kirche*, 293; Hefele, 49). Only Rome accepted it.

Sergius refused to accept the *Tome* of Sophronius, and in response to it, had Heraclius promulgate the famed *Ekthesis*, which was published in the autumn of 638. The *Ekthesis* was basically the *Psephos* of 633 issued over the Emperor's signature. The first time the *Psephos* was issued, its purpose was to insure *Monophysite* acceptance of Imperial policy. The second time it was issued, with the Emperor's signature giving it the force of law, its purpose was to insure *Orthodox* acceptance of Imperial policy. As in the case of so many attempts by the government to stop theological debate (recall, for example, Zeno's *Henotikon* and Constans' *Typos*), this one illustrated that Imperial efforts at quelling religious disputes were breaking down and that there was nothing the government could do to repair the damage.

The *Ekthesis* did contain one new twist, however, which was absent from the *Psephos*: not only was it officially forbidden to discuss one operation or two in Christ, but he was clearly affirmed to have only one *will*.[29] The *Ekthesis* marks the end of Monenergism and the beginning of Monotheletism; we shall probe its subtleties later. For the time being, let us conclude the reign of Heraclius.

For all its glory and promise, Byzantine victory in the Near East proved to be short-lived. The year 628 saw not only the Byzantine victory over the Persians, but also the Hijra of Mohammed. The Arab

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[29]The affirmation of one will was originally made by Pope Honorius in his first *Epistle* to Sergius. Since the one operation formula had been abandoned already in the *Psephos*, the Pope's *una voluntas* served as a handy alternative which Sergius was quick to appreciate. As Beck ("Byzantine Church," 458) says of Sergius, "To make him suffer with what people are unwilling to charge Pope Honorius I is one of the indiscretions of Church history."

offensive was about to begin. In 634 the Calif Omar entered Imperial territory at the head of an Arabian Islamic army. At the battle of Jarmuk on 20 August 636, the Byzantine forces were completely routed.[30] Damascus fell in 637, Jerusalem in February of 638,[31] Byzantine Mesopotamia in 639-40, Armenia in 640, and Alexandria on 12 September 642. Heraclius' life work crumbled before his eyes. He died a broken man on 11 February 641 after great suffering.[32]

4. The reign of Constans

A battle for succession broke out between Heraclius' two sons, Constantine III, the son of his first wife, and Heraclonas, who was the child of the Emperor's second wife and niece, Martina. Martina was hated in Constantinople, and the Emperor himself, despite his great popularity, bore the umbrage of the City for having illicitly married his niece. The two sons reigned as co-Emperors for three months, where-upon Constantine died of an illness. Heraclonas now ruled alone, though Martina held all of the power. Popular opposition grew, and the proffered coronation of Constantine III's son, Constans, as co-Emperor in his father's place was not enough to prevent Heraclonas' fall from power. In September 641 he was deposed; Martina's tongue was cut out,

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[30]Ostrogorsky, 110-11.

[31]Shönborn, 95.

[32]Ostrogorsky, 111-15.

Heraclonas' nose was cut off, and the unpopular pair was banished to Rhodes.[33]

The reign of Constans (641-68) was marked by two concerns: continued struggles with the Arabs, and Monotheletism. During Constans' reign, Egypt was lost to the Arabs, as was Cappadocia. The Arabs launched their first naval fleet in 649 and attacked Cyprus; Rhodes was ravaged in 654, and in 655 the first naval battle between the Byzantines and the Arabs ended with the total defeat of the Byzantine fleet. Fortunately, civil war broke out among the Arabs in 656, and, unable to continue the war due to domestic strife, in 659 the Arabs made peace.[34] As for Monotheletism, we cannot pursue its history further without introducing its chief opponent and our protagonist, Maximus the Confessor.

5. Maximus' life and career

Even though most every major work on Maximus provides a summary of his life,[35] it is nevertheless appropriate to devote a few lines to it

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[33]Ibid., 112-14.

[34]Ibid., 116-17.

[35]The *Vita* of Maximus is to be found in Migne, PG 90.67-100. It is a late document and not the most accurate of sources. Essential material for an accurate account of the Confessor's last years and trials is found in these works of Maximus: the *Relatio motionis* (also called the *Acta*), PG 90.109-29; the *Dispute at Bizyae*, PG 90.136-72; and the *Epistola ad Anastasium monachum discipulum*, PG 90.132-33.

Contemporary accounts of his trials can be found in the *Epistle to the monks of Calaris* (*Epistle C*) by Maximus' disciple, Anastasius (PG 90.133-36); the *Epistle* of Theodosius of Gangre by Anastasius, the Apokrisarius of Rome (R. Devreesse, "La lettre d'Anastase l'Apocrisaire sur la mort de S. Maxime le Confesseur et de ses compagnons d'exile" *AB*

here. Maximus was born ca. 580, according to the Greek *Vita*, of well-

to-do parents in Constantinople.[36] He was well educated[37] and

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73[1955]: 5-16); and in the *Hypomnesticum* of Theodore of Spoudê (R. Devreesse, "Le texte grec de l'Hypomnesticum de Théodore Spoudée" *AB* 53 [1935]: 49-80).

Christopher Birchall has translated the *Vita* into English (Boston: Holy Transfiguration Monastery, 1982). All of the other above-mentioned texts are gathered into a French translation by J.-M. Garrigues ("Le martyre de Saint Maxime le Confesseur" *Revue thomiste* 76 [1976]: 410-52). George C. Berthold provides an English translation of the *RM* in his *Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1985). And Constantine Tsirpanlis does quite a nice job of putting together a single, continuous account from all the disparate sources ("Acta Sancti Maximi," *Studies in Byzantine History and Modern Greek Folklore* [New York: EO Press, 1980]), as does Polycarp Sherwood (*An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor*. Studia Anselmiana 30. [Rome: Herder, 1952]).

Sherwood's version of the narrative of Maximus' life, woven into the text of his *Date-List*, is corrected and enriched by the addition of copious documentation from the Confessor's letters and other writings. Because Sherwood uses so many sources, and because so many subsequent scholars follow him, the present author will likewise follow him in this narrative.

Classical works on Maximus' life not mentioned above include R. Devreesse, "La vie de S. Maxime le confesseur et ses recensions," *AB* 46 (1928): 5-49; W. Lackner, "Zu Quellen und Datierung der Maximosvita (BHG 1234)," *AB* 85 (1967): 285-316; and Sebastian Brock, "An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor," *AB* 91 (1973): 299-346.

[36]According to the Syriac *Life*, which was decidedly pro-Monothelite, Maximus' origins were nothing short of calamitous. Here is the beginning of the Syriac *Life*, as much for its shock value as for its interest to us here:

"The narrative concerning the wicked Maximos of Palestine, who
blasphemed against his Creator and his tongue was cut out.
This Maximos was from the village of Hesfin, for it was there
that this bitter tare was born, his father being a Samaritan
from Sychar, while his mother was a Persian, the slave-girl of a
certain Jew named Zadok from the town of Tiberias. . . . when
[his father] was in Tiberias, next door to the house of Zadok,
he committed adultery with the Persian slave-girl, for she was
very pretty . . ." etc., etc. (Brock, 314).

Because, apart from the birth narrative and the account of his early years, the Syriac Life agrees closely with the Greek Life, Brock (pp. 340-43) feels that a reasonable case can be made for a Palestinian origin for Maximus, polemical exaggerations aside.

entered government service, eventually becoming first secretary to Emperor Heraclius. His imperial appointment did not last very long; by 613-14, Maximus withdrew from civil service to a monastery in Chrysopolis on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, where he stayed until 624-25, when he moved again, this time to the monastery of St. George in Cyzicus. It was during these years that he wrote his early "spiritual" works, i.e., the *Liber asceticus*, the *Centuries on Charity*, the *Commentary on Psalm 59*, and the *Questiones et dubia*. His stay in Cyzicus was short-lived, for in 626 the Persians' advance through Asia Minor westward to Constantinople resulted in the evacuation of the monastery and Maximus along with it. He set sail for Africa, and during the trip put into port in Cyprus and Crete, arriving in Africa only ca. 628-30.

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[37]That Maximus was well-educated is beyond all doubt. Where and how he was educated is a very interesting question. The presumption of the Greek *Life* is that Maximus received the standard higher education of somone destined for imperial service. If the Syriac *Life* is to be believed, Maximus was orphaned at age ten and taken to *Palaia Lavra*, the Monastery of St. Chariton. It was here that he was educated. Maximus himself gives implicit support to the Syriac *Life's* account of his education in two ways.

First, in the Introduction to the *Mystagogy*, he explains that he tried to excuse himself from writing the *Mystagogy* because he lacked the requisite grace, and "moreover, I do not have experience in the power and practice of discourse, *since my education was private*" (PG 91.660B6-8: μήτε μὴν πεῖραν ἔχειν τῆς πρὸς τὸ λέγειν δυνάμεώς τε καὶ τριβῆς, ἰδιωτείᾳ συντεθραμμένος.) Here Maximus avers that his private eduation did not include rhetoric, which was a standard part of the education of the day, but which may well have been omitted from a monastic education.

Secondly, there is Maximus' notoriously difficult Greek (about which even Photius complained), which may have resulted from schooling that lacked the polish of a proper Byzantine education. Maximus himself apologizes for his style in *Opuscula* 8 (PG 91.112A9-11) and 9 (PG 91.129C6-7). To my knowledge, no one has yet adduced these texts to support the veracity of the Syriac *Life*. Should the Syriac *Life* be accurate, the "private" education available to a 10-year old boy in a Palestinian monastery at the close of the sixth century was astonishingly erudite.

In Africa, Maximus lived in a monastery, the Eucratas, which was led by Sophronius. Sophronius, as we recall, became embroiled in Monenergism in 633, left Africa to oppose it in Constantinople the same year, and was elected Patriarch of Jerusalem by 634. Between his arrival in Africa and 634, Maximus had completed his first major theological works: the *Commentary on the Our Father*, the earlier *Ambigua*, the *Mystagogy*, the *Questions to Thalassus*, and the *Theological and Economic Centuries*. It is also in 633/34 that we have the first clearly anti-Monothelite lines from the pen of Maximus, namely *Epistle* 19, which was his response to a letter from Pyrrhus, which Pyrrhus had written to curry Maximus' support of the *Psephos*. From this time on, Maximus became more and more involved in Monotheletism, and his writings reflect that involvement.

Pope Honorius of Rome died on 12 October 638, about the time that Heraclius issued the *Ekthesis*. Patriarch Sergius died soon after, on 9 December 638. Honorius' successor, Severinus, reigned only three months, 28 May 640 to 2 August 640. His apokrisaries brought a copy of the *Ekthesis* back to Rome from Constantinople (where they had gone seeking imperial consent for their master's consecration); Severinus condemned it before he died.[38]

Pyrrhus became Patriarch of Constantinople in 638 upon the death of Sergius and continued Sergius' Monenergistic policies and upheld the *Ekthesis*. John IV (640-42) was elected in Rome. When the Emperor

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[38]See the "*Concilium Romanum in quo Heraclii Ecthesis a Severino Pontifice damnata*," Mansi 10.679-80.

Heraclius died in February 641, the theological climate in the City changed. Heraclius' son, Constantine III, and his grandson, Constans, were both Orthodox, and when Martina and Heraclonas were deposed and exiled to Rhodes in 641, their Patriarch, the still-reigning Pyrrhus, was sent packing as well. He was replaced by Paul II (641-53).[39]

Pyrrhus fled to Africa where he soon came face to face with Maximus. In July of 645, Maximus and Pyrrhus debated Monenergism and Monotheletism in the presence of the Patrician Gregory and a group of bishops. This debate was taken down by tachygraphers and survives in its entirety as *Opuscule* 28, the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*.[40] In the course of the debate, Monenergism and Monotheletism are completely refuted by Maximus, and Pyrrhus is converted to Orthodoxy.

The next year, 646, finds both Maximus and Pyrrhus in Rome, where Pyrrhus makes a profession of faith to Pope Theodore (642-49). Within a short time, however, and for reasons that are unclear, Pyrrhus reverted to Monotheletism and fled to imperial protection in Ravenna; the

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[39]Ostrogorsky, 114.

[40]The *Disputation* is a most important document for this dissertation. We will be analyzing part of it in depth, particularly in Chapter VIII. The text of the *Disputation* is found in Migne, PG 91.288-353 and in Mansi 10.709-60. Marcel Doucet has established the critical text ("La dispute de saint Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus." Introduction, critical text, translation, and notes. Unpublished thesis. Montreal: Institute d'études médiévales, 1972), which is forthcoming in the *Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca.* Hefele, 73-89, gives a summary of the *Pyrr* that is very close to the text. The English translation of Farrell has been mentioned in the Preface.

Pope excommunicated him with a fearful anathema.[41] Pope Theodore

had also written to the Patriarch Paul II in Constantinople, complaining

of the continued Monothelite policy. The Patriarch responded Monothe-

letically, and the Pope deposed him. Seeing that controversy was

erupting again, Emperor Constans decided to put an end to it once and

for all and issued the *Typos* (648). The *Ekthesis*, which was publicly

posted in Hagia Sophia, was removed. All discussion of one operation or

two operations, or of one will or two wills, was strictly forbidden; each

side was prohibited from condemning the other, either personally or

doctrinally; and finally, the *Typos* invoked severe penalties on any who

dared to infringe upon its strictures.[42]

On 14 May 649, Pope Theodore died. On 5 July 649, Martin I was

consecrated, and without imperial sanction. He called together a Synod,

which opened on 5 October 649 in the Lateran. This Synod, styled the

Fourth Lateran, was attended by a hundred bishops from the West,

Italy, and Africa. Stephen of Dor in Palestine also attended, as did a

number of monastic and clerical refugees from the Monothelite East.

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[41]The *Notae Severini Binii*, Mansi 10.702A, says that when the Pope
heard of Pyrrhus' recantation, he assembled his clergy in St. Peter's at
the grave of the Apostle, "took some drops of the Holy Blood from the
chalice, mixed it with ink, and subscribed with it the condemnation of
Pyrrhus."

[42]Hussey, 19. The text of the *Typos* is found in the Acts of the
Fourth Lateran Council, Fourth Secretarius, Mansi 10.1030C-32D.

Maximus was there also and played a major role in the proceedings.[43]

Monotheletism was condemned, as were its perpetrators.

The Imperial response was slow in coming, but it did come. Some four years later, on 17 June 653, Pope Martin and Maximus were arrested and taken to Constantinople. The Pope was tried, exiled to Cherson in March 654, and died with the martyr's crown on 16 September 655. Maximus was tried in May of 655.[44] Refusing to be won over, he was exiled to Bizya in Thrace to stew for a while in the hopes that he might change his mind. The next year, a bishop was sent to interrogate him and ask his adherence to the *Typos*; the Confessor would not budge.[45] Maximus was sent to Perberis in Thrace for a more permanent exile. He stayed here for six years. Finally, in 662, Emperor Constans recalled the most recalcitrant opponent to his religious policy to Constantinople. Maximus was tried by a panel of Monothelites and anathematized along with Sts. Martin and Sophronius. His right hand, with which he wrote Dyothelite doctrine, and his tongue, with which he preached it, were cut off. He was led about the City, exposed to public scorn and ridicule, and then shipped off to Lazica on the Eastern shore of the Black Sea. He arrived there on 8 June 662.

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[43]See Rudolf Riedinger, "Die Lateranakten von 649, ein Werke der Byzantiner um Maximos Homologetes," *Byzantion* 13 (1985): 517-34; and "Die Lateransynode von 649 und Maximos der Bekenner," *MC* 111-22.

[44]The account of this first trial is found in the *Relatio motionis.*

[45]The account of this interrogation is preserved as the *Disputation at Bizya.*

His health already broken with rough treatment and age (he was 82), he died soon after on 13 August 662.

Such, then, were the life and times of Maximus. Having said so much, and having broadly set the stage, we now restrict our scope to Christology and focus specifically upon the theological positions of the day.

C. Theological Overview

1. A Thorny Question

As the first part of this chapter has shown, the purpose of the whole Monenergist enterprise was to reconcile the Monophysites of the Empire to Imperial Orthodoxy. That reconciliation was accomplished (in Egypt only) by the Pact of Union of 633. There was something in the Pact which appealed to the Monophysites, something which was not articulated before by the Orthodox. Obviously, it was the seventh chapter, the linchpin of the accord, which stated "this one and the same Christ and Son worked [both] the divine and the human by one theandric operation." If Monenergism had been a blatant capitulation to the Monophysites, charges of Severanism and Monophysitism would have resounded in Orthodox circles. They did not. Even Sophronius, when he read the chapters, did not accuse Cyrus of Alexandria of defecting to the Monophysite camp.[46] Indeed, the Pact of Union formally endorsed

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[46]As we saw above (p. 24), Sophronius *did* accuse Cyrus of Apollinarianism, which in the eyes of many was tantamount to Monophysitism. Still, the direct charges of Monophysitism, Severanism, or Theodosianism were never made. Theodore of Pharan likewise escaped charges of Monophysitism when his Monenergism was condemned (see the discussion

Chalcedon. However, the Theodosian Monophysites of Egypt responded to the Pact with glee, saying "The Synod of Chalcedon has come to us, and not we to it."[47] It is curious that the Orthodox *did not* regard the reunionists as Monophysite, while the Monophysites *did* regard the reunionists as Monophysite. How are we to resolve this paradox?

Marcel Doucet gives us a clue. Speaking of Sergius, Doucet says that he "adopted (with regards to the will, not with regards to the relation of hypostasis/nature) the conceptual 'model' of Severus of Antioch."[48] That is, Sergius held the Logos to be the sole agent in Christ, whose will is realized divinely and humanly. Severus himself says as much:

> The one who acts is one—that is the Word of God Incarnate—and the operation is one efficient cause, but the things done are different . . . Thus let no man separate the Word from the flesh, and thus he cannot divide or separate the operations.[49]

The question begs to be asked: How is it possible, as Doucet claims, to conceive of operation and will in a Monophysite way while conceiving of hypostasis and nature in an Orthodox way? In fact, Maximus himself asks precisely this question: "If there is one unique will of the natures because of the union [of the natures], why then, for the same reason, is

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of Theodore below, p. 56).

[47]Theophanes, *Chronogr.* ed. Bonn, 1:507, quoted in Hefele, 21.

[48]Marcel Doucet, "La volonté humaine du Christ, specialement en son agonie. St. Maxime le Confesseur interprèt de l'Écriture." *Science et Esprit* 37 (1985): 133.

[49]"First Letter to Sergius," *Corpus scriptorum christianorum orientalium* 119:83, quoted in Roberta C. Chesnut, *Three Monophysite Christologies* (Oxford: University Press, 1976), 31.

there not one sole nature from the two natures?"[50] No one has

addressed this question.

The present author is convinced that the answer to the question we

have raised will disclose a basic assumption of Monenergism and Mono-

theletism, and that this assumption was recognized by Maximus,

addressed by him, and refuted. Indeed, the full disclosure, analysis

and refutation of this basic assumption is integral to this dissertation.

To begin to answer the question before us, consider first the other

respect in which Sergius and company did remain Orthodox: it is,

namely, that the Monenergists and Monothelites did profess the two

natures of Christ. For example, to Maximus' inquiry whether Christ is

one by hypostasis or by nature, Pyrrhus frankly responds, "By

hypostasis, for by nature he is dual."[51] Maximus himself, in *Opuscule*

8, acknowledges that the Monenergists profess the two natures:

> Many think that after the union the natural properties, sin
> excepted, are not perfectly preserved in Christ God, even
> though they confess correctly, according to the Fathers, that
> the natures themselves are preserved.[52]

The confession of one hypostasis and two natures is, of course, the

Faith of Chalcedon. It does not surprise us that the Monenergists and

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[50]*DB* 20, PG 90.157B13-C1: Εἰ διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν μία τῶν φύσεων γέγονε
θέλησις, τί δήποτε διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν μία τῶν φύσεων οὐ γέγονε φύσις;

[51]*Pyrr* §154 (175) (PG 91.340B3-4): Τῇ ὑποστάσει· τῇ γὰρ φύσει διπλοῦς
τυγχάνει. Pyrrhus also professes his belief in the two natures in §146
(163) (PG 91.336A3-4).

[52]*TP* 8, PG 91.93C9-96A2: Ταῦτα γάρ, καὶ τούτων πλείω δοξάζουσιν, ὅσοι μὴ
παντελείως ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ τὰ φυσικά, καὶ δίχα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς
φύσεις αὐτὰς σώζεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς ἁγίους Πατέρας ὀρθοδόξως ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ μετὰ
τὴν ἕνωσιν.

Monothelites should profess Chalcedon: their purpose was, after all, to bring the Monophysites back into the Orthodox Chalcedonian fold. That the Monophysites were willing to come, however, should tell us something about how the Monenergists understood the Faith of Chalcedon, and it should indicate the direction our inquiry ought to take.

At this point we should note that the Pact of 633 professed that Christ was "in two natures," which might seem surprising, since the "in two natures" formula was most offensive to Monophysite ears. However, it is important to note *where* it was professed, namely, in the infamous seventh chapter, where it was immediately qualified by the "one theandric operation" formula. It is not too difficult to see that the "one theandric operation" formula was first put to use *precisely* to counteract the "in two natures" formula of Chalcedon.

The Monenergist affirmation of the "in two natures" formula is important. By it, we recognize that they were not Monophysites. However, the question before us has only been sharpened, not answered: How is it possible to conceive of operation and will in a Monophysite way while conceiving of hypostasis and nature in an Orthodox way?

The answer to this question is that *it is not possible without eroding the Orthodox position in some way.* That is to say, some aspect of Orthodox Christology, as it was understood and expressed in the early part of the seventh century, was abandoned, transformed, or modified in such a way that it became acceptable to the contemporary Monophysites. Since Neo-Chalcedonian Christology had been endorsed at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553, *the erosion took place in*

the understanding of hypostasis as it was developed in Neo-Chalcedonian thought, and in particular by Leontius of Jerusalem. To substantiate this assertion, we turn first to the understanding of hypostasis which Leontius undertook to refute.

2. The Identification of Hypostasis and Nature

Leontius of Jerusalem is a Neo-Chalcedonian, a theologian devoted to reconciling (or better, showing the harmony between) the Christology of Cyril of Alexandria and the Council of Chalcedon. The whole Neo-Chalcedonian enterprise was undertaken because the Monophysites accused Chalcedon of betraying Cyril by professing that Christ existed "in two natures" and thereby lapsing into Nestorianism. The Monophysites, of course, held to the famous Cyrillian formula "one nature of God the Word incarnate" (μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη) and spoke only of Christ existing "*from* two natures."

As Patrick Gray points out repeatedly in his analysis of the several Neo-Chalcedonian theologians he considers, the success or failure of their syntheses rested upon how clearly they seized upon the Chalcedonian "in one hypostasis" formula as the basis of the unity in Christ, which the Monophysites expressed by their "one nature" formula.[53] The problem and the source of confusion spring from two ideas: (1) the one to one correspondence of "nature" and "hypostasis" upon which the Monophysites insisted; and (2) their ambiguous use of "nature," which

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[53]Gray, 105.

could be generic or specific (i.e., the equivalent of "hypostasis"),
depending upon context.[54] R. V. Sellers gives an excellent summary of
the way the contested vocabulary was used by the schools active in the
fifth century. Note particularly the usages of the Alexandrian school,
which largely obtained in subsequent times:

Essence (οὐσία), a philosophical term, had two meanings: as (1) an
"individual thing" (corresponding to Aristotle's first substance), it was
used by Apollinarius of Laodicea and by the Monophysites, Timothy
Aelurus, Julian of Halicarnassus, and Severus of Antioch. But in
general, whenever referring to the "person" of Jesus Christ, the
Alexandrian writers prefer the terms hypostasis (ὑπόστασις), nature
(φύσις), and person (πρόσωπον). As (2) "that which is common among a
group of particulars," or "a common undifferentiated substance," οὐσία
was used by both Alexandrian and Antiochene to refer to the divinity or
humanity of Christ. (This corresponds to Aristotle's second substance.)

Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις). This, too, was a metaphysical term, and it
was understood to have the same two meanings that οὐσία had. So, as
(1) "a particular individual or object," it was used by the Alexandrians.
This usage was taken over from Trinitarian theology. It is in this
sense, for example, that Cyril speaks of "hypostatic union" (ἕνωσις καθ'
ὑπόστασιν) and "one incarnate nature of God the Word" (μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ
Λόγου σεσαρκομένη). The Antiochenes, however, did not accept this sense

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[54]See Chesnut, 9. Pierre Piret (*Le Christ et la Trinité selon Maxime
le Confesseur*, Théologie historique 69 [Paris: Beauchesne, 1983], 105-06),
also gives a brief synopsis of Monophysite thought on this point.

in Christological discussion. As (2), "that which underlies," and thus has "reality and genuineness," ὑπόστασις was used by Alexandrians and especially by the Antiochenes, who used the term in this way to underscore the reality of the divine nature and the human nature in Christ.

Nature (φύσις), an empirical, rather than a philosophical term, could also embody the same two senses which were given to οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. So in the sense of (1), "an individual," or "the person himself," it was used by Apollinarius and the later Alexandrians, and indeed by all Greek Fathers. In (2) the generic sense, φύσις = *substantia*, it was used by both schools. The Antiochenes used φύσις exclusively in the generic sense. And here is the crux of the matter: when the Alexandrians said that the Lord was "one nature," μία φύσις, in the sense of *one concrete individual*, the Antiochenes heard them to say that there was only *one nature*, in the sense of *substantia*, in Christ. For the same reason the Antiochenes opposed the Alexandrian use of the phrase "one ὑπόστασις."

Person (πρόσωπον) was a non-technical, non-metaphysical term which originally meant "face" and "presence." It came to mean the external "appearance," the individuality of the individual, the expression of a thing, and consequently, the "individual himself." This formula was especially prevalent among the Antiochenes.[55]

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[55]R. V. Sellers, *The Council of Chalcedon: A Historical and Doctrinal Survey* (London: S.P.C.K., 1961), 138 note 7.

Though all this ambiguity surrounded the terminology, one thing stands clear: with regard to two of the terms, nature and hypostasis, saying one always implied saying the other. In short, the two terms could and did mean the same thing; they were identical and convertible. To illustrate what we mean, here are a few citations from some of the theologians of the period.

Timothy Aelurus, the Monophysite Patriarch, says,

> No man whose heart is healthy in the faith teaches or believes two natures, either before or after the union, for when God the Father's fleshless Word was conceived in the womb of the Holy Virgin, then he also took a body from the flesh of the Holy Virgin, in a manner known to him alone, while he remained without change or modification as God, and was one with his flesh, for his flesh had no hypostasis or essence before the conception of God the Word so that one could give it the name of particular or separate nature, for *the nature does not exist without the hypostasis, nor the hypostasis without the person* [προσωπον]; *therefore, if there are two natures, there are also necessarily two persons; but if there are two persons, there are also two Christs.*[56]

There is no problem with the statement that "the nature does not exist without the hypostasis," for, as we shall see in Chapter V, there is no an-hypostatic nature. The problem lies with the conclusion that "if there are two natures there are also *necessarily* two persons." This is the identity we must grasp. The Monophysite, accepting this identity, reasons that if two natures in Christ means two persons in Christ--which is unacceptable--there must necessarily be only one nature so that there will be only one person.

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[56]*Against Chalcedon*, ed. and trans. F. Nau, *Patrologia Orientalis* 13.2.228-229, quoted in John Meyendorff, *Christ*, 38. My emphasis.

The same feature is reflected in the writings of Philoxenus of Mabbugh: "There is no nature without person, just as there is no person without nature. For if there are two natures, there must also be two persons and two sons."[57] Here again we see exactly the same pattern of associations and identifications that we saw in Timothy Aelurus: the perfectly acceptable and true affirmations that nature does not exist without being hypostasized, and that nature is inherent in the notion of hypostasis; with the less acceptable and problematic affirmations (which follow from the preceding) that to say "two natures" means that there are two persons and two sons.

Severus, the Monophysite master, also retained this identification and affirmed that two hypostases remained after the union, though, because of the hypostatic union, the two hypostases no longer had individual existence.[58] Thus, "hypostatic union" (ἕνωσις ὑποστατική) and "natural union" (ἕνωσις φύσεως) amounted to the same thing in Monophysite thought. This facet of Monophysite Christology did not go unnoticed by the Orthodox:

> Severus viciously says that hypostasis is the same thing as nature in order to effect a confusion by means of the one nature, and to avoid criticism by saying that nature should be conceived as hypostasis. And again, he [actually] introduces *division* by advocating the union from hypostasis, thinking that

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[57]*Against Nestorius* 11, ed. and English trans. E. A. W. Budge, vol. 2 (London, 1894), xlii, quoted in Meyendorff, *Christ*, 39.

[58]Gray, 14.

his advocacy of the *hypostases* instead of natures will escape notice.[59]

This much is to say that the Monophysites were conceiving of hypostasis *as a particular nature.* Hypostasis was thus seen to be *identical* with nature, and the Monophysites were led to speak of a synthetic nature in Christ made up of the divine nature and the human nature. The Orthodox did not hesitate to pounce upon this idea either and show where it leads:

> If [Severus] is found to have been convicted by the investigating charges, then clearly, through the "one synthetic nature," he is advocating the fantasy of Manes, the confusion of Apollinarius, and Eutyches' contraction of the united natures into one essence after the union, [and] like a chameleon changing [the color of] its skin, he changes his own word, by saying that he understood hypostasis as the nature.[60]

For the Neo-Chalcedonian Orthodox, the Monophysite and Nestorian identification of hypostasis and nature—even if it were a mere terminological identification—could only result in a confusion or a

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[59]Maximus, *TP* 2, PG 91.40A5-12: Ὅτι Σευῆρος κακούργως ταυτὸν εἶναι λέγει τῇ φύσει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἵνα τὴν σύγχυσιν διὰ τῆς μιᾶς κυρώσῃ φύσεως, καὶ φύγῃ τὸν ἔλεγχον, ὑπόστασιν λέγων νενοηκέναι τὴν φύσιν· καὶ πάλιν τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰσηγήσηται, τὴν ἐξ ὑποστάσεως πρεσβεύων ἕνωσιν· καὶ δόξῃ λανθάνειν ἀντὶ φύσεων ἐκδέχεσθαι φάσκων τὰς ὑποστάσεις.

[60]Maximus, *TP* 2 (PG 91.40B14-C7): εἰ μὲν ἁλοὺς τοῖς ἐλέγχοις φωραθῇ, σαφῶς διὰ τῆς μιᾶς συνθέτου φύσεως, τήν τε Μάνεντος φαντασίαν, καὶ τὴν Ἀπολιναρίου σύγχυσιν, καὶ τὴν Εὐτυχοῦς μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν τῶν ἐνωθέντων πρεσβεύων συναίρεσιν, χαμαιλέοντος δίκην τὰς χρόας ὑπαλλάσσοντος, τὴν οἰκείαν μεταβάλοι φωνήν, φάσκων, ὑπόστασιν νενοηκέναι τὴν φύσιν.

Kenneth Warren Wesche, "The Defense of Chalcedon in the 6th Century: The Doctrine of 'Hypostasis' and Deification in the Christology of Leontius of Jerusalem," Ph.D. Diss. (New York: Fordham University, 1986), 93 note 33, says that the one "composite hypostasis (=physis)," constituted "of two natures" is the central idea which Leontius undertakes to refute in his work *Contra Monophysitas.*

Ironically, Jugie says that Monotheletism is "l'hérésie chaméléon par excellence" ("Monothélisme," *DTC* 10 pt. 2: 2307).

separation of the two realities in Christ: the divine and human natures. In particular, the Monophysite identification of hypostasis and nature left them open to two charges: either (a) denying the reality of the humanity or the divinity because the hypostasis/nature of Christ was exclusively one; or (b) confusing the divinity and the humanity in a synthetic union (i.e., producing a synthetic *tertium quid*).

This identification of hypostasis and nature the Monophysites retained from the writings of Cyril. For example, the Alexandrian Father says in the third of his *Twelve Anathematisms* against Nestorius:

> If anyone divides in the one Christ the *hypostases* after the union, joining them only by a conjunction of dignity or authority or power, and not rather by coming together in a union by *nature*, let him be anathema.[61]

And again, even more pointedly, he says, "the nature, or hypostasis, of the Logos which is the Logos itself."[62]

But we should not stop with demonstrating the presence of that identification in Alexandrian thought alone, for as we have said, the identification of hypostasis and nature, as well as the ambiguous use of the term "nature," were both common Christological currency among *all* parties up to--and even after--the Fourth Council. Theodoret of Cyr,

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[61]Εἴ τις ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς Χριστοῦ διαιρεῖ τὰς ὑποστάσεις μετὰ τὴν ἔνωσιν, μόνῃ συνάπτων αὐτὰς συναφείᾳ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἢ γοῦν αὐθεντίαν ἢ δυναστείαν καὶ οὐχὶ δὴ μᾶλλον συνόδῳ τῇ καθ' ἔνωσιν φυσικήν, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. Norman P. Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, vol. 1, *Nicaea I to Lateran V* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 59.

[62]Ἡ τοῦ Λόγου φύσις ἤγουν ὑπόστασις, ὅ ἐστιν αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος, *Apol. adv. Diod. et Theod.* 2, ed. P. E. Pusey, VI, 404, quoted in Meyendorff, *Christ*, 217, note 9.

for example, in his *Reprehensio XII* countering Cyril's *Twelve Anathematisms* against Nestorius, says,

> If therefore each nature has perfection, and both came together
> into the same, it is obvious that after the form of God had
> taken the form of a servant, piety compels us to confess one
> person and one Son and Christ; while to speak of *the united
> hypostases or natures* as two, is not absurd, but necessarily
> follows the case.[63]

Later, after Theodoret had anathematized Nestorius at Chalcedon, he was more cautious in his writings (e.g., in the *Haereticarum fabulatum compendium*) and took care to ascribe the properties of each nature in Christ only to the respective nature and never to the Word as the subject of the Incarnation.[64] That is to say, the actions of Christ are considered only from the perspective of the two natures, and not from the perspective of the one Christ. As Meyendorff concludes from this usage, for Theodoret, "the words φύσις and ὑπόστασις remain synonymous."[65]

Given this state of affairs, it is easy to see why a Neo-Chalcedonian enterprise evolved: to overcome lingering misconceptions about what the

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[63]Theodoret of Cyrus, *Reprehensio duodecim capitum seu anathematismorum Cyrilli* 3 (PG 76.404B9–C1): Εἰ τοίνυν ἑκατέρα φύσις τὸ τέλειον ἔχει, εἰς ταὐτὸν δὲ συνῆλθον ἀμφότεραι, τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ μορφῆς δηλονότι λαβούσης τὴν τοῦ δούλου μορφήν, ἓν μὲν πρόσωπον, καὶ ἕνα Υἱὸν καὶ Χριστὸν ὁμολογεῖν εὐσεβές· δύο δὲ τὰς ἐνωθείσας ὑποστάσεις, εἴτουν φύσεις, λέγειν οὐκ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἰτίαν ἀκόλουθον.

[64]See Meyendorff, *Christ*, 32–33 and footnotes 8–11.

[65]Meyendorff, *Christ*, 32. Others share in the same estimation, e.g. Kevin McNamara, "Theodoret of Cyrus and the Unity of the Person in Christ," *Irish Theological Quarterly* 22 (1955): 319; and Sellers, 176–77, where the same understanding is demonstrated in the writings of other Antiochenes, with citations of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius.

Chalcedonian defintion intended, specifically how Chalcedon could speak of *one* hypostasis and *two* natures at the same time. As Meyendorff points out, "The distinction established at Chalcedon between the terms φύσις and ὑπόστασις was too new and revolutionary in the theology of the incarnation not to bring about divergent interpretations and misunderstandings."[66]

3. Leontius of Jerusalem: The Key to the Question

Gradually, the post-Chalcedonian Orthodox recognized that the only way to stave off the inherent problems of the widely accepted but confusing identification of hypostasis with nature was to separate the two terms as clearly as possible. This separation was effected most successfully by Leontius of Jerusalem, who, if we may use such images, "evacuated" the concept of hypostasis, or "desiccated" it.

In discussing "Leontius's Description of Hypostasis Conceived in Itself," Kenneth Wesche makes two observations which characterize hypostasis in the Leontine analysis:

> . . . the term hypostasis itself is not the coming together of natures, or of properties, but it is itself that in which the στάσις or σύστασις is observed. In other words, the hypostasis itself is not a union or a coming together, but it is that in which the union or coming together takes place.

> . . . in the case of natures coming together, the properties are associated with the nature, not the hypostasis.[67]

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[66]Ibid., 29. One might profitably recall here the earlier Nicene struggle to distinguish οὐσία and ὑπόστασις.

[67]Wesche, 52.

Already the attentive reader will find in these observations a fore-shadowing of the subsequent analysis. We may note here that in the first observation Leontius is making a clear distinction between nature and hypostasis by defining hypostasis as that *in which* the union takes place. Furthermore, in the second observation, he delimits hypostasis by ascribing all properties to nature rather than to hypostasis. Thus, hypostasis for Leontius is *particular*, but it is not a particular *nature*:

> The hypostasis is not to be identified analytically with the nature or the properties; it is conceptually distinguished from them and is not produced by them. In short, the hypostasis itself is the foundation and not the product of being: it is the ὑποκείμενον πρᾶγμα, the "underlying reality," or if you will, the "real subject".[68]

Freed from natures and natural properties, the hypostasis is thus able to become the locus *in which* the union or coming together of natures takes place, and the properties proper to the humanity and divinity are clearly ascribed to their respective natures, not to the hypostasis. The result is a clearly articulated Chalcedonian Christology which scrupulously maintains the unity of Christ for which Cyril was most concerned: the full divine nature and the full human nature are both hypostasized in one and the same Subject, who is the Logos, the unity being preserved by the unique hypostasis, the difference by the natural distinction of the two natures. As Leontius says,

> We say the Logos assumed a certain proper nature of its own from our nature into his own hypostasis. So then, the union is of natures in the hypostasis, that is to say, the union of one [nature] with the other. But from these natures there has not been produced a composite nature, since they are not united by confusion, nor is there a composite hypostasis, since the union

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[68]Ibid., 54-55.

is not from hypostases. But the property of the hypostasis of the Logos has become more uncompounded since more properties have been drawn together [in it] after the Incarnation, which proves that neither his nature nor his hypostasis is composite or mutable.[69]

In this quotation, Leontius summarizes all that has been said about the Neo-Chalcedonian enterprise and about his own role in it. He focuses on the "one hypostasis" of Chalcedon as the key to unlocking the identification of hypostasis and nature which had kept Monophysite and Nestorian from accepting the conciliar decree. Hypostasis and nature are clearly separated concepts and realities. The union, he says, is of two natures in the one hypostasis. By this union, there is not a confusion of natures (as the Monophysites believed and the Nestorians feared), for the human nature is not brought into the divine nature of Christ, but into his hypostasis. Moreover, the union is not one of hypostases, which would result in division of the person (as the Nestorians believed and the Monophysites feared), for there is no human hypostasis to be joined with the divine hypostasis in Christ. All of the properties of the divinity and the humanity Leontius ascribes to their respective natures. In this way, the properties of both the divinity and

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[69]Leontius of Jerusalem, *Adv. Nest.* 1.20 (PG 86.1485C14-D10): φαμὲν τὸν Λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν προσλαβέσθαι φύσιν ἰδικήν τινα· κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν οὖν ταῖς φύσεσιν ἡ σύνθεσις, εἴτ' οὖν ἕνωσις ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλας· οὔτε δὲ φύσις σύνθετος ἐκ τῶνδε γέγονεν. Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σύγχυσιν συνετέθησαν, οὔτε ὑπόστασις σύνθετος· ὅτι οὐχ ἐξ ὑποστάσεων· ἀλλ' ἀσυνθετώτερον ἰδίωμα τῆς τοῦ Λόγου γέγονεν ὑποστάσεως, πλειόνων ἐπισωρευθέντων ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν ἁπλῶν ἰδιωμάτων μετὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν· ὅπερ οὐδὲ σύνθετον, οὐδὲ τρεπτὴν δείκνυσιν οὔτε τὴν φύσιν οὔτε τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ. Quoted in Wesche, 178, with modifications.

the humanity remain proper to each and accrue to the one hypostasis in virtue of which the two natures are united.

It is at this point that the famous enhypostaton (ἐνυπόστατον) comes into play.[70] As Leontius says,

> Now we say that two natures exist in one and the same hypostasis. This does not mean that one of the natures can exist in it without an hypostasis, but rather that both are able to exist in one common hypostasis. And thus, each one is hypostatic in one and the same hypostasis.[71]

And again,

> The Word in the latter times, by himself clothed his hypostasis, which existed before his human nature, and his nature which, before the worlds, was without flesh, *with flesh in his very own hypostasis*.[72]

That is to say, to think that the humanity of Christ is imperfect because it lacks an hypostasis is incorrect, for it, in fact, does not lack an hypostasis. The hypostasis of the humanity of Christ is precisely the hypostasis of the Word in which the human nature is hypostasized along with the divine nature. Both natures are hypostatic; to coin the term in English, they are both "in-hypostasized" in the one hypostasis of the Word.

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[70]We will consider the enhypostaton in detail in Chapter V.

[71]Leontius, *Adv. Nest.*, 2.13 (PG 86.1561B8-13): τὰς γὰρ δύο φύσεις ἐν μιᾷ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποστάσει λέγομεν ὑφίστασθαι· οὐχ ὡς δυναμένης θατέρας ἀνυποστάτου εἶναι ἐν αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐν μιᾷ κοινῇ δυναμένων ὑφίστασθαι ὑποστάσει· καὶ οὕτως κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν, ἑκατέρας ἐνυποστάτου οὔσης. Quoted in Wesche, 157.

[72]*Adv. Nest.* 5.28 (PG 86.1748D11-14): τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὑπόστασιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ φύσιν ὁ Λόγος τὴν ἄσαρκον πρὸ αἰώνων, ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς ἑαυτῷ σάρκα περιβαλὼν αὐτῇ τῇ ἰδίᾳ ὑποστάσει . . . Cited in Meyendorff, *Christ*, 74. Parallel texts can be found in *Adv. Nest.* 7.4 (PG 86.1768A) and 12.2 (PG 86.1761B).

The significance of the enhypostaton lies precisely in its ability to express the distinction of hypostasis from nature and to render hypostasis the locus in which natures come together without the hypostasis being a nature itself. It might even be said that the enhypostaton teaching is the prime achievement of Neo-Chalcedonianism.

Leontius' clarification of what hypostasis means vis-à-vis nature was not an entirely original undertaking. To a degree, it was a refinement of the Cappadocian idea of hypostasis, taken up from Trinitarian theology and applied to Christological economy.[73] Monophysites did not allow such a correlation between theology and economy. Consider the words of "Eranistes":

> I should say that the divine Scripture uses some terms
> theologically and some economically, and that one ought not
> apply what is economical to what is theological.[74]

The Nestorians did allow one, but in a peculiar Nestorian way.[75] The Orthodox allowed the correlation, especially after the definitions of terms were clarified, and they scourged their adversaries with the implications that their Christologies held for theology. Take, for example, the following from Leontius:

> Now we can show the absurdity of your arguments, which you
> believe are so obvious, in another way. For example, if the
> hypostases are nothing but particular essences, and you say

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[73]See Wesche, 55.

[74]Theodoret of Cyrus, *Eranistes* 2 (Gerard H. Ettlinger, critical text and proleg. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975], p. 140, lines 19-21): Εἴποιμ' ἂν, ὡς τὰ μὲν θεολογικῶς, τὰ δὲ οἰκονομικῶς ἡ θεία λέγει γραφή, καὶ ὡς οὐ χρὴ τὰ οἰκονομικῶς εἰρημένα τοῖς θεολογικοῖς συναρμόττειν.

[75]Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700)*, The Christian Tradition (Chicago: University Press, 1974), 43-45.

that the hypostases of the Holy Trinity are three, then you are also clearly saying that there are three essences. And so you have slipped in a threefold God by your blasphemy against the dispensation [of our Lord].[76]

This passage is directed against Nestorians; it could as easily be addressed to Monophysites. Pelikan states very succinctly the dynamic of theology in Leontius' day when he says,

> The post-Chalcedonian conflicts made it clear that as the settlement of the dogma of the Trinity at Nicea and Constantinople had reopened the Christological question, so the settlement of the dogma of the two natures in Christ at Ephesus and Chalcedon reopened the Trinitarian question.[77]

Thus the identification of hypostasis and nature is once more affirmed to be a fundamental presupposition of both Monophysitism and Nestorianism. Indeed it is part of the "common Christological currency" of the day. Given that the Neo-Chalcedonian project was to distinguish hypostasis and nature, it might be said that what Leontius and company were combatting was the Paleo-Chalcedonian tendency to identify them. Furthermore, since this Paleo-Chalcedonianism is common to both Monophysitism and Nestorianism, the clear distinction of nature and hypostasis offers a way out of the problems engendered by both

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[76]Leontius, *Adv. Nest.* 2.6 (PG 86.549A13-B5): Ἕτερα δὲ λίαν εὔδηλα τυγχάνοντα παραστήσουσι τῶν δοξάντων ὑμῖν πλεῖστον εἶναι τὸ ἄτοπον. Εἰ γὰρ αἱ ὑποστάσεις οὐδὲν ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ἢ ἰδικαὶ οὐσίαι εἰσί, τρεῖς λέγοντες τὰς ὑποστάσεις τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος, δηλονότι τρεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας φατέ· καὶ ἰδοὺ τὴν τριφεῖαν μετὰ τῆς εἰς τὴν οἰκονομίαν βλασφημίας ὑπεδύσασθε. Quoted in Wesche, 59-60, with modifications.

[77]Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600)*, The Christian Tradition vol. 1 (Chicago: University Press, 1971), 267. Meyendorff also takes note of the similarities, and remarks that "the same problem, linked with a different notion of hypostasis, came up later between East and West in relation to the *Filioque* problem" (*Christ*, 225, note 25).

heresies. And so the program of Neo-Chalcedonian theology is shown to be doubly effective, as against Nestorianism as well as against Monophysitism.

Let us summarize what we have done in this section. We have seen that

1. The theological enterprise of Neo-Chalcedonian Christology centered on the concept of hypostasis and sought to articulate it in such a way as to be faithful both to the Fourth Synod and to Cyril.

2. Both Monophysites and Nestorians conceived of hypostasis and nature as identical. Monophysites were led to affirm either (a) one nature in Christ by exclusion, or (b) one composite nature by synthetic union. Nestorians, on the other hand, were led to affirm two hypostases along with the two natures.

3. Leontius of Jerusalem seized upon the "one hypostasis" formula of Chalcedon as the key to the dilemma. By clearly distinguishing hypostasis from nature, and by ascribing all properties to nature, Leontius was able rigorously to affirm both the unity of Christ by hypostasis and his duality by natures, and do so without succumbing to the problems to which Monophysitism and Nestorianism fell victim. He was able to do this in part by his use of the term enhypostaton which allowed him to ascribe the human nature of Christ to the hypostasis of the Word.

Having laid this groundwork, we return to the Monenergists and the Monothelites and answer the question that has been waiting a long time to be answered.

4. The Answer to the Question

Earlier in the present chapter we saw that:

1. The Monenergist-Monothelite enterprise was undertaken to reconcile the Monophysites.

2. The Orthodox did not consider the reunion Pact an open lapse into Monophysitism, but the Monophysites themselves embraced it.[78]

3. The Monenergists and Monothelites are accused of adopting the "conceptual model" of Severus with regard to operation and will, though not with regard to nature and hypostasis.

4. This accusation led to the question of how it is possible to conceive of operation and will in a Monophysite way while conceiving of hypostasis and nature in an Orthodox way.

5. The answer was asserted that it is not possible without an erosion of Orthodox Christology in some respect, and that such an erosion took place in the concept of hypostasis as it had been hammered out by the Neo-Chalcedonians and especially by Leontius of Jerusalem.

6. Therefore, it remains in this section to prove (a) that Orthodox Christology *was* eroded at the hands of the Monenergists and Monothelites, (b) that the erosion took place in the notion of hypostasis, (c) in what way they altered the definition of hypostasis from what they had

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[78]Remember that it was the affirmation of the two natures which kept the Monenergists and Monothelites from the Monophysite fold. It is not suggested here that the Orthodox did not attack the Monenergist and Monothelite positions. They did, and they even noted that these heresies smacked strongly of Monophysitism. As we shall see below, the Orthodox were aware of what Monophysite, Monenergist and Monothelite *shared in common*, and it is that common thread which the Orthodox attacked and which we are about to lay bare.

received, and (d) why this erosion was not Monophysitism. All of these facets will be addressed in the same discussion.

The sum of the matter is this: although the Monenergists (and Monothelites) retained the dogma of the two natures in Christ, they nevertheless ascribe all operation (and will) to the one hypostasis of the Logos. That is to say, *they have ascribed to hypostasis what properly belongs to nature, and they are able to make this move because they have retained the identification of hypostasis and nature just as the Monophysites and the Nestorians did.* Let us take some examples from the controversy, two Monenergist, one Monothelite, and one Orthodox, to show that this is the case.

a. **The Fragments of Theodore of Pharan.** First, consider Theodore of Pharan, the "Father of Monotheletism."[79] We recall that Theodore was one of the bishops to whom Sergius first wrote in the late 610's to evaluate his newly-conceived Monenergism. Among the extracts of Theodore's works preserved in the Acts of the Lateran Synod of 649, there are the following:

> From this we see clearly that everything we understand or believe about Christ, be they proper to the divine nature or to the human nature, are the work of God, and from then on, that which is from his divinity and that which is from his humanity we piously call one operation. [Fragment 4]

> The whole Incarnation, from beginning to end, and everything in it, small and great, is in truth a most sublime and divine operation. [Fragment 5]

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[79]So Stephen of Dor calls him, Mansi 10.893A.

The divine will, which is that of Christ himself. For his will is one, and it is divine. [Fragment 6][80]

Most scholars consider Theodore to have been Chalcedonian. Grumel gives several reasons why: Theodore was not called Monophysite by his contemporaries, neither was he condemned with the Monophysites. Moreover, his writings were acrimoniously denounced at the Lateran Synod of 649, much too acrimoniously for them to have been written by a non-Orthodox (i.e., the Synodal Fathers considered him to be one of their own).[81] One should also be fair: in the early stages of Monenergism when Theodore wrote, the question of the relationship between operations, nature, and hypostasis was not yet clear. Sergius was able to undertake his Monenergist project precisely because the relation of operation to nature and of operation to hypostasis was uncharted territory. Theodore cannot be too severely criticized for speculating about unsettled questions.

What we may note from the Pharanite's fragments is this: Fragment four clearly affirms the two natures in Christ in a way that does not contradict the Chalcedonian definition. Fragment five reveals a Cyrillian flavor when it speaks of the whole Incarnation being a divine operation.

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[80]Mansi 11.568E4-9: Ἔχομεν ἄρα ἐκ τούτων σαφῶς, ὅτι ἔργον Θεοῦ ἅπαντα, ὅσα περὶ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἀκούομεν, καὶ πιστεύομεν εἴτε τῇ θείᾳ φύσει προσεοικότα, εἴτε τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ· καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο μία ἐνέργεια ταῦτα τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος εὐσεβῶς ὠνόμασται.

Mansi 11.569A3-5: Ὡς εἶναι πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, καὶ ὅσα ταύτης μικράτε καὶ μεγάλα, μίαν ἀληθῶς ὑψηλοτάτην καὶ θείαν ἐνέργειαν.

Mansi 11.569A10-12: Τὸ δὲ θεϊκὸν θέλημα, ὅπερ ἐστί αὐτοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ· αὐτοῦ γὰρ τὸ θέλημα ἕν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτο θεϊκόν.

[81]Grumel, 262-64.

Again, there is no disharmony here with Chalcedon, which affirmed the subject of the Incarnation to be the divine Logos; neither are Cyrillian flavors surprising, since, as we have seen, Chacedon and post-Chalcedonian Christology were fundamentally Cyrillian. Fragment six reveals a strong Cyrillian flavor and in this respect: Theodore presupposes the identification of hypostasis and nature evident in Cyril, that conception of hypostasis as nature which the Neo-Chalcedonians worked to undo. As Doucet puts it,

> Theodore attaches operation to the hypostasis of the Word, but the hypostasis in the Cyrillian sense, which is indistinguishable from the divine nature of the Word.[82]

The most damning statement one can make about Theodore is that he clearly opted for ascribing operation to the hypostasis. In light of where that ascription ultimately led, to full blown Monenergism and Monotheletism, the anger of the Fathers at the Lateran Synod is understandable. Theodore may have been Orthodox, but his thinking reflected in these fragments is *not* Neo-Chalcedonian. It is instead Paleo-Chalcedonian.

b. The *Psephos* and the *Ekthesis*. Sergius, as we recall, wrote to Pope Honorius, probably in 634, soon after the Pact of Union and the visit of Sophronius, to report on the reunion effected in Egypt. This *Epistle* is a gold mine of material, and it contains the text of the *Psephos*. In the passages we will be looking at, there is nothing overtly heterodox. In fact, the text of the *Psephos* is really quite mild. This mildness is no doubt the result of Sophronius' visit to Constan-

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[82]Doucet, "La dispute," 68.

tinople to protest the Pact of Union and its Monenergist stance, for

Sergius writes to the Pope,

> After we had discussed this at length with the most venerable
> Sophronius . . . knowing that heretical dissensions always arise
> from such contentions, we judged it necessary . . . to cut off
> this superfluous dispute over words, and we wrote to the most
> holy Patriarch of Alexandria that, after the union, accomplished
> with God, with those who were previously separated, that he
> permit no one to confess either one or two operations in Christ
> our God.[83]

For our present needs, consider the following quotation:

> We confess, as the holy and ecumenical Synods have handed
> down, that one and the same Only-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus
> Christ the true God, works both the divine and the human, and
> all divine and human operations proceed without separation from
> one and the same incarnate God Word, and are referred back to
> one and the same . . . and that from one and the same
> incarnate God Word, as we said before, proceeds all divine and
> human operation without division and without separation. For
> this is what the God-bearing Leo taught us in the words: "For
> each form does in communion with the other what is proper to
> it."[84]

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[83]Mansi 11.533B7-8, C4-6, 7-14: Πολλῶν τοίνην περὶ τούτου κεκινημένων
λόγων ἡμιν πρὸς τὸν εἰρημένον ὁσιώτατον Σωφρόνιον . . . καὶ εἰδότες ὡς ἐκ τῆν
τοιούτων ἀεὶ φιλονεικιῶν αἱ τῶν αἱρέσεων διχοστασίαι γεγόνασιν, ἀναγκαῖον . . .
ἐκκόψαι τὴν περιττὴν ταύτην λογομαχίαν. Καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸν συχνῶς εἰρημένον
ἁγιώτατον τῆς Ἀλεξανδρέων πατριάρχην γεγραφίκαμεν, ὥστε αὐτὸν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς
πόλαι χωριζομένους ἕνωσιν σὺν Θεῷ κατορθώσαντα, μηκέτι τοῦ λοιποῦ τινι συγχω-
ρεῖν μίαν, ἢ δύο προφέρειν ἐνεργείας ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν.

[84]Mansi 11.533D1-8, 537A5-11: καθάπερ αἱ ἅγιαι καὶ οἰκουμενικαὶ
παραδεδώκασι σύνοδοι, ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν μονογενῆ τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν
Χριστὸν τὸν ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν ἐνεργεῖν ὁμολογεῖν τά τε θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, καὶ πᾶσαν
θεοπρεπῆ καὶ ἀνθρωποπρεπῆ ἐνέργειαν ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σεσαρκωμένου Θεοῦ
Λόγου ἀδιαιρέτως προϊέναι, καὶ εἰς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀναφέρεσθαι . . . καὶ ἐξ
ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σεσαρκωμένου Θεοῦ Λόγου, καθὰ φθάσαντες ἔφημεν, πᾶσαν
προϊέναι ἀμερίστως καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως θείαν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην ἐνέργειαν. Τοῦτο γὰρ
ἡμᾶς ὁ θεοφόρος ἐδίδασκει Λέων διαρρήδην εἰπών· ἐνεργεῖ γὰρ ἑκατέρᾳ μορφὴ μετὰ
τῆς θατέρου κοινωνίας ὅπερ ἴδιον ἔσχηκεν.

While Sergius does emphasize the unity of the one Lord, and the role of the Incarnate Word as the agent of all operations, he nevertheless does mention both divine and human operations. Even so, he does not quote all of Leo's *agit utraque*:

> For each form does in communion with the other, what is proper to it, *the Word, that is, does what is proper to the Word, and the flesh carrying out what is proper to the flesh.*[85]

Sergius' emphasis, as we have said, is on the unity of the Word as agent.

Where Sergius will ultimately get into trouble is over the meaning of the word "operation." Does it refer to the act itself, the *doing*, or to the result of the action, the *thing done*? If he means the latter, the *thing done*, then his statements are Orthodox; if, however, he means the former, the *doing itself*, then he is a Monenergist. What does he mean? Let us take this part of the *Psephos* bit by bit to see what he is saying.

> We confess, as the holy and ecumenical councils have handed down, that one and the same Only-begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the true God, works both the divine and the human, and that all divine and human operations procede without separation from one and the same incarnate God the Word and are referred back to one and the same by the expression "one operation." Although some of the Fathers spoke [in this way], it seemed strange and offended the ears of some, since they suspected it was put forth in order to do away with the two natures of

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[85] *Tome* of Leo, v. 94: Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione quod proprium est. *Verbo scilicet operante quod Verbi est et carne exsequente quod carnis est* (*Concilium Oecumenicorum Decreta,* Ed. Instituto per le scienzie religiose [Bologna: Instituto per le scienze religiose, 1972], 79).

Christ our God [which are] hypostatically united and without confusion, which it was not (may it not be!).[86]

The expression "one operation" has *some* basis in the writings of the Fathers, hence it bears some legitimacy. Nevertheless, some people are opposed to it (namely, Sophronius) because they believe it endangers the integrity of the two natures of Christ. That is, the Orthodox thought it leads to Monophysitism, which, Sergius says, was not the intention of the Monenergists. Why should the Orthodox think that Monenergism should lead to Monophysitism? Because the Orthodox, in good Neo-Chalcedonian fashion, located faculties and powers, i.e. will and its attendant operation, not in the hypostasis, but in the nature. We have seen this already in Leontius of Jerusalem, and we will see it again in Sophronius and in Maximus. If you say "one operation" to a Neo-Chalcedonian, he will hear you to say that there is only one nature.

Still, Sergius affirms that the two natures are not being done away with: "may it not be!" His point of departure is not that operation pertains to nature, but rather that it pertains to hypostasis. Because there is one agent, the Logos, there is one operation, namely the divine. Sergius is not Neo-Chalcedonian, but Paleo-Chalcedonian. The clear distinction between hypostasis and nature which the Neo-Chalcedonians

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[86]Mansi 11.533D1-13: καθάπερ αἱ ἅγιαι καὶ οἰκουμενικαὶ παραδεδώκασι σύνοδοι, ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν μονογενῆ τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν ἐνεργεῖν ὁμολογεῖν τά τε θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, καὶ πᾶσαν θεοπρεπῆ καὶ ἀνθρωποπρεπῆ ἐνέργειαν ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ σεσαρκωμένου Θεοῦ Λόγου ἀδιαιρέτως προϊέναι, καὶ εἰς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀναφέρεσθαι, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν μιᾶς ἐνεργείας φωνήν, εἰ καί τισι τῶν ἁγίων εἴρηται κατέρων, ὅμως ξενίζειν καὶ θορυβεῖν τάς τινων ἀκοάς, ὑπολαμβανόντων ἐπ' ἀναιρέσει ταύτην προφέρεσθαι τῶν ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ Θεῷ ἡμῶν ἀσυγχύτως καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἡνωμένων δύο φύσεων· ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι ποτέ, μηδὲ γένοιτο.

articulated, and the clear ascription of faculties to nature, is absent in what Sergius says. Given only this much, we may see that Doucet is right: the Severan model is at work in Monenergism with regards to operation. But even more, we find evidence in Sergius' presuppositions that Severus is being followed not only in matters regarding operation, but in matters regarding nature and hypostasis, as well, for natural faculties are being ascribed to hypostasis. To go on,

> Similarly, to speak of "two operations" scandalizes many, because it is found in none of the divine and approved teachers of the Church.[87]

While *some* of the Fathers speak of "one operation," *none* of the Fathers speak of "two operations." It is obvious which of the two positions is being favored here, even though Sergius has prohibited anyone to speak of either one operation or two. With this statement, Sergius begins a well-constructed argument proving that Monenergism is the correct view.[88] He begins with this statement, that to maintain two operations is scandalous. He goes on to state the consequences:

> In addition, and beyond this, there would follow two contrary wills [in Christ], as if God the Word had been willing to fulfill the suffering for our salvation, but his humanity, opposing it,

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[87]Mansi 11.533E1-3: ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν δύο ἐνεργειῶν ῥῆσιν πολλοὺς σκανδαλίζειν, οἷα μηδέ τινι τῶν θεσπεσίων τε καὶ ἐκκρίτων τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰρημένην μυσταγωγῶν·

[88]Our analysis of this argument owes much to Doucet, "Est-ce que le monothélisme a fait autant d'illustres victimes? Reflexions sur un ouvrage de F.-M. Léthel," *Science et esprit* 35 (1983): 58-63, which includes criticisms of Léthel's handling of Sergius. Léthel discusses the *Psephos* in *Agonie*, 36-49. Piret, 242-45, gives a brief synopsis of the *Psephos* based on Sergius' text and Léthel's analysis.

had resisted it by will, and there would follow two contrary willers, which is impious.[89]

First, the patent consequence of saying "two operations" is not just that there must be two wills, but two *contrary* wills. Sergius presumes that difference implies contrariness, and as an example, he suggests that the Logos might will the suffering of the Passion, but his humanity might will no-suffering. Léthel shows that difference-as-contrariness has roots in Aristotle and Apollinaris,[90] but clear antecedents do not legitimize what is actually an assertion on Sergius' part. Maximus will demonstrate that different wills need not be contrary, and Sergius himself could have asserted that two simple wills, instead of two contrary wills, would result from a doctrine of two operations.

For Sergius, the consequence of saying "two wills" is that there must be two willers, which is indeed impious, and would be even if the two willers in Christ were not contrary. From this consequence we are sure that Sergius is taking will to be a hypostatic and not a natural faculty; that is, Sergius believes that for there to be a human will in

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[89]Mansi 11.533E4-10: ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἕπεσθαι ταύτῃ τό, καὶ δύο πρεσβεύειν θελήματα ἐναντίως πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχοντα, ὡς τοῦ μὲν Θεοῦ λόγου τὸ σωτήριον θέλοντος ἐκπληρωθῆναι πάθος, τῆς δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν ἀνθρωπότητος ἀντιπιπτούσης τῷ αὐτοῦ θελήματι καὶ ἐναντιουμένης, καὶ εἶθεν δύο τοὺς τἀναντία θέλοντας εἰσάγεσθαι, ὅπερ δυσσεβές.

[90]*Théologie*, 41-44. Most of Léthel's book, in particular, pp. 33-49, is an examination of difference-as-contrariness. Because the wills in Christ are different, they are contrary; therefore there can be no contrary, human will in Christ, only the divine will. This is what Léthel calls "Byzantine Monotheletism." Léthel should be read with the corrections given in Doucet, "Est-ce que." See also Piret, 243-45.

Christ there must be a human subject willing something contrary to the divine subject.

> For it is impossible that one and the same subject should have two contrary wills simultaneously and in the same way.[91]

Having reached the depths of impiety and having shown the depravity of asserting two operations, Sergius now begins to climb out of his argument, correcting each stage as he goes. He begins with denying the last consequence, that there could be two willers in Christ, because Christ is one subject, who logically could not will two contrary things simultaneously and in the same way. It is significant that Sergius uses the word "subject" (ὑποκείμενον) here. He avoids saying that operation is proper either to hypostasis or to nature by ascribing it to the "subject" in Christ. Now we know that the subject Sergius has in mind is none other than the Incarnate Logos, but he has avoided saying so directly. What Sergius is presupposing here will be made clear in the next sentence: that all operation in Christ proceeds from the divine hypostasis of the Logos and is deployed divinely and humanly. This, as we know, is Paleo-Chalcedonian and is found in the teaching of Severus.

> The saving doctrine of the God-bearing Fathers clearly teaches that the noetically ensouled flesh [of the Lord] never accomplishes is natural motion by its own impulse contrary to the command of God the Word hypostatically united with it, but only when, and as, and how God the Word willed.[92]

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[91]Mansi 11.533E11-36A1: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ὑποκειμένῳ δύο ἅμα καὶ κατὰ ταυτὸν ὑφεστάναι θελήματα.

[92]Mansi 11.536A1-7: ἡ δὲ σωτήριος τῶν θεοφόρων πατέρων διδασκαλία ἐναργῶς ἐκπαιδεύει τό, μηδέποτε τὴν νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένην τοῦ Κυρίου σάρκα κεχωρισμένως καὶ ἐξ οἰκείας ὁρμῆς ἐναντίως τῷ νεύματι τοῦ ἡνωμένου αὐτῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν Θεοῦ Λόγου τὴν φυσικὴν αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι κίνησιν, ἀλλ' ὁπότε καὶ οἵαν

The reason there are not two contrary wills (i.e., a human will contrary to the divine one) is because it is the command of the divine Logos that wills his noetically ensouled flesh to accomplish its natural motion. Note that the humanity of Christ has a *natural motion.* The human nature of Christ is not being denied here. Neither has Sergius explicitly denied the simple existence of a human will in Christ. It is only *implicit* that, because there is no *contrary* human will, there is no human will *at all.* Ultimately, there is only one impulse, and it belongs to the divine hypostasis of the Logos; and there cannot be two operations because *all* operation in Christ proceeds out of the divine Logos.[93]

καὶ ὅσην αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἠβούλετο.

[93]At this point it is illuminating to see that the teaching of Sergius in the *Psephos* is so close to the teaching of Severus as to be practically identical. Joseph Lebon ("Christologie du monophysisme syrien," in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon,* Vol. I, ed. A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht [Würtzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951], 556-57) says, "In Monophysite Christology, the unity of the subject, of the individual, is so strongly affirmed that it dominates every other consideration. The one who acts is rigorously one in his individual existence (μία φύσις, μία ὑπόστασις); his operative movement (κίνησις ἐνεργητική) will also be rigorously one, and his activity (ἐνέργεια) will be one. Christ is God, even though he is God incarnate; when he speaks and acts, it is God who speaks and acts; his activity is thus *divine,* even though it is the activity of God incarnate. The mystery [of the Incarnation] has put the Word in a new state; there is always one *divine* nature or hypostasis, but it is incarnate or synthesized with the flesh (σύνθετος πρὸς τὴν σάρκα), in a word, theandric. The activity of Christ, which is that of the Word in this new state, will from now on be one divine activity, though synthetic: a theandric activity. Two proper activities, one divine and the other human, or the properties in activity for the divine and the human in Christ, are, for the Monophysites, two operative movements, two agents, two beings separated as individuals. Our theologians could not understand that one can distinguish *he who acts* and *that by which he acts,* the *quod* and the *quo* of the activity, nor that one can introduce two activities by reason of a duality of *principium quo* without introducing a duality of *principium quod.*"

And, to speak plainly, in the same way as our body is ruled, adorned, and arrayed by our noetic and rational soul, so also in our Lord Christ is the whole of his manhood comparably led by the logos of his divinity always and in everything; it was moved by God.[94]

This is what the *Psephos* taught. Again, its language is mild, but Sergius' preferences and intentions are still clear enough to discern.

The *Psephos* forbade discussion of one operation or two, even though one operation was strongly favored. The *Ekthesis*, however, introduced something new. The first part of the *Psephos* it reproduces word for word and then goes on to say,

In addition, and beyond this, there would follow two contrary wills [in Christ], as if God the Word had been willing to fulfill the suffering for our salvation, but his humanity, opposing it, had resisted it by will, and there would follow two contrary willers, which is impious, and which is contrary to Christian dogma. For if the impious Nestorius, who divided the divine incarnation of the Lord and introduced two Sons, did not dare to speak of their two wills, but on the contrary, affirmed an identity of will of the two persons he imagined, how is it possible that those who confess the Orthodox Faith and glorify one sole Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, true God, would admit in him two contrary wills? Therefore following the holy Fathers in all things and also in this, we confess one will of our Lord Jesus Christ, true God, so that the noetically ensouled flesh [of the Lord] never accomplishes is natural motion by its own impulse contrary to the command of God the Word hypostatically united with it, but only when, and as, and how God the Word willed.[95]

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[94]Mansi 11.536A7-13: καὶ σαφῶς εἰπεῖν, ἕν τρόπον το σῶμα τὸ ἡμέτερον ἡγεμονεύεται, καὶ κοσμεῖται, καὶ τάττεται ὑπὸ τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ λογικῆς ἡμῶν ψυχῆς, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεσπότου Χριστοῦ ὅλον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ σύγκρινα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου θεότητος ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγόμενον· θεοκίνητον ἦν.

[95]Mansi 10.996B6-C10: ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἕπεσθαι ταύτῃ τό, καὶ δύο πρεσβεύειν θελήματα ἐναντίως πρὸς ἄλληλα ἔχοντα, ὡς τοῦ μὲν Θεοῦ λόγου τὸ σωτήριον θέλοντος ἐκπληρωθῆναι πάθος, τῆς δὲ κατ' αὐτὸν ἀνθρωπότητος ἀντιπιπτούσης τῷ αὐτοῦ θελήματι καὶ ἐναντιουμένης, καὶ εἶθεν δύο τοὺς τἀναντία θέλοντας εἰσάγεσθαι, ὅπερ δυσσεβές, καὶ ἀλλότριον τοῦ χριστιανικοῦ δόγματος. Εἰ γὰρ ὁ μιαρὸς Νεστόριος καίπερ διαιρῶν τὴν θείαν τοῦ κυρίου ἐνανθρώπησιν, καὶ δύο εἰσάγων υἱοὺς, δύο θελήματα τούτων εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησε, τοὐναντίον δὲ ταυτοβουλίαν τῆς

Thus the *Ekthesis* not only forbade speaking of one or two *operations*, but it positively taught one *will* in Christ. The question of operation had been forbidden by Imperial decree; the question of will rose in its stead. Monenergism had been transformed into Monotheletism.

The consideration of operation had moved to a consideration of will. Implicit in the Monenergist teaching was the denial that the humanity of Christ had its own impulse, and that the humanity was similarly lacking a will. This denial became explicit in Monotheletism.

The movement from operation to will was not a move away from the teachings of Monenergism to something radically new. The Monothelites sought continuation with the previous teaching, circumscribed only by the parameters of Imperial decree. Adopting "will" in place of "operation" seemed to realize this goal.[96]

However, the shift in focus from operation to will resulted in a substantially more dangerous teaching. Monenergism, concerned with operation, focused on an element of volition which was *external* to Christ. The question about the *internal* structures of Christ's volition was raised only implicitly, as an unpleasant consequence of confessing

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ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀναπλαττομένων δύο προσώπων ἐδόξασε, πῶς δυνατὸν τοὺς τὴν ὀρθὴν ὁμολογοῦντας πίστιν, καὶ ἐν υἱὸν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν δοξάζοντας δύο καὶ ταῦτα ἐναντία θελήματα ἐπ' αὐτοῦ παραδέχεσθαι. Ὅθεν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν ἐν ἅπασι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κατακολουθοῦντες· ἐν θέλημα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ Θεοῦ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὡς ἐν μηδενὶ καιρῷ τῆς νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένης αὐτοῦ σαρκὸς κεχωρισμένως καὶ ἐξ οἰκείας ὁρμῆς ἐναντίως τῷ νεύματι τοῦ ἡνωμένου αὐτῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν Θεοῦ Λόγου, τὴν φυσικὴν αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι κίνησιν, ἀλλ' ὁπότε καὶ οἵαν καὶ ὅσην αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος ἠβούλετο.

[96]Certainly, Papal sanction of the term *una voluntas* (in the First *Epistle* of Honorius of Sergius) paved the way.

two operations: in the words of the *Psephos*, "there would follow two contrary wills." Monotheletism, on the other hand, explicitly focused on the interior structures of Christ's volition, specifically on the question which had been waiting in the wings for a long time: will. Monotheletism denied a component of the humanity of Christ, namely his human will. Such a denial is a long way from a vague ascription of operation to a subject. If Monenergism was a compromise built on ambiguity, Monotheletism leaned clearly toward Christological heresy.

c. **The *Synodal Tome* of Sophronius of Jerusalem.** Having looked at two Monenergist theologians and the Monothelite *Ekthesis*, we turn our attention to one Orthodox theologian, Sophronius of Jerusalem. Sophronius was elected Patriarch of Jerusalem in 634. It was customary in those days for a newly-elected Patriarch to set forth his Faith in a *Tome* on the occasion of his consecration. Since a number of bishops would gather for a consecration, episcopal consecrations became opportunities for synodal meetings as well, meetings where ecclesiastical matters could be discussed. The *Synodal Tome* of Sophronius was the result of just such a "consecration synod."

At the very beginning of his treatment of Monenergism, Sophronius states,

> And the same is acknowledged to be one and two. It is one according to hypostasis and person, and two according to the natures themselves, and their natural properties, from which it obtained single existence and maintained double continuity in nature.
> Whence the same one, remaining one Christ and Son and Only-begotten, is seen undivided in both natures, and operates both essences naturally according to an essential property present in each, or even a natural property. If it had a nature that was single and uncomposite, just as it had the hypostasis

and the person . . . the one and the same would not have perfectly accomplished the things of each nature.[97]

We have a good idea of what Sophronius means by all of this, especially since we know what the new Patriarch was combatting. Sophronius also knew what he was up against. He begins by distinguishing hypostasis and nature. All essential qualities and natural properties are to be ascribed to their respective natures. Christ works naturally (φυσικῶς) by each nature, not hypostatically. This natural operation would not be possible if Christ had "a nature that was single and unconjoined, just as he had one hypostasis and one person;" that is to say, it would not be possible if hypostasis and nature were identical in Christ.

In the first few lines, Sophronius has laid down the principles which we have seen developed in Leontius of Jerusalem: the clear distinction of nature and hypostasis, the denial of their identification, and the ascription of all qualities and properties to the natures.[98] To proceed with the text of the Tome, the Patriarch says,

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[97]PG 87.3168A10-B9: ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἐν καὶ δύο τὸ αὐτὸ γνωριζόμενον· ἐν μὲν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασίν τε καὶ πρόσωπον, δύο δὲ κατὰ τὰς φύσεις αὐτὰς, καὶ τὰς φυσικὰς αὐτῶν ἰδιότητας, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν διεκλήρωσε, καὶ τὸ μένειν τῇ φύσει διπλοῦν διεφύλαξεν.

Ὅθεν ὁ αὐτὸς μένων εἷς Χριστὸς καὶ Υἱὸς καὶ μονογενὴς ἀδιάτμητος ἐν ἑκατέραις ὁρᾶται ταῖς φύσεσι, καὶ τὰς ἑκατέρας φυσικῶς οὐσίας εἰργάζετο κατὰ τὴν ἑκατέρᾳ προσοῦσαν οὐσιώδη ποιότητα, ἢ καὶ φυσικὴν ἰδιότητα. Ὅπερ εἰ τὴν φύσιν ἔσχε μοναδικήν τε καὶ ἀσύζυγον, καθὰ καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασίν τε καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον, οὐκ ἂν διεπράξατο· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ὁ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τὰ τῆς ἑκατέρας ἐντελῶς κατειργάζετο φύσεως.

[98]The only thing missing is the Christological use of the term "enhypostaton." Schönborn, 147, note 67, points out that the Patriarch uses the term in Trinitarian theology, but not in Christology.

For just as in Christ each nature maintains its own property undiminished, so also each form [nature] works in communion with the other what is proper to itself: the Logos works what is proper to the Logos in communion, clearly, with the body, and the body accomplishes what is proper to the body united, clearly, with the work of the Logos. And these things are recognized in one hypostasis, [and] the detestable sundering is avoided.[99]

This passage is, of course, a restatement of the *agit utraque* of Leo's *Tome.* It is worth comparing Sophronius' quotation of it with Sergius', which was discussed above. We see that the Patriarch of Jerusalem reproduces the *whole* passage from Leo in its correct sense, whereas the Patriarch of Constantinople reproduced only the first part of it, and that in a Monenergist sense. Moreover, the unity of the two natures and operations in the one hypostasis of Christ prevents a lapse into the "detestable sundering" of Nestorius.

The *Tome* of Sophronius goes into greater detail concerning the ascription of the operations:

The Divinity and the humanity are not the same in their natural quality, even though they are ineffably joined in one hypostasis, and have been put together without confusion in one person . . . Because of this, they do not have the same indistinguishable operation after the natural and unconfused union, i.e., the true [union] according to hypostasis; neither do we say one sole operation of them or [say it is] essential, natural, or absolutely indistinguishable, so that we might not

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[99]PG 87.3168D1-69A3: Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν Χριστῷ ἑκατέρα φυλάττει φύσις ἀνελλιπῶς τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἰδιότητα, οὕτω καὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἑκατέρα μορφὴ μετὰ τῆς θατέρου κοινωνίας τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἴδιον ἔσχηκε· τοῦ μὲν Λόγου κατεργαζομένου τοῦθ', ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ Λόγου μετὰ τῆς κοινωνίας δηλονότι τοῦ σώματος· τοῦ δὲ σώματος ἐκτελοῦντος ἅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ σώματος, κοινωνοῦντος αὐτῷ δηλαδὴ τοῦ Λόγου τῆς πράξεως· καὶ ταῦτα ἐν ὑποστάσει μιᾷ γνωριζόμενα, καὶ τὴν βδελυρωτάτην τομὴν διωθούμενα.

drive them into one essence and one nature, as the Acephali [the Monophysites] childishly maintain.[100]

Here Sophronius applies the dictum which was first put forth by Basil, that natures are known by their operations.[101] The two natures of Christ are different; therefore, their operations are different. If the two natures are to be confessed after the union, then two operations must also subsist, for only one natural energy implies only one nature, which is Monophysitism.

Again, there is oblique reference to the notion of hypostasis-as-nature in what the Patriarch says, for he denies that the operations become indistinguishable as a result of the hypostatic union. Such indistinguishability results from the Monophysite conception of the hypostatic union, which teaches, as we have said, that one hypostasis of the Incarnate means one nature of the Incarnate. Such an indistinguishability can arise only if the hypostatic union is seen as a union *from* two natures and not also as a union subsisting *in* two natures, the hypostasis being the locus *in which* the union of natures takes place.

If "by the operations and by them alone are the natures recognized with certainty; and the difference of essences are always grasped by

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[100]PG 87.3169D8-72A1, 8-15: Οὐ ταὐτὸν γὰρ θεότης τε καὶ ἀνθρωπότης κατὰ τὴν φυσικῶς ἑκάστῃ προσοῦσαν ποιότητα, κἂν εἰς ὑπόστασιν μίαν ἀλλήλαις ἀφράστως συνέδραμον, καὶ εἰς ἓν ἀσυγχύτως συνετέθησαν πρόσωπον, . . . Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀλλήλαις ἐνέργειαν μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν τὴν φυσικὴν καὶ ἀσύγχυτον, τουτέστι τὴν ἀληθῆ καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσιν· οὐδὲ μίαν καὶ μόνην αὐτῶν τὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν, ἢ οὐσιώδη καὶ φυσικήν, καὶ παντελῶς ἀπαράλλακτον, ἵνα μὴ καὶ εἰς οὐσίαν μίαν, καὶ φύσιν μίαν αὐτὰς συνελάσωμεν, τὴν 'Ακεφάλων παιζομένην παισί. . .

[101]Basil the Great, *On the Holy Spirit* 8.19 (PG 32.101D-04A).

the difference of operations,"[102] then it is necessary to confess the full natural operation of the humanity of the Word:

> For he gave and willed to the nature of the humanity time to work and to suffer the things proper to it, so that his far-famed Incarnation might not be regarded as some fantasy or hollow spectacle. Not unwillingly or out of necessity did he undertake these things, even if he let them come [to him] physically and humanly, and he worked and acted in human movements. . . . But he himself willed to suffer, to act, and to work humanly, when he reckoned it to be profitable to the onlookers because of whom he truly became man, and not when the physical and carnal movements willed to be moved naturally to operation.[103]

Thus Sophronius confesses the full natural operation of Christ's humanity.

At the end of his profession of Dyenergism, Sophronius takes up the content of the seventh chapter of the Pact of Union of 633, the sentence which he first opposed and thereby set the whole controversy over Monenergism in motion. The pertinent text of the seventh chapter reads:

> If anyone [does not confess] . . . this one and the same Christ and Son worked [both] the divine and the human by one

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[102]PG 87.3172B8-13: ἐκ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ μόνων κατὰ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα δεινοὺς αἱ φύσεις γνωρίζονται. Καὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀεὶ τὸ διάφορον ἐκ τοῦ διαφόρου τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

[103]PG 87.3173B9-14, C3-8: Ἐδίδου γὰρ ὅτε καὶ ἤθελε φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ καιρὸν ἐνεργεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὰ ἴδια· ἵνα μὴ φαντασία τις καὶ θέα διάκενος ἢ αὐτοῦ περιώνυμος κρίνοιτο σάρκωσις. Οὐ γὰρ ἀκουσίως ταῦτα ἢ ἀναγκαστῶς προσεδέχετο, κἂν φυσικῶς αὐτὰ καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως προσίετο, καὶ ἀνθρωπίναις κινήσεσιν ἐπόει καὶ ἔπραττεν· . . . Ἀλλ' ὅτε πάσχειν καὶ πράττειν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἀνθρωπίνως αὐτὸς ἐβεβούλητο, καὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας ὠφελεῖν ἐψηφίζετο, δι' οὓς καὶ ἄνθρωπος κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγονε· καὶ οὐχ ὅτε αἱ φυσικαὶ κινήσεις καὶ σαρκικαὶ κινεῖσθαι φυσικῶς πρὸς ἐνέργειαν ἤθελον.

theandric operation, as St. Dionysius says, . . . let him be anathema.[104]

Here is how Sophronius addresses it:

> And this one (and not one and another) does everything, the high and the low without exception. . . . And we believe that all the words and deeds belong to the same, although some of them are divine, and some of them, again, are human, and these have an intermediate character, since they have the divine and the human together. Of this kind of ability, we say, is that which is called "common and theandric operation" [which] is not one, but heterogenous and different, of which the divinely-called Dionysius the Areopagite . . . spoke, since it has in the same one the divine and the human together, and, by a most agreeable and synthetic naming, reveals perfectly the operation of each essence and nature.[105]

As we remarked earlier (p. 38), the seventh chapter confessed the "in two natures" formula of Chalcedon, but that it was immediately qualified by the "one theandric operation" formula, which was designed precisely to counteract it. Here we see the *Tome* implicitly reaffirming the "in two natures" formula and explicitly offering an Orthodox interpretation of the "one theandric operation." Far from being a synthetic operation of a synthetic nature, as the Monenergists and the Monophysites would

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[104]Mansi 11.565C4, D6-8, E10: Εἰ τις [οὐχ ὁμολογει] . . . τὸν αὐτὸν ἕνα Χριστὸν καὶ υἱὸν ἐνεργοῦντα τὰ θεοπρεπῆ, καὶ ἀνθρώπινα μιᾷ θεανδρικῇ ἐνεργείᾳ, κατὰ τὸν ἐν ἁγίοις Διονύσιον . . . ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.

[105]PG 87.3177A15-B2, 7-C5: καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἅπαντα δρᾶν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον, τά τε ὑψηλὰ καὶ ἐλάχιστα παντοίας ἐκτὸς διαστάσεως. . . . καὶ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα τοῦ ἑνὸς Υἱοῦ διαβεβαιούμεθα, καὶ πάσας αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας πιστεύομεν· κἂν αἱ μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσι θεοπρεπεῖς, αἱ οὕτω πάλιν ἀνθρωποπρεπεῖς, αἱ δὲ μέσην τινὰ τάξιν ἐπέχουσιν, ὡς ἔχουσαι τὸ θεοπρεπὲς ἐν ταὐτῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπινον. Ταύτης δὲ φαμεν τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὴν κοινὴν καὶ θεανδρικὴν λεγομένην ἐνέργειαν, οὐ μίαν ὑπάρχουσαν, ἀλλ' ἑτερογενεῖ καὶ διάφορον, ἣν ὁ ἐξ Ἀρέου πάγου . . . Διονύσιος ἔφησεν, ὡς τὸ θεοπρεπὲς ἐν ταὐτῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπινον ἔχουσαν, καὶ διὰ τῆς χαριεστάτης τε καὶ συνθέτου προσρήσεως τὴν ἑκάστης οὐσίας καὶ φύσεως ἑκάστην ἐντελῶς δηλοῦσαν ἐνέργειαν.

have it, "one theandric operation" confesses rather the two operations of the divinity and the humanity working inseparably. Only if hypostasis is identified with nature can the Monenergist reading of Dionysius be acceptable. If, on the other hand, the Areopagite is read with Neo-Chalcedonian eyes, then Sophronius' interpretation is correct.

This much should be enough to illustrate from the *Tome* of Sophronius the he was Neo-Chalcedonian, that he recognized the paradigm at work in Monenergism and the features of it which we have been discussing in this chapter (the identification of hypostasis and nature and the ascription of natural qualities to hypostasis), and that he combatted the whole Monenergist paradigm with paradigmatically Neo-Chalcedonian arguments. Having laid this groundwork, we are now in a position to examine Maximus' understanding of the hypostatic union and see how he came to apply it over the course of the Monothelite debates.

CHAPTER II

INTRODUCTION TO THE HYPOSTATIC UNION IN MAXIMUS

A. General Comments

At this point we begin an undertaking that will occupy us for the next several chapters: the exposition of Maximus' theory of the hypostatic union.

As we shall see, Maximus did make *some* original contribution to the Christological debates in which he was engaged and to the understanding of the hypostatic union in Christ. However, his real genius lies in his ability to synthesize the insights of his predecessors into a broad theory that is as well integrated as it is comprehensive. Thus, we will discover what may be characterized either as a lack of Christological originality on his part, or as a strong fidelity to the tradition of Christological inquiry of which he is an heir, depending on how one cares to approach him.

It is no exaggeration to say that *Chalcedon and Second Constantinople are the firm, unquestioned and ubiquitous ground upon which Maximus established all of his Christological insights.* It is with these two councils--and particularly with Chalcedon--that we locate all the fundamental presuppositions in the Confessor's Christology. This fact must be acknowledged before we may proceed any further. Maximus

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himself affirmed it when he said near the end of his life, "I have no
dogma of my own, just the common dogma of the catholic Church."[1]
Because of his fidelity to his Orthodox predecessors, all of the next few
chapters will include some background material, some of the antecedents
of the point under consideration. We do well to take this approach.
Not only will we see the strands that Maximus will take up to weave
together, we will also see where he carries further what he has
received. Thus, his originality will be set in bolder relief.

A word ought to be said about the order of the four chapters that
follow and the citations of Maximus contained in them. The Confessor's
thought is remarkably integrated. The several aspects of hypostatic
union that we will consider are not so clearly separated in Maximus'
writings as they are in this presentation. Indeed, they cannot be so
separated without imposing upon them a certain artificiality. That ought
to be obvious, but it bears mentioning all the same.

The order in which the various aspects are to be discussed is an
attempt to link them logically. Since in Maximus, everything ultimately
presupposes everything else, the attempt will prove difficult. In spite
of the difficulties inherent in the approach we will take, there are some
aspects of his thought which seem more "a priori" than others, and
those we will consider first.

With regard to the citations which have been selected to illustrate
the material before us, those familiar with the Confessor's writings may

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[1]*RM* 6 (PG 90.120C7-8): Ἐγὼ δόγμα ἴδιον οὐκ ἔχω, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς
Ἐκκλησίας τῆς καθολικῆς. Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 22.

notice that some of the more obvious citations from the anti-Monothelite literature are not used. This approach is intentional. For the time being we want to present Maximus' thought, not as a response to Monothelite claims, but positively, that is, on its own terms. The anti-Monothelite literature cannot be avoided altogether, because the Confessor's thought was sharpened as a result of the controversy. However, some of the material we want to reserve for Chapter VII, where the principles of Monotheletism will be systematically presented. Then the Maximian texts which directly address those principles can be cited to full effect.

B. Metaphors of Unconfused Union

We begin our discussion of the hypostatic union in Christ with an examination of the metaphors of unconfused union, because the metaphors that Maximus uses turn up everywhere in his writings and shed a great deal of light on the more exacting theological issues he is concerned with. By coming to understand these metaphors we gain fundamental insight into the reality of the hypostatic union without the burden of the heavy Christological terminology that we will be examining in the subsequent chapters. Indeed, the metaphors of unconfused union illustrate precisely the kind of union that obtains in the hypostatic union in Christ. Moreover, since the hypostatic union is *the* paradigm for ordering *all* of reality in the Maximian synthesis, we shall find that an appreciation of these metaphors as they are used Christologically will

help us better to understand other aspects of the Confessor's thought where the metaphors are used.

We will only concern ourselves with two of the most important metaphors Maximus uses: whole and parts, and fire and iron.[2] None of the metaphors that appear in his corpus are of his own invention (with the possible exception of the way he uses Ezechiel's wheels). All of them were common philosophical and theological currency in his day.[3]

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[2]Metaphors of unconfused union which Maximus uses include the following:

Whole and parts: *Myst* 1 (PG 91.665A11-14), 2 (668C14-69A1, 669B6-14); *TP* 8 (PG 91.B10-C9), 9 (125C8-12), 14 (152C11-D4). Specifically in Christ: *Ep* 12 (91.501A7-9), 15 (PG 91.553C13-57A3); *TP* 7 (PG 91.73C1-8), 9 (117A3), 16 (197D14), 20 (233A4-B2), 24 (268A9-B7); *Pyrr* §73 (PG 91.305C10-12), §145(162) (333D8-9); *Amb* 7 (PG 91.1076B10-D3). Specifically in the Trinity: *Char* 2.29 (Aldo Ceresa-Gastaldo, ed., intro., trans. and notes, *Massimo Confessore: Capitoli sulla carità*, Verba Seniorum, New Series No. 3. [Rome, 1963],104-05 [=PG 90.992D10-93B3]); *ThOec* 2.1 (PG 90.1124D12-25C5).

Fire and iron: *Amb* 7 (PG 91.1073D1-76A5, 1088D5-8), 10 (1140C9-10); *TP* 4 (PG 91.60B11-C1), 8 (101C6-10), 9 (125B10-12), 16 (189C12-D1); *Pyrr* §147 (170) (PG 91.337D3-40A8), §159 (184) (341B4-10); *QD* I.67 (CCSG 10:155 [=PG 90.841B9-14]).

Light and air: *Amb* 7 (PG 91.1073D1-A5, 1088D5-8), 10 (1140C9).

Color and body: *Amb* 10 (PG 91.1140C10-11); *TP* 23 (PG 91.261B12-13).

Body and soul: *Myst* 7 (PG 91.684D10-85A14); *TP* 8 (PG 91.101D1), 13 (145B12-C2), 14 (152A11-13).

Sun and stars: *Char* 1.10 (Ceresa-Gastaldo, 52 [=PG 90.964A4-10]); *Myst* 1 (PG 91.665A14-B1).

Creatures and God: *Myst* 1 (PG 91.665B8-C1, 668C1-5), 21 (697A9-12), 23 (701C1-4).

Seal and impression: *ThOec* 1.12 (PG 90.1088A14-B11); *Myst* 2 (PG 91.669B14-C4); *Amb* 10 (PG 91.1133B9); *TP* 3 (PG 91.48A14).

Ezechiel's wheels: *Myst* 2 (PG 91.669C6-9).

[3]An excellent treatment of the more common metaphors of unconfused union may be found in Jean Pépin, "'Stilla aquae modica multo infusa vino, ferrum ignitum, luce perfusus aer.' L'origine de trois comparisons familières à la théologie mystique médiévale," *Miscellanea André Combes* I, Divinitas 11 (Rome, 1967): 331-75.

Those interested in the Aristotelian and Stoic antecedents of the various kinds of mixture that turn up as Christological metaphors may also consult Pépin.

1. Whole and parts

The most fundamental and broadly applicable metaphor that Maximus

uses to describe unconfused union is that of a whole and its parts.

This image is ubiquitous in the Confessor's writings, particularly in the

Mystagogy, where it finds especially clear application, chiefly in

chapters one and two. Thus we will begin with the *Mystagogy*.

In *Mystagogy* 2, Maximus talks about the spiritual and material parts

of the world:

> Once again, there is but one world and it is not divided by its
> parts. On the contrary, it encloses the differences of the parts
> arising from ther natural properties by their relationship to
> what is one and indivisible in itself. Moreover, it shows that
> both [the spiritual and material parts] are the same thing with
> it and alternately with each other in an unconfused way and
> that the whole of one enters into the whole of the other, and
> both fill the same whole as parts fill a unit, and in this way the
> parts are uniformly and entirely filled as a whole.[4]

Several things need to be pointed out here. First, a whole is not

divided by its parts. Even though it has parts, it remains a whole

thing. Second, a whole encloses, or circumscribes, the differences of its

constituent parts within itself. These differences arise from *natural*

properties proper to each of the parts. And the whole is able to

circumscribe these differences because of the relationship the parts

bear to the whole. Third, both parts not only constitute or make up

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[4]Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 188-89 (PG 91.669B9-14): Πάλιν εἷς ἐστι
κόσμος τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μὴ συνδιαιρούμενος μέρεσι· τοὐναντίον δὲ, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν μερῶν
τὴν ἐξ ἰδιότητος φυσικῆς διαφορὰν, τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον ἀναφορᾷ
περιγράφων· καὶ ταυτὸν ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀσυγχύτως ἐναλλὰξ ὄντας· καὶ
θατέρῳ θάτερον ὅλον ὅλῳ δεικνὺς ἐμβεβηκότα· καὶ ἄμφω ὅλον αὐτὸν ὡς μέρη ἕνα
συμπληροῦντας καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὅλον μέρη ἑνοειδῶς τε καὶ ὁλικῶς συμπλη-
ρουμένους.

the whole, but they in fact *are* the whole; and not only are both parts

taken together the whole, but each part individually is the whole, and

this is so without any confusion, alteration, diminution or metamorphosis

in the constitutent parts. This is the key to the relationship between

the parts and the whole. Fourth, each part is the same thing as the

other part, but in an unconfused way, i.e., each part is wholly the other

without losing its own self-identity. And so we are able to say, lastly,

that the whole of each part wholly fills the whole, and the whole wholly

fills each part.

Let us take, as a second example and further illustration, this

passage from the beginning of *Mystagogy* 2:

> On the second level of contemplation he used to speak of
> God's holy Church as a figure and image of the entire world
> composed of visible and invisible essences because like it, it
> contains both unity and diversity.
> For while it is one house in its construction it admits of a
> certain diversity in the disposition of its plan by being divided
> into an area exclusively assigned to priests and ministers, which
> we call a sanctuary, and one accessible to all the faithful, which
> we call a nave. Still, it is one in its basic reality [lit., *hypo-
> stasis*] without being being divided into its parts by reason of
> the differences between them, but rather by their relationship
> to the unity it frees these parts from the difference arising
> from their names. It shows to each other that they are both
> the same thing, and reveals that one is to the other in turn
> what each one is for itself.[5]

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[5]Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 188 (PG 91.668C10-69A3): Κατὰ δευτέραν
δὲ θεωρίας ἐπιβολήν, τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου τοῦ ἐξ ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀοράτων οὐσιῶν
ὑφεστῶτος, εἶναι τύπον καὶ εἰκόνα, τὴν ἁγίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ Ἐκκλησίαν ἔφασκεν· ὡς τὴν
αὐτὴν αὐτῷ καὶ ἕνωσιν, καὶ διάκρισιν ἐπιδεχομένην. Ὥσπερ γὰρ αὕτη κατὰ τὴν
οἰκοδομὴν εἰς οἶκος ὑπάρχουσα, τὴν κατὰ τὴν θέσιν τοῦ σχήματος ποιᾷ ἰδιότητι,
δέξεται διαφοράν, διαιρουμένη εἴς τε τὸν μόνοις ἱερεῦσί τε καὶ λειτουργοῖς ἀπό-
κληρον τόπον, ὃν καλοῦμεν ἱερατεῖον· καὶ τὸν πᾶσι τοῖς πιστοῖς λαοῖς πρὸς ἐπίβασιν
ἄνετον, ὃν καλοῦμεν ναόν. Πάλιν μία ἐστί κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη
τοῖς ἑαυτῆς μέρεσι, διὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν διαφοράν· ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ
τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἑαυτῆς ἀναφορᾷ τὸ μέρη, τῆς ἐν τῇ κλήσει διαφορᾶς ἀπολύουσα, καὶ

Here we find a treatment of whole and parts that accords completely with the first one, though it is less technical in its presentation. The one whole admits a certain diversity in the parts from which it is composed, but for all that, it remains one in hypostasis. The differences in the parts do not divide the one hypostasis because the differences in the parts are differences proper to nature, not to hypostasis. Moreover, the parts are freed from difference by their relationship to the whole. That is, the parts different in nature find unity in the hypostatic identity. And the way this is to be understood is that, in virtue of the unity, each part is *the same thing*, each is hypostasized in one and the same hypostasis and make up one reality, one really existent thing. Further, each part is to the other what it is for itself, or put more simply, each part *is* what the other part *has*.[6] Each part communicates the whole of itself wholly to the other part without ceasing to be what it is in itself.

And further, the overall sense of the passage leads us to believe that there is a certain priority given to the whole over the parts in virtue of it being the whole of the parts. This belief is strengthened by a statement in *Mystagogy* 1, where Maximus says that "the parts are brought forth from the whole,"[7] just like effects from a cause. Hence

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ταυτὸν ἀλλήλοις ἄμφω δεικνύουσα· καὶ θάτερον θατέρῳ κατ' ἐπαλλαγὴν ὑπάρχον, ὅπερ ἑκάτερον ἑαυτῷ καθέστηκεν ὂν ἀποφαίνουσα·

[6] I am indebted to Dr. Eric Perl for this happy phrase.

[7] PG 91.665B3: Πέφυκε γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς ὁλότητος τὰ μέρη . . .

we may conclude a certain priority of the whole over the parts, because it is the whole that gives rise to the parts.

To take a third general example, this time from Trinitarian theology, we turn to the *Theological and Economic Centuries* 2.1, which describes, in full Byzantine rhetorical splendor, the relationships that obtain between the divine essence and the divine hypostases. Because it is wearisome to read all at once, we will take it in small bites and provide the commentary as we go along.

> There is one God because [there is] one divinity, monad, unoriginate, simple and super-essential, without parts and undivided; the same is monad and triad, the same wholly monad and the same wholly triad; the same wholly monad according to essence, and the same wholly triad according to hypostases.[8]

At the very beginning we are presented with the unity of God, i.e. the unity of the whole, but we are told that God is without parts and undivided. This is because of the divine unity, simplicity, and unoriginate supersubstantiality, as well as because God is undivided. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the three hypostases are spoken of exactly as if they were parts, for God is as identically and wholly triad as he is monad, even though he is such without parts.

> For the divinity is the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the divinity is in Father, Son and Holy Spirit.[9]

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[8]PG 90.1124D12-25A5: Εἰς Θεὸς, ὅτι μία θεότης, μόνας, ἄναρχος καὶ ἁπλῆ καὶ ὑπερούσιος· καὶ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος· ἡ αὐτὴ μονὰς καὶ Τριάς· ὅλη μονὰς ἡ αὐτὴ, καὶ ὅλη Τριὰς ἡ αὐτή· μονὰς ὅλη κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἡ αὐτή, καὶ Τριὰς ὅλη κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις ἡ αὐτή.

[9]PG 90.1125A5-7: Πατὴρ γὰρ, καὶ Υἱὸς, καὶ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἡ θεότης, καὶ ἐν Πατρὶ, καὶ Υἱῷ, καὶ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι ἡ θεότης.

The parts, taken severally, "is" the whole, and the whole is in all the parts, again taken severally.

> The same whole [divinity] is in the whole Father, and the whole Father is in the whole of it; the same whole is in the whole Son, and the whole Son is in the same whole of it. And the same whole is in the whole Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit is in the same whole of it.[10]

From this section we learn that the parts are themselves considered as wholes and that the whole of each part is in the whole of the Godhead, just as the whole Godhead is in the whole of each part, this time taken individually. What begins to emerge is the recognition that the whole of each hypostasis/part is identical with the whole nature/Godhead in everything except hypostasis. Also, a clear allusion is being made to the definition of Chalcedon, which ascribed the realities of the Incarnation time and time again to "the same" incarnate Logos.

> The whole is the Father and in the whole Father; and the whole Father is the whole of it. And the same whole is the whole Son, and the whole is in the whole Son, and the whole Son is the whole of it, and the Son is in the same whole of it. And the same whole is the Holy Spirit and in the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is the whole of it and the whole Holy Spirit is in the same whole of it.[11]

It is curious that the whole Godhead is both said *to be* each of the three parts and said to be *in* each of those parts as well. Again, this

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[10]PG 90.1125A7-11: Ὅλη ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Πατρὶ ἡ αὐτή· καὶ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ αὐτῇ ὁ Πατήρ· καὶ ὅλη ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Υἱῷ ἡ αὐτή καὶ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ αὐτῇ ὁ Υἱός. Καὶ ὅλη ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ ἡ αὐτή· καὶ ὅλον ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ αὐτῇ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.

[11]PG 90.1125A12-B3: Ὅλη Πατήρ, καὶ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Πατρί· καὶ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῃ ὁ Πατήρ, καὶ ὅλη ὅλος ὁ Πατήρ. Καὶ ὅλη ὅλος ὁ Υἱὸς ἡ αὐτή· καὶ ὅλη ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Υἱῷ ἡ αὐτή· καὶ ὅλος ὅλη, καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ αὐτῇ ὁ Υἱός. Καὶ ὅλη Πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἡ αὐτή, καὶ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ· καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὅλον ὅλη, καὶ ὅλον ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ αὐτῇ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.

is evidence that each hypostasis is identical with the one Godhead in everything except hypostasis.

Note that the Father is not said to be "in the whole" of the Godhead like the Son and Holy Spirit are. This discrepancy in the "divine geometry" may be explained by the *monarchia* of the Father articulated in classical, Cappadocian Trinitarian theology: it the hypostasis of the Father—not the divine essence—which is the cause of the other two divine hypostases. The Father is not "in the whole" of the Godhead like the Son and Holy Spirit are because the Father is not caused like the Son and the Holy Spirit, who have their origin "in the whole" of the Father.

> For neither is the Godhead partly in the Father nor is the Father partly God; nor is the Godhead partly in the Son nor the Son partly God; nor is the Godhead partly in the Holy Spirit nor the Holy Spirit partly God. For neither is the Godhead divisible nor are Father, Son and Holy Spirit imperfect God. Rather the whole and entire Godhead is entirely in the entire Father, and the same whole and entire Godhead is entirely in the entire Son; and the same whole and entire Godhead is entirely in the entire Holy Spirit.[12]

This section simply restates the ideas already presented, but in a negative way, and recapitulates them. In our understanding of whole and parts, one part + one part + one part = one whole. But, it is not permissible to say that one part = one-third whole. (Nor is it

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[12]PG 90.1125B3-12: Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ μέρους ἡ θεότης ἐν τῷ Πατρί, ἢ ἐκ μέρους Θεὸς ὁ Πατήρ· οὔτε ἐκ μέρους ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ ἡ θεότης, ἢ ἐκ μέρους Θεὸς ὁ Υἱός· οὔτε ἐκ μέρους ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι ἡ θεότης, ἢ ἐκ μέρους Θεὸς τὸ Πμεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Οὔτε γὰρ μεριστὴ ἡ θεότης· οὔτε ἀτελὴς Θεὸς ὁ Πατὴρ, ἢ ὁ Υἱός, ἢ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον· ἀλλ' ὅλη ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ τελεία τελείως ἐν τελείῳ τῷ Πατρί· καὶ ὅλη τελεία τελείως ἐν τελείῳ τῷ Υἱῷ ἡ αὐτή· καὶ ὅλη τελεία τελείως ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τελείῳ τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι.

permissible to say that three parts = three wholes. We have met both
of these errors before, and will meet them again.)

> For the whole Father is entirely in the whole Son and the Holy
> Spirit; and the whole Son is entirely in the whole Father and
> the Holy Spirit; and the whole Holy Spirit is entirely in the
> whole Father and the Son.[13]

Here we have the complement to the idea that each part is in the whole,

for not only is each part in the whole, but each part is in each of the

other parts as well. It is important to note that Maximus does not say

that "the Father *is* the Son" or that "the whole Father is the whole

Son," for that would lead to a confusion of the parts among themselves,

and he is concerned with maintaining the union unconfused. Rather, he

will only say that "the Father is *in* the Son," thereby preserving the

distinction of hypostases.

> This is why there is only one God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
> For there is one and the same essence, power and act of the
> Father and Son and Holy Spirit, since no one of them can exist
> or be conceived without the others.[14]

The reason we can say that three hypostases are one God is that there

is one and the same essence, power, and act common to the three.

In this last section, and in contradistinction to the quotations from

Mystagogy 2, there seems to be a priority of the hypostases over the

Godhead, of the parts over the whole, because their unity is recognized

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[13]PG 90.1125B12-C1: Ὅλος γὰρ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Υἱῷ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι τελείως
ἐστὶν ὁ Πατήρ· καὶ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Πνεύματι τελείως ἐστὶν ὁ Υἱός·
καὶ ὅλον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ τελείως ἐστὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.

[14]PG 90.1125C1-5: Διὸ καὶ εἷς Θεὸς ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Υἱὸς καὶ τό Πνεῦμα τὸ
ἅγιον. Μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία καὶ δύναμις καὶ ἐνέργεια Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ
ἁγίου Πνεύματος· οὐκ ὄντος οὐδενὸς τοῦ ἑτέρου χωρὶς ἢ νοουμένου. Berthold's
translation (*Maximus Confessor*, 147-48) is very close to ours.

from the essence, power and act common among the three. How can this difference be explained? It is explained by noting that in the passages from the *Mystagogy*, the whole had priority over the parts because the whole *hypostasized* the parts. Likewise in the case of the Trinity: the parts have priority over the whole because the parts *hypostasize* the whole.[15] Thus it is proper to speak neither of a priority of whole over parts nor of parts over whole, but rather to speak of a priority of hypostasis over nature. And we are able to speak in this way because it is the hypostasis which really *is*.

We should also point out the triad of essence, power and act, which, for our purposes, is better rendered essence, power and operation. *Operation* will, of course, be the "operative" term in Monenergism, while one particular power, *will*, will be the operative term in Monotheletism; in this way the triad of essence, power and operation will become important in the Christological debates.[16]

This much should provide an adequate picture of how Maximus understands the relationship of whole and parts. To round out the discussion, we should not neglect to present an instance of the whole

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[15]We do not, in the case of the Trinity, intend to push the priority of hypostases over nature so far that we end up with the opposite of the common parody of Trinitarian theology: nature-prior-to-hypostasis. As Maximus says at the beginning of *ThOec* 2.1, God is equally and entirely (and simultaneously) monad and triad. The point to be made here is that the divine nature does not exist apart from, above, or anterior to the hypostases, but rather that the divine nature only exists *hypostatically*, i.e., in the hypostases and as hypostases.

[16]This triad was also important in the Origenist controversy, but in a way that has little bearing on Monenergism and Monotheletism. See Polycarp Sherwood, *The Earlier Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor*, Studia Anselmiana 36 (Rome: Herder, 1955), 103-16.

and parts metaphor at work in Christology. As we shall see in the next four chapters, the metaphor will be used here and there to illustrate the various aspects of hypostatic union that will be considered. In addition to its ancillary role, however, we do find instances of the whole and parts metaphor standing alone in Christological texts. In light of what has already been said about wholes and parts, the following passage from *Epistle* 15 will need little commentary:

> One and the same Christ persevering without change, without separation and without confusion in the abiding of the parts from which he is composed, so that by hypostasis he is the mediator of the parts from which he is composed, joining in Himself the distance of the extremes, "making peace and reconciling to the God" and Father, by the Holy Spirit, the nature of humanity. He truly exists as God by essence, and he truly became man in nature by the economy. He is not divided by the natural difference of his proper parts, neither is he confused in their hypostatic union. But by reason of the essential communion of the parts from which he is composed, united naturally to the Father and Mother, he is shown preserving the difference of the parts from which he is composed, one to the other. And by reason of the hypostatic property of his proper parts which distinguishes Him from the extremes (I mean from his Father and Mother) he is shown having the unicity of his own hypostasis completely without difference and wholly one in personal identity, uniting the extremes of his proper parts, the one to the other. The essential sharing of each of the parts toward the extremes, in the unity of the one hypostasis, preserves the difference of each nature unconfused.[17]

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[17]PG 91.556A1-B10: εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ μονιμότητι τῶν ἐξ ὧν συνέστη μερῶν διαμένων ἄτρεπτος, ἀδιαίρετός τε καὶ ἀσύγχυτος· ἵνα ᾖ καθ' ὑπόστασιν μεσίτης τοῖς ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη μέρεσι· τὴν τῶν ἄκρων ἐν ἑαυτῷ συνάπτων διάστασιν· ποιῶν εἰρήνην, καὶ ἀποκαταλλάσσων τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Πατρὶ διὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην· ὡς Θεὸς ἀληθῶς κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπάρχων, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῶς φύσει κατ' οἰκονομίαν γενόμενος· μήτε τῇ κατὰ φύσιν διαφορᾷ τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν διαιρούμενος, μήτε τῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἑνότητι τῶν αὐτῶν συγχεόμενος· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν λόγῳ τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν τῶν ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη μερῶν κοινότητος, Πατρί τε καὶ Μητρὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐνούμενος, τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη μερῶν διεδείκνυτο σώζων διαφοράν· τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τῆς καθ' ὑπόστασιν τῶν οἰκείων μερῶν ἰδιότητος, τῶν ἄκρων Πατρός τέ φημι καὶ Μητρὸς διακρινόμενος, τὸ μοναδικὸν τῆς οἰκείας ὑποστάσεως ἔχων διεφαί-

Christ is one and the same "persevering without change, without
separation and without confusion in the abiding of the parts from which
he is composed." Christ, who is one and the same, is a whole consti-
tuted from two parts, divinity and humanity. But since a whole is not
divided by its parts, Christ is able to abide as a whole *in* the two parts
from which he is constituted. And since we know the union in Christ is
unconfused, we are not surprised to find here three of the four
"Chalcedonian adverbs" as guardians of the Confessor's Orthodoxy.
Also, the clear allusions to both "in two natures" and "from two
natures" gives added depth to the Christology being articulated and
shows it to have Neo-Chalcedonian coloring.

"By hypostasis he is the mediator of the parts from which he is
composed. . . . He truly exists as God by essence, and he truly became
man in nature by the economy." A whole circumscribes the difference
of its constituent parts within itself. Thus Christ, as a whole and an
hypostasis, is able to bring together as a mean the two extremes, the
divine nature and the human nature, from which he is composed.

"He is not divided by the natural difference of his proper parts,
neither is he confused in their hypostatic union." Difference in nature
between the two parts does not divide the unity of Christ, which unity
is a hypostatic one, nor does the identity of hypostasis confuse the

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νετο παντελῶς ἀδιάφορον, ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα κατ' ἄκρον προσωπικῇ ταυτότητι τῶν
οἰκείων μερῶν διαπαντὸς ἐνιζόμενον. Ἡ γὰρ κατ' οὐσίαν θατέρου τῶν μερῶν πρὸς
τὰ ἄκρα κοινότης, ἐν τῇ ἑνότητι τῆς μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως, ἀσύγχυτον τὸ διάφορον τῆς
θατέρου διασώζουσα φύσεως . . . Quoted in Piret, *Le Christ*, 186, 193, 198.

difference between the two parts or natures, because it is a natural difference.

> But by reason of the essential communion of the parts from which he is composed, united naturally to the Father and to the Mother, he is shown preserving the difference of the parts from which he is composed.

The divine and human parts of Christ are united to the Father and to the Most Holy Theotokos by nature; that is to say, Christ is *homoousios* with the Father with regards to his divinity, and *homoousios* with his Mother with regards to his humanity. Because of this essential communion that persists in hypostatic union, the parts from which Christ is composed also persist. The integrity of the parts in an unconfused union remains intact.

> And by reason of the hypostatic property of his proper parts, which distinguishes Him from the extremes (I mean from his Father and Mother), he is shown having the unicity of his own hypostasis completely without difference and wholy one in personal identity, uniting the extremes of his parts, the one to the other.

The previous sentence was concerned with maintaining the integrity of the two parts in the whole. Now we are concerned with maintaining the whole in the face of the two constituent parts. While Christ is united by nature to his divine Father and human Mother, he is also distinguished from them by hypostasis. And it is by hypostasis, not by nature, that he brings together the extremes from which he is composed.

> The hypostatic property of each of the parts, toward the composition of the whole [that is] Christ, has led to a common characteristic of the parts, characterizing the hypostasis [as] one [which is] constituted of them.

It is in the one hypostasis of Christ that the two constitutent parts find their common existence, and it is in virtue of both natures being in the

one hypostasis that they share a common set of hypostatic charac-
teristics.

This much should provide an examination of the whole and parts
metaphor sufficient to understand it and sufficient to demonstrate its
utility in Theology and Christology. We will be able to return to it
when it turns up again in later chapters.

2. Fire and iron

The fire and iron metaphor also occurs frequently in the
Confessor's writings, but not nearly as much as the whole and parts
image. This metaphor is frequently met together with a closely related
one, that of light and air. However, rarely is either metaphor explained
in the Maximian corpus; they are usually mentioned in passing as ready-
to-hand, well-known illustrations of what Maximus is talking about.
Thus the two metaphors typically occur in passages like the following.
Here Maximus is discussing deification, and his use of the whole and
parts image is more notable than it is for the fire and iron, and light
and air metaphors:

> [The lover hastens toward the beloved and] does not rest until
> the whole [lover] comes to be in the whole beloved [God] and
> encompassed by the whole, willingly receiving the whole saving
> circumscription by choice, so that the whole [lover] is qualified
> by the whole circumscriber [God], there being nothing whatever
> left that the whole circumscribed can desire to be characterized
> from itself, but from the circumscriber, as air is iillumined
> through the whole of light, and as iron is inflamed by fire.[18]

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[18]*Amb.* 7 (PG 91.1073D1-1076A5): οὐχ ἵσταται μέχρις ἂν γένηται ὅλον ἐν
τῷ ἐραστῷ ὅλῳ καὶ ὑφ' ὅλου περιληφθῇ, ἑκουσίως ὅλον κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν
σωτήριον περιγραφὴν δεχόμενον, ἵν' ὅλον ὅλῳ ποιωθῇ τῷ περιγράφοντι, ὡς μηδ' ὅλως

Given their close association with the whole and parts image, fire and iron, as well as light and air, are easily understood; in fact, they are by and large common illustrations of the whole and parts metaphor itself.

There is one passage in *Opuscule* 16 where Maximus lays out in some detail what the fire and iron metaphor means. We will use it as our text to illustrate this metaphor and show its Christological utility. The passage occurs in an argument where Maximus is defending the Dyothelite position, i.e., that will is proper to nature (not to hypostasis):

> And how is the incarnate Logos perfect man without a natural [human] will? For just as being deified through union with God does not deprive the nature of the rational and noetically ensouled flesh of [its] essential reality, so too the extreme and thorough mixture and union with fire does not deprive iron of its proper nature; but it suffers the fire, since it has become fire in the union; and again, it remains naturally heavy, and it cuts, for it endured no mutilation of its proper nature, nor did the whole lose its natural operation, even though it is with fire according to one and the same hypostasis and does inseparably both what is proper to it by nature—I mean the cutting—and, moreover, what is proper to it by the union, which is the burning. For the cutting belongs to the iron as well as to the fire because of the extreme interpenetration and communication. We are absolutely not forbidden to name and number either its nature—I mean that of the iron— even if it is seen with fire, or the natural operation [of the iron], even if it is seen with burning, and it is not set apart from it, but it is seen and known as being united both with it and in it.[19]

λοιπὸν βούλεσθαι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὅλον γνωρίζεσθαι δύνασθαι τὸ περιγραφό-μενον, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ περιγράφοντος· ὡς ἀὴρ δι' ὅλου πεφωτισμένος φωτί, καὶ πυρὶ σίδηρος, ὅλος ὅλῳ πεπυρακτωμένος. Quoted in Eric Perl, "Methexis: Creation, Incarnation, Deification in Saint Maximus the Confessor," Ph.D. diss. (Yale, 1991), 128.

[19]*TP* 16 (PG 91.189C7-192A5): Καὶ πῶς τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ὁ σαρκωθεὶς Λόγος, θελήματος ἐκτὸς φυσικοῦ; Τὸ γὰρ θεωθῆναι τῇ πρὸς Θεὸν ἑνώσει, καθὰ καὶ

When iron is heated in fire until it glows, we have an example of unconfused union. There is only one existent thing, one hypostasis, which is the fiery sword. The fact that the sword has taken on the nature of fire does not mean that it has become two things; on the contrary, it remains one. In the union of iron and fire in the one sword, the iron subsists as iron and the fire as fire. Thus the fiery sword subsists *in* the two natures *from* which it is composed. All of the characteristics of iron remain intact: it is metal, it is heavy, and it cuts. All of the characteristics of fire remain intact also: it is hot, it gives off light, and it burns. Thus the natural properties of each nature persist in the union, just as the two natures do. Yet because there is only one sword, the two natures and their properties form only one reality: a fiery sword. And because both natures have become one hypostatically, the attributes of both are inseparably ascribed to the one hypostasis. Thus the sword not only cuts, but it simultaneously burns, so much so, in fact, that we can speak indistinguishably of a burning cut or of a cutting burn.

τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν τῆς λογικῶς τε καὶ νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένης σαρκός, τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ὀντότητος οὐκ ἐξίστησιν· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς οἰκείας τὸν σίδηρον, ἡ ἄκρα καὶ δι' ὅλου πρὸς τὸ πῦρ συνανάκρασίς τε καὶ ἕνωσις· ἀλλὰ πάσχει μὲν τὰ πυρός, ἐπειδὴ πῦρ τῇ ἑνώσει γεγένηται· βρίθει δὲ πάλιν κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ τέμνει, ὅτι μὴ τῆς οἰκείας λώβην πέπονθε φύσεως, ἢ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐξέστη τὸ σύνολον· καίτοι μετὰ πυρὸς ὑπάρχων κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ ἀδιαστάτως δρῶν τά τε κατὰ φύσιν ἰδίαν· λέγω δὲ τὴν τομήν· καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕνωσιν αὖθις, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ καῦσις. Αὐτοῦ γὰρ ὑπάρχει, καθάπερ καὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ τομή, διὰ τὴν ἄκραν τούτων εἰς ἄλληλα περιχώρησίν τε καὶ ἀντίδοσιν· καὶ οὔτε τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ φημί· δὲ τοῦ σιδήρου, κἂν μετὰ πυρὸς ὁρᾶται, κωλυόμεθα τὸ παράπαν ὀνομάζειν ἢ ἀριθμεῖν, οὔτε τὴν φυσικὴν ἐνέργειαν, εἰ καὶ μετὰ καύσεως καθορᾶται, καὶ μηδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς ταύτην διάστασιν, ἀλλ' ἑνοειδῶς σὺν αὐτῇ τε καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ διαφαίνεται καὶ γνωρίζεται.

It is clear how useful this metaphor is for Christology. Maximus found it particularly useful in combatting Monotheletism because it illustrates with great clarity the persistence of the properties of each nature in the union. As he says in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*,

> What would someone say about the burning sword, which preserves no less than the natures, i.e. of fire and iron, their natural operations, that is, cutting and burning, and which reveals these together with and in the same thing. For after the union the burning is not free of the cutting, nor the cutting of the burning. And through the duality of the natural operation [he] does not introduce two burning swords, nor through the unicity of the burning sword does [he] effect a mixture or a confusion of their essential differnce.[20]

Because the example of the fiery sword had frequently gone on to speak of the cutting burn and the burning cut, i.e., its action or operation, Maximus was able to use it with great force in argument against Monothelite foes. Like the whole and parts metaphor, we will see this image turn up here and there in the anti-Monothelite literature.

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[20] *Pyrr* §149 (PG 91.337D3-340A8): Τί δ' ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ περὶ τῆς πεπυρακτωμένης μαχαίρας, οὐχ ἧττον τῶν φύσεων, τουτέστι τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ τοῦ σιδήρου, καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας, τὴν καῦσίν φημι καὶ τὴν τομήν, σωζούσης, καὶ διὰ πάντων ἅμα, καὶ ἐν ταυτῷ, ταύτας ἐνδεικνυμένης; Οὔτε γὰρ ἡ καῦσις αὐτῆς τῆς τομῆς ἄφετός ἐστι μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, οὔτε ἡ τομὴ τῆς καύσεως· καὶ οὔτε διὰ τὸ διττὸν τῆς φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας, δύο εἰσάγει τὰς πεπυρακτωμένας μαχαίρας· οὔτε διὰ τὸ μοναδικὸν τῆς πεπυρακτωμένης μαχαίρας, τῆς αὐτῶν οὐσιώδους διαφορᾶς φύρσιν ἢ σύγχυσιν ποιεῖται.

CHAPTER III

THE TWO NATURES "FROM WHICH, IN WHICH, AND WHICH CHRIST IS"

A. Antecedents:

"From two natures" and "In two natures"

The dispute over which of the two phrases, "*from* two natures" or "*in* two natures," best characterizes the hypostatic union in Christ is too-well represented in the scholarly literature to bear repetition here. In light of the perspective which this dissertation assumes--that Chalcedon was fundamentally and thoroughly Cyrillian in content and outlook--we need only see that the receptivity of the post-Chalcedonian Church to Cyril's "from two natures" formula is eminently understandable. The reason the Fourth Synod rejected the phrase "from two natures" in favor of the phrase "in two natures" was that the Cyrillian formula by itself was insufficient to exclude the extreme views of Eutyches. However, once the Church had affirmed the persistence of two natures in the hypostatic union in Christ by confessing one Christ "in two natures," the dangers of Eutychianism were excluded, and the insight contained in the Cyrillian formula could also be affirmed.

Thus we find among the Neo-Chalcedonian writers a willingness to speak of Christ as both "in two natures" and "from two natures." How is this possible? By presupposing the distinction of hypostasis and

nature, which is the radical insight of Neo-Chalcedonian thought. Given this distinction, it is possible to say that "from two natures" can be ascribed to the unique hypostasis of the Word as the product of the divine and human natures, while "in two natures" can be ascribed to those two natures which persist after the union. Thus, as the Orthodox Fathers would say, to use the two phrases together advances no confusion, but confesses both the unity and the distinction in Christ.

One of the clearest voices to affirm the dual usage of "from two natures" and "in two natures" is the Emperor Justinian. In his *Letter to the Monks of Alexandria Against the Monophysites*, note how he distinguishes the two words "of (= "from") and "in":

> We must give careful consideration to what this father [Cyril] says. He teaches us to confess the preposition "in" with respect to the two natures of divinity and humanity, in which Christ is known. The heretics refuse to apply this preposition to the divinity and humanity of Christ for they allege that it introduces division. They fail to understand that this term preserves the union unconfused and undivided . . .
> . . . Christ exists in divinity and humanity, for just as to say "of divinity and humanity" means "of" two natures, so also to say "in divinity and humanity" means that Christ is and is known "in" two natures. Something which is said to be composed "of" certain elements produces a confusion and destroys what has come together, unless it is also understood [to exist] "in" those things "of" which it is composed.
> . . . if anyone confesses that our Lord Jesus Christ is constituted "of" two natures, namely divinity and humanity, while saying that the essences which have come together in him are not confused, then he must also confess that he is known "in" the two natures of divinity and humanity "of" which he is composed. In this way we both maintain the difference of the natures in Christ, and preserve their inseparable union.[1]

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[1]Kenneth Paul Wesche, ed. and trans., *On the Person of Christ: The Christology of Emperor Justinian* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1991), 32, 33, 34, with modifications.

Eduard Schwartz, *Drei dogmatische Schriften Iustinians.* Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophische-

Justinian is willing to acknowledge the truth to be found in the "from two natures" formula; indeed, Christ *is* from two natures. But the bald affirmation of "from two natures" is liable to end up confusing the two natures from which Christ is composed, or, worse, destroying them. To prevent their confusion or destruction, it is necessary to find a way to affirm the persistence and integrity of the two natures in the union. That is achieved by the "in two natures" formula. Moreover, to say both "from two natures" and "in two natures" underscores both the inseparable unity of the one hypostasis "from two natures," as well as the differences of the two natures in which the one Christ subsists.

To take a second text, in his *Edict on the True Faith*, Justinian says,

> Wherefore, when we speak of one composite Christ constituted *of each nature*, that is, of divinity and humanity, we do not introduce confusion into the union. And while we know our one Lord Jesus Christ, the Logos of God who was incarnate and became man, *in each nature*, that is in divinity and humanity, we do not introduce into his one hypostasis a division or

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historische Abteilung, Neue Folge. Heft 18 (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1939), p. 8, lines 40-41; p. 9, lines 1-3, 17-21, 33-36 (=PG 86.1109):Δεῖ κἀνταῦθα τοῖς παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰρημένοις ἐπισκέψαι· τὴν γὰρ ἐν πρόθεσιν ἐπὶ τῶν δύο φύσεων τῆς θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης, ἐν αἷς ὁ Χριστὸς γνωρίζεται, ὁμολογεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐκδιδάσκει, ἣν πρόθεσιν οἱ αἱρετικοὶ ἀρνοῦνται ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἁρμόζειν, διαίρεσιν δῆθεν προφασιζόμενοι διὰ ταύτης γίνεσθαι, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι αὕτη ἡ πρόθεσις τὴν ἕνωσιν ἀσύγχυτον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον φυλάττει.

. . . ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι τὸν Χριστὸν ὑπάρχειν ὁμολογεῖ, ὥσπερ δὲ τὸ ἐκ θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος ἐκ δύο φύσεων σημαίνει, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι ἐν δυσὶ φύσεσιν εἶναί τε καὶ γνωρίζεσθαι τὸν Χριστὸν δηλοῖ. Ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἔκ τινων συνεστάναι λεγόμενον ἐὰν μὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς γνωρίζηται ἐξ ὧν καὶ συνέστη, σύγχυσιν καὶ ἀφανισμὸν τῶν συνελθόντων ποιεῖ πραγμάτων . . .

. . . ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς δύο φύσεσιν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν γνωρίζεσθαι, ἐξ ὧν καὶ συνετέθη, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι. Οὕτω γὰρ οὔτε ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν ἐν Χριστῷ φύσεων ἀναιρεῖται καὶ ἡ τούτων ἕνωσις ἀδιάσπαστος φυλάττεται.

separation of parts, but we indicate the difference of the natures of which he is composed, which is not abolished because of the union, since each nature exists in him.[2]

Thus it is legitimate to employ both the "from" and the "in" together, because each phrase prevents the error inherent in the other. "In two natures" keeps "from two natures" from confusion or change, while "from two natures" keeps "in two natures" from division and separation. We also note the reference to the parts of the one whole Christ. Given what we know of whole and parts from the last chapter, we find that Justinian likewise understood the relationship of parts to a whole that Maximus will use: the whole Christ is not divided by his parts, while the parts remain unconfused in the whole.

One modern commentator does not understand Justinian's program completely. Referring to the last quotation above, Jaroslav Pelikan says that

> on the crucial question of one nature or two in the incarnate Logos, the confession equivocated. In one sentence it spoke of him as "one Christ synthesized from both natures," . . . but in the very next it went on to speak of acknowledging "one Lord in each nature.[3]

To return to the point made earlier, the Emperor's statements can be called equivocal only if hypostasis and nature are not clearly distin-

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[2]Ibid., 165-66 (Schwartz, 74, lines 14-18): Ὅθεν ἐξ ἑκατέρας φύσεως, τουτέστιν ἐκ θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος, ἕνα Χριστὸν σύνθετον λέγοντες σύγχυσιν τῇ ἑνώσει οὐκ ἐπεισάγομεν. Καὶ ἐν ἑκατέραι δὲ φύσει, τουτέστιν ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι, τὸν ἕνα κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα γινώσκοντες διαίρεσιν μὲν τὴν ἀνὰ μέρος ἢ τομὴν οὐκ ἐπιφέρομεν τῇ μιᾷ αὐτοῦ ὑποστάσει, τὴν δὲ διαφορὰν τῶν φύσεων, ἐξ ὧν καὶ συνετέθη, σημαίνομεν, οὐκ ἀνῃρημένην διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, ἐπειδὴ ἑκατέρα φύσις ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ.

[3]Pelikan, *Emergence*, 276.

guished, a distinction Justinian was endeavoring to make clear. The present author, therefore, cannot subscribe to Pelikan's assessment; on the contrary, far from equivocating, the Emperor was quite astute.

So, too, was Leontius of Jerusalem, who, like Justinian, also used the two phrases together:

> But if it is said, "You who therefore glorify the Lord in two natures, of what sort do you say these are?," we will respond without any envy that we say "from two" since both the divinity and the common humanity exist before the union of Christ; but we say "in two" since the common divinity is beyond the principle of the common and the particular, and since the particular humanity belongs to him alone [i.e., to the hypostasis of the Logos].[4]

Finally, we may note that the two phrases occur also in the eighth and ninth of the thirteen *Anathemas* which Justinian included in his *Edict.* These were subsequently adopted by the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. English translations have not done justice to the emphasis which the Greek text places on distinguishing and explaining the two phrases. Anathema 7 considers the "in two natures" formula and excludes interpretations which use the phrase to introduce division in Christ. It begins, "If someone says in two natures . . .". Anathema 8 speaks of "from two natures" and excludes interpretations which introduce confusion; it begins similarly with the words, "If someone

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[4]Leontius of Jerusalem, *Contra Monoph.* 58 (PG 86.1801A13-B6): Εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν· Ὑμεῖς οὖν ἐν δύο φύσεσι τὸν Δεσπότην δοξάζοντες, ὁποίων τούτων φατέ; ἀφθόνως αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν, ὡς ἐκ δύο μὲν τῆς τε θείας καὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἀνθρωπείας ἄμφω προϋπαρχουσῶν τῆς ἑνώσεως Χριστοῦ φαμεν· ἐν δύο δέ, τῆς τε ὑπέρ τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἰδικὸν οὔσης κοινῆς θεότητος καὶ τῆς ἰδικῆς μόνου αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπότητος. Quoted in Wesche, *Person*, 184, with modifications.

confesses from two natures . . .".[5] The juxtaposition of the two

phrases, their joint acceptance and positive employment, are clear.

B. Maximus:

The Two Natures "From which, in which and which Christ is"

As we might expect, Maximus knew and used both "from" and "in"

two natures as we have seen the two terms used in Justinian, Leontius

of Jerusalem, and the Fifth Council. To cite but one text,

> Just as they [the Monophysites] do not refuse to speak of two
> names of Christ [God and man] after the union, so also let them
> say, after the union [there are] the two natures of Christ, from
> which and in which he consists, and to which the names belong,
> if they truly, in good faith, confess that the things united by
> nature are really preserved after the union.
> And again, we believe that the same is without division in
> two natures, that is, in the divinity and in the humanity. Just
> as in speaking of from two natures, we think that Christ is
> from the divinity and the humanity, like a whole is from its
> parts; so also, in speaking of in two natures after the union, we
> believe him to be in the divinity and in the humanity, as a
> whole is in its parts. The parts of Christ are his divinity and
> humanity, from which and in which he subsists.[6]

Maximus accomplishes with his use of the the two phrases the same

thing that his predecessors did, namely the clear affirmation that

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[5]Tanner, *Decrees*, 117.

[6]*Epistle* 13 (PG 91.524C13-25A4): ὥσπερ οὐ παραιτοῦνται λέγειν τὰς δύο τοῦ Χριστοῦ μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν προσηγορίας, οὕτω καὶ τὰς δύο φύσεις τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν αἷς συνέστηκε λεγέτωσαν μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, ὧν καὶ προσηγορίαι· εἴπερ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πιστῶς ὁμολογοῦσι σώζεσθαι πραγματιωδῶς κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ ἐνωθέντα μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν.
Καὶ πάλιν ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀδιαιρέτως τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα πιστεύομεν, ὡς ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκ δύο φύσεων λέγοντες τὸν Χριστὸν, ἐκ θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος ὄντα νοοῦμεν, ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὅλον· οὕτω καὶ ἐν δύο φύσεσι λέγοντες μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι ὄντα πιστεύομεν, ὡς ὅλον ἐν μέρεσι. Μέρη δὲ Χριστοῦ ἡ θεότης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐστίν, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ἐν αἷς ὑφέστηκε. Cited in Piret, 208.

Christ's two natures subsist after the union. The Monophysites were willing to speak of the divinity and the humanity of Christ after the union, but they were unwilling to affirm that the divinity and the humanity persisted as two natures. In this passage, Maximus takes the Monophysites to task for applying names to the divinity and humanity of Christ without affirming the divine and human realities which give rise to the names. Sherwood notes in another context that Maximus "is clearly indebted to Justinian for his grasp of Origenism."[7] We see that the Confessor is indebted to him for a whole lot more.

As the title of this chapter suggests, Maximus gave depth to the accepted formula by adding a third phrase to the two we have been discussing. Hence, in Maximus it is not proper to speak only of "from two natures" and "in two natures," but also of "the two natures which Christ is." This third element is a unique contribution of Maximus.

Whether or not the addition of this third element is Christologically significant has been debated. Doucet was the first to point out Maximus' use of the tri-partite formula.[8] His estimation of it, however, is that it is not that significant and even "manifeste une certaine gaucherie." The traditional "from two natures" and "in two natures" only represent the divinity and the humanity of Christ *modo abstracto*, he says, while they are represented in the third element *modo concreto*. Doucet concludes that

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[7]*Earlier Ambigua*, 88.

[8]"La dispute," 117-19.

The first two members of the formula let us understand that there is a unique subject somehow distinct from its natures, while the third member only sets forth the duality of the natures.[9]

Piret challenged Doucet's estimation in an article and argued for the significance of the tri-partite formula.[10] Garrigues, in an article of his own, goes so far as to claim that the formula "is the key to the Christological doctrine of Maximus."[11]

The formula, the two natures "from which, in which, and which Christ is," occurs with great frequency in the Confessor's writings, in early works and in late ones, in anti-Monophysite polemic and in anti-Monothelite. In earlier, anti-Monophysite writings, the formula is used only with reference to the two natures of Christ, as might be expected (as, for example, in the quotation from *Epistle* 13 above). However, once Maximus engages Monenergism and the subsequent Monotheletism, the consideration of natures is broadened into a consideration of the powers (i.e., wills) and the operations of the two natures. This application

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[9]Ibid., 119.

[10]"Christologie et théologie trinitaire chez Maxime le Confesseur, d'après sa formule des natures 'desquelles, en lesquelles et lesquelles est le Christ'." In *Maximus Confessor. Actes du Symposium sur Maxime le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 septembre 1980,* ed. Felix Heintzer and Christoph von Schönborn. Paradosis: Études de littérature et de théologie anciennes 27, 215-22. This article is a restatement of the chief points Piret makes in *Le Christ,* 205-39, in which he presents and analyzes several passages from the Maximian corpus where the formula occurs. The present chapter is indebted to Piret's analysis.

[11]"La personne composée du Christ d'après S. Maxime le Confesseur," *Revue Thomiste* 74 (1974): 196, note 71.

bears directly on Maximus' response to the latter two heresies.[12] For

the purposes of our analysis, we will consider three instances of the

tri-partite formula.

1. *Opuscule* 19

In the ninteenth *Opuscule*, Maximus answers two difficulties put

forth by Theodore the Deacon and Rhetor, Secretary to Archbishop Paul

of Constantinople. The substance of the first difficulty is this: God is

omniscient. So is his Word. Therefore the Incarnate Word, Christ,

cannot really be said to be ignorant. Hence, Christ's human ignorance

is appropriated (κατ' οἰκείωσιν). Similarly, we may say that his human

will is also appropriated.[13]

In his response to this difficulty, Maximus first disposes of the

error of subscribing ignorance and will to the same rubric. Ignorance

is a privation; will is a natural power. Thus it does not follow that if

ignorance be appropriated, will must likewise be appropriated. Maximus

then goes on to ascribe will to nature and to say that where the

attributes or properties of a nature are lacking, there also the nature

itself is lacking.[14] In conclusion he says,

> Those who believe in him in an Orthodox way do not rely upon
> such reasonings, [which are] like a cobweb of thought in their
> feebleness, for [the two natures] *from* which Christ is, Christ is

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[12]In passing, we may also point out that there is even a Trinitarian
use of the formula in *Epistle* 15 (PG 91.552A3-4), where Maximus speaks
of "the persons in which and which is the unique Divinity."

[13]*TP* 19 (PG 91.216B4-C4).

[14]Ibid. (PG 91.218B1-224A10).

in, and [the two natures] *in* which Christ is, Christ *is*. Thus Christ *is* identically both God and man; he is *in* the divinity and humanity.[15]

Maximus here affirms that not only is Christ from two natures, but that two natures subsist in him after the union. In this way he allows a human nature to ground the human will of Christ. But in addition, Christ *is* the two natures in which he subsists. Thus, all the attributes of each nature (especially the human) are properly and really Christ's.

2. *Relatio motionis*

The same line of argumentation is found in the *Relatio motionis*, the account of Maximus' first trial. Here, Maximus is told that Roman legates are come to Constantinople to unite with the Byzantine Monothelite hierarchy. The Confessor responds,

> And I am certainly not convinced that the Romans will unite with them if they will not confess that our Lord and God, according to each of the [natures] from which he is, in which he is, and which he is, by nature both wills and effects our salvation.[16]

A little later in the account he says,

> If he is perfect according to each [nature], as nothing is lacking to either, it is obvious that he is corrupting the whole mystery who does not confess that he is what he is with all the

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[15]Ibid. (PG 91.224A9-14): ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς ὡς ἐξ ἀράχνης τῆς κατ' αὐτοὺς ἀδρανοῦς διανοίας ἐπερείδεσθαι λόγοις, τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸν ὀρθοδόξως πιστεύοντας, ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός· καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς, ταῦτά ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός. Ἔστιν οὖν Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ταὐτῷ ὁ Χριστός· ἔστι δὲ ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι·

[16]*RM* 7 (PG 90.121B9-13): καὶ οὐ πείθομαι πάντως ὅτι οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἑνοῦνται τοῖς ἐνταῦθα, εἰ μὴ ὁμολογήσωσι τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν καὶ Θεὸν, καθ' ἑκατέραν τῶν ἐξ ὧν, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἅπερ ἐστίν, εἶναι φύσει θελητικόν τε καὶ ἐνεργητικὸν τῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας.

natural properties in which and which he is that belong to him according to each [nature].[17]

Again, the import is that to preserve the reality of a human will in Christ, one must safeguard the reality of the human nature in which it is grounded. The old anti-Monophysite arguments still obtain: to say Christ is "from two natures" is insufficient to preserve the full reality of the human nature. To say "in two natures" does preserve the human nature. To say Christ is the two natures intensifies the reality of each nature after the union: Christ *is* his human nature and his divine nature. This is one way the "which Christ is" phrase works, as an intensifier for the "in two natures" phrase. Reinforcing the real persistence of the two natures after the union is an important first step in combatting Monotheletism. Only an existent, intact human nature can ground an existent, intact human will.

3. *Epistle* 15

Epistle 15 was written to Cosmas the Alexandrian Deacon. It is basically an anti-Monophysite tract, but the conclusion gives what is perhaps Maximus' most extended commentary on the tri-partite formula, "from which, in which, and which Christ is." In his analysis of it, Piret

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[17]*RM* 9 (PG 90.124B3-8): Εἰ δὲ τέλειός ἐστι καθ' ἑκάτερον, ὡς οὐδενὸς καθ' ἑκάτερον ἐλλιπής, προφανῶς τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν ὅλον νοθεύει μυστήριον, ὁ μὴ ὁμολογῶν αὐτὸν εἶναι ὅπερ ἐστί, μετὰ τῶν προσόντων αὐτῷ καθ' ἑκάτερον, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἅπερ ἐστί, πάντων φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων.

divides the passage into four sections for commentary.[18] We shall do likewise.

> For Christ is not only from these [natures], but also in these, and to speak more authoritatively, is these. We number [the natures] from which Christ is after the union. We do not separate the natures (God forbid!), but we only make clear that their difference is preserved after the union.[19]

The statement that Christ is the two natures points to the real and singular unity of the two natures as the one person, the two natures from which and in which Christ is, Christ is, and apart from them there is no nature to consider, number, or identify, for Christ is in fact the single instance of the two natures of divinity and humanity. Having set forth the tri-partite formula, Maximus goes on to speak more fully about each of the three elements which make it up.

> Following St. Cyril, we confess a conjunction [of the two natures] according to a natural union, i.e. truly and really, and we venerate the most holy Virgin, truly and rightly Theotokos. She conceived, not simply but really, God the Word himself, begotten of the Father ineffably before all ages; and she begat him indescribably who was made flesh from her.[20]

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[18]Piret, *Le Christ*, 210-20.

[19]*Ep.* 15 (PG 91.573A4-9): Οὐ μόνον γὰρ ἐκ τούτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις, καὶ κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν, ταῦτά ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός· ἀριθμοῦμεν δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν τὰ ἐξ ὧν ὁ Χριστός, οὐ μερίζοντες, μὴ γένοιτο, τὰς φύσεις, ἀλλὰ μόνην τῆς αὐτῶν σῳζομένης μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν διαφορᾶς ποιούμενοι δήλωσιν. Cited in Piret, *Le Christ*, 210.

[20]Ibid. (PG 91.573A9-B2): Σύνοδον δὲ καθ' ἕνωσιν φυσικήν, ἤγουν ἀληθῆ τε καὶ πραγματικὴν ὁμολογοῦμεν κατὰ τὸν ἅγιον Κύριλλον, καὶ Θεοτόκον κυρίως καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τὴν παναγίαν Παρθένον πρεσβεύομεν· οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων ἀφράστως ἐκ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα Θεὸν Λόγον συλλαβοῦσαν ἀληθῶς, καὶ ἀρρήτως ἐξ αὐτῆς σαρκωθέντα γεννήσασαν. Cited in Piret, *Le Christ*, 210-11.

Maximus begins with the first element, "from two natures." In an anti-Monophysite tract, that is the logical place to start, for the Monophysites affirmed the "from two natures" formula. Maximus addresses the origins of the natures from which Christ is: the divine, as begotten from the Father; and the human, as begotten from the Theotokos. These natures come together in a natural union, i.e. in a union of one nature with the other. Maximus and the Monophysite will differ on how this is to be understood: the Monophysite will confuse nature and hypostasis and speak of a synthetic nature, while Maximus will distinguish hypostasis and nature and speak of one synthetic hypostasis in which the integrity of the constitutent natures are preserved. Finally, we note that while both the two natures and the one hypostasis of the Logos are mentioned here, the relationship between them has yet to be addressed.

> And His, we say, are the miracles and the sufferings. Clearly as one sole being, Christ operates the divine things and the human things. He does the divine things humanly, for he showed the power of miracles through a natural operation that did not share [in them]. And he does the human things divinely, without natural power, by authority he willingly underwent the experience of human sufferings.[21]

Here is the consideration of the second element, "in two natures." The locus and principle of unity is not to be found in the divine nature of the Logos, but in the hypostasis of the Logos, who is become incarnate.

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[21]Ibid. (PG 91.573B2-9): Καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τά τε θαύματα καὶ τὰ πάθη λέγομεν, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος δηλαδὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐνεργοῦντος· τὰ μὲν θεῖα σαρκικῶς, ὅτι διὰ φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας οὐκ ἀμοιρούσης τὴν τῶν θαυμάτων προυβάλλετο δύναμιν· τὰ δ' ἀνθρώπινα θεϊκῶς, ὅτι δίχα βίας φυσικῆς, κατ' ἐξουσίαν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθῶν θέλων κατεδέχετο πεῖραν. Cited in Piret, *Le Christ*, 213.

The incarnate Logos is what Maximus means when he says "Christ".
Echoes of Leo's *agit utraque* can be heard here, each nature doing in
conjunction with the other what is proper to it. Moreover, as we saw
earlier in this chapter, the persistence of each nature in the hypostatic
union is manifest by the persistence of divine and human operations,
which witness to the natures in which they are grounded. The relation-
ship between the hypostasis of Christ and his two natures is that the
hypostasis is "in" the two natures "from" which it is composed.

> And his [we say] are the cross, the death, the tomb, the resur-
> rection, and the ascension into heaven; having come down from
> there without flesh, he returned without a change of place, he
> who is not circumscribed in any way by [created] reality. He
> exists free of all circumscription. But he appeared in flesh as
> the lover of man by nature, becoming circumscribed in his true
> birth from a woman, as he wished, by our [reality]. That is
> why we ascribe to him who was also incarnate one sole
> adoration with the Father and the Holy Spirit.[22]

Here is the expansion on the third element, "the natures which Christ
is." To the one hypostasis of Christ are ascribed all the aspects of the
saving economy. Yet the two natures which Christ is are not to be
confused with each other, for the divine nature did not leave the
heavenly realm, while the human nature was taken from the Virgin; and
the uncircumscribed nature of the Godhead was circumscribed by the
human nature in a manner past all understanding. Neither are the two

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[22]Ibid. (PG 91.573B9-C3): Τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸν σταυρὸν καὶ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν
ταφὴν καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνάληψιν· ἐξ ὧν ἄσαρκος κατελθών,
οὐ μετῆλθε τόπους ἀμείψας, ὁ μηδενὶ λόγῳ τοῖς οὖσι χωρούμενος. Πάσης γὰρ
ὑπάρχει περιγραφῆς ἐλεύθερος· ἀλλ' ἐπεφάνη διὰ σαρκὸς ὡς φύσει φιλάνθρωπος, κατὰ
γέννησιν ἀληθῆ τὴν ἐκ γυναικὸς χωρητός, ὡς ἠθέλησε, τοῖς ἡμετέροις γενόμενος.
Διὸ καὶ μίαν αὐτῷ καὶ σαρκωθέντι προσάγομεν σὺν Πατρὶ καὶ Πνεύματι τὴν προσκύ-
νησιν. Cited in Piret, *Le Christ*, 216-17.

natures to be confused with the one hypostasis. The identity and unity of the two natures are to be grounded in the one hypostasis; nevertheless, there is nothing else but the two natures to which the operations of divinity and humanity can be predicated. Christ is the two natures: unity of person, diversity of nature.

In a very real way, Maximus is making a radical distinction between hypostasis and nature here. On the one hand, the real existence of a nature is hypostasis; without being hypostasized, there is no nature to speak of. On the other hand, the whole content of a given hypostasis is its own nature. There is no mixture of natures or a confused *tertium quid* in Christ; all powers and operations belong to nature, so much so that one can say quite literally that Christ is the two natures from which and in which he subsists. As he says in his ninth *Opuscule*,

> For Christ *is* by nature both God and man, existing *from*
> divinity and humanity, and *in* divinity and humanity, by nature.
> There is absolutely nothing else.[23]

Where, then, do we find the unity of Christ? The unity in Christ is located not in a nature synthesized from two, but in the one hypostasis, and the hypostasis of Christ is the incarnate Word. There is not duality of persons, a duality of Christs, because there is a duality of natures. On the contrary, there is only one sole Christ, the Logos made man, and Maximus can rightly say that there is only one adoration of Christ with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Again, to claim that the Orthodox were introducing two Sons presupposes a confusion of

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[23]TP 9 (PG 91.121B3-6): Ἐκ θεότητος γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος, καὶ ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχων, Θεὸς φύσει καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός· καὶ ἄλλο τὸ παράπαν οὐδέν. Cited in Piret, *Le Christ*, 229-30.

hypostasis and nature. Through his formula, "two natures from which, in which, and which Christ is," Maximus is able clearly to preclude that confusion and to establish a clear distinction of hypostasis and nature that builds upon the insights of the Orthodox thinkers who preceded him.

C. Summary

By way of a general summary on the tri-partite formula, we recall that the project of using the Cyrillian "from two natures" along with the Chalcedonian "in two natures" was a Neo-Chalcedonian undertaking. We have cited Justinian, Leontius of Jerusalem, and the Fifth Council to this effect. For Maximus to take up the double formula and give it added precision with the third element, "the two natures which Christ is," places Maximus well within this tradition.

Moreover, the usage to which the two- and, with Maximus, three-part formula was put was to underscore the real persistence of the two natures in Christ after the union. The third element, which identifies Christ with the two natures from which he was constituted and in which he subsists not only reaffirms the persistence of the two natures in union, but it further removes the possibility of confusing the hypostasis of Christ with either nature (and with the divine nature in particular). In short, there is nothing natural about the hypostasis of Christ save the divine and human natures from which, in which, and which Christ is.

We have seen, then, our first example of how Maximus takes up a theme bequeathed to him by his predecessors and deepens its meaning without changing it. In this case, it was one of the central themes of Chalcedon and II Constantinople. In the next chapter we will take up a more broadly based theme and see how the Confessor will treat it.

CHAPTER IV

THE LOGOS-TROPOS DISTINCTION

One of the more broadly based notions which Maximus brought to bear on his articulation of Christology is the distinction between logos and tropos. This distinction is best known in its classical form, λόγος φύσεως and τρόπος (τῆς) ὑπάρξεως, i.e. the "logos of nature" and the "mode of existence." It will be advantageous to look at the antecedents of the two terms for clues to their use by Maximus.

A. Antecedent use of the two terms

1. Logos of nature

The logos of nature, the definition or "reason" of its nature, is the definition of what a thing is, by nature or in essence. It is the identity of a given nature by which it may be distinguished from all other natures. The logos of a nature is not the nature itself but its expression. That is to say, a nature is not a logos; rather, it *has* a logos. This is an easy concept that will be even clearer when contrasted with mode of existence. There is a certain aspect to the

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logos notion, however, that bears elaboration, and for that we may turn to Leontius of Byzantium.[1]

In chapter seven of his *Contra Nestorianos et Eutuchianos*, Leontius says this about unions and distinctions among beings: "Some things are united by species [εἶδος] but distinguished by hypostases, while others are distinguished by species but united by hypostases."[2] This is the basis for what follows. Several lines further, he goes on to say of the first-mentioned, i.e., those things united by essence but distinguished by hypostases, "Now of beings which exist essentially and are united by essence, some even in the union preserve the proper definition of their being, while others both confuse and obliterate it."[3] What concerns us here are the kinds of beings that preserve the integrity of their

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[1]In the following discussion of the Byzantine Leontius, we shall rely upon David Beecher Evans, *Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology*, Dumbarton Oaks Studies 13 (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 1970), but with serious reservations. Evans himself distinguishes Leontius' *formal Christology* from its proper *matter* (p. 83), which he claims is Evagrian Origenism. The present author declines from Evans' affirmation of a subcutaneous Origenism in Leontius. It is possible to read Leontius intelligibly without recourse to Origenist myths; that is, the *formal Christology* as Evans presents it stands well enough on its own. Without a careful study of Leontius, which the present author has not undertaken, he is not bold enough to press his reading of Leontius too far, nor value its defense too highly. He does note that at least one other person shares his view (John J. Lynch, "Leontius of Byzantium: A Cyrillian Christology," *Theological Studies* 36 [1975]: 455-71).

[2]PG 86.1301D11-1304A1: Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἥνωται τοῖς εἴδεσι, διῄρηται δὲ ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι. Τὰ δὲ διῄρηται τοῖς εἴδεσιν, ἥνωται δὲ ταῖς ὑποστάσεσι· Quoted in Evans, 30.

[3]PG 86,1304B1-4: Τῶν τοίνυν οὐσιωδῶς ὑπαρχόντων καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐνου-μένων, τὰ κὲν κἂν τῇ ἑνώσει σώζει τὸν ἴδιον τῆς ὑπάρξεως λόγον, τὰ δὲ <αὐτὸν> συγχεῖ τε καὶ ἐξαφανίζει. Evans, 42, modified.

definition of being. Evans identifies these as beings in their mode of nature.[4]

It is important to point out that Leontius does not seem to be very strict in the way he uses his theological vocabulary, though the concepts he discusses are clear enough to discern. For example, in the last passage just quoted, what Evans translates "definition of being" is in Leontius' Greek, τῆς ὑπάρξεως λόγον, what we would prefer to render the "logos (or definition) of existence." Evans also points out that "Leontius distinguishes two states of certain beings, their ὅρος or τρόπος τῆς φύσεως, that is their mode of nature, and their τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως, that is, their mode of union or combination."[5] Indeed, within three columns of Migne, Leontius will speak of ὅρος φύσεως, τρόπος τῆς φύσεως, and λόγος τῆς φύσεως, as opposed to λόγος οἰκονομίας, λόγος τῆς ἐνώσεως, and τρόπος τῆς ἐνώσεως.[6] All of this is to say that Leontius uses "mode" in a broader sense that we would care for him to and identifies it (at least in some cases) with "logos."

The point to be gleaned from all of this is that in some unions the definition of nature, or the logos of nature, as we prefer to call it, persists. In such cases, the essences coming into union, though united, persist and retain their integrity. Set against those unions which

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[4]Evans, 45.

[5]Evans, 31, speaking of Leontius, *Solutio argumentorum a Severo objectorum*, PG 86.1936D-40A.

[6]Evans, 54, again speaking of the *Sol. Arg. Sev.*, PG 86.1936D-40A.

confuse and obliterate the logoi of their constituent natures, it is not too difficult to see that Leontius is contrasting the orthodox understanding of the hypostatic union (wherein Christ perserves his union by essence both with the Father and with us) with the Monophysite (wherein Christ, being confused in nature, is no longer *homoousios* with either the Father or with us). And indeed, Leontius does go on to make this contrast, pointing out in the course of his exposition that the orthodox understanding, preserving as it does the two constituent natures, allows for a *communicatio idiomatum*, while the Monophysite understanding, confusing the two constituent natures, prevents a *communicatio idiomatum* by the simple fact that there are no longer two natures available for mutual communication.[7]

In summary, in the Leontine analysis, the definition of nature persists even in union with another nature. This is the aspect to be remembered, for we will see it at work again in Maximus.

2. Mode of existence

The sense of a thing's mode of existence bears a little more elaboration. Here we will follow the lineaments given by Sherwood.[8] Basil is the author of the classical formula of the logos-tropos distinction. There are five texts which we should mention briefly to illumine his understanding and use of "existence." One is found in a letter to Amphilochius of Iconium, where Basil speaks of the ways we can know

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[7]*C. Nest. et. Euty.* 1.7, PG 86.1304B4-9, 1305B1-C3; Evans, 45-51.

[8]Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, 155-64.

some thing. He says, "a thing is knowable with regard to number, size, power, mode of existence, time of generation, and essence."[9]

Two other passages are concerned with the ineffable mode of the Holy Spirit's existence. Of these, one simply affirms that there is no shame in admitting that the Holy Spirit's mode of existence is unknowable.[10] The other, from the treatise *On the Holy Spirit*, sheds more light on what Basil means by "mode of existence." Here he acknowledges that the Holy Spirit is clearly divine, given his origin from the Father, but again, "the mode of existence remains unspeakable."[11] Thus Basil seems to distinguish the divine essence, shared by the Father the Holy Spirit, and the mode of the Spirit's existence, i.e., his hypostasis.[12]

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[9]*Epistle* 235.2: . . . καὶ γνωστόν τί ἐστι, τὸ μὲν κατὰ ἀριθμόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὑπάρξεως, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τῆς γεννήσεως, τὸ δὲ κατ' οὐσίαν. *Saint Basil: The Letters*, with an English trans. by Roy J. DeFerrari, 4 vols., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953) 3:378.

[10]*Homily* 24.6, *Contra Sabellianos, et Arium et Anomoeos*, PG 31.613A10-14. The context is clearly anti-Eunomian.

[11]*Sur le Saint-Esprit* 18.46, p. 408 (= PG 31.152B): . . . τῆς μὲν οἰκειό-τητος δηλουμένης ἐντεῦθεν, τοῦ δὲ τρόπου τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἀρρήτου φυλασσο-μένου.

[12]What distinguishes the Holy Spirit's mode of existence is actually his mode of origination, and "mode of origination" actually captures the meaning of τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως better than "mode of existence," at least among the Cappadocian Fathers. A great deal of time was spent in the Arian controversy over how the Son was related to the Father, i.e. as a creature, a subordinate deity, or as co-equal God. The debate frequently centered on how the Son came to be, i.e. the mode of his origination from the Father. The same debate took place with regard to the Holy Spirit in the Macedonian controversy. The phrase τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως never lost the sense of "mode of origination," although it is clear that its meaning broadened over time to "mode of existence," such

That this interpretation of the Cappadocian Father's words is correct is strengthened by a passage in the *Contra Eunomium*, where we do not find "mode of existence" as we might expect the context to dictate, but the phrase "mode of hypostasis" instead. In a paragraph explaining that it is not possible for us to know *how* God exists, Basil says rhetorically, "but some might say, it is not the mode of his subsistence that I seek, but the material substrate of the man himself."[13]

Finally, we note the clear identification of "existence" with "hypostasis" in *Contra Eunomium* 2.13, where Basil says, in so many words, that one cannot think of anything prior to the hypostasis of the Only-begotten because his existence is anterior to any conceivable eon.[14] Thus for Basil, the two terms are synonymous.

Sherwood goes on to point out that Gregory the Theologian does not use the term "existence" in a technical way like Basil, but that Gregory of Nyssa does, as does Amphilochius of Iconium, Didymus the Blind, Cyril of Alexandria, the Antiochene Fathers, and the two Leontii. All but the Byzantine Leontius use the term and the logos-tropos distinction as

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as we will see it used by Maximus.

[13]*C. Eun.* 1.15: Ἀλλ' οὐχι τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὑποστάσεως ἐπιζητῶ, φήσειεν ἂν τις, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον. St. Basil, *Contre Eunome*, intro., text, trans., and notes Bernard Sesboüé, Sources chrétiennes 299 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982), 226. Sesboüé notes that this phrase is unique in the *Contra Eunomium* and goes on to affirm that τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως is for St. Basil a definition of hypostasis (p. 227, note 1).

[14]Ibid., Sources chrétiennes 305 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1983), 48-50. Here, ὑπάρξις obviously has the sense of "origination."

Basil sets it down. Leontius of Byzantium, as we have seen, is looser in his terminology, but clear about the concept and the distinction, and in this he follows the accepted teaching.

Sophronius of Jerusalem also knew the distinction, and it appears in his works. Schönborn speaks of Sophronius' usage in the context of the Incarnation, where the divine Logos remains without confusion and without change in nature, but undertakes a new mode of existence when he is born in the flesh assumed from the pure Virgin. Moreover, the Incarnation establishes a new mode of existence for the human nature, too, for in Christ, humanity no longer inclines toward sin.[15] Unfortunately, Schönborn extrapolates this teaching from the writings of the Patriarch and provides no direct quotations to support his assessment. There may, in fact, be no clear-cut examples from the pen of Sophronius of the logos-tropos distinction, although it would be consistent with the rest of his work.

B. The use of the distinction in Maximus

1. Non-Christological uses

In Maximus, the logos-tropos distinction is not restricted to Trinitarian theology as it was in Basil, nor even to Christology, as we

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[15]Schönborn, 192-94. Here again the new mode of existence is clearly a reference to the new mode of *origination* which the Son, begotten before all ages from the Father, is now begotten in time from the Most Holy Theotokos. In this, Sophronius stands squarely in the established tradition. But we also see that τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως as a new mode of *existence*, as a persistent reality, is also in his mind, since human nature, in its new mode of existence, hypostasized in a divine person, no longer inclines toward sin.

found it used in Leontius of Byzantium, but it finds it way into all aspects of his thought. Sherwood notes some forty instances of the terms "logos" and "tropos" occuring together in the Maximian corpus. Of them, only three have to do with the Trinity.[16] In this we see the broader understanding of τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως, beyond the Cappadocian "mode of origination." We also find in Maximus that logos is seen as the *cause* of the nature of which it is also the definition.

We begin by looking at some of the various ways in which Maximus uses the distinction. In *Mystagogy* 18, Maximus says this about the Creed recited at the Divine Liturgy:

> The confession of the divine Symbol of Faith by all proclaims the mystical thanksgiving to perdure throughout the age to come through the marvellous logoi and modes, by the all-wise providence of God on our behalf, by which we are saved.[17]

"The marvellous logoi and modes . . . by which we are saved" refer to theology and economy, that is, to the eternal and unchangeable Logos of the Godhead which, through a new mode of being in the Incarnation, effected our salvation.

In a second application we see that the distinction which Maximus makes between the image and likeness of God in man is really a

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[16] *Earlier Ambigua*, 164. At the time, Sherwood did not know of the *Second Letter to Thomas*, where further instances of the logos-tropos distinction are to be found, including, in paragraph 5, another Trinitarian one. See P. Canart, "La douxième letter à Thomas de S. Maxime le Confesseur," *Byzantion* 34 (1964): 433.

[17] *Myst.* 18 (PG 91.696A13-B4): Ἡ δὲ τοῦ θείου συμβόλου τῆς πίστεως γινομένη παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογία, τὴν ἐφ' οἷς ἐσώθημεν παραδόξοις λόγοις τε καὶ τρόποις τῆς πανσόφου περὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ Θεοῦ προνοίας γενησομένην μυστικὴν εὐχαρισ-τίαν, κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα τὸν μέλλοντα, προσημαίνει·

variation of the logos-tropos distinction. Consider how the divine

attributes are distributed to the being and faculties of man in this

chapter from the *Centuries on Charity*:

> In bringing into existence a rational and intelligent nature, God
> in his supreme goodness has communicated to it four of the
> divine attributes by which he maintains, guards, and preserves
> creatures: being, eternal being, goodness, and wisdom. The
> first two of these he grants to the essence, the second two to
> its faculty of will; that is, to the essence he gives being and
> eternal being, and to the volitive faculty he gives goodness and
> wisdom in order that what he is by essence the creature might
> become by participation. For this reason he is said to be made
> "to the image and likeness of God": to the image of his being
> by our being, to the image of his eternal being by our eternal
> being (even though not without a beginning, it is yet without
> end); to the likeness of his goodness by our goodness, to the
> image of his wisdom by our wisdom. The first is by nature, the
> second by grace. Every rational nature indeed is made to the
> image of God; but only those who are good and wise are made
> to his likeness.[18]

The first two attributes, being and eternal being (literally, "ever-

being"), are granted to man's essence, which corresponds to logos, since

indeed every essence has, is caused by, and is defined by, its logos.

The latter two attributes, goodness and wisdom, are given by grace and

are innovations in mode. Thus everyone bears the image of God as part

of the logos of human nature, but not everyone bears likeness to God,

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[18]*Char* 3.25 (Ceresa-Gastaldo, 154): Τέσσαρα τον θείων ἰδιωμάτων
συνεκτικὰ καὶ φρουρητικὰ καὶ διασωστικὰ τῶν ὄντων δι' ἄκραν ἀγαθότητα
ἐκοινοποίησεν ὁ Θεός, παραγαγὼν εἰς το εἶναι τὴν λογικὴν καὶ νοερὰν οὐσίαν· τὸ
ὄν, τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, τὴν ἀγαθότητα καὶ τὴν σοφίαν. Τούτων τὰ μὲν δύο τῇ οὐσίᾳ
παρέσχε· τὰ δὲ δύο τῇ γνωμικῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι· καὶ τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ
ὄν· τῇ δὲ γνωμικῇ ἐπιτηδειότητι τὴν ἀγαθότητα καὶ τὴν σοφίαν, ἵνα ἄπερ ἐστὶν
αὐτὸς κατ' οὐσίαν, γίνηται ἡ κτίσις κατὰ μετουσίαν. Διὰ ταύτην κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ
ὁμοίωσιν Θεοῦ λέγεται γεγενῆσθαι· καὶ κατ' εἰκόνα μέν, ὡς ὄν, ὄντος· καὶ ὡς ἀεὶ
ὄν, ἀεὶ ὄντος· εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀνάρχως, ἀλλ' ἀτελευτήτως· κατ' ὁμοίωσιν δέ, ὡς ἀγαθός,
ἀγαθοῦ· καὶ ὡς σοφός, σοφοῦ· τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, ὁ κατὰ χάριν. Καὶ κατ' εἰκόνα μὲν
πᾶσα φύσις λογική ἐστι τοῦ Θεοῦ· καθ' ὁμοίωσιν δέ, μόνοι οἱ ἀγαθοί καὶ σοφοί.
Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 64.

for likeness has to do with the innovation of the person by grace.

Thus, Maximus will say elsewhere,

> The one who has illumined his mind with divine thoughts, who
> has accustomed his reason to honor ceaselessly the Creator with
> divine hymns, and who has sanctified his sense with uncon-
> taminated images has added to the natural beauty of the image
> the voluntary good of likeness.[19]

Indeed, "every rational nature . . . is made to the image of God; but

only those who are good and wise are made to his likeness."

It should be pointed out that for Maximus virtues, though they are

pursued by individuals, nevertheless are *natural* to man and not some-

thing introduced from the outside. Consider this exchange in the

Disputation with Pyrrhus:

> PYR: What, then? Virtues are natural?
> MAX: Yes, natural.
> PYR: If they are natural, why do they not exist equally in
> all [who are] the same by nature?
> MAX: But they do exist equally in all who are the same by
> nature.
> PYR: Then why is there such a great disparity [of virtues]
> in us?
> MAX: Because we do not all practice equally what is natural
> [to us]; indeed, if we [all] practiced equally [those virtues]
> natural [to us] as we were created [to do], then one would be
> able to perceive that, just as there is [one] nature [in us all],
> so there is [one] virtue, [which] does not admit of "more" or
> "less".
> PYR: If what is natural to us exists not through askesis,
> but through creation, and virtue is natural, why do we acquire
> the virtues, which are natural, through toil and askesis?
> MAX: Askesis, and the toils that go with it, were devised
> for the lovers of virtue for the soul simply to purge the
> confused deception [introduced] by sense perception. The

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[19]*ThOec* 1.13 (PG 90.1088B13-C4): Ὁ τὸν νοῦν ταῖς θείαις καταστράψας νοήσεσιν, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐθίσας θείοις ὕμνοις ἀπαύστως γεραίρειν τὸν Κτίσαντα, καὶ ταῖς ἀκηράτοις φαντασίαις καθαγιάσας τὴν αἴσθησιν· οὗτος τῷ φυσικῷ κατ' εἰκόνα καλῷ, προσέθηκε τὸ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν γνωμικὸν ἀγαθόν. Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 131.

virtues are not lately introduced [into the soul] from without,
for they inhere in us from creation, as it was said. Therefore,
when deception has been perfectly dispersed, the soul exhibits
the brilliance of its natural virtue. . . . Consequently, with the
removal of things that are contrary to nature only the things
proper to nature are manifest. Just as when rust is removed
the natural clarity and glint of iron [are manifest].[20]

Thus, as man gains likeness to God, he approaches *personal* conformity

to his own *nature*. Indeed, in deified man, the mode of human existence

will correspond perfectly with the logos of human nature.

We must be careful *not* to construe these statements to mean that

logos is to tropos what genus is to species, or common to particular.

The logos of nature does not exist (just as nature itself does not exist)

except as it is hypostasized, i.e., except as being a really existent thing.

Thus logos of nature pertains only to an hypostasized nature, and it is

only within this hypostasized nature that we can speak of modes of

existence.

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[20]*Pyrr* §§88-95 (PG 91.309B1-A7): ΠΥΡ. Τί οὖν; φυσικαί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί;
ΜΑΞ. Ναί, φυσικαί.
ΠΥΡ. Καὶ εἰ φυσικαί, διὰ τί μὴ ἐπίσης πασιν ἐνυπάρχουσι τοῖς ὁμοφυέσι;
ΜΑΞ. Πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοφυέσιν ἐπίσης ἐνυπάρχουσι.
ΠΥΡ. Καὶ πόθεν ἐν ἡμῖν τοσαύτη ἀνισότης;
ΜΑΞ. Ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐπίσης ἐνεργεῖν τὰ τῆς φύσεως. Ὡς, εἴπερ πάντες ἴσως, ἐφ'
ᾧ καὶ γεγόναμεν, ἐνηργοῦμεν τὰ φυσικά, μία ἄρα ἐδείκνυτο ἐν πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ
φύσις, οὕτω καὶ ἀρετή, τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένη.
ΠΥΡ. Εἰ οὐκ ἐξ ἀσκήσεως ἡμῖν τὰ φυσικὰ πρόειαν, ἀλλ' ἐκ δημιουργίας, ἡ δὲ
ἀρετὴ φυσική, πῶς πόνῳ καὶ ἀσκήσει τὰς ἀρετάς, φυσικὰς οὔσας, κτώμεθα;
ΜΑΞ. Ἡ ἄσκησις, καὶ οἱ ταύτη ἑπόμενοι πόνοι, πρὸς τὸ μόνον διαχωρίσαι τὴν
ἐμφυρεῖσαν δι' αἰσθήσεως ἀπάτην τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπενοήθησαν τοῖς φιλαρέτοις· οὐ πρὸς τὸ
ἔξωθεν προσφάτως ἐπεισαγαγεῖν τὰς ἀρετάς· ἔγκεινται γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐκ δημιουργίας, ὡς
εἴηηται· ὅθεν καὶ ἅμα τελείως διακριθῇ ἡ ἀπάτη, ἅμα καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἀρετῆς τὴν
λαμπρότητα ἐνδείκνυται ἡ ψυχή. . . . Ἄρα τῇ ἀφαιρέσει τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, τὰ κατὰ
φύσιν καὶ μόνα διαφαίνεσθαι εἴωθεν· ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἰοῦ ἀποβολῇ, ἡ τοῦ σιδήρου
κατὰ φύσιν αὐγὴ καὶ λαμπρότης.

Thirdly, in a much more generic use of the distinction, Maximus says, "we acknowledge God the only wise and just judge who judges all things wisely and justly, according to the logos of [their] being, and not according to the mode of [their] appearance."[21] Here the distinction is employed simply to distinguish between reality and appearance.

One ought to note that the broad application of the logos-tropos distinction, even in its Christological use (which we shall consider below), does not support the idea that Maximus is using it in any extraordinary way. Alain Riou feels that he does, particularly in *Ambiguum* 42, and Riou speaks of "a technical and precise aspect" of the distinction, its "specific and technical sense," and its "technical and mystical sense".[22] Schönborn states that the distinction is "strongly developed" in Maximus.[23] Again, the distinction has been shown to be widely disseminated in Patristic literature, and Maximus' understanding and employment of it is consistent with general Patristic usage. While the Confessor does use the distinction in a wider variety of contexts than his predecessors, the present author cannot perceive any more "technical," "specific," "precise," "mystical," or "strongly developed" use. The distinction is a basic one and admits of easy application.

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[21]*Myst.* 24 (PG 91.713C12-D1): γινώσκοντες ἕνα μόνον κριτὴν σοφόν τε καὶ δίκαιον τὸν Θεὸν, τὸν σοφῶς τε καὶ δικαίως πάντα τὰ γινόμενα κρίνοντα· καθ' ὃν γεγένηται λόγον, ἀλλ' οὐ καθ' ὃν πεφανέρωται τρόπον·

[22]Alain Riou, *Le monde et l'église selon Maxime le Confesseur*, Théologie historique 22 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1973), 82, 105, 136.

[23]Schönborn, 193.

Given its broad application in Maximus' thought, we are justified in seeing the logos-tropos distinction as fundamental. Consider this statement from *Ambiguum* 42:

> Every innovation, to speak generically, has naturally to do with the mode of the innovated thing but not with the logos of nature; because a logos innovated corrupts the nature, as not retaining unadulterated the logos according to which it exists; but the mode innovated, the logos being preserved in its nature, manifests miraculous power.

Sherwood says of this quotation, "Clearly this is a fundamental law" in Maximus' thought,[24] and indeed, we are finding out that it is.

Before taking up Christology, we ought not overlook the soteriological use of the distinction. Only the briefest sketch can be offered here, which is unfortunate, for this aspect of Maximus' thought is one of the richest and most beautiful in his whole synthesis, and it delights the mind.

In brief, then, Maximus holds that the logos of each and every created being pre-exists undifferentiatedly in the one divine Logos. The logos of a creature, then, is the pattern, as it were, according to which the creature shall come to exist in the created order as the Logos wills. Moreover, the logoi of all things have a teleological character such that creatures fulfill the divine economy when they exist according to the logoi of their natures. The nature of man, too, has its logos. As

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[24]*Amb.* 42 (PG 91.1341D1-7): Πᾶσα γὰρ καθόλου φάναι καινοτομία περὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ καινοτομουμένου πράγματος πέφυκεν, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως γίνεσθαι, διόπερ ὁ μὲν λόγος καινοτομούμενος φθείρει τὴν φύσιν, οὐκ ἔχουσαν τὸν καθ' ὅν ἐστι λόγον ἀραδιούργητον, ὁ δὲ τρόπος καινοτομούμενος φυλαττομένου δηλαδὴ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν λόγου θαύματος ἐνδείκνυται δύναμιν. Cited in Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua,* 165.

part of the definition of his nature, man has being (he is created) and
ever-being (he will not cease to exist once created). However, man, as a
rational animal, has the ability to live well or ill, that is, to live in
accordance with the logos of his nature or contrary to it. This ability
is lived personally, hypostatically, and it is thus an aspect, not of the
logos of nature, but of the mode of existence. So, it lies in the
personal mode of existence of each of us whether we shall have ever-
well-being in heaven or ever-ill-being in hell. Ever-well-being, it
should be added, is deification and is bestowed by God with the
cooperation of man living in accordance with the logos of his nature.
Maximus says all of this at once in *Ambiguum* 42, though the develop-
ment of the particulars is scattered throughout his works:

> Of all things that do or will substantially exist . . . the logoi,
> firmly fixed, preexist in God, in accordance with which all
> things are and have become and abide, ever drawing near
> through natural motion to their purposed logoi. They [the
> things] are rather constrained to being and receive, according
> to the kind and degree of their elective movement and motion,
> either well-being because of virtue and direct progress in
> regard to the logos by which they are, or ill-being because of
> the vice and motion out of harmony with the logos by which
> they are. Or, to put it more concisely, according to the having
> or the lack, in their natural participative faculty, of him who
> exists by nature completely and unparticipated [the Logos] and
> who proffers himself entire simply and graciously by reason of
> his limitless goodness to all, the worthy and the unworthy,
> producing the permanence of everlasting being as each man of
> himself has been and is [then] disposed. For these the
> respective participation or imparticipation of the very being,
> well-being and ever-being is the increase and augment of
> punishment for those not able to participate and of enjoyment
> for those able to participate.[25]

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[25]PG 91.1329A1-B7: Πάντων οὖν τῶν κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπαρκτικῶς ὄντων τε καὶ
ἐσομένων, . . . ἐν τῷ Θεῷ προϋπάρχουσι παγίως ὄντες οἱ λόγοι, καθ' οὓς καὶ εἰσὶ
τὰ πάντα καὶ γεγόνασι καὶ διαμένουσιν ἀεὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ πρόθεσιν λόγοις, διὰ

Here we ought to note one point which bears more directly on the business before us, and that is the notion of the unchangeability of the logos of nature. As Maximus says in the fifteenth *Ambiguum*, "All beings, by the logos by which they were brought to being and are, are perfectly firm and immutable."[26] We have already quoted Maximus as saying that to change the logos of nature is to change the nature itself; indeed, a thing must surely correspond to its definition. But the immutability of a nature is more firmly fixed in the Maximian synthesis because the logos of that nature pre-exists immutably in the divine Logos. In this respect, Maximus goes a step further than his predecessors.[27]

κινήσεως φυσικῆς ἐγγίζοντα καὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι μᾶλλον συνεχόμενα, κατὰ τὴν ποιάν τε καὶ ποσὴν τῆς προαιρέσεως κίνησίν τε καὶ ῥοπὴν, τὸ εὖ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον καθ' ὃν ἐστιν εὐθυπορίαν, ἢ τὸ φεῦ εἶναι διὰ κακίαν καὶ τὴν παρὰ τὸν λόγον καθ' ὃν ἐστι κίνησιν λαμβάνοντα, καὶ συντόμως εἰπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὴν στέρησιν τῆς αὐτῶν κατὰ φύσιν μεθεκτικῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ παντελῶς ἀμεθέκτου κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχοντος, καὶ πᾶσιν ἁπλῶς ἑαυτὸν ἀξίοις τε καὶ ἀναξίοις ὅλον κατὰ χάριν δι' ἄπειρον ἀγαθότητα παρέχοντος, καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι καθὼς ἕκαστος ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ διατέθειταί τε καὶ ἔστι διαμονὴν ἐμποιήσοντος. Οἷς ἡ τοῦ κυρίως ὄντος καὶ εὖ ὄντος καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἀνάλογος μέθεξις ἢ ἀμεθεξία, τιμωρίας τῶν μετασχεῖν μὴ δυναμένων, καὶ ἀπολαύσεως τῶν μετασχεῖν δυναμένων, ἐπίτασίς ἐστι καὶ ἐπαύξησις. Cited in Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, 170-71.

[26]*Amb.* 15 (PG 91.1217A12-14): πάντα τὰ ὄντα καθ' ὃν μὲν ὑπέστησάν τε καὶ εἰσὶ λόγον, στάσιμά τε παντελῶς εἰσι καὶ ἀκίνητα . . . Ibid., p. 172 note 63. (Sherwood gives the reference as PG 91.1217A13-B1, which is slightly off.)

[27]For fuller treatments of the Logos/logoi theory, see Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, 155-80; Lars Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor*, Acta Seminarii Neotestamentici Upsaliensis 25 (Copenhagen: C.W.K. Gleerup, Lund, & Einar Munksgaard, 1965), 76-84; and I.-H. Dalmais, "La théorie des 'Logoi' des creatures chez s. Maxime le Confesseur," *RSPT* 36 (1952): 244-49.

2. Christological use

In Christology, Maximus draws upon both the traditional Trinitarian use we have laid out, as well as the Christological use found in Leontius of Byzantium, for his own applications of the logos-tropos distinction. That is to say, just as the logos (of nature) pertains to the divine essence and mode (of existence) to the three persons of the Trinity, so too does logos pertain to the two natures in Christ and mode to the one hypostasis. This correspondence of theological and Christological vocabulary comes easily to Maximus.[28] Indeed, this correspondence was a commonplace of Neo-Chalcedonian thought.

As Chapter I pointed out, the achievement of the Neo-Chalcedonian theologians was to clarify the Chalcedonian definition by seizing upon the "one hypostasis" as the basis of the unity in Christ. This clarification required, in addition, that hypostasis be clearly distinguished from nature, and we discussed Leontius of Jerusalem in this respect.

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[28]One of the most accessible examples of this is found in *Mystagogy* 23, where Maximus uses the four Chalcedonian adverbs and applies them to the Trinity: "The same unconfused Monad and Triad has unity without confusion, and distinction without separation and without division. It is Monad according to essence or the definition of being, but not by synthesis or contraction, or by any confusion. It is Trinity according to its mode of existence and subsistence, but not by any separation or diversity, or by any division."

(PG 91.700D9-01A5: ἑαυτῇ ταὐτὴν καὶ μονάδα καὶ τριάδα ἀσύγχυτόν τε καὶ ἀσυγχύτως τὴν ἕνωσιν ἔχουσαν, καὶ τὴν διάκρισιν ἀδιαίρετόν τε καὶ ἀμέριστον· μονάδα μὲν κατὰ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ἤτοι τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον· ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἢ συναίρεσιν, ἢ τὴν οἱανοῦν σύγχυσιν· τριάδα δὲ, κατὰ τὸν τοῦ πῶς ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὑφεστάναι λόγον· ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀλλοτρίωσιν, ἢ τὸν οἱονοῦν μερισμόν.)

Two othr instances of Trinitarian usage are mentioned by Sherwood: *Amb.* 67 (PG 91.1400df.) and *Amb.* 1 (PG 91.1036C); see *Earlier Ambigua*, 164.

Maximus was able to deepen the clarity of this Neo-Chalcedonian insight by a direct application of the logos-tropos distinction to Christology.

In this application, Maximus makes somewhat of an original contribution. We saw, for example, in the discussion of Leontius of Byzantium above, that Leontius does distinguish logos and mode in Christology, but that his chief concern is for the logoi of natures as they subsist in the mode of union. Even though he speaks of hypostatic union, Leontius' focus is a little different: his concern is for the subsistence of natures in union. He does not make the clear distinction of logos and tropos that Maximus will make. Again, as we have seen, Sophronius seems not to have seen all the possibilities inherent in the distinction, though he does speak of the new mode of the Virgin birth. The Confessor does see more possibilities. Here we may consider some of the advantages that Maximus is able to reap by using it Christologically.

1. Following upon the Byzantine Leontius, Maximus affirms that the logos of nature preserves the definition of each nature in Christ. Here we may quote again the passage from *Ambiguum* 42 quoted above:

> Every innovation, to speak generically, has naturally to do with the mode of the innovated thing but not with the logos of nature; because *a logos innovated corrupts the nature, as not retaining unadulterated the logos according to which it exists;* but the mode innovated, the logos being preserved in its nature, manifests miraculous power.

We need add no further comment at this time.

2. Again, following upon Leontius of Byzantium, Maximus teaches that, not only does the logos of nature preserve the definition of nature, it preserves it even when that nature is in union with another. This he made clear very early, in *Epistle* 19, where he writes,

> The union from different natures without mixture, accomplished
> by a natural concourse, both preserves the component natures
> unchanged, and conserves their component powers undiminished,
> for the completion of one single work.[29]

The similarity with the Leontine theory articulated above is clear, and

so is the similarity with the whole and parts metaphor. A union without

mixture is the kind found in the orthodox understanding of the

hypostatic union; the Monophysites, of course, are accused of mixing the

two natures into a composite. However, this Maximian quotation opens

up wider vistas which Leontius did not address, namely the

undiminished conservation of the natural component powers.

3. The conservation of the powers which constitute a nature is

important not only because failure to conserve them corrupts the nature

itself, but also because it is by means of the natural powers that we are

able to know a nature at all. As Maximus says in *Ambiguum* 15,

> The only true declaration of a substance is its natural consti-
> tuent power. One would not fall short of the truth in calling it
> [i.e. the power] a natural operation, strictly and primarily
> characteristic of it as being its specific movement, more general
> than any comprehensive property belonging to it, apart from
> which there is only non-being, "as," according to this great
> doctor [Dionysius], "only non-being has neither movement nor
> existence."[30]

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[29]*Ep.* 19 (PG 91.593B1-5): Τὸ γὰρ ἔκ τινων ἀσυγχύτως ἐνώσει τῇ κατὰ
σύνοδον φυσικὴν ἀποτελούμενον, καὶ τὰς φύσεις ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀτρέπτους
διατηρεῖ, καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν συστατικὰς ἀμειώτως διασώζει δυνάμεις, εἰς ἑνὸς ἔργου
συμπλήρωσιν·

[30]*Amb.* 5 (PG 91.1048A7-B1): Ἧς [οὐσίαν] μόνη τε καὶ ἀληθής ἐστιν
ἀπόδειξις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῆς συστατικὴ δύναμις, ἣν οὐκ ἄν τις ἁμάρτοι τῆς
ἀληθείας φυσικὴν φήσας ἐνέργειαν, κυρίως τε καὶ πρότως χαρακτηριστικὴν αὐτῆς, ὡς
εἰδοποιὸν ὑπάρχουσαν κίνησιν, γενικωτάτην πάσης τῆς φυσικῶς αὐτῇ προσούσης
περιεκτικῆς ἰδιότητος, ἧς χωρὶς μόνον ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς μόνου τοῦ μηδαμῶς
ὄντος, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν μέγαν διδάσκαλον, οὔτε κίνησιν οὔτε ὕπαρξιν ἔχοντος.
Quoted in Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, 114.

The "declaration" of a nature by its inherent powers is characterized by Maximus in a number of ways, e.g., as a "showing forth," a "revelation," as a "making known."[31] All of this is to say that without the manifestation of a nature's constituent power, that nature remains unintelligible.

The doctrine that powers were to be rooted in nature rather than in hypostsis was already apparent at the Fifth Council, whose first *Anathema* against the "Three Chapters" reads:

> If anyone does not confess that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit have *one nature or essence*, and have *one power and authority*, [and] that there is a consubstantial Trinity, one Deity adored in three hypostases or persons: let him be anathema.[32]

The importance of this point for Christology is great. If in Christ there is no manifestation of a human will and operation, then there is no full human nature in him either; it is corrupted:

> Hence we recognize the same verily to be by nature God and man, not otherwise than by the inborn attributes characterizing him at once divinely and humanly--I mean the divine willing and operation and the human willing and operation of the same, by which and through which he seals what he was and what he became.[33]

And again,

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[31]Piret, *Le Christ*, 214 note 20, cites these three examples.

[32]Tanner, 114: Εἴ τις οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος μίαν φύσιν, ἤτοι οὐσίαν, μίαν τε δύναμιν καὶ ἐξουσίαν, τριάδα ὁμοούσιον, μίαν θεότητα ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν, ἤγουν προσώποις, προσκυνουμένην, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.

[33]*TP* 9 (PG 91.121A2-8): Ὅθεν φύσει Θεὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον τὸν αὐτὸν κυρίως, οὐχ ἑτέρωθεν ὄντα διαγινώσκομεν, ἢ ἐκ τῶν θεϊκῶς ἅμα καὶ ἀνθρωπικῶς χαρακτηρι-ζόντων αὐτόν, ἐμφύτων ἰδιωμάτων· τῆς τε θείας, ὡς ἔφην, θελήσεως καὶ ἐνεργείας, καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θελήσεως καὶ ἐνεργείας· αἷς, καὶ δι' ὧν, ὃ ἦν καὶ γέγονεν ἐπισφραγίζει· Quoted in Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, 115.

It is necessary to preserve the nature assumed by the divine
Word who was himself made flesh and perfectly incarnate for us,
with all his [natural] properties, without which that nature does
not exist but is a delusion only.[34]

Thus it is necessary to maintain all the constitutive powers of human
nature in Christ if his humanity is to be complete. This doctrine
becomes fundamental in the Monothelite debates. The Monothelite
doctrine, that Christ could have a human nature without exercising a
human will, cannot hold, for without the manifest exercise of human will,
there can be no recognition of its underlying nature.

4. In the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, Maximus articulates his
teaching that will is properly ascribed to nature and not to hypostasis,
as Pyrrhus and the Monothelites maintain. Pyrrhus raises objections,
one of which is that if will be natural, every time we will something or
another, we will differ in nature from other men and even from our-
selves.[35] Here we come to one of the chief applications, not only of
the logos of nature, but of its distinction from the mode of existence as
well. Maximus responds to this objection thus:

The will and the mode of willing are not the same, just as sight
and the mode of seeing are not the same. For will, like sight,
is natural, and is [so] in all those that are of like nature and
like origin. But the mode of willing, like the mode of seeing—
that is, to will to walk or not to will to walk; or to look to the
right or to the left, or up or down; or concupiscence, or to
contemplate the logoi which are in things—, this is the mode of

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[34] *TP* 4 (PG 91.61B14–C5): Δεῖ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν καὶ τὴν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ σαρκω-
θέντος καὶ τελείως δι' ἡμᾶς ἐνανθρωπήσαντος Θεοῦ Λόγου, καὶ τὴν προσληφθεῖσαν
φύσιν μετὰ τῶν αὐτῆς φυσικῶν συντηρεῖν· ὧν ἄνευ τὸ παράπαν οὔτε φύσις ἐστίν,
ἀλλὰ φαντασία μόνη διάκενος.

[35] *Pyrr* §22 (PG 91.291D4–9). See Chapter VII.B.4 (p. 212) for a
fuller treatment of this passage as a Monothelite principle.

the use of will and sight, [which belongs] only to the user.
And the same distinction [may be applied] to other things,
following common usage.[36]

In this passage, Maximus distinguishes a natural faculty, will, from its

mode of existence, which is the personal, hypostatic appropriation and

exercise of the natural faculty. As Thunberg puts it, "it is through the

τρόπος that the powers of nature are transferred to the level of

existence."[37]

To cite another example of this notion, the Confessor says in his

10th *Opuscule,*

> And according to the same text, [Theodore of Pharan] conceals
> and obscures [the Incarnation], [for he] gave to the person as
> person the operation that [properly] characterizes nature,
> instead of [giving to person] the mode (the how and quality) of
> the natural accomplishment, by which the difference between the
> doers and the things done is recognized, [whether it be] accor-
> ding to nature or contrary to nature. For yet as being
> some*thing* chiefly, but not as some*one*, each of us acts, that is
> as a human being; so someone, like Peter or Paul, shapes the
> mode of operation, for example, by decline or progress, and [he]
> is formed in this way or that by [the mode] according to
> volition. Whence it is in the mode that the difference between
> person is recognized with reference to conduct; but it is in the
> logos that the unchangeable [character] of the natural operation
> [is recognized]. For operation or reason is not [a matter of]

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[36]*Pyrr* §23 (PG 91.292D12-93A10): Οὐ ταὐτὸν τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ πῶς
θέλειν· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ πῶς ὁρᾶν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ θέλειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
ὁρᾶν, φύσεως· καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοφυέσι καὶ ὁμογενέσι προσόν· τὸ δὲ πῶς θέλειν,
ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πῶς ὁρᾶν, τουτέστι θέλειν περιπατῆσαι, καὶ μὴ θέλειν περιπατῆσαι,
καὶ δεξιὰ ὁρᾶν, ἢ ἀριστερά, ἢ ἄνω, ἢ κάτω, ἢ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν, ἢ κατανόησιν τῶν ἐν
τοῖς οὖσι λόγων, τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ θέλειν καὶ ὁρᾶν χρήσεως, μόνῳ τῷ κεχρημένῳ
προσόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὸν χωρίζον, κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην διαφοράν.
Farrell, *Disputation,* 10, with corrections.

[37]Thunberg, *Microcosm,* 96.

more or less, but we all equally have the logos, and its operation by nature.[38]

Again, will is natural, but its mode personal. We also find here an affirmation of the point we made earlier in this chapter, that the logos of nature is not an abstraction of which the mode of existence is the concrete instance. Rather, the logos of nature defines the hypostasized nature, and it is only within the hypostasized nature that we can speak of modes of existence. That which is "something chiefly," i.e. nature, is what acts, because operation is proper to nature. But abstract nature does not do anything simply because it does not exist. Only hypostasized natures, Peters and Pauls, act, and the way they employ their natural faculties and powers is proper to their unique hypostases and is characterized as mode.

The same characterization of natural will and personal mode obtains in Christ:

> And no one who recalls these statements [of mine] should [think that we] assert that the operation of Christ is one. For we do not proclaim that Christ is a deified man, but God who perfectly became man, and by the same ineffable Godhead, the infinite, innumerable and infinitely more than infinite operations of the flesh were, by nature, intellectually animated by a conspicuous power. The same was wholly God and truly man, the same

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[38]*TP* 10 (PG 91.136D7-137B1): Καὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτα λόγον συνεσκίασέ πως καὶ ἡμαύρωσε, τῷ προσώπῳ, δεδωκὸς ὡς προσώπῳ τὴν χαρακτηρίζουσαν τὴν φύσιν ἐνέργειαν· οὐχὶ τὸν πῶς καὶ ὅμοιον τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν ἐκβάσεως τρόπον· καθ' ἣν ἡ διαφορότης τῶν τε πραττόντων καὶ τῶν πραττομένων γνωρίζεται, κατὰ φύσιν, ἢ παρὰ φύσιν ἐχόντων. Ὡς γάρ τι ὂν προηγουμένως, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς τις ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐνεργεῖ· τουτέστιν, ὡς ἄνθρωπος· ὡς δέ τις, οἷον Παῦλος ἢ Πέτρος, τὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας σχηματίζει τρόπον, ἐνδόσει τυχὸν ἢ ἐπιδόσει, οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κατὰ γνώμην τυπούμενος. Ὅθεν ἐν μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῶν προσώπων κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν γνωρίζεται· ἐν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ, τὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀπαράλλακτον ἐνεργείας. Οὐ γὰρ ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δὲ ἧττον ἐστιν ἐνεργὴς ἢ λογικός· ἀλλ' ἐπίσης ἅπαντες τόν τε λόγον ἔχομεν καὶ τὴν τούτου κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργειαν.

perfect and complete in both natures, having what is proper to
both natures without any defect, except sin, which has no logos.
For the same was the hypostasis of both natures, naturally
admitting the logoi of the natures naturally and essentially.
But if he was the subject of the essential logoi of which he was
[the] hypostasis, then he had a natural operation as man, of
which the logos of nature exists as a component. And he also
clearly had a natural operation as God, which he manifested
himself, being the Logos of the super-essential Godhead. For
the same, existing as perfect God and perfect man in a manner
proper to each [nature], operates in a manner proper to each
and is not divided. And if the hypostasis operates naturally in
a manner proper to each [nature] in which it existed, and was
not divided, then clearly along with the natures of which he
was the hypostasis, he also really had their natural and
constituent operations, of which he himself was the union. He
operates in a manner befitting his nature and he is an object of
belief because of the things through which he operates the
reality of those things from which, in which, and which he
was.[39]

Thus, Christ is able to have a will proper to and constitutive of his

human nature, and a will proper to and constitutive of his divine

nature. Neither nature is deficient or corrupted; their logoi of nature

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[39] *TP* 1 (PG 91.36A9-C7): Καὶ μηδεὶς ὑπονοήσει τούτοις μίαν καταγγέλλεσθαι
Χριστοῦ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ἀποθεωθέντα τὸν Χριστὸν καταγγέλλομεν,
ἀλλὰ Θεὸν τελείως ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, καὶ τὴν οἰκείας ἀφράστου θεότητος τὴν ἄπειρον,
ἀπειράκις ἀπείρως ὑπεράπειρον δι' ἐνεργοῦς φύσει σαρκὸς νοερῶς ἐψυχωμένης ἐμφανῆ
ποιησάμενον δύναμιν· ὅλον Θεὸν τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς· ἄμφω τε φύσει
τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ πληρέστατον· καὶ πᾶν εἴ τι κατ' ἄμφω πεφυκὸς ἀνελλιπῶς
ἔχοντα πλὴν ἁμαρτίας, ἧς λόγος οὐδείς. Ὧν γὰρ αὐτὸς φύσεων ὑπόστασις ἦν,
τούτων καὶ τοὺς οὐσιώδεις φυσικῶς ἐπεδίχετο λόγους. Εἰ δὲ τοὺς οὐσιώδεις ὧν
αὐτὸς ὑπόστασις ἦν, ἐπεδέχετο λόγους, καὶ φυσικὴν ἔμψυχον σαρκὸς εἰκότως εἶχεν
ἐνέργειαν, ἧς οὐσιώδεις τῇ φύσει κατέσπαρται λόγος. Εἰ δὲ φυσικὴν ὡς ἄνθρωπος
ἐνέργειαν εἶχεν, ἧς ὁ λόγος τῆς φύσεως ὑπῆρχε συστατικός, καὶ ὡς Θεὸς δηλονότι
φυσικὴν εἶχεν ἐνέργειαν, ἧς ὁ λόγος τὴν ὑπερουσίου θεότητος ὑπῆρχεν ἐκφαντικός.
Θεὸς γὰρ ὑπάρχων τέλειος, καὶ ἄνθρωπος τέλειος ὁ αὐτός, καθ' ἑκάτερον ὧν
ὑπῆρχεν ὑπόστασις, φυσικῶς ἐνήργει μὴ διαιρούμενος. Εἰ δὲ καθ' ἑκάτερον ὧν
ὑπῆρχεν ὑπόστασις φυσικῶς ἐνήργει μὴ διαιρούμενος, δῆλον ὅτι μετὰ τῶν φύσεων,
ὧν ὑπόστασις ἦν, καὶ τὰς οὐσιώδεις αὐτῶν καὶ συστατικὰς ἐνεργείας εἶχεν, ὧν
αὐτὸς ἕνωσις ἦν· ἑαυτῷ προσφυῶς ἐνεργῶν, καὶ οἷς ἐνήργει πιστούμενος, τὴν τῶν
ἐξ ὧν, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἅπερ ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλήθειαν.

are intact. Both are predicated, however, of one and the same subject, in whom is their unique mode of existence.[40]

5. The last Christological use to which Maximus puts the logos-tropos distinction does not follow directly from the four points just covered, though it is certainly related to them. This use has to do with the mode of origination of the Incarnation and hearkens back to the Cappadocian use of the terms. While this use is profound and admits of detailed analysis beyond our needs, we may say a little about it here. We may take as our starting point this passage from *Ambiguum* 42:

> He [Christ], who did not disdain to be created as man because of the creation of the first Adam, and who did not disdain to be born for the sake of his sin, showed by his creation his condescension toward him who had fallen, and by his birth his voluntary emptying toward him who was condemned. By his creation he became identical to man by nature by means of the life-giving breath by which he received as man the image [of God], and he guarded it without default of his freedom, neither soiled it in his innocence. By his birth in the Incarnation he voluntarily took on, through the form of a slave, similarity to the corrupt man, and he accepted by his own will to be subject like us to the same natural passions, but not to sin, as if he who was without sin were so dependent.[41]

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[40]See Wesche, 191-96, for the same teaching in Leontius of Jerusalem.

[41]*Amb.* 42 (PG 91.1316C13-D14): Ὁ γὰρ τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν τοῦ πρώτου Ἀδὰμ ἄνθρωπος γενέσθαι καταδεξάμενος, καὶ γεννηθῆναι τῆς αὐτοῦ παραβάσεως χάριν οὐκ ἀπαξιώσας, διὰ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως τὴν πρὸς τὸν πεσόντα συγκατάβασιν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γεννήσεως τὴν πρὸς τὸν καταδεδικασμένον ἑκούσιον κένωσιν ἐπεδείξατο· τῇ μὲν γενέσει φυσικῶς εἰς ταὐτὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κατὰ τὴν ζωτικὴν ἀγόμενος ἔμπνευσιν, ἐξ ἧς τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα λαβὼν ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἄπρατον διέμεινεν ἔχων τῆς ἐλευθερίας, τῆς ἀναμαρτησίας καὶ ἄχραντον· τῇ δὲ γεννήσει κατὰ τὴν σάρκωσιν τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς φθορᾶς ὁμοίωσιν ἑκουσίως διὰ τῆς δουλικῆς μορφῆς ὑποδὺς τοῖς αὐτοῖς παραπλησίως ἡμῖν κατὰ θέλησιν ὑποκεῖσθαι φυσικοῖς παθήμασι χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας, ὡς ὑπεύθυνος ὁ ἀναμάρτητος, ἠνέσχετο. Cited in Riou, 83, and Juan-Miguel Garrigues, *Maxime le Confesseur: La charité, avenir divin de l'homme*, Théologie historique 38 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1976), 104.

Here we find two aspects of the Incarnation discussed and contrasted: the human nature and the person of the Logos. The human nature was created; the Logos was born. Insofar as he assumed human nature, he was created and received in himself the divine image which is common to man. Insofar as he is the person of the Logos, he was not created but born, and took on the form of a slave, being subject to all the passions, but without sin.

In *Opuscule* 4, Maximus lays out the way that Christ saves man, not by alteration of the logos of human nature, but by an innovation of its mode of existence, which innovation also included a new mode of origination:

> Therefore, his humanity, not because of the logos of nature, but because of the new mode of begetting, is different from our humanity. For it is the same [as ours] by essence, but it is not the same because of [its] seedless generation. Thus, it was not in the mere [human nature] that belonged to the one who truly became human for us. His will in a proper sense is natural like us, but it was formed in a divine way transcending us. For just as generation with or without seed does not constitute nature, but are distinctions concerning the same nature, so too are unbegotten and begotten.
> If, perhaps, the Logos as man had a different nature from ours because of the seedless generation, then he certainly will have a different essence than the Father because of his generation. For unoriginateness and generation are not the same. So will we have [a different nature] from Adam and Eve of old, who were also begotten without seed. For Adam was a form of the Former, while Eve was a portion of the formed. But the Son is the same as the Father through the Divinity, just as we, related through the humanity, are *homoousios* with Adam and Eve and with God himself who became flesh for us. For unoriginateness and generation are not the essence of God (for who says this?), so neither is generation with or without seed the nature of humanity.[42]

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[42]PG 91.60C4-61A9: Ὅθεν τὸ κατ' αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπινον, οὐ διὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν καινοπρεπῆ τῆς γενέσεως τρόπον, πρὸς τὸ ἡμέτερον παραλλάττει· ταυτὸν μὲν ὑπάρχον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· οὐ ταυτὸν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀσπορίαν· ἐπὶ μὴ

Maximus explicitly talks about the logos of genesis and the mode of birth in another passage in *Ambiguum* 42 (PG 91.1320A). There he says the purpose of the Incarnation was to renew the nature that had been marred by sin. Since, as we have already seen, "every innovation . . . has naturally to do with the mode of the innovated thing but not with the logos of nature, because a logos innovated corrupts nature," the renewal of human nature takes place by means of a new mode of existence, namely in being hypostasized in the person of the Logos. While it is important to see that the Virgin birth is certainly a new mode of existence for human nature, it is more important to see that the human nature of Christ, by finding its mode in the person of the divine Logos and not in a weak, vacillating, sin-prone human person, is allowed its full expression. In Christ, then, humanity at last finds complete freedom and expression, and, unemcumbered by sin, is able to pursue the course intended for it from the beginning: union with God, or deification. And in the person of Christ this plan is achieved.

ψιλῆ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δι' ἡμᾶς ἐνανθρωπήσαντος ἦν. Ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τὸ θέλειν αὐτοῦ κυρίως μὲν ὃν φυσικὸν καθ' ἡμᾶς, τυπούμενον δὲ θεϊκῶς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς. Δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀσπορία καὶ σπορά, φύσιν οὐ τέμνει· περὶ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν τέμνεται φύσιν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἀγεννησία καὶ γέννησις.

Ἐπεὶ τυχὸν εἰ διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν ὡς ἄνθρωπος εἶχεν ὁ Λόγος διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν· ἕξει γε πάντως, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίαν, διὰ τὴν γέννησιν. Οὐ γὰρ ταυτὸν ἀγεννησία καὶ γέννησις. Ἕξομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς πρός τε τὸν παλαιὸν Ἀδὰμ καὶ τὴν Εὔαν, δίχα σπορᾶς γενομένους· ὁ μὲν γάρ, πλάσμα τοῦ πλάσαντον· ἡ δέ, τμῆμα τοῦ πλάσματος. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ταυτὸν ὁ Υἱὸς τῷ Πατρὶ διὰ τὴν Θεότητα· Θεὸς γὰρ καὶ ὁμοούσιος· ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς, πρός τε τὸν Ἀδὰμ καὶ τὴν Εὔαν, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς σαρκωθέντα Θεόν, συγγενεῖς διὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα καὶ ὁμοούσιοι. Ὡς γὰρ οὐκ οὐσία Θεοῦ τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ γεννητόν (τίς γὰρ ὁ λέγων), οὕτως οὐδὲ σπορὰ καὶ ἀσπορία φύσις καθοτιοῦν ἀνθρωπότητος.

CHAPTER V

THE ENHYPOSTATON

A. Antecedents

1. Leontius of Byzantium[1]

As Wesche points out in his dissertation, the term enhypostaton

(ἐνυπόστατον) is at least as old as Apollinarius, who applied it Christo-

logically.[2] Nevertheless, Apollinarius' use does not at all correspond

with the uses with which we shall be concerned in this chapter. Our

starting point will be somewhat later, in the writings of Leontius of

Byzantium. In the first chapter of his *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychi-*

anos, Leontius says this of enhypostaton:

> Hypostasis and enhypostaton are not the same thing, just as
> essence and enousion are different. For *hypostasis* reveals a
> certain thing, while enhypostaton reveals the essence. And
> hypostasis defines a person in its particular characteristics,
> while enhypostaton clearly reveals what is not itself accidental,
> that has its being in another, and is not seen in itself.[3]

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[1]The reader is reminded of the brief discussion of the enhypos-
taton in Chapter I.C.3, p. 49, and the footnote concerning our reser-
vations toward Evan's work in Chapter IV.A.1, note 1, p. 111, above.

[2]Wesche, 152.

[3]Leontius of Byzantium, *Contr. Nest. et Eutych.* 1.1 (PG 86.1277C14-
D6): Οὐ ταὐτόν, ὦ οὗτοι, ὑπόστασις καὶ ἐνυπόστατον, ὥσπερ ἕτερον οὐσία καὶ
ἐνούσιον· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπόστασις τὸν τινὰ δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον τὴν οὐσίαν· καὶ
ἡ μὲν ὑπόστασις πρόσωπον ἀφορίζει τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπό-
στατον τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ συμβεβηκὸς δηλοῖ, ὃ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν

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As Evans goes on to say, Leontius predicates enhypostaton of two things: first of essence, and second of those things which have their being in another and are not seen in themselves (these latter are clearly distinguished from accidents, which are known to be anhypostaton, without hypostasis, and which must find their being in another). Moreover, enhypostaton refers not to beings in themselves, but to beings in their "mode of union."[4] To recall the discussion of Leontius from Chapter I, we see that enhypostaton pertains not to the logos, but to the tropos of a being. This much is probably safe to say.

To follow Evans' argument further, Leontius teaches that not all essences are enhypostasized, because not all essences have a mode of union where the enhypostaton obtains, that is, some unions result in a confusion of the two essences that have come together. In Christ, however, the enhypostaton does obtain, and one might be led to think that only the human nature is enhypostatized in the hypostasis of the Logos. However, according to Evans' theory, Leontius posits that the two natures each have hypostases that both pre-exist the hypostatic union and subsist after it. The locus of unity in Christ is to be found "in" the Evagrian Christ-νοῦς. Leontius held to a double enhypostasization: both the divine hypostasis of the Logos and the human hypostasis are enhypostasized in the one hypostasis of the Christ-νοῦς.[5]

ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται. Greek text cited in Evans, 134.

[4]Evans, 135.

[5]Evans, 136-37.

This is the "locative" theory of how the enhypostaton functions, i.e., by defining the hypostasis as the locus in which the two natures are enhypostasized.

Wesche cites an unpublished paper of Brian Daley, in which he takes issue with the assesment that Leontius of Byzantium used the enhypostaton in the "locative" sense. Wesche believes that Leontius of Byzantium used the enhypostaton simply to indicate—contrary to Evans' view—that a nature has its own hypostasis.[6] That is, when a nature is hypostasized, it is enhypostaton.

At any rate, Wesche believes that Leontius of Byzantium was not the originator of the "locative" sense of the enhypostaton, but that Leontius of Jerusalem is to be credited with this employment. Who came up with the idea is of little concern to us in this dissertation, so we shall not belabor the point. Suffice it to say that the good which we glean from Leontius of Byzantium is the following:

1. It is likely that Leontius of Byzantium re-introduced the term enhypostaton into Christology.

2. Enhypostaton signifies something which is not an accident, but which nevertheless has its being in another.

3. It is properly ascribed not to beings in themselves, but to beings in their mode of union; that is, enhypostaton pertains to the mode of a being's existence, not to the definition of its nature.

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[6]Wesche, *Defense*, 152-56.

2. Leontius of Jerusalem

The meaning which Leontius of Jerusalem gives to enhypostaton is this:

> Now we say that two natures exist in one and the same hypostasis. This does not mean that one [of the natures] can exist in the hypostasis without an hypostasis, but rather that both are able to exist in one common hypostasis. And thus, each one is hypostatic in one and the same hypostasis.[7]

Whether or not Leontius conceived of enhypostaton in a "locative" sense, it is clear that Leontius of Jerusalem did. Both the divine and the human nature of Christ exist "in" the one hypostasis of the Logos. Contrary to the objections of some, that without its own hypostasis the humanity of Christ is fundamentally deficient or corrupted, Leontius of Jerusalem teaches that the humanity of Christ is full and complete, for the whole human nature is preserved and finds its hypostasis in the hypostasis of the Logos.

A notion like the enhypostaton in the "locative" sense we have described here cannot stand alone. Rather, it is contingent upon the Neo-Chalcedonian enterprise of distinguishing hypostasis and nature. One cannot maintain this "locative" understanding of enhypostaton if natures are understood to *be* hypostases. There would be no "place" to locate them. All of this means that a "hypostatic nature" is a nature

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[7]*Adv. Nest.* 2.13 (PG 86.1561B8-13): τὰς γὰρ δύο φύσεις ἐν μιᾷ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποστάσει λέγομεν ὑφίστασθαι· οὐχ ὡς δυναμένης ἀνυποστάτου εἶναι ἐν αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐν μιᾷ κοινῇ δυναμένων ὑφίστασθαι ὑποστάσει· καὶ οὕτως κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν, ἑκατέρας ἐνυποστάτου οὔσης. Cited in Wesche, *Defense*, 157.

that really exists in an hypostasis: it is a concrete existent thing.

Indeed, Leontius goes on to remark,

> For it is not necessary that if something must exist, it must
> also exist by itself. . . . In the same way, then, when there are
> a number of natures, they must both subsist and be hypostatic.
> But when they are not apart from one another, because they
> have admittedly been united, then it is not necessary that each
> one exist by itself.[8]

"To exist by itself" refers to something that has its own hypostasis.

Here Leontius is denying that for something to exist it must have its

own, unique hypostasis. What lies behind this statement is the Paleo-

Chalcedonian tendency to identify nature and hypostasis such that a

nature does not only *have* an hypostasis, but that it *is* an hypostasis.

It is true, as he goes on to say, that for a nature to be real it must

both subsist and be hypostatic, but that does not mean each nature

must have its own unique subsistence and hypostasis. The result, in

the case of Christ, would be either that there were two persons in him

because of the two natures, or that there would be only one nature

because of the one person.

Moreover, with reference to Christ, the two natures were never

separate from each other, and so the humanity never had need of, or

occasion for, an hypostasis apart from that of the Logos. For this

reason the human nature of Christ never existed "by itself" either

before or after the union. For,

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[8]*Adv. Nest.* 2.13 (PG 86.1561B13-14, C2-7): Οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸ δεῖν
τι εἶναι, πάντως καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῦτο εἶναι· . . . οὕτως οὖν ἐπεὶ μέν εἰσιν αἱ φύσεις,
ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὰς καὶ ὑφεστηκέναι καὶ ἐνυποστάτους εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἰδίᾳ ἀπ'
ἀλλήλων εἰσίν, ἑνώσεως αὐτῶν ὁμολογημένως γενομένης, οὐχὶ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφεστηκέναι
ἑκατέραν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι. Cited in Wesche, *Defense*, 158.

> Clearly, there is not a difference of hypostasis, but both
> natures--which are hypostatic--must be conceived in one and
> the same hypostasis.[9]

Again we have our working understanding of the enhypostaton doctrine.

With this in hand, let us turn to Maximus and see how it is used in his

writings.

B. Maximus

In eighteenth century England, lexicography was an unimportant

discipline, so much so that Samuel Johnson, himself a lexicographer,

defined one as "a writer of dictionaries; a harmless drudge." In

seventh century Byzantium, however, careful and meticulous lexico-

graphy was most important for the right articulation of the Faith. We

are not surprised, therefore, to find that of Maximus' twenty-eight

Opuscula theologica et polemica, one is the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, two

are *florilegia* of Patristic texts supporting Dyotheletism, and four

(*Opuscula* 14, 17, 18, and 23) are collections of definitions of theological

terms. We are pleased to discover that two of these *opuscula* contain

definitions of enhypostaton. Unlike the concepts presented in Chapters

III and IV, we do not find in Maximus very much originality in his use

of the enhypostaton.

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[9]*Adv. Nest.* 2.13 (PG 86.1561C8-10): Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐχ ἑτεροϋπόστατον
εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποστάσει νοεῖσθαι ἀμφοῖν αὐτῶν τὸ ἐνυπόστατον
δεῖ. Cited in Wesche, *Defense*, 158.

1. *Opuscule* 14

This *opuscule* consists entirely of definitions of terms and starts out with definitions of essence and nature: "*Essence* and *nature* are the same, for both are predicated of what is common and universal among many and numerically distinct things, and they are never limited to any [individual] person."[10] In a set of definitions which goes on to consider different types of unions, attributes, and wills, it is not surprising to find that the collection starts off with a definition of essence and nature. Note that Maximus categorically denies that nature means an individual person; nature is used only with reference to what is common and universal among a given set of numerically distinct things (i.e. hypostases). In this he eliminates the ambiguous use of the term *nature*, which, as we recall, could refer either to the common substance or to an individual thing. This ambiguity is clearly done away with by restricting the meaning of nature to what is common and universal.

It is most significant that the second definition in the list is not for hypostasis and person, as we might expect, but rather for enhypostaton: "*Enhypostaton* is that which is common according to essence, that is, the species which really exists in particular individuals, and is thus not

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[10]PG 91.149B8–11: Οὐσία καὶ φύσις, ταυτόν· ἄμφω γὰρ κοινὸν καὶ καθόλου, ὡς κατὰ πολλῶν καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ κατηγορούμενα, καὶ μήποτε καθοτιοῦν ἑνὶ προσώπῳ περιοριζόμενα.

understood to be a mere abstraction."[11] Here Maximus is accomplishing a couple of things we have already seen in the two Leontii.

First, enhypostaton refers not to an hypostasis, but to an essence. Both essence/nature and enhypostaton share the definition of being "common," and enhypostaton is even said clearly to be common "according to essence."

Second and more important, Maximus explains how nature and enhypostaton are different. Enhypostaton refers to an essence that "really exists in particular individuals." *It is to enhypostaton that Maximus has transferred the meaning of nature as an individual.* When a nature is not an abstraction but a really existing thing, a concrete reality, it is such only in virtue of being hypostasized. And an hypostasized nature is what Maximus calls an enhypostaton.

The Confessor goes on with his definition of enhypostaton by saying, "Or again, to put it differently, enhypostaton is that which comes into union and subsists together with another, distinct [from it] in nature, in a subsistence of one person and a genesis of one hypostasis, and is not recognized in itself."[12] "That which comes into union and subsists together with another, distinct [from it] in nature" is itself a nature. This nature, along with the other nature, subsists

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[11]PG 91.149B12-C1: Ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν κοινόν, ἤγουν τὸ εἶδος, τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις πραγματικῶς ὑφιστάμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἐπινοίᾳ ψιλῇ θεωρούμενον.

[12]PG 91.149C3-7: Ἄλλως, ἢ πάλιν ἐνυπόστατόν ἐστι, τὸ ἄλλῳ διαφόρῳ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑνὸς σύστασιν προώπου καὶ μιᾶς γένεσιν ὑποστάσεως, συγκείμενόν τε καὶ συνυφιστάμενον, καὶ οὐδαμῶς καθ' αὐτὸ γνωριζόμενον.

and generates one person and hypostasis. That it is "not recognized in itself" means that this nature does not have its own, unique hypostasis distinguished from the hypostasis of the other nature. Both natures have the same hypostasis, both natures subsist in it, and both are hypostatic in it.

Because the enhypostaton concerns hypostasized natures, it also has to do with union, the union of two natures distinct from each other, which come together and subsist together in one person/hypostasis. (We are reminded of Evans' assessment, that the Byzantine Leontius allowed the enhypostaton in the mode of union, and here we find Maximus advocating something along the same lines.) The "locative" sense of the term is noted, and there is, moreover, the implied distinction between hypostasis and nature such that the natures can come together "in" the one hypostasis. The persistent reality of the two natures in the union is again brought forth with the choice of the two verbs, both of which begin with συν-, the "with" prefix: συγκείμενον τε καὶ συνυφιστάμενον.

After going on to define consubstantiality, essential union, hypostasis, person, and enousion, Maximus comes to the term homo-hypostaton, which has some bearing on our discussion:

> *Homohypostaton* is that which is united with another in one and the same hypostasis, but which happens to be different from it by essence, as is the case for a soul and a body, as well as many other things distinct by difference of nature but united by hypostasis. If therefore something is united to another by union, it is identical by hypostasis, that is to say, it becomes one hypostasis with it, but it differs from it by essence. And if one thing has been united to another by hypostasis, then this thing is neither one nor the same kind of thing as the

other by essence. So if something united to another is different in essence, it is united to the same thing by hypostasis.[13]

We see that the Trinitarian term *homoousios* has given rise to a similar, parallel term, homohypostaton. In this definition of homohypostaton we find a close similarity with the idea of enhypostaton we have been examining. Indeed, enhypostaton and homohypostaton are related terms. To distill the lengthier presentation, essences are united hypostatically, and two essences coming into one common hypostasis are said to be homohypostaton. To extrapolate the Confessor's thought,

"heteroousios" : homohypostaton

:: homoousios : "heterohypostaton"

i.e., things different in essence can be united by hypostasis, while things identical in essence can be differentiated by hypostasis.

What is perhaps more germane to our discussion is the statement that when two hypostasized natures, that is, two enhypostata, are hypostasized in one and the same hypostasis, they are identical in hypostasis. We come close to the incomprehensibility of the Incarnation here, for we recall that the enhypostaton refers to a nature, not as an abstraction, but as a really existent thing. Maximus is saying that in

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[13]PG 91.152A9-B6: Ὁμοϋπόστατόν ἐστι, τὸ εἰς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπό-στασιν ἄλλῳ συντεθειμένον· διάφορον δὲ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ κατ' οὐσίαν τυγχάνον· ὡς ἐπί τε ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φύσεως ἑτερότητι διαφέροντα, καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἤνωται. Εἴ τι οὖν ἄλλῳ καθ' ἕνωσιν συντεθὲν, ταυτὸν ὑπααρχει κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τουτέστιν, ὑπόστασις μετ' αὐτοῦ γένονε μία, ἕτερον τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐστί. Καὶ εἴ τι ἐν καὶ ἡνωμένον ἄλλῳ τυγχάνει κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, τοῦτο οὐχ ἐν οὔτε ὁμόγενές ἐστι τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. Καὶ εἴ τι συντεθειμένον ἄλλῳ διαφορὰν ἔχει κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, τοῦτο ἕνωσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

the Incarnation two concrete realities are in fact one concrete reality: they are identical in hypostasis. The intimacy of the hypostatic union stands out in bold relief and in all its mystery.

After this definition of homohypostaton, Maximus summarizes what the preceding definitions have been leading up to. He says, "Therefore, *hypostatic union* is one that brings together and binds together distinct essences or natures into one person and into one and the same hypostasis."[14] Thus we are brought full circle: the importance of the enhypostaton lies in its ability to clarify the terms of hypostatic union.

Given what we have said, one might be tempted to think that the enhypostaton can be used, for example, to establish the plausability of a centaur, in which horse nature is enhypostasized into a human hypostasis. However, a situation where the enhypostaton is possible obtains only where the hypostasis in question is God's. Maximus, in *Epistle* 15, clearly says,

> For to him who alone properly is was it possible, by an abundance of power, to become without change, unconfusedly, what he was not, and to remain properly both, what he was and what he became.[15]

Therefore, as Maximus might put it, let no one be led astray by fanciful imaginations, for there is only one enhypostaton and only one hypostatic union, that of the Lord Jesus Christ.

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[14]PG 91.152B7-9: Ὑποστατικὴ οὖν ἕνωσίς ἐστιν, ἡ τὰς διαφόρους οὐσίας ἤγουν φύσεις εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον, καὶ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόστασιν συγάγουσά τε καὶ συνδέουσα.

[15]PG 91.577B9-12: Αὐτῷ γὰρ μόνῳ κυρίως ὄντι περιουσίᾳ δυνάμεως γενέσθαι δυνατὸν ἦν δίχα τροπῆς ἀσυγχύτως ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἄμφω μεῖναι κυρίως ὅπερ ἦν τε καὶ γέγονε·

2. *Opuscule* 23

This *opuscule* we shall quote a little more extensively. It bears the title, "Of the Same Maximus, Chapters on Essence and Nature, Hypostasis and Person," and it begins,

> *Essence* and *enousion* are not the same; neither are *hypostasis* and *enhypostaton*, as if each should be considered in the other, but rather one is one thing, and the other, another. For *enousion* is that which is contemplated in the nature, and which does not exist by itself, while *enhypostaton* reveals that which exists in an hypostasis and which does not occur in itself by itself. That is to say, enhypostaton is not the union of incomplete parts into one, but [it] is seen in the unconfused[16] coming together of complete and incomplete parts.[17]

Let us take this much in smaller pieces. "Essence and enousion are not the same; neither are hypostasis and enhypostaton, as if each should be considered in the other, but rather one is one thing, and the other, another." First we notice that *essence* and *hypostasis* are in their

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[16]Here we note what *must* be error in the Migne text. Migne has the last sentence ending ἐν τῇ κατὰ σύγχυσιν συνόδῳ θεωρούμενον, which says that the coming together was a confusion of the complete and the incomplete parts. This cannot be what the Confessor means. That is why we have rendered the passage ἐν τῇ κατ' ἀσύγχυσιν συνόδῳ θεωρούμενον. The situation which the Migne rendition would dictate is what *TP* 14 calls a "confusing union," one which "does not preserve the existence of its parts, but rather obscures them by mixing them and rendering them unknown" (see PG 91.152C11–D4). Since, as we have seen, *TP* 14 maintains the clear distinction and preservation of the essences in a union enhypostaton, the term, in Maximus' useage, cannot admit a confusion.

[17]PG 91.261A4–12: Ὅτι οὐσία καὶ ἐνούσιον, οὐ ταὐτόν· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὑπόστασις καὶ ἐνυπόστατον, εἰ καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἄμφω θεωρεῖται, ἀλλ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. Ἐνούσιον μὲν γάρ ἐστι, τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει θεωρούμενον, καὶ οὐ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑπάρχον· ἐνυπόστατον δὲ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ὑποστάσει ὄν, καὶ οὐχ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καθ' ἑαυτὸ τυγχάνον, δηλοῖ· τουτέστι, τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀτελῶν μερῶν εἰς ἕν τι συνελθὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τελείου καὶ ἀτελοῦς, ἐν τῇ κατ' ἀσύγχυσιν συνόδῳ θεωρούμενον.

usual, feminine forms, but that *enousion* and *enhypostaton* are both

neuter constructions, implying enessenced and enhypostatic *things.*

Essence is not the same as what is "enessenced." To anticipate the

following discussion, qualities are things in essence, and, significantly,

so are hypostases. Similarly, hypostasis is not the same as the

enhypostaton. What is enhypostaton? A nature that is hypostasized,

"that which is in an hypostasis and which does not occur in itself by

itself." And why does a nature not occur in itself by itself? Because

to occur, to be real, it must be hypostasized. And hypostasis and

nature are not the same.[18]

To go on, "enhypostaton is not the union of incomplete parts into

one, but [it] is seen in the coming together of complete and incomplete

parts." Maximus characterizes enhypostaton as a union, not of two

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[18]To return to the unpublished article of Brian Daley mentioned near the beginning of this chapter—and to speculate for a moment—Wesche says this and quotes Daley:

. . . in Leontius of Byzantium enhypostasis must be understood as the opposite of anhypostasis and is simply an example "of those Greek adjectival formations in which the prefix 'en' is joined to a substantive to signify the possession of something or quality, as opposed to the alpha-privative, which would signify its absence. . . . Enhypostatos would simply mean 'hypostatic,' having a concrete existence, as opposed to 'an-hypostatic,' or purely abstract." (Wesche, *Defense,* 153-54.)

Maximus' distinction of essence and enousion, hypostasis and enhypostaton, suggests that someone was in fact confusing the pairs of terms. It may be that Leontius of Byzantium was doing just that, and that Wesche, following Daley, is correct that Leontius of Byzantium did not use enhypostaton in the "locative" sense, but only used it to mean "hypostatic," and that Leontius of Jerusalem gets credit for having first used the term as a "locative." Moreover, it may be that when Maximus, in *TP* 14, says, "Enhypostaton is that which is common according to essence, that is, the form which really exists in particular individuals, and *is thus not understood to be a mere abstraction*," he means that the enhypostaton is to be distinguished as not being anhypostatic. Such an interpretation would be consistent with Daley's line of reasoning.

incomplete parts into one, but of a complete and an incomplete part,
which come together in an unconfused way. To make the direct
application to Christology, the "incomplete" part is the humanity which
is "incomplete" as lacking a human hypostasis; while the "complete" part
is the divinity, which is "complete" as having a divine hypostasis.
These two parts come together in a union in which the two parts remain
unconfused, and in which the "incomplete" part finds its completion by
being hypostasized in the hypostasis of the Logos. Still, it must not be
supposed that human nature exists "incompletely" in any way, for, as we
have said, nature is either abstract or it exists hypostatically. The
humanity of Christ was not a "fragment" waiting for "completion," since
before it was hypostasized in the person of the Logos it did not exist.

Maximus goes on to say,

Hypostasis refers to a person by means of its characteristic
properties. *Enhypostaton* reveals the accidental which does not
subsist in itself, but which has its being in another and is not
contemplated in itself, neither does it subsist by itself, but it is
always contemplated in the hypostasis [in which it subsists],
just as qualities which are called essential and nonessential:
they are not the essence, neither do they subsist by them-
selves, but they subsist in the essence, without which they
have no being.[19]

Again, enhypostaton refers to a nature that is hypostasized, not in
itself, but in another, and it is around that other hypostasis, now the
common hypostasis of two natures, that both natures are to be

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[19]PG 91.261A13-B7: Ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὑπόστασις πρόσωπον ἀφορίζει τοῖς χαρακτηρι-
στικοῖς ἰδιώμασι. Τὸ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον, τὸ μὴ ὂν καθ' ἑαυτὸ συμβεβηκὸς δηλοῖ·
ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἑαυτῷ θεωρεῖται, οὐδὲ ἔστι καθ'
ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστός, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν πάντοτε θεωρούμενον, ὥσπερ αἱ ποιότητες,
αἵ τε οὐσιώδεις καὶ ἐπουσιώδεις καλούμεναι· αἵτινες οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐσία, οὐδὲ καθ'
ἑαυτά, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τυγχάνουσι, καὶ δίχα ταύτης τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἔχουσιν.

contemplated. Further, this use of the term is possible only if

hypostasis and nature are clearly distinguished such that a hypostasis

can admit a "foreign" nature and hypostasize it within itself. This

aspect of the enhypostaton reminds us of the distinction between logos

and tropos examined in the previous chapter. The logos of a nature

persists when that nature is hypostasized (indeed it does not exist

before then), and yet that firm, immutable logos of nature, in virtue of

being hypostasized, admits a mode of existence that is mutable, capable

of becoming more complex by the hypostasization of another nature

within it.

> So neither an essential nor a nonessential quality is essence,
> nor is it something which subsists by itself, but it is ever a
> characteristic in the essence, like color in a body or knowledge
> in a soul. For just as one cannot say that color is displayed
> without a body, or that knowledge operates without a soul,
> neither is enhypostaton or enousion to be considered apart from
> essence or hypostasis. For they have no existence by
> themselves, but are ever contemplated in the hypostasis.[20]

Here the Confessor drives home (a) the distinction of essence and the

essential, of hypostasis and the hypostatic; (b) the contingency of

enhypostaton upon essence and enousion upon hypostasis; and (c) the

location of the essence essence in hypostasis.

It is important to note which terms are spoken of with respect to

which. Enhypostaton is said with respect to essence, for it is an

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[20]PG 91.261B8-C3: Ὅτι ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἑτέρα τῶν ποιοτήτων, ἤγουν οὐσιωδῶν καὶ ἐπουσιωδῶν, ἐστὶν οὐσία, ἢ πρᾶγμα ὑφεστὼς καθ' ἑαυτο, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὸ χαρακτηριστικὸν κέκτηνται, ὥσπερ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν χρῶμα δίχα σώματος φαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἐπιστήμην δίχα ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖσθαι· οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐνυπόστατον ἢ ἐνούσιον ἔστιν νοῆσαι δίχα οὐσίας ἢ ὑποστάσεως. Οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτὰ τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ περὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν θεωροῦνται.

essence which is enhypostasized. Similarly, enousion is said with

respect to hypostasis, for it is an hypostasis which is "enessenced."

> Thus it is not necessary to bring the enhypostaton into
> hypostasis, neither to delimit enousion into essence.[21]

That is to say, having thus distinguished enhypostasis from hypostasis

and enousion from essence, one ought not confuse them.

> Thus, what some say, i.e. that there is no anhypostatic nature,
> is correctly said, but not correctly considered; for that which is
> not anhypostatic is to be brought into hypostasis, but it is not
> to be contemplated in the hypostasis [itself].[22]

This sentence is most important, but requires some unpacking. The

statement is true that there is no anhypostatic nature. For nature to

be more than an abstraction, for it to be a real, existent thing, it must

be hypostasized. Maximus goes on to clarify the distinction between

nature and hypostasis for his readers:

> It is just as if someone were to say, "There is no body
> without shape or color," which is correctly said, but then goes
> on to conclude incorrectly that shape or color *are* the body, but
> are not seen in a body. So it is with him who says, "There is
> no anhypostatic nature," and then goes on to unite what is not
> anhypostatic [i.e. the nature] to hypostasis; he does not
> correctly discern them.[23]

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[21]PG 91.261C5-6: Ὅτι οὐ δέον οὔτε τὸ ἐνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν συνάγειν, οὔτε τὸ ἐνούσιον εἰς οὐσίαν διορίζειν.

[22]PG 91.261C8-11: Ὅτι τὸ λέγειν τινάς, μὴ εἶναι φύσιν ἀνυπόστατον, ὀρθῶς μὲν λέγεται παρ' αὐτοῖς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ νενόηται· καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατιν εἰς ὑπόστασιν φέρειν, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει θεωρεῖσθαι.

[23]PG 91.261C13-64A5: Ὅτι ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγει, Οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα ἀσχημάτισον ἢ ἀχρωμάτισον, ὀρθῶς μὲν λέγει, οὐ μὴν ὀρθῶς συμπεραίνει, τὸ σχῆμα, ἢ τὸ χρῶμα σῶμα λέγων εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐν σώματι θεωρεῖσθαι· οὕτως εἴ τις ὀνομάσει λέγων· Οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος· εἶτα τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν συνάγων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διακρίνει.

Again, what is hypostatic is not the hypostasis, but nature. The

Confessor then goes on to give us proof for the analysis we have just

offered.

> There is indeed no anhypostatic nature, but neither is
> nature hypostasis, nor is the not anhypostatic to be thought of
> in hypostasis [itself]. They are not convertible. For hypostasis
> is surely also a nature, just as form is also a body. For it is
> not possible to perceive hypostasis without nature [as] it is
> impossible to perceive shape or color without a body. But
> nature is surely not also hypostasis.
> For nature has a common logos of being, while hypostasis
> has the logos of being by itself.
> And nature exhibits only the logos of species, while
> hypostasis reveals the particular.[24]

There is no anhypostatic nature, for to be without hypostasis is to be

non-existent. A problem arises, however, when someone wishing to

affirm the reality of a given nature understands the nature to be the

hypostasis itself. As Maximus indicates at the end of this section, those

who confuse the issue have forgotten their basics, and he provides

simple, straightforward definitions of nature and hypostasis which

underscore their distinction.

The last paragraphs of this part of *Opuscule* 23 reveal to us a

confusion over three terms, a confusion which Maximus treats at greater

length in another *opuscule*. The three terms are anhypostaton,

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[24]PG 91.264A6-B4: Ὅτι φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτὲ ἀνυπόστατος, οὐ μὴν ἡ φύσις ὑπόστασις· οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον εἰς ὑπόστασιν θεωρεῖαι. Ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲ ἀντιστρέφει. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπόστασις, πάντως καὶ φύσις· ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, πάντως σῶμα. Οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ὑπόστασιν νοῆσαι ἄνευ φύσεως· οὐ δὲ πάλιν σχῆμα ἢ χρῶμα ἄνευ σώματος· ἡ δὲ φύσις, οὐ πάντως καὶ ὑπόστασις.

Ὅτι ἡ μὲν φύσις τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον κοινὸν ἐπέχει, ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις, καὶ τὸν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ εἶναι.

Ὅτι ἡ μὲν φύσις εἴδους λόγον μόνον ἐπέχει, ἡ δὲ ὑπόστασις καὶ τοῦ τινός ἐστι δηλωτική.

hypostasis, and enhypostaton, and the work in which they are treated is *Opuscule* 16. It is to that work that we now turn to finish our analysis.

3. *Opuscule* 16

Opuscule 16 is a long and complicated document entitled "Concerning the Two Wills of the One Christ our God." An obviously anti-Monothelite work, the first half of it is taken up with demonstrations that to deny two wills in Christ is to deny the two natures which give rise to the wills and in which they are grounded, and that such a denial opens up a plethora of Christological and theological problems.

Indeed, it is worth pointing out that in the first half of this *opuscule*, we find a variation of the question which set this whole dissertation into motion. Recall from Chapter I.C.1[25] our leading question: How is it possible to conceive of operation and will in a Monophysite way while conceiving of hypostasis and nature in an Orthodox way? In *Opuscule* 16, the Confessor says, "How are the wills, being natural, not numbered if it is reasonable to number the natures?"[26] And several columns later the question comes up in the reverse: "If the confession of the natural energies is not good, neither

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[25]See p. 36 above.

[26]PG 91.189B6-8: πῶς ὄντα μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, οὐκ ἀριθμούμενα δὲ τὰ θελήματα τὴν αὐτήν, εἴπερ εὐλόγως μὴ παύσοιντο τοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαι καὐταὶ αἱ φύσεις;

is the confession of the natures themselves. Or why are the latter

confused and the former are not?"[27]

In the section of *Opuscule* 16 we want to discuss, Maximus has been

flogging his opponents with the implications of identifying nature and

hypostasis: the Fathers proclaimed and confessed the two operations to

be natural, but they did not go on to conclude that there must likewise

be two subjects operating, as did that anthropolater Nestorius; nor did

they confuse the two operations into one on account of the one person,

as did Severus, who "shamelessly contrives sophistries and

nonsense."[28]

The Confessor's opponents want to understand nature to be an

individual *thing*. In order to do this, they will say that nature is not

anhypostatic, i.e. that it is not unreal but a real, existent thing.

Maximus summarizes the fruit of their reasoning:

> For if nature is not anhypostatic, then hypostasis is made to be
> the same [as nature]; and it doubtless follows that if hypostasis
> exists not unessentially, then essence is proven to be the same
> [as hypostasis].[29]

Maximus is saying that if nature is hypostatic according to the Monothe-

lite understanding, then nature is the same as hypostasis; and if

hypostasis is essential, then hypostasis is the same as nature. We see

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[27]PG 91.204C1-3: Εἰ γὰρ τὰς φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας ὁμολογεῖν οὐ καλόν, οὐδὲ τὰς φύσεις αὐτάς. Ἢ πῶς ταύτας μὲν, οὐκ ἐκείνας δέ;

[28]PG 91.204C-D.

[29]PG 91.205A1-4: Εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ὑπόστασιν ταύτην ποιεῖ, πάντως δήπου κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον, καὶ τὸ μὲ ἀνούσιον τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὑπάρχειν, οὐσίαν ταύτην παρίστησι.

that Maximus is accusing the Monothelites of confusing *hypostasis* with the *hypostatic* (i.e. with nature), and the charge sticks. Here is the reason why.

We have already seen in the discussion of *Opuscule* 23 that anhypostaton means unreal, without real existence, or abstract. Again, it is true that no nature is anhypostatic, but that does not mean that nature = hypostasis. This is the problem in Paleo-Chalcedonian Christology. By Paleo-Chalcedonian reasoning, if the reality of the unique hypostasis of Christ is to be maintained, one must also affirm one nature; and if the reality of the two natures is to be maintained, one must also affirm two hypostases. We discover that the same dynamic is at work among the Monothelites, and that, moreover, it infects their consideration of will and operation as well. To the Mono-thelite mind, *an operation implies an operator, and a will implies a willer, in exactly the same way that a person implies a nature.* So, from their standpoint, to say "two wills" is to say that there are two willers in Christ, two persons; and that is Nestorianism. On the other hand, from the orthodox point of view, to say "one will" is to say that there is one willer in Christ, one person, but further, that there is either (a) only one nature in Christ (Monophysitism), or (b) that the human nature was defective in that it lacked a will (Apollinarianism). Add to all of this the fact that, at the time, it was openly debated whether operation or will was to be ascribed to person or to nature, and the whole enterprise takes on dizzying aspects. Maximus lost his life trying to show the Monothelites that theirs was not good Christology.

According to Maximus' reasoning, nature and hypostasis do not

amount to the same thing: an hypostasis is a (concrete instance of a)

nature, but a nature is not an hypostasis. Maximus pelts the

Monothelites some more with the fruit of their confusion:

> And don't those who say this divide the doctrine of theology,
> by saying [there is] an equal number of natures as there are
> hypostases, if ousia is truly the not unessential hypostases
> themselves? And why don't they confuse the economy by
> [affirming] the singularity of nature on account of the one
> hypostasis? They contradict and make such declarations against
> themselves.[30]

This line of reasoning we have seen before, in the Confessor and in

others. Now that Maximus has spared his opponents nothing, he

explains the truth of the matter:

> Grace is with those who confess the natural operations and who
> unite them in this way, since through everything they gather
> the truth for themselves in line with the tradition of the Saints,
> aaccording to which being anhypostatic does not make the
> nature an hypostasis, but being enhypostaton does, lest it
> [nature] be grasped only in thought instead of being conceived
> as a really existing species. Likewise, what is not unessential
> does not make the hypostasis an essence, but being essential
> does, so that we do not consider it a mere property, but rather
> [consider it] with that in which we rightly know the
> property.[31]

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[30]PG 91.205A4-11: Καὶ οἱ τοῦτο λέγοντες, πῶς τόν τε τῆς θεολογίας οὐ
διαιροῦσι λόγον, ταῖς τῶν ἰσαρίθμων ὑποστάσεων φύσεσιν, εἴπερ οὐσία πάντως αἱ μὴ
ἀνούσιοι κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑποστάσεις· καὶ τὸ τῆς οἰκονομίας οὐ συγχέουσι, τῷ τὴν
φύσεως μοναδικῷ διὰ τὴν μίαν ὑπόστασιν; Ἑαυτοῖς γοῦν στοιχοῦντες, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
καθ' ἑαυτῶν δογματίσουσι.

[31]PG 91.205A11-B5: Τοῖς δὲ τὰς φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας ὁμολογοῦσι, τὸ καὶ οὕτω
ταύτας συνάγειν, χάρις ἐστὶ, διὰ πάντων ἑαυτοῖς τὸ ἀληθὲς συναγείρουσι κατὰ τὴν
τῶν ἁγίων παράδοσιν, καθ' ἣν τὸ μὴ ἀνυπόστατον, οὐχ ὑπόστασιν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν
ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐνυπόστατον· ἵνα μὴ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἐπινοίᾳ μόνῃ λαμβάνηται, ἀλλ' ὡς
εἶδος πραγματικῶς θεωρῆται. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀνούσιον, οὐκ οὐσίαν ποιεῖ τὴν
ὑπόστασιν, ἀλλ' ἐνούσιον παριστᾷ, ἵνα μὴ ψιλὸν ἰδίωμα ταύτην, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν
ᾧ τὸ ἰδίωμα κυρίως γνωρίζωμεν.

The tradition of the Saints, then, maintains a great many things, and we may give a summary of them in the following, brief way.

1. The overriding presupposition for a discussion of the enhypostaton is the clear distinction of hypostasis and nature.

2. If a nature is anhypostatic, it does not really exist; it is an abstraction.

3. For natures to exist, they cannot be anhypostatic.

4. A nature that is not anhypostatic is said to be hypostatic.

5. That which is hypostatic is not to be confused with hypostasis itself. *Natures* are hypostatic.

6. Thus to speak of "hypostatic nature" is somewhat redundant, since what is hypostatic is, indeed, nature.

7. The correct way to express the relationship between hypostasis and nature is to say that nature is enhypostasized in hypostasis.

8. Therefore, enhypostatic pertains to nature and expresses how nature relates to hypostasis: it resides *in* the hypostasis as the whole content of the hypostasis.

C. Conclusion

In a discussion such as the one presented in this chapter, it is tempting to conceive of nature and hypostasis as two distinct *things* and to speak about them that way. However, that would be a mistake. Lest it seem the case, we offer as a corrective the quotation from Maximus given above: "Nature exhibits a common logos of being, while hypostasis has being proper to itself. And nature exhibits only the

logos of form, while hypostasis is indicative of some particular thing."[32] These descriptions we must take seriously if we are to avoid falling into error. Hypostasis is a particular, concrete instance of a nature, and a nature does not exist save in a particular hypostasis. Nature without hypostasis is an abstraction, while hypostasis without nature is simply nothing.

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[32]*TP* 23 (PG 91.264A13-B4). See p. 152 above.

CHAPTER VI

PERICHORESIS

A. Introduction

The next aspect of hypostatic union that merits our attention is

perichoresis (περιχώρησις). It is universally acknowledged that Maximus

was the first theologian to develop the term's Christological potential.[1]

What the term means, and how the Confessor uses it, will be our

business in this chapter. That so original a contribution to Christology

should be widely noted but little studied is remarkable; the last--in fact

the only--substantial treatment of perichoresis in Maximus is

Thunberg's.[2]

At the very outset we may take a moment to clarify the meaning of

"perichoresis." The root, χώρησις, means "penetration," in the sense of

occupying a place. The prefix, περὶ, can give the word two different

shades of meaning. If the prefix is taken somewhat "spatially,"

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[1] G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London: SPCK, 1952), 293, was the first scholar to point this out. However, Prestige's analysis of perichoresis in Maximus is erroneous on a number of points. Thunberg, *Microcosm*, 24-26, epitomizes Prestige's analysis, as well as H. A. Wolfson's response to it. Piret, *Le Christ*, 32-37, also offers some criticisms.

[2] Thunberg, 23-37. We shall follow Thunberg's exposition somewhat in the pages that follow. He will go so far as to say that "the *perichoresis* idea is at the heart of Maximus' Christology" (Ibid., 109).

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perichoresis is interpreted to mean encircle, encompass, reciprocation, alternation, rotation, interchange or the completion or revolution of a cycle;[3] thus, the familiar Latin expression, *circumincessio*. If the prefix is taken rather in an "intensive" sense, perichoresis comes to mean *complete* or *thorough* penetration.

Thunberg rightly notes at the beginning of his consideration of perichoresis that to understand how Maximus conceived and employed the term is important in delineating the shape of his Christology. For example, (1) did Maximus understand perichoresis to mean that the divine penetrates the human, but that the human does not penetrate the divine? This understanding was common in Monophysite circles.[4] If Maximus held to this understanding, it would provide some evidence to those scholars who think that Maximus was Monenergist in his early years and hesitated to condemn Monenergism because he shared a

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[3]All of these terms are used by Prestige, 291-96. Verna Harrison notes that Julian Stead adopted the same position as Prestige regarding the meaning of perichoresis, and, moreover, that Prestige's influence is felt in Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, where perichoresis is not taken to mean "interpenetration" until rather late in Christological thought (Verna Harrison, "Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers," *SVThQ* 35 [1, 1991]: 53). Harry A. Wolfson (*The Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation*, 3rd. ed. [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970]: 420) and Harrison both maintain that perichoresis meant "interpenetration" from the beginning of its theological relevance, as opposed to Prestige, who maintained that the spatial sense predominated at least until after Maximus' time.

[4]Cf. Chesnut's statement (p. 29): "Severus uses the word 'operation' in two major Christological contexts: first, when he is talking about the one source of activity in Christ, and second, in the places where he is explaining how *the humanity of Christ is said to be the operation of the divinity within the Incarnation*" (emphasis mine).

common set of beliefs with the Monenergists.[5] (2) Perhaps Maximus

used the term with strong reservations or stringent qualifications? If

so, an "Antiochene" tendency might be discernable in his thought, a

tendency that would set him at odds with Neo-Chalcedonian Christology

as we have presented it.[6]

Perhaps we may allow (3) that the divine penetrates the human,

while the human penetrates the divine by passively receiving the

divine? Correlative to this question is (4) for perichoresis to be

reciprocal, must the divine and the human both penetrate each other

actively, or may perichoresis obtain where the divine actively penetrates

the human, while the human passively penetrates the divne, as in

situation (3). These questions are not nit-picking. Consider this from

Prestige, where he comments on a passage from *Ambiguum* 5:

> The meaning [of perichoresis] here cannot be 'interpenetrate,'
> because no one ever had the hardihood to suggest that the
> human nature is capable of interpenetrating the divine; the
> process where it is alleged, is always in the opposite direction,
> and that for obvious reasons.[7]

Prestige allows that the divine can penetrate the human, but denies that

the human can penetrate the divine. Moreover, the passivity or activity

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[5]See, e.g., Léthel, 59-64; Grumel, 33-34; Garrigues, 98; and Riou, 68, 70, 129. Doucet critiques Léthel in his article, "Est-ce que," and he takes Garrigues and Riou to task in "Vues recentes sur les 'metamorphoses' de la pensée de saint Maxime le Confesseur" *Science et esprit* 31, 3 (1979): 269-302.

[6]Thunberg, 24.

[7]p. 292-93. Prestige's reference is to *Amb.* 112b D, which is obviously scrambled. He does, however, provide the Greek word, περικεχώρηκε, which occurs in PG 91.1053B1-7 and allows us clearly to identify this as the passage he is referring to. We will come to this passage below.

of the human when penetrated by the divine gives rise to speculations that bring us close to Monotheletism: is the humanity of Christ passive before the divine activity, or are both divinity and humanity active in the one Christ?[8]

B. Antecedent use of the term

Where Maximus picks up the idea of perichoresis is not hard to find. In a portion of the *Scholia* on the *Areopagitica* considered to be authentically Maximian,[9] the Confessor quotes a line from Gregory the Theologian's *Epistle* 101, to Cledonius. Gregory makes reference to Ephesians 3.17, which describes Christ dwelling in our hearts, and he speaks of a kind of mixture (κρᾶσις) taking place between the divine nature and ours and of the divine and human "penetrating into each other on account of their mutual adhesion."[10] To recast what Gregory says in a more systematic way, the divine and human natures adhere to

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[8]See, e.g. Chapter VII.B.7, p. 228 below.

[9]PG 4.533C. The authenticity of this passage is attested by von Balthasar, *Kosmische Liturgie*, 255 note 11.

[10]περιχωρουσῶν εἰς ἀλλήλας τῷ λόγῳ τῆς συμφυΐας (Grégoire de Nazianze, *Letteres théologiques*, intro., critical text, trans., and notes by Paul Gallay, Sources chrétiennes 208 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1974], 48). See Felix Heinzer, *Gottes Sohn als Mensch. Die Struktur des Menschseins Christi bei Maximus Confessor* (Fribourg: Universitäts Verlag, 1980), 124, and Thunberg, *Microcosm*, 26. Thunberg, ibid., 26 note 4, cites *Amb.* 42 (PG 91.1336A) as another instance of Maximus referring to this letter. Of more consequence to a discussion of perichoresis, however, is the (near) quotation of this letter in *TP* 9 (PG 91.120B), in a passage where the notion of perichoresis is clearly in the Confessor's mind.

each other, and, as a result, mutually interpenetrate, thereby allowing for a mutual application of the attributes proper to each nature.[11]

As we shall see, this is precisely the way Maximus will use perichoresis Christologically. Note that Gregory makes a distinction between adhesion and interpenetration, between συμφυΐα and περιχώρησις: interpenetration is *on account of* mutual adhesion. We find the same pairing of of the terms, adhesion and perichoresis, in Maximus, but we do not find that perichoresis is *on account of* adhesion.[12] As Maximus says in *Opuscule* 7,

> Moreover, as it was shown, his natural operations, that is, [the operations] of Christ God who was composed of two [natures], were perfectly preserved, that of his Godhead through the all-sufficient [divine] command, and of his humanity through [its] touch. He showed that they were altogether united by their mutual adhesion and perichoresis, so that one operation is manifest on account of the union of the Word himself and of his all-holy flesh.[13]

And here we may note one of the chief reasons why perichoresis is so important to the Confessor's Christology: perichoresis expresses the

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[11]In what follows, "penetration" and "interpenetration" will be equally acceptable translations for perichoresis. The choice between the two will be contingent upon whether the passage in question describes reciprocal perichoresis or only one side of perichoresis, i.e., one element penetrating the other. In this latter case, it seems awkward to speak of A "interpenetrating" B if B does not "interpenetrate" A. To say "A penetrates B" makes much more sense.

[12]Piret, *Le Christ*, 350-51, has also recognized this distinction.

[13]*TP* 7 (PG 91.85D10-88A5): Εἶτα, ὡς ἔδειξε τὰς φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συγκειμένου Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, σωζομένας τελείως· τὴν τῆς θεότητος αὐτοῦ, διὰ τοῦ παντουργοῦ προστάγματος, τὴν δὲ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος αὐτοῦ, διὰ τῆς ἁφῆς· παρέστησε ταύτας ἡνωμένας διόλου τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλας συμφυΐᾳ καὶ περιχωρήσει· ὡς μίαν διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τῆς παναγίας αὐτοῦ σαρκὸς δείκνυσθαι τὴν ἐνέργειαν·

dynamic relationship between the two natures, their dynamic inter-penetration and interaction on account of the hypostatic union. The application of perichoresis to Christology is thus not only an original contribution by Maximus, but also one of some significance.

C. Perichoresis in Maximus

1. Unidirectional or reciprocal perichoresis?

We will begin our examination of Maximus' use of perichoresis with a text that deals primarily with deification. It is a reasonable place to begin, for as we shall see, deification itself is defined as a perichoresis. In citing this passage we are able to shake off for a moment the constrictions of this dissertation and glimpse the (literally) cosmic dimensions of salvation, of which the hypostatic union of Christ is the center and the key. In this extraordinarily rich and beautiful passage, Maximus says,

> The soul's salvation is the consummation of faith. This consum-mation is the revelation of what has been believed. Revelation is the inexpressible interpenetration of the believer with the object of belief and takes place according to each believer's degree of faith. Through that interpenetration the believer returns to his origin [as his end]. This return is the fulfilment of desire. Fulfilment of desire is ever-active repose in the object of desire. Such repose is eternal uninterrupted enjoy-ment of this object. Enjoyment of this kind entails participation in supra-natural divine realities. This participation consists in the participant becoming like that in which he participates. Such likeness involves, so far as this is possible, an identity with respect to energy between the participant and that in which he participates by virtue of the likeness. This identity with respect to energy constitutes the deification of the saints. Deification, briefly, is the encompassing and fulfilment of all times and ages, and of all that exists in either. This encompassing and fulfilment is the union, in the person granted salvation, of his real authentic origin with his real authentic consummation. This union presupposes a transcending of all

that by nature is essentially limited by an origin and a consummation. Such transcendence is effected by the almighty and more than powerful energy of God, acting in a direct and infinite manner in the person found worthy of this transcendence. The action of this divine energy bestows a more than ineffable pleasure and joy on him in whom the unutterable and unfathomable union with the divine is accomplished. This, in the nature of things, cannot be perceived, conceived, or expressed.[14]

Let us begin with the third sentence, "Revelation is the inexpressible

interpenetration of the believer with the object of belief and takes place

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[14] *Thal* 59 [=Cap. Al. 4.19] (PG 90.608C-09A) (CCSG 22.53-54, lines 122-70): Σωτηρία δὲ τῶν ψυχῶν κυρίως ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς πίστεως· τέλος δὲ πίστεώς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ πιστευθέντος ἀληθὴς ἀποκάλυψις· ἀληθὴς δὲ τοῦ πιστευθέντος ἐστὶν ἀποκάλυψις ἡ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ πίστεως ἄρρητος τοῦ πεπιστευμένου περιχώρησις· περιχώρησις δὲ τοῦ πεπιστευμένου καθέστηκεν ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ τέλος τῶν πεπιστευκότων ἐπάνοδος· ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρχὴν κατὰ τὸ τέλος τῶν πεπιστευκότων ἐπάνοδός ἐστιν ἡ τῆς ἐφέσεως πλήρωσις· ἐφέσεως δὲ πλήρωσίς ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐφετὸν τῶν ἐπιεμένων ἀεικίνητος στάσις· ἀεικίνητος δὲ στάσις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἐφετοῦ διηνεκής τε καὶ ἀδιάστατος ἀπόλαυσις· ἀπόλαυσις δὲ διηνεκὴς καὶ ἀδιάστατος ἡ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν θείων καθέστηκε μέθεξις· μέθεξις δὲ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν θείων ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων ὁμοίωσις· ἡ δὲ πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων ὁμοίωσίς ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ μετεχόμενον τῶν μετεχόντων δι' ὁμοιότητος ἐνδεχομένη ταυτότης· ἡ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ἐνδεχομένη κατ' ἐνέργειαν δι' ὁμοιότητος πρὸς τὸ μετεχόμενον ταυτότης ἐστὶν ἡ θέωσις τῶν ἀξιουμένον θεώσεως· ἡ δὲ θέωσίς ἐστι καθ' ὑπογραφῆς λόγον πάντων τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν αἰώνων καὶ τῶν ἐν χρώνῳ καὶ αἰῶνι περιοχὴ καὶ πέρας· περιοχὴ δὲ καὶ πέρας τῶν χρώνων καὶ τῶν αἰώνων ἐστὶ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ τῆς ἀκραιφνοῦς καὶ κυρίως ἀρχῆς πρὸς τὸ κυρίως τέλος καὶ ἀκραιφνὲς ἐν τοῖς σῳζομένοις ἀδιάστατος ἑνότης· ἀδιάστατος δὲ τῆς ἀκραιφνοῦς ἀρχῆς τε καὶ τέλους ἑνότης ἐν τοῖς σῳζομένοις ἐστὶν ἡ κρείττων τῶν οὐσιωδῶς ἀρχῇ τε καὶ τέλει μεμετρημένων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἔκβασις· ἔκβασις δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος περιγεγραμμένων ἐστὶν ἡ ἄμεσος καὶ ἄπειρος καὶ ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἐν τοῖς ἀξιωθεῖσι τῆς κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον νοουμένης τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκβάσεως ἐνέργεια τοῦ θεοῦ πανσθενὴς καὶ ὑπερδύναμος· ἄμεσος δὲ καὶ ἄπειρος καὶ ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἐνέργεια τοῦ θεοῦ πανσθενής ἐστι καὶ ὑπερδύναμος ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἄφθεγκτον καὶ ὑπὲρ νόησιν ἕνωσιν ἄρρητός τε καὶ ὑπεράρρετος ἡδονὴ καὶ χαρὰ τῶν ἐνεργουμένων, ἧς οὐκ ἔστι νοῦν ἢ λόγον παντάπασιν ἢ νόησιν ἢ ρῆσιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν. This passage from *Thal* 59 is also found in the *Philokalia*, in the collection which is only partially by Maximus but ascribed to him, "Various Texts on Theology, the Divine Economy, and Virtue and Vice" 4.19. English translation from G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, & Kallistos Ware, *The Philokalia* (London: Faber & Faber, 1981), 2:239-40.

according to the believer's degree of faith." What needs to be seen in this statement is *not* that God penetrates into the believer according to the believer's degree of faith (which is certainly true), but rather that it is the *believer* who penetrates God (the object of faith) according to the believer's degree of faith.

No one has denied that God is able thoroughly to penetrate his creature, and because of this, Thunberg can point out, and quite rightly, that the Incarnation itself may be described as a perichoresis.[15] But here we find Maximus averring that the reverse is also true: man is able to penetrate God.[16] As the next statement in the passage says, "Through that interpenetration the believer returns to his origin [as his end]." That is, man returns to his proper source when he penetrates God. Thus, perichoresis clearly involves the human penetration into the divine.

The reality of the human penetration into the divine is fleshed out in the remainder of the passage. It is spoken of in terms of participation. In fact, perichoresis *is* participation, which, as Maximus goes on to say, is "participation in supra-divine realities." In this participation, the participant becomes "like that which he participates." Here we see that there is no confusion of participant and participated in the participation Maximus is describing: the participant becomes *like* the

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[15]Thunberg, 27. See also Stephen Gersh, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), 254-55.

[16]*pace* Prestige, who said with reference to this point, that Maximus was engaging in "word-play" (p. 296).

object of partipation.[17] We will speak of the extent of this likeness

directly. For now we can take up the flip side of deification, namely

the Incarnation. Here also we find that not only does the divine nature

penetrate the human nature, but that the human penetrates the divine.

Maximus will state this explicitly in *Ambiguum* 5, where he says,

> Christ accomplished human things in a super-human way:
> according to the strong union [of the two natures] that took
> place without change, and he showed human operation by means
> of divine power, since the [human] nature, united in an
> unconfused manner to the [divine] nature, wholly penetrated
> [it], having nothing whatsoever destroyed by or separated from
> the divinity united with it by hypostasis.[18]

In fact, both movements--the divine penetration into the human and the

human penetration into the divine--are parts of a simultaneous and

reciprocal movement which is how Maximus understands perichoresis.

The reciprocal character of perichoresis we have seen, for example,

in the passage quoted from *Opuscule* 7 above, where *mutual* adhesion

and interpenetration were spoken of. In *Ambiguum* 17, in a section

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[17]In St. Maximus, the *image of God* in man is immutable and cor-
responds with the logos of nature, while the *likeness to God* attainable
is determined personally, hypostatically, and corresponds with the
tropos of existence. Thus participation in God, or perichoresis, involves
not image and logos, but likeness and mode.

[18]*Amb.* 5 (PG 91.1053B1-7): Καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον ἐνήργει τὰ ἀνθρώπου, κατ'
ἄκραν ἕνωσιν δίχα τροπῆς συμφυεῖσαν δεικνὺς τῇ θεϊκῇ δυνάμει τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην
ἐνέργειαν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἀσυγχύτως ἐνωθεῖσα τῇ φύσει δι' ὅλου περικεχώρηκε,
μηδὲν ἀπόλυτον παντάπασιν ἔχουσα, καὶ τῆς ἡνωμένης αὐτῇ καθ' ὑπόστασιν
κεχωρισμένον θεότητος.
The phrase δι' ὅλου περικεχώρηκε undermines Prestige's analysis of
perichoresis where he says that Maximus "always calls the process a
perichoresis of the two natures 'to' (εἰς or πρὸς) one another, never a
perichoresis 'in' (ἐν) one another or 'through' (διά) one another" (p.
294). In fact, in *TP* 16 (PG 91.208A13-14) Maximus uses both "to" and
"through" together in the same phrase when he says, καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλας
δι' ὅλου περιχωρήσει συμφυΐσας ἀλλήλαις.

where Maximus asks a series of rhetorical questions as to who is able to fathom the complexity of human being, its faculties and composition, he asks,

> Again, what is [the meaning of] the intertwining of the opposites of our bodies according to the mixture by means of synthesis? [The intertwining] brings things opposite by nature into a friendly cohabitation and tames the harshness in extremes by moderation, and prepares them to advance through each other without injury, and taking care of the things synthesized in this way, [by causing] the interpenetration of the extremes into each other according to the mixture? etc.[19]

Here again the reciprocal character of perichoresis is expressly stated. In fact, we do not stray from the truth by saying that reciprocity is fundamental to, and inherent in, the Confessor's notion of perichoresis.

At this point it is profitable to recall the discussion of whole and parts from Chapter II. If there is any aspect of hypostatic union in Maximus which embodies this metaphor it is perichoresis. Consider again this quotation from *Mystagogy* 2 that was used in Chapter II to illustrate the whole and parts metaphor:

> Once again, there is but one world and it is not divided by its parts. On the contrary, it encloses the differences of the parts arising from ther natural properties by their relationship to what is one and indivisible in itself. Moreover, it shows that both [the spiritual and material parts] are the same thing with it and alternately with each other in an unconfused way and that the whole of one enters into the whole of the other, and

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[19]*Amb.* 17 (PG 91.1228C6-13): τίς πάλιν τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς σωμάτων ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κατὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν διὰ συνθέσεως συμπλοκή, τὰ διεστῶτα κατὰ τὴν φύσιν εἰς φιλικὴν συνοικίαν ἐνάγουσα καὶ τῇ μεσότητι τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις αὐστηρὸν τιθασσεύουσα, καὶ χωρεῖν δι' ἀλλήλων ἀλυμάντως παρασκευάζουσα καὶ ταύτην ποιουμένη τῶν συνθέτων συντήρησιν, τὴν τῶν ἄκρων κατὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν εἰς ἄλληλα περιχώρησιν, καὶ πῶς ἕκαστον τούτων ἐστί, καὶ τί ἐστι, καὶ ποῦ φέρον ἢ φερόμενον καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι γεγένηται ἢ φέρει ἢ φέρεται, οὐ μόνον, ὡς εἴρηται, οἷς προηγουμένως ὑπάρχουσι ταῦτα λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἷς πρὸς ἑαυτά τε καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα μυρίοις κατ' ἐπίνοιάν τε καὶ ἐνέργειαν διαιροῦνταί τε καὶ ἑνοῦνται τρόποις;

both fill the same whole as parts fill a unit, and in this way the parts are uniformly and entirely filled as a whole.[20]

Two things which interpenetrate each other can be likened to two parts that make a whole. When two parts make a whole, they make one reality such that it is possible to speak of an identity of the two parts, as for example, the two natures in the one Christ, or the three persons of the Trinity in the one God. Even so, the parts that make up the whole retain their self-identity in the whole without confusion, diminution, change or alteration. Thus two natures persist in the hypostatic union and three persons persist in the one Godhead. Nevertheless, the whole of each part is wholly in the whole and *is* the whole. That is to say, there is limitless, thorough and complete interpenetration between the parts which make up the whole.

2. Perichoresis and unconfused union

In the last quotation from *Ambiguum* 5, we saw that Maximus will carry the idea of perichoresis so far as to say "the [human] nature, united in an unconfused manner with the [divine] nature, *wholly penetrated it.*" In *Ambiguum* 7, he will make the bold statement that

the whole man is made God through deification in the grace of the Incarnate God, the whole man remaining [intact] in soul and

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[20]Berthold, *Maximus Confessor*, 188-89 (PG 91.669B9-14): Πάλιν εἷς ἐστι κόσμος τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μὴ συνδιαιρούμενος μέρεσι· τουναντίον δὲ, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν μερῶν τὴν ἐξ ἰδιότητος φυσικῆς διαφορὰν, τῇ πρὸς τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον ἀναφορᾷ περιγράφων· καὶ ταυτὸν ἑαυτῷ τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀσυγχύτως ἐναλλὰξ ὄντας· καὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον ὅλον ὅλῳ δεικνὺς ἐμβεβηκότα· καὶ ἄμφω ὅλον αὐτὸν ὡς μέρη ἕνα συμπληροῦντας καὶ κατ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὅλον μέρη ἐνοειδῶς τε καὶ ὁλικῶς συμπληρουμένους.

body on account of the nature, and the whole becoming God in soul and body on account of the grace . . .[21]

We have also commented on the fact that for Maximus perichoresis is complete and thorough interpenetration. It does not admit degrees of interpenetration. In fact, one can go so far as to say that it is precisely *because* perichoresis is limitless that the two parts are able to subsist in the one whole. But how to avoid confusion between the two elements in limitless perichoresis? How to avoid the absorption of one by the other?

Maximus avoids confusion in two ways. Quite often he does it by means of the formulary phrase τοσοῦτον . . . ὅσον, i.e., "inasmuch as . . . so too," "insofar as," or "in the same measure," what appears in Latin as *tantum . . . quantum.*[22] An example may be found in *Ambiguum* 10:

> They say that God and man are paradigms of each other, and *insofar as* God is hominized for man through his love for man, *so too* did man empowered through love divinize himself to God; and *insofar as* man is ravished in mind by God toward the unknown, *so too* did man by the virtues manifest the naturally invisible God.[23]

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[21]PG 91.1088C6-10: . . . καὶ ὅλος ἄνθρωπος θεωθῇ τῇ τοῦ ἐνανθρωπήσαντος Θεοῦ χάριτι θεουργούμενος, ὅλος μὲν ἄνθρωπος μένων κατὰ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα διὰ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ὅλος γινόμενος Θεὸς κατὰ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα διὰ τὴν χάριν . . . Cited in John Meyendorff, *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends & Doctrinal Themes* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1979): 164, but with omissions. We have retranslated the whole passage here.

[22]See Thunberg, *Microcosm*, 33, and Gersh, 256, note 241.

[23]PG 91.1113B10-C2: Φασὶ γὰρ ἀλλήλων εἶναι παραδείγματα τὸν Θεὸν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τοσοῦτον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Θεὸν διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν ἀνθρωπίζεσθαι, ὅσον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν τῷ Θεῷ δι᾽ ἀγάπης δυνηθεὶς ἀπεθέωσε, καὶ τοσοῦτον ὑπὸ Θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατὰ νοῦν ἁρπάζεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἄγνωστον,* ὅσον ὁ ἄνθρωπον τὸν ἀόρατον φύσει Θεὸν διὰ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐφανέρωσεν.

And again in *Ambiguum* 60,

> Man becomes God *inasmuch as* God becomes man, for man is
> exalted through God by divine ascensions *in the same measure
> as* God is abased through man in achieving without change the
> extremity of our nature.[24]

And again in the *Commentary on the Our Father*,

> By the humbling of the passions [humanity] assumes divinity *in
> the same measure* that the Word of God willed to empty himself
> in the Incarnation of his unmixed glory and became genuinely
> human.[25]

But just how far is "inasmuch as" or "in the same measure"? The

quotation from *Ambiguum* 60 indicates the direction in which the answer

is to be found: *extremely far*, so far, in fact, that the human nature can

penetrate through the whole of the divine nature and have nothing of

itself either separated from the divinity or destroyed by it.[26] This is

complete, total and thorough penetration. Reciprocally, we may say that

the divine nature can penetrate through the whole of the human nature

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*Note that Sherwood's reading, ἄγνωστον, is clearly preferable to
Oehler's reading, γνωστόν, given in Migne; see also Thunberg, 33.

In *Amb.* 7 (PG 91.1084C7-14) there is a beautiful passage describing
the "blessed inversion" (καλὴ ἀντιστροφή) in which God becomes man
thanks to the deification of man, and man becomes God thanks to God's
Incarnation.

[24]PG 91.1385B13-C4: . . . γενόμενος τοσοῦτον Θεὸς ὅσον ἐκεῖνος ἄνθρωπος,
τῷ ὑψωθῆναι τοσοῦτον ταῖς θείαις ἀναβάσεσι διὰ τὸν Θεόν, ὅσον διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ
Θεὸς πρὸς τὸ ἔσχατον τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ἑαυτὸν ἀτρέπτως κενώσας κατελήλυθεν.

[25]Peter van Deun, *Maximi Confessoris: Opuscula exegetica duo
[Expositio in Psalmum 59, Expositio orationis dominicae]*. Corpus chris-
tianorum, Series graeca 23 (Turnhout-Brepols: Leuven University Press,
1991), 32-33, lines 102-106 (=PG 90.877A7-11): καὶ τοσοῦντον τῇ κενώσει τῶν
παθῶν μεταποιουμένη θεότητος, ὅσον ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγος, τῆς οἰκείας ἀκραιφνοῦς
δόξης οἰκονομικῶς ἑαυτὸν κατὰ θέλησιν κενώσας, γενόμενος ἀληθῶς κεχρημάτικεν
ἄνθρωπος.

[26]See *Amb.* 5 (PG 91.1053B1-7) quoted on p. 167 above.

and have nothing of itself separated from the humanity (destruction being unthinkable). Moreover, the quotation from *Ambiguum* 17 above indicates that things "distant in nature" are able "to advance through each other *without injury.*" To give a complete answer to how two things may thoroughly interpenetrate each other without injury, we may return to a passage of *Ambiguum* 5 quoted earlier, a passage which will lead us into Maximus' second way of delimiting perichoresis. The passage is *Ambiguum* 5 (PG 91.1053B1-7), which says,

> Christ accomplished human things in a super-human way: according to the strong union [of the two natures] that took place without change, and he showed human operation by means of divine power, since the [human] nature, united in an unconfused manner to the [divine] nature, wholly penetrated [it], having nothing whatsoever destroyed by or separated from the divinity united with it by hypostasis.

The words Maximus uses are two of the four "Chalcedonian adverbs": ἀσυγχύτως, "without confusion," and ἀτρέπτως, "without change."[27] And here is the second way of delimiting perichoresis: ground it firmly in Chalcedonian Orthodoxy.[28] Each nature is joined to and penetrates the other in an unconfused way and without change, just as the parts of a whole do. Maximus' fidelity to Chalcedon and his anti-Monophysite work testify to his insistence that the two natures persist in the union. *How*

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[27]In this passage from the *Ambigua* Maximus says διχὰ τρόπης instead of ἀτρέπτως as Chalcedon does, but the meaning is the same.

[28]Cf. Thunberg, 462: "Maximus' Christology implies that the Chalcedonian juxtaposition of the two principles of unity and distinction is finally overcome in the conviction, held by Maximus, that each of them is fully realized only when the other is equally realized. And this conviction allows for Maximus' understanding of *perichoresis.*"

the two persistent natures can interpenetrate without confusion or change remains to be explained.

3. The mode of perichoresis

a. Perichoresis and natures. The explanation is to be found in the material of Chapter IV, in the distinction between logos and tropos. To recapitulate some of the points made in Chapter IV, we saw that the logos of a thing, the definition, cause, or "reason" of its nature, is the definition of what a thing is, by nature or in essence. It is the identity of a given nature by which it may be distinguished from all other natures. The logos of a nature is not the nature itself but its definition and cause. That is to say, a nature is not a logos; rather, it has a logos. Moreover, the logos of any given nature is inherently unchangeable: change the logos, the definition, of a nature, and you have changed the nature; it will not be what it was before. "All beings, by the logos by which they were brought to being and are, are perfectly firm and immutable," says the Confessor in *Ambiguum* 15.[29]

Since the logos of a nature is firm and immutable, it is reasonable (and indeed necessary) to say that perichoresis does not involve the logos of the nature. Again, if one takes perichoresis to mean that the two elements interpenetrating each other become indistinguishable, or are no longer numerically two, or form a synthesis in which the two elements lose their identity, one is no longer talking about perichoresis,

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[29]PG 91.1217A12-14: πάντα τὰ ὄντα καθ' ὃν μὲν ὑπέστησάν τε καὶ εἰσὶ λόγον, στάσιμά τε παντελῶς εἰσι καὶ ἀκίνητα . . .

precisely because it has affected the logoi and corrupted the natures of the things interpenetrating each other.[30] This situation cannot arise for Maximus, because his notion of union requires the unconfused, unchanged, and undiminished subsistence of the consitutent natures in a union of hypostatic identity: "for clearly there is a union of things, so long as their natural difference is preserved."[31] And this requirement obtains, be it the union of God and man in the Incarnation, or the union of man and God in deification. As he says of the hypostatic union,

> The thing which results from a union without mixture,
> accomplished by a natural concourse, both preserves the
> component natures unchanged, and conserves their component
> powers undiminished, for the completion of one work.[32]

Thus the logos of nature remains unchangeable and the nature it defines retains its identity, even though that nature is in union with another, wholly penetrates it, and is wholly penetrated by it. Given this requirement of Orthodox thinking, how does perichoresis take place?

If perichoresis is not appropriate to the logos of nature, it must be appropriate to the mode of a given nature's existence. And this is precisely what we find in Maximus. He says,

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[30]This is the Monophysite error.

[31]*TP* 8 (PG 91.97A2-4): Μέχρι γὰρ τότε σαφῶς ἕνωσις πραγμάτων ἐστιν, ἕως ἂν ἡ τούτων σώζηται φυσικὴ διαφορά· See also *Ep.* 15 (PG 91.569D7-8): "of the things of which there is difference after the union, of these, clearly, there is union" (Ὧν γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, τούτων προδήλως ἡ ἕνωσις·), cited in Perl, 199.

[32]*Ep.* 19 (PG 91.593B1-5): Τὸ γὰρ ἔκ τινων ἀσυγχύτως ἑνώσει τῇ κατὰ σύνοδον φυσικὴν ἀποτελούμενον, καὶ τὰς φύσεις ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀτρέπτους διατηρεῖ, καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν συστατικὰς ἀμειώτως διασώζει δυνάμεις, εἰς ἑνὸς ἔργου συμπλήρωσιν·

> Every innovation, to speak generically, has naturally to do with the mode of the innovated thing but not with the logos of nature; because a logos innovated corrupts the nature, as not retaining unadulterated the logos according to which it exists; but the mode innovated, the logos being preserved in its nature, manifests miraculous power.[33]

To speak not generically but specifically about the hypostatic union,

Maximus says the following with regards to the Areopagite's phrase,

"new theandric operation," in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*,

> But if this newness is a qualitative one, then it does not mean one operation [which is a quantitative statement]. Rather, it indicates [1] the new and ineffable *mode of the manifestation of the natural operations* of Christ by the ineffable *mode of the interpenetration of Christ's natures into each other*; and [2] that manner of life which was proper to his humanity, which, being foreign and miraculous, is unintelligible to natural beings; and [3] *the mode of the exchange of attributes* proper to the ineffable union.[34]

Perichoresis is said of the two natures of Christ; that is to say, it is

the two natures that interpenetrate each other. Moreover, perichoresis is

modal, that is, it pertains to the mode of existence, not to the logos of

nature. Thus perichoresis is an innovation in the mode of a nature's

existence which does not alter the logos of that nature. As Maximus

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[33]*Amb.* 42 (PG 91.1341D1-7): Πᾶσα γὰρ καθόλου φάναι καινοτομία περὶ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ καινοτομουμένου πράγματος πέφυκεν, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως γίνεσθαι, διόπερ ὁ μὲν λόγος καινοτομούμενος φθείρει τὴν φύσιν, οὐκ ἔχουσαν τὸν καθ' ὃν ἐστι λόγον ἀραδιούργητον, ὁ δὲ τρόπος καινοτομούμενος φυλαττομένου δηλαδὴ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν λόγου θαύματος ἐνδείκνυται δύναμιν. Cited in Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, 165.

[34]*Pyrr* §167 (192) (PG 91.345D7-48A2): Εἰ δὲ ποιότης ἐστὶν ἡ καινότης, οὐ μίαν δηλοῖ ἐνέρειαν, ἀλλὰ τὸν καινὸν καὶ ἀπόρρητον τρόπον τῆς τῶν φυσικῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐνεργειῶν ἐκφάνσεως, τῷ ἀπορρήτῳ τρόπῳ τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλας τῶν Χριστοῦ φύσεων περιχωρήσεως προσφόρως, καὶ τὴν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον αὐτοῦ πολιτείαν, ξένην οὖσαν καὶ παράδοξον, καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων ἄγνωστον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀπόρρητον ἕνωσιν ἀντιδόσεως.
This passage from the *Pyrr* almost exactly parallels one from *Amb.* 5 (PG 91.1057D5-60A1).

says in *Ambiguum* 5, there is "newness of modes," but never an "alteration of logos."[35] Two elements or natures interpenetrating remain two, distinct, and self-identical even through they undergo modal innovation through mutual interpenetration.

b. Perichoresis and operation. To carry the analysis one step further, we saw in the last quotation from the *Disputation with Pyrrhus* not only "the ineffable mode of the interpenetration of Christ's natures into each other," but also "the ineffable mode of the manifestation of the natural operations of Christ." The question may be asked, is there a perichoresis of the two operations of Christ, just like there is a perichoresis of his two natures? Here the answer is in the affirmative, and we may cite again as proof the passage from *Opuscule* 7 which was given earlier in this chapter:

> Moreover, as it was shown, his natural operations, that is, [the operations] of Christ God who was composed of two [natures], were perfectly preserved, that of his Godhead through the all-sufficient [divine] command, and of his humanity through [its] touch. He showed that they were altogether united by their mutual adhesion and perichoresis, so that one operation is manifest on account of the union of the Word himself and of his all-holy flesh.[36]

Thus, even as the two natures in Christ mutually adhere and interpenetrate, so also do the operations, proper to each of the two natures, adhere and interpenetrate. Again, just as "the two natures which Christ is" come together to make the one Christ who is simultaneously

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[35]PG 91.1053B13-14: . . .τῶν τρόπων καινότης . . . κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀλλοίωσις. Cited in Thunberg, 31.

[36]See p. 163 above.

one and two, so also do the operations come together to make the new theandric operation which is simultaneously one and two.

c. **Perichoresis and will.** Having seen that Maximus speaks of the mutual adhesion and interpenetration of the two *natures* of Christ and of the two *operations* of Christ, we expect him to speak also of the mutual adhesion and interpenetration of the two *wills* of Christ. While Maximus does speak of the mutual *adhesion* of the two wills, he does *not* ever mention the *perichoresis* of the two wills.[37] Is this significant? Perhaps we can find out if it is by looking at some texts where Maximus does speak about the adhesion of the wills.

Opuscule 3. This *Opuscule* is concerned with proving the duality of wills in Christ by establishing (1) that will is properly ascribed to nature (not to person), and going on to show (2) that to deny duality of wills is to deny duality of natures, which is Monophysite. In his analysis, he quotes Gregory the Theologian's *Fourth Theological Oration* (the second on the Son) and comments upon it:

> "For that [human] will," the great Gregory said, "was not set in opposition to God, having been wholly deified." And if it was deified, then clearly it was deified in the adhesion with the one deifying; the defying and the deified are doubtless two things, and certainly not one and the same in nature. Since that which deifies and that which is deified are relative, then doubtless they have their relation in each other and are to be thought of in connection with each other.[38]

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[37]Doucet, "La dispute," 294-95, also notices this break in the pattern of the Confessor's thought. Piret, *Le Christ*, 351, represents Doucet's comments.

[38]PG 91.48A14-B7: Τὸ γὰρ ἐκείνου θέλειν, φησὶν ὁ μέγας Γρηγόριος, οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον Θεῷ, θεωθὲν ὅλον. Εἰ δὲ τεθέωτο, τῇ τοῦ θεοῦντος δηλονότι συμφυΐᾳ τεθέωτο· τὸ δὲ θεοῦν καὶ θεούμενον, δύο πάντως· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἓν καὶ φύσει ταυτόν.

Here we can make three points. First, this passage is about the deification and number of wills, not of natures. Second, for the wills to have their relations in each other does not preclude their perichoresis; rather, it would seem to imply it. And third, the human will is deified in its adhesion to the divine will which deifies it. We have already seen that perichoresis and adhesion are the same, and that deification is the human perichoresis into the divine. Now we see that deification takes place on account of adhesion. So in this first text, at least, even though Maximus expressly says "adhesion," but does not expressly say "perichoresis," one need only scratch the surface to find it.

A few lines later in the same *Opuscule*, the Confessor quotes and interprets Mt 26.39:

> Christ says, "Father, if it be possible, remove this cup from Me; nevertheless, not what I will, but Thy will be done," showing simultaneously with the repulsion the human will's impulse that was formed and brought to pass by adhesion with the divine [will], according to the intertwining of the natural logos in the mode of the economy.[39]

Here, Maximus emphasizes the persistence of the human will and its agreement with the divine will in his agony in Gethsemane. The human will "impulses," not in opposition to, but in adhesion with the divine will. This adhesion results from the intertwining (literally, weaving or

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Εἴπερ τῶν πρός τι, τό τε θεοῦν, καὶ τὸ θεούμενον· τὰ δὲ πρός τι, πάντως ἀλλήλοις συνεισάγεσθαι πέφυκε, καὶ θατέρῳ συνεπινοεῖσθαι θάτερον.

[39]PG 91.48C4-10: Διὸ φησι· Πάτερ, εἰ δυνατόν, παρελθέτω τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον ἀπ᾽ ἐμοῦ· πλὴν μὴ τὸ ἐμόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γενέσθω θέλημα δεικνὺς ἅμα τῇ συστολῇ τὴν ὁρμὴν τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου θελήματος, ἐν τῇ συμφυΐᾳ τοῦ θεϊκοῦ, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸν τῆς οἰκονομίας τρόπον συμπλοκήν, τυπουμένην τε καὶ γινομένην·

plaiting together) of the natural logos of each nature, and this inter-

twining came about not by a change of logoi, but by the new mode of

the economy, which brought the two natures together. The similarity

with the foregoing discussion of natural perichoresis is clear.

Opuscule 6. The sixth *Opuscule* is a short work completely taken

up with a Dyothelite exegesis of Mt 26.39. Commenting on the second

half of the Gethsemane prayer, Maximus asks,

> The remainder of the prayer, i.e., the "nevertheless, not what I
> will, but Thy will be done," what do you think it means? Is
> this a sign of repulsion or of courage? The utmost agreement
> or separation? But that it means neither reticence nor
> cowardice, but rather the most complete adhesion and
> agreement, no one with a mind can gainsay.[40]

Here again, no explicit reference to perichoresis of wills, but nothing

which would make the perichoresis of wills impossible.

Toward the end of the same *Opuscule*, the Confessor comments again

on the same text and says,

> It is clear that this negation, "not as I will," which repudiates
> all opposition reveals the adhesion of the human will of the
> Savior with the divine will which is his and the Father's, for
> the whole Logos assumed the whole human nature and divinized
> the whole of it by assuming it.[41]

In this passage, there is evidence similar to what we found in the first

passage quoted from *Opuscule* 3 above: (1) there is nothing which would

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[40]PG 91.65B8-12: τὸ *Οὐχ ὃ ἐγὼ θέλω, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν ἰσχυέτω θέλημα,* τί σοι δοκεῖ; συστολῆς ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ἀνδρείας; συννεύσεως ἄκρας, ἢ διαστάσεως; Ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἀντιπτώσεως, οὔτε δειλίας, συμφυΐας δὲ μᾶλλον ἐντελοῦς καὶ συννεύσεως, οὐδεὶς ἀντερεῖ τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων.

[41]PG 91.68C6-10: τὸ *Οὐχ ὃ ἐγὼ θέλω,* πάντῃ τὴν ἐναντίωσιν ἀποσκευαζο-μένη, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρωπικοῦ τοῦ Σωτῆρος πρὸς τὸ θεῖον αὐτοῦ θέλημα καὶ πατρικὸν συμφυΐαν παρίστησιν· ὡς ὅλην ὅλου τὴν φύσιν οὐσιωθέντος τοῦ Λόγου, καὶ ὅλην τῇ οὐσιώσει θεώσαντος.

seem to preclude the perichoresis of wills; (2) the reference to diviniza-

tion allows us to presume strongly in favor of interpenetration of wills;

and (3) the language of "wholes" (as in "wholes and parts") is a

metaphor for perichoresis.

The only speculative reason the present author can give as to why

Maximus might have refused to speak of perichoresis of wills is that the

powers of a nature (especially the will) are the only means by which a

nature is able to be known:

> The only true declaration of a substance is its natural consti-
> tuent power. One would not fall short of the truth in calling it
> natural operation, strictly and primarily characteristic of the
> substance as being its specific movement, more general than any
> comprehensive property belonging to it, apart from which there
> is only non-being, "as," according to this great doctor [Diony-
> sius], "only non-being has neither movement nor existence."[42]

But even here the reasoning falls flat. Perichoresis would damage

identity of wills (and obscure the reality of their constituent natures)

only if it were not correctly understood. Perichoresis is like all the

other examples of unconfused union in the Confessor's writings: the

constituent elements *always* remain self-identical, unconfused, and

undiminished when in union.

Thus, to summarize our foray into the absence of any talk about

perichoresis of wills in Maximus' writings, we are able to find nothing

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[42]*Amb.* 5 (PG 91.1048A7-B1): Ἧς μόνη τε καὶ ἀληθής ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῆς συστατικὴ δύναμις, ἣν οὐκ ἄν τις ἁμάρτοι τῆς ἀληθείας φυσικὴν φήσας ἐνέργειαν, κυρίως τε καὶ πρώτως χαρακτηριστικὴν αὐτῆς, ὡς εἰδοποιὸν ὑπάρχουσαν κίνησιν, γενικωτάτην πάσης τῆς φυσικῶς αὐτῇ προσούσης περιεκτικῆς ἰδιότητος, ἧς χωρὶς μόνον ἐστί τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς μόνου τοῦ μηδαμῶς ὄντος, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν μέγαν διδάσκαλον, οὔτε κίνησιν οὔτε ὕπαρξιν ἔχοντος. Quoted in Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, 114.

which would stand in its way; and moreover, certain expressions ("deification" and "wholes") give us good reason to say that perichoresis of wills is neither inconsistent with, nor unthinkable in Maximus, though it is nowhere expressly said. Therefore, we conclude that the absence of "perichoresis of wills" language is curious and notable, but ultimately insignificant, and it has no bearing on the understanding of perichoresis in Maximus.

D. Conclusion

To summarize the findings of this chapter,

1. Interpenetration expresses the dynamic relationship between the elements in union.

2. Maximus speaks about the divine penetration into the human (of which the Incarnation is the paradigm), the human penetration into the divine (of which deification is the paradigm), and the mutual interpenetration of the divine and the human into each other.

3. Perichoresis in Maximus means that human nature is able to penetrate the divine nature *wholly, completely and thoroughly*, even as the divine nature is able to penetrate the human nature wholly, completely, and thoroughly.

4. Confusion in perichoresis is prevented by (a) the commensurability of interpenetration between the divine and the human (i.e., the divine penetrates the human insofar as the human penetrates the divine), and by (b) the affirmation that perichoresis is an unconfused union (without confusion and without change à la Chalcedon).

5. Perichoresis is made possible not by an alteration of the logoi of the natures in perichoresis, but by an innovation in the mode of each nature's existence.

6. Maximus affirms that there is a perichoresis of the two natures in Christ, and of the two operations. By an examination of a few texts we have found sufficient evidence to say that perichoresis of wills is within the realm of Maximian thought and consistent with it.

Near the beginning of the chapter, we raised two questions put forth by Thunberg.[43] It would not do to leave them with implicit answers only.

1. Is perichoresis a one way, divine -> human, penetration? The importance of the question lies in the fact that such an understanding was acceptable in Monophysite circles. If Maximus held to the same notion, perhaps it would be used as evidence to support the claim of some that he was a Monenergist early in his career and hesitated to condemn Monenergism because he shared their beliefs. However, we have seen that perichoresis is not uni-directional, but fully reciprocal, so we must answer this question in the negative and deny any advantage to those who would use perichoresis to brand Maximus a reformed heretic.

2. Did Maximus use the term "perichoresis" with strong reservations or stringent qualifications? The significance of reservations or qualifications lies in the evidence it would give that Maximus displayed "Antiochene" tendencies. Besides the fact that

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[43]See p. 160 above.

"Antiochene" tendencies (as opposed to "Alexandrian" tendencies) is somewhat of an anachronistic category for a seventh century Neo-Chalcedonian, the only reservations or qualifications we are able to find are those which preserve the full integrity of the elements in perichoresis. Hardly the kind of thing which would cast doubts upon his theological pedigree. Indeed, we have seen perichoresis used of the nature, (wills,) and operations of Christ, as well as of deification.

Beyond the points we have covered in this chapter, we are able to "penetrate" no further into the mechanics of perichoresis. One of the most persistent, recurring words in all of the perichoretic texts is "ineffable." The most patent example is the passage from the *Disputation with Pyrrhus* §165 (192), where Maximus says that "the mode of the manifestation of the natural operations of Christ," and "the mode of the interpenetration of Christ's two natures into each other," and "the mode of the exchange of attributes proper to the . . . union" are all "ineffable." Deification, likewise, is ineffable, as the end of the long quotation from the *Questions to Thalassus* above says, "This, in the nature of things, cannot be perceived, conceived, or expressed."[44]

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[44]Cf. *Amb* 22 (PG 91.1257B2-11): "Who is able to understand and say precisely how God is whole in all things commonly, and in each being individuatingly, without division and impartible, neither being diversely spread out with the differences of the beings in which he is as being, nor contracted according to the individuating existence of one, nor drawing together according to his one, single wholeness the differences of all beings; but is truly all things in all things, never going out of his own indivisible simplicity?" (Quoted in Perl, 178.)

τίς ἀκριβῶς ἐστιν ὁ νοῆσαί τε καὶ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενος, πῶς ἐν πᾶσί τε κοινῶς ὅλος καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων ἰδιαζόντως, ἀμερῶς τε καὶ ἀμερίστως ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός, μήτε ποικίλως συνδιαστελλόμενος ταῖς τῶν ὄντων οἷς ἔνεστιν ὡς ὢν ἀπείροις διαφοραῖς, μήτε οὖν συστελλόμενος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδιάζουσαν ὕπαρξιν, μήτε

E. Summary Analysis of Hypostatic Union in Maximus

Having finished laying out the different rubrics under which

Maximus' thoughts on the hypostatic union may be classified, we may

now summarize all of them together. That way, with a clear idea of the

Confessor's teaching on the hypostatic union (considered in itself), we

may pass on to a particular application of that teaching in the debate

over Monotheletism. We begin our summary with the metaphors of

unconfused union from Chapter II.

The chief metaphor for unconfued union is that of a whole and its

parts. We recall that a whole is not divided by its parts; even though

it has parts, it nevertheless remains a whole thing. A whole encloses,

or circumscribes, the differences of its constituent parts within itself.

The differences are real, and they arise from natural properties proper

to each of the parts. The whole is able to circumscribe these

differences and contain them in itself on account of the relationship the

parts bear to the whole. The parts not only constitute or make up the

whole, but they in fact *are* the whole because they are the whole

content of the whole. And it is not only the case that all the parts

taken together are the whole, but each part taken individually is the

whole as well, and this is so without any confusion, alteration,

diminution, or metamorphosis in the constituent parts. Moreover, each

part is the same thing as the other parts, but in an unconfused way,

which is to say that each part is wholly the others without losing its

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συστέλλων κατὰ τὴν μίαν πάντων ἐνικὴν ὁλότητα τὰς τῶν ὄντων διαφορὰς, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν ἀληθῶς, ὁ μηδέποτε τῆς οἰκείας ἀμεροῦς ἁπλότητος ἐξιστάμενος;

self-identity; or again, each part *has* what the another part *is*. Thus,
the whole of each part wholly fills the whole of each other part, the
whole of each part wholly fills the whole, and the whole wholly fills each
part.

Chapter III took up the formula the two natures "from which, in
which, and which Christ is." There we quoted Maximus to say

> Just as they [the Monophysites] do not refuse to speak of two
> names of Christ [God and man] after the union, so also let them
> say, after the union [there are] the two natures of Christ, from
> which and in which he consists, and to which the names belong,
> if they truly, in good faith, confess that the things united by
> nature are really preserved after the union.
> And again, we believe that the same is without division in
> two natures, that is, in the divinity and in the humanity. Just
> as in speaking of from two natures, we think that Christ is
> from the divinity and the humanity, like a whole is from its
> parts; so also, in speaking of in two natures after the union, we
> believe him to be in the divinity and in the humanity, as a
> whole is in its parts. The parts of Christ are his divinity and
> humanity, from which and in which he subsists.[45]

Thus the one hypostasis of Christ possesses the two natures from which
he is composed and in which he subsists. But more than that, Christ *is*
the two natures. He is not a *tertium quid*, a third nature compounded
out of divinity and humanity; rather, the one hypostasis is the sole
instance of the two realities from which it is composed and in which it

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[45]*Epistle* 13 (PG 91.524C13-25A4): ὥσπερ οὐ παραιτοῦνται λέγειν τὰς δύο
τοῦ Χριστοῦ μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν προσηγορίας, οὕτω καὶ τὰς δύο φύσεις τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐξ
ὧν καὶ ἐν αἷς συνέστηκε λεγέτωσαν μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, ὧν καὶ προσηγορίαι· εἴπερ
κατ' ἀλήθειαν πιστῶς ὁμολογοῦσι σώζεσθαι πραγματιωδῶς κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ ἑνωθέντα
μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν.
Καὶ πάλιν ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀδιαιρέτως τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα πιστεύομεν, ὡς ἐν
θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκ δύο φύσεων λέγοντες τὸν Χριστόν, ἐκ
θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος ὄντα νοοῦμεν, ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὅλον· οὕτω καὶ ἐν δύο
φύσεσι λέγοντες μετὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, ἐν θεότητι καὶ ἀνθρωπότητι ὄντα πιστεύομεν, ὡς
ὅλον ἐν μέρεσι. Μέρη δὲ Χριστοῦ ἡ θεότης αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ ἀνθρωπότης ἐστίν, ἐξ ὧν
καὶ ἐν αἷς ὑφέστηκε. Cited in Piret, 208.

remains. The formula underscores the reality that hypostasis is not to be confused with nature, for the real existence of the natures (from which he is composed) is the one hypostasis, while the whole content of the one hypostasis is the two natures (in which he subsists).

We may draw from our discussion in Chapter IV concerning the distinction between the logos of nature and the mode of existence. The logos of a nature is a definition of that nature, while the mode of its existence pertains to its hypostasis. Nature cannot be innovated or changed without being destroyed. Thus every innovation of a nature must be made with reference to its mode, to its hypostasis, if the nature itself is to be preserved. A union of two natures, then, must take place on the level of the mode of existence, not on the level of the logos of nature, and such an innovation in no way compromises the integrity of either nature. Furthermore, not only is the integrity of each nature preserved in such a union, but the inherent powers constitutive of each nature are also preserved in it. So in the case of Christ, the logoi of the two natures from which he is persist unchanged in the union, but there is an innovation in the mode of his existence, in his hypostasis, such that the hypostasis of the Logos is able to contain the human nature and to hypostasize it. And because the powers inherent in each of the two natures which Christ is are likewise preserved in the logoi which ground them, the one Christ displays all the powers of divinity and humanity unimpared.

It is possible to overlay the tri-partite formula with the logos-tropos distinction and find an exact congruence. It is further possible

to overlay both of these formulae with the enhypostaton. For a nature to be a concrete, existent thing it must be hypostasized. The two natures from which Christ is find their concrete existence in the one hypostasis of the Logos: they are enhypostasized in it. That is not to say that either of the two natures (or both of them together) is to be identified with the hypostasis of the Logos, for the hypostasis of the Logos is the single, concrete instance of the two natures, and the two natures are the whole content of the hypostasis of the Logos.

When we take the whole and parts metaphor, the tri-partite formula, the logos-tropos distinction, and the enhypostaton and view them synoptically, we see that all of them are pressed into the service of the hypostatic union as a means of conveying the relationship between the one hypostasis and the two natures of Christ. All four presuppose the definition of Chalcedon, and all are faithful to the Fifth Council and the Neo-Chalcedonian view of Christology. Indeed, all of them are different but related ways of expressing the same truth about Christ. Perichoresis is also used for the same purpose. Its closest cousin among the other four aspects of the hypostatic union we have considered is the whole and parts metaphor. The two natures do not simply come together in a static way but actually interpenetrate each other so that the whole divinity of Christ is wholly filled with the whole humanity, and the whole humanity is wholly filled with the whole divinity. This perichoresis takes place modally, and it is so thorough that it is possible to say that on the level of hypostasis the humanity and the divinity are *identical.* Perichoresis does not involve only the

two natures; it also applies to the powers and operations constitutive of the natures, as well: they also interpenetrate.

This summary should give us an adequate grasp of what Maximus means by the hypostatic union in Christ. In our exposition in these last five chapters we have been able to use quotations from early works of the Confessor (notably the *Ambigua*), as well as later works. This is significant, for it demonstrates that all of the essential lineaments and elements of Maximus' Christology are inherent in this thought and were not formulated as a response to Monenergism or Monotheletism. What we will find, then, in the next chapter, is a straightforward application of the Neo-Chalcedonian Christology of which Maximus is an heir, with benefit of the added depth his own reflections brought to the Christology he received. The next chapter will thus serve as an illustration of how Maximus' Christology functioned in the face of a contemporary Christological dispute, and the specific Monothelite principles Maximus will combat will also cause certain elements of his Christology to stand out with greater clarity.

CHAPTER VII

THE PRINCIPLES OF MONOTHELETISM

A. Introduction

This chapter will set forth the principles of Monotheletism and the responses Maximus makes to the Monothelite claims. We will be able to see the ways in which he will apply his Christological insights to a concrete, historical situation, namely the rise and promulgation of Monotheletism in the Byzantine Church. No one has undertaken to analyze all of the principles of Monotheletism (or of Monenergism) systematically. In this respect, we strike new ground.

Maximus addresses nine Monothelite principles in his extant writings. All of them appear, if only briefly, in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*. For that reason, we will be able to follow the order of the arguments as they unfold in the *Disputation* for our analysis. This chapter, then, will be a point by point analysis of the Christological arguments contained in the first half of the *Disputation*.

The nine Monothelite principles to be covered are:

1. that will is ascribed to hypostasis;

2. that two opposing wills in the same person are impossible;

3. that will and the object of will are confused;

4. that the faculty of will and its employment are confused;

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5. that will is synthetic;

6. that nature and hypostasis are confused;

7. that the human will is moved by the divine will;

8. that the human will is appropriated; and

9. that will is gnomic (i.e., intentional).

In discussing Monenergism and the subsequent Monotheletism, it is perhaps clearest to conceive of the whole issue as a continuum with a constant theme undergirding it all; a continuum, moreover, that was punctuated decisively by the *Ekthesis*, the document which clearly raised the question of operation to the question of will. The constant theme which served to unify the whole movement was the ascription of operation, and later of will, to the hypostasis of the Word. That much is fairly easy to say; how to explain it, though, proved to be very difficult indeed.

There is an oblique testimony to the problems inherent in the Monothelite position in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*. Maximus says to Pyrrhus,

> I speak the truth [when I say] nothing so appalled me about
> your predecessor [Patriarch Sergius] as his inconsistency. He
> was wont to change his mind from time to time and not persist
> in one line of thought. At one time he accepted the formula *one
> divine will* and thus imposed the opinion that the Incarnate is
> God alone. Another time he accepted that it is *deliberative,*
> making him a mere man . . . And yet another time he says it is
> *hypostatic* . . . And yet even another time he accepts [the
> opinion] of those who say it is *self-determinative* . . . And yet
> another time he admits the opinion of those who say that it is
> *freely choosing* and *intentional* . . . And yet another time he
> proposes the same thing as those who say it is *economical* . . .
> He has been brought to countless other strange opinions which
> have no basis in the truth. And if I wanted to write down [all

of his opinions] exactly, with all their absurdities, there would simply not be enough time.[1]

Let us turn to the individual principles of Monotheletism now and see how Maximus addresses them.

B. The Principles of Monotheletism

1. Will is ascribed to hypostasis

The principle that will is to be ascribed to hypostasis (as opposed to nature) is the first argument in the *Disputation*. We already have the testimony of the *Ekthesis*, which confesses that there is "one will of our Lord Jesus Christ," and that his humanity did not fulfill "the natural motion [of the flesh], but only at the time, and in the manner and measure that God the Word willed."[2] The "natural motion of the flesh" is equivalent to the operation of the humanity. Thus, the Monothelites, like the Monenergists and Monophysites before them, recognized a human operation in Christ; but just like the preceding Christologies, the human operation was not the result of a human will or

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[1]*Pyrr* §135 (152) (PG 91.329C4-32A6): Ἀλήθειαν λέγω· οὐδὲν οὕτως ἀπεδιέθηκέ με πρὸς τὸν πρὸ σοῦ, ὡς τὸ παλίμβολον αὐτοῦ· ἤγουν τὸ ἄλλοτε εἰς ἄλλας αὐτὸν μεταπίπτειν ἐννοίας, καὶ ἐν μηδενὶ βεβηκέναι φρονήματι. Ποτὲ μὲν τοὺς τοῦτο τὸ ἓν θέλημα θεῖον προσαγορεύοντας ἀποδεχόμενος, τὸ Θεὸν μόνον εἶναι τὸν σαρκωθέντα εἰσῆγε· ποτὲ δέ, τοὺς βουλευτικὸν αὐτὸ λέγοντας, ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν ψιλὸν εἶναι εἰσῆγε . . . ποτὲ δὲ ὑποστατικὸν αὐτὸ λέγων . . . ποτὲ δέ, καὶ τοὺς ἐξουσιαστικὸν αὐτὸ λέγοντας ἀποδεχόμενος . . . ποτὲ δέ, τοὺς προαιρετικὸν καὶ γνωμικὸν αὐτὸ λέγοντας προσλαμβανόμενος . . . ποτὲ δέ, τοὺς οἰκονομικὸν αὐτὸ λέγοντας . . . καὶ εἰς ἄλλας μυρίας ἀτόπους ἐξηνέχθη ὑπολήψεις, τὴν ἀλήθειαν βάσιν οὐκ ἐσχηκώς· ἃς δι' ἀκριβείας εἰ βουληθείην γραφῇ παραδοῦναι μετὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀτόπων, οὐδὲ ὁ μέλλων ἀρκέσει χρόνος.

[2]See Chapter I.C.4.b, p. 62, 65 above.

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impulse; rather, it was an *effect* of the divine will. The only recognized

will in Christ is that "of God the Word hypostatically united with" the

flesh. In brief, the only recognized will is the will of the hypostasis of

the Logos.

Pyrrhus, too, is bald in ascribing Christ's will to his hypostasis.

Near the very beginning of the *Disputation*, we have this exchange:

> PYR: But is Christ one or not?
> MAX: Obviously, he is one.
> PYR: If Christ is one, he willed as one. And if he willed
> as one, then doubtless he has one will, and not two.[3]

Maximus responds to Pyrrhus with a question of his own:

> MAX: Tell me this, if Christ is one, is he God alone, or man
> alone, or both of them together, God and man?
> PYR: Obviously, God and man.[4]

Here Maximus has invited Pyrrhus into the heart of the matter: the

relationship between person and nature, and the faulty paradigm that

Pyrrhus is maintaining. We will divide the Confessor's response in two

for analysis. (Note the clear expressions of Neo-Chalcedonian

Christology in what follows.)

> Therefore, Christ exists as God and man by nature. Then did
> he will as God and man, or only as Christ? But if it was
> principally as God and man that Christ willed, then it is clear
> that, being one and the same, [He willed] dually and not singly.
> For if Christ is nothing else than his natures from which and in

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[3]*Pyrr* §8-10 (PG 91.288D5-89A3): ΠΥΡ. Εἷς ὁ Χριστός, ἢ οὔ;
ΜΑΞ. Ναί, εἷς προδήλως.
ΠΥΡ. Εἰ οὖν εἷς ὁ Χριστός, ὡς εἷς πάντως καὶ ἤθελεν· εἰ δὲ ὡς εἷς ἤθελεν,
ἓν πάντως αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ θέλημα· καὶ οὐ δύο.

[4]*Pyrr* §11-12 (PG 91.289A9-13): ΜΑΞ. Τοῦτο οὖν εἰπέ μοι· Ὁ Χριστὸς εἷς
ὤν, Θεὸς μόνον ἐστίν, ἢ καὶ ἄνθρωπος μόνον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον, Θεὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ
ἄνθρωπος;
ΠΥΡ. Προδήλως, Θεὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ ἄνθρωπος.

which he exists, then he obviously [wills] according to each of his natures; being one and the same, he wills and operates as each [nature] is able, if indeed neither is without will or operation. So if Christ wills and operates according to each of his natures—as each nature is able to will and operate—and if he has two natures, then surely he must have two natural wills, and in the same number as these, [two] essential operations.[5]

The key to what Maximus is saying is the question near the beginning, "Did he will as God and man, or only as Christ?" Maximus hears Pyrrhus advocating that Christ is something else than the two natures from which and in which he exists, and that it is this "other" Christ that is willing. To this Maximus reaffirms that Christ is not other than the two constituent natures "from which and in which he exists," and that he wills in a correspondingly dual way.

He goes on,

For just as the number of the natures of one and the same Christ, piously conceived and spoken of, does not divide Christ, but preserves the distinction of natures in the union; so neither does the number of essential wills and operations attached to the two natures divide Christ either. For through both of his natures, as it was said, there was the same will and operation of our salvation. This introduces no division (God forbid!), but shows rather that each of them is guarded and preserved, even in the union.[6]

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[5]*Pyrr* §13 (PG 91.289A14-B13): Θεὸς οὖν φύσει καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὑπάρχων ὁ Χριστός, ὡς Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτὸς ἤθελεν, ἢ ὡς Χριστὸς μόνον; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν προηγουμένως ὡς Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἤθελεν ὁ Χριστός, δηλονότι δυϊκῶς, καὶ οὐ μοναδικῶς, εἰς ὢν ὁ αὐτός, ἤθελεν. Εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὁ Χριστὸς παρὰ τὰς αὐτοῦ φύσεις, ἐξ ὧν, καὶ ἐν αἷς ὑπάρχει· προδήλως, ὡς καταλλήλως ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεσιν· ἤγουν, ὡς ἑκάστη πέφυκεν, εἰς ὢν καὶ ὁ αὐτός, ἤθελέ τε καὶ ἐνήργει· εἴπερ οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἀθέλητός ἐστιν, ἢ ἀνενέργητος. Εἰ δὲ καταλλήλως ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεσιν ὁ Χριστός, ἤγουν, ὡς ἑκάστη πέφυκεν, ἤθελέν τε καὶ ἐνήργει· δύο δὲ αὐτοῦ αἱ φύσεις· δύο αὐτοῦ πάντως καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ θελήματα· καὶ αἱ τούτων ἰσάριθμοι, καὶ οὐσιώδεις ἐνέργειαι.

[6]*Pyrr* §13 (PG 91.289B13-C8): Ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ τῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς Χριστοῦ φύσεων ἀριθμός, εὐσεβῶς νοούμενός τε καὶ λεγόμενος, οὐ διαιρεῖ τὸν

Here Maximus ties a correct understanding of will to a correct under-
standing of nature. If one understands the hypostatic union aright,
then to confess the two natures does not undermine the unity of Christ,
and neither does confessing the natural properties inherent in those
natures. Rather, they persist, like the natures that ground them, whole
and unimpaired in the union.

Pyrrhus does not seem to grasp Maximus' point, and restates his
objection, "It is impossible not to introduce 'willers' along with the
wills."[7] To this statement Maximus gives a theological response:

> Granted that "willers" are introduced along with the wills, by a
> reasonable inversion, will is introduced with "willer". Thus will
> you find that the super-essential, more-than-good and blessed
> Divinity, through its one will, is one hypostasis, like Sabellius
> did? Or because of the three hypostases will there also be
> three wills? And because of this, three natures as well, like
> Arius said, since the definitions and canons of the Fathers say
> that a distinction of wills implies a distinction of natures?[8]

We should note that Pyrrhus did not care for the Neo-Chalcedonian
correlation of theology and economy. When Maximus reiterates, later in

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Χριστὸν, ἀλλὰ σωζομένην κἂν τῇ ἐνώσει παρίστησι τῶν φύσεων τὴν διαφοράν· οὕτω
καὶ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν οὐσιωδῶς προσόντων ταῖς αὐτοῦ φύσεσι θελημάτων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν·
κατ' ἄμφω γάρ, ὡς εἴρηται, τὰς αὐτοῦ φύσεις θελητικὸς ἦν ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐνεργητικὸς
τῆς ἡμῶν σωτηρίας· οὐ διαίρεσιν εἰσάγει· μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δηλοῖ καὶ
μόνον, κἂν τῇ ἐνώσει φυλακὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν.

[7]*Pyrr* §14 (PG 91.289C11-12): Ἀδύνατον τοῖς θελήμασι, μὴ συνεισάγεσθαι
τοὺς θέλοντας.

[8]*Pyrr* §15 (PG 91.289D4-92A2): Εἰ γὰρ δοθῇ τοῖς θελήμασι συνεισάγεσθαι
τοὺς θέλοντας, πάντως καὶ τοῖς θέλουσι τὰ θελήματα κατὰ τὴν εὔλογον ἀντιστροφὴν
συνεισαχθήσεται· καὶ εὑρεθήσεται καθ' ὑμᾶς, τῆς ὑπερουσίου καὶ ὑπεραγάθου καὶ
μακαρίας Θεότητος· διὰ μὲν τὸ ἐν αὐτῆς θέλημα, μία καὶ ἡ ὑπόστασις κατὰ
Σαβέλλιον· διὰ δὲ τὰ τρία πρόσωπα, τρία καὶ τὰ θελήματα· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τρεῖς
φύσεις, κατὰ τὸν Ἄρειον, εἴπερ, κατὰ τοὺς πατρικοὺς ὅρους καὶ κανόνας, ἡ διαφορὰ
τῶν θελημάτων καὶ φύσεων εἰσάγει διαφοράν.

the *Disputation*, that all the Fathers taught that different operations

indicate different natures, Pyrrhus responds,

> But the Fathers said this with reference to theology and not
> with reference to economy. Hence, no lover of the truth should
> change the established meaning of their statements which
> pertain to theology into statements that pertain to economy, and
> thereby introduce absurdity.[9]

Pyrrhus' rejection of a basic Neo-Chalcedonian tenet helps us to under-

stand his own set of presuppositions.

But we must go further in our consideration of will. Maximus, in

other of his *Opuscula*, tells why will must be ascribed to nature. In

Opuscule 16, he approves a definition of will submitted to him by the

disciple of a certain monk and goes on to distinguish will from other

aspects of volition:

> I thus go on [to ask] whether [or not] the definition of the
> natural will which your most esteemed servant, disciple and
> monk made is correct, namely that "it is an appetitive power of
> a being according to nature, which maintains all the essential
> attributes and properties of nature." And that the [natural
> will] is one thing and the gnomic [will] another is well received
> [by him] and [taken] from the divinely determined and pleasing
> teaching of the Fathers; even though some are of another
> opinion, [that the Fathers] did not speak so, [and] contend that
> the Fathers defined will rather as an act of willing, or the
> object of the will.[10]

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[9]*Pyrr* §176 (201) (PG 91.348C7-11): Τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογίας τοῖς
Πατράσιν, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας εἴρηται. Ὅθεν οὐδὲ φιλαλήθους διανοίας
καθέστηκε, τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογίας αὐτοῖς εἰρημένα, μετάγειν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας, καὶ
τὴν τοιαύτην συνεισαγαγεῖν ἀτοπίαν.

[10]*TP* 16 (PG 91.185C13-88A1): λέγω δὴ τὴν ταπείνωσιν, πυθέσθαι
κατηξίωσας τὸν οἰκέτην καὶ μαθητὴν, διὰ τὸν περὶ φυσικοῦ θελήματος ὁρισμὸν, ὃν
ὁ εὐλαβὴς πεποίηκε μοναχίς, εἰ εὖ ἔχει, ἢ μὴ, φήσας, "Δύναμιν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ κατὰ
φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτικὴν, καὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων συνεκτικὴν πάντων
ἰδιωμάτων." Καὶ ὅτι ἄλλο τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ γνωμικὸν ἄλλο, καλῶς ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνω,
καὶ τῆς τῶν θεοκρίτων οὐκ ἀπάδοντα διδασκαλίας Πατέρων, εἰ καί τισιν ἐνομίσθη μὴ
οὕτως ἔχειν, θέλησιν καὶ θεληθὲν ἢ θελητὸν ἰσχυριζομένοις τὸ θέλημα τοὺς

Maximus touches on a number of important issues in these two sentences. First, will is said to be (a) an appetitive power, (b) proper to nature, and (c) a maintainer of all the essential attributes and properties of the nature of which it is constitutive. Second, the natural will is to be distinguished from the "gnomic" will. This teaching is to be found in the Fathers, even though some people (namely the Monothelites) say otherwise. And third, these people say rather that the Fathers taught that will is either (a) the act of willing, or (b) the object of will. We will treat each of these issues in its proper place.[11] For now, let us go on with our definition of will.

We may gain more insight from the definition of will found in the first *Opuscule*, in the section entitled, "Concerning the natural will, that is, the faculty of will." In this passage, Maximus is distinguishing natural will from free choice:

> It is said that the natural will, i.e. the faculty of will, is an appetitive power of being according to nature which maintains all the essential attributes and properties of nature. For by this [natural will], the essence is naturally compelled and desires the being, life, and motion [proper to it] by sense and intellect: its own natural and full being. Being voluntary in itself, and the sustainer of all that is comprised by it, the nature is established, continuing in the logos of its being, according to which it is and becomes appetitive. For this reason, others define natural will to be a rational and vital appetite, while free choice is a deliberative appetite of those things within our [power]. Therefore, the faculty of will is not free choice, since the simple faculty of will is a certain rational and vital appetite, while free choice is a concourse of appetite, deliberation and

Πατέρας ὁρίζεσθαι.
This same definition of natural will is given in *TP* 3 (PG 91.45D3-48A1).

[11]See the principles that "the faculty of will and its employment are confused" and that "will and the object of will are confused" below.

judgement. For desiring, we first deliberate; and having deliberated, we judge; and having judged, we choose what judgement has shown to be better [over] the worse. The one [natural will] is fitted only to natural things; while the other [free choice] is fitted only to those things within our [power], and which are brought to pass by [our] power. The faculty of will, therefore, is not free choice.[12]

Will is natural, a natural power or faculty of the nature, and the most important attribute of a nature. Its importance lies in that it conserves the nature of which it is constitutive, and it does so by willing, in accordance with the logos of the nature that grounds it, all of those things that sustain the nature, including being itself. Natural will, or the faculty of will, is to be distinguished from free choice in that free choice concerns particular things which one can choose or not choose, depending upon one's deliberation and judgement. The faculty of will is simply the rational and vital appetite inherent in a nature and does not concern particular choices. As we shall see later, the difference between natural will and free choice is precisely the difference between logos and tropos.

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[12] *TP* 1 (PG 91.12C8-13A12): Περὶ φυσικοῦ θελήματος, ἤγουν θελήσεως. Θέλημά φασιν εἶναι φυσικόν, ἤγουν θέλησιν, δύναμιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτικήν· καὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων συνεκτικὴν πάντων ἰδιωμάτων. Τούτῳ γὰρ συνεχομένη φυσικῶς ἡ οὐσία, τοῦ τε εἶναι καὶ ζῆν καὶ κινεῖσθαι κατ' αἴσθησίν τε καὶ νοῦν ὀρέγεται, τῆς οἰκείας ἐφιεμένη φυσικῆς καὶ πλήρους ὀντότητος. Θελητικὴ γὰρ ἑαυτῆς, καὶ τῶν ὅσα σύστασιν αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι πέφυκε, καθέστηκεν ἡ φύσις· τῷ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῆς λόγῳ, καθ' ὃν ἔστι τε καὶ γέγονεν ὀρεκτικῶς ἐπηρτημένη. Διόπερ ἕτεροι τοῦτο τὸ φυσικὸν ὁριζόμενοι· θέλημά φασιν εἶναι, ὄρεξιν λογικήν τε καὶ ζωτικήν· τὴν δὲ προαίρεσιν, ὄρεξιν βουλευτικὴν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν προαίρεσις ἡ θέλησις· εἴπερ ἡ μὲν θέλησις ἁπλῆ τις ὄρεξίς ἐστι, λογική τε καὶ ζωτική· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις, ὀρέξεως καὶ βουλῆς καὶ κρίσεως σύνοδος. Ὀρεγόμενοι γὰρ πρότερον βουλευόμεθα· καὶ βουλευσάμενοι, κρίνομεν· καὶ κρίναντες, προαιρούμεθα τοῦ χείρονος τὸ δειχθὲν ἐκ τῆς κρίσεως κρεῖττον· καὶ ἡ μέν, μόνον ἤρτηται τῶν φυσικῶν· ἡ δὲ μόνων τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ δι' ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν θέλησις ἡ προαίρεσις.

If a nature lacks its will, it ceases to be the same kind of nature, for there is no inherent power to conserve the nature. Thus, a man bereft of will lacks an essential attribute of humanity. And further, a Christ bereft of a natural human will has not assumed a complete humanity; indeed, he has not assumed a humanity at all. The result is every conceivable Christological error. As Maximus says in the third *Opuscule*,

> But how did the Incarnate Word truly become man [if] he was destitute of that which most especially characterizes the [human] nature as rational? For being deprived of appetitive motion, he must also be bereft of every [other] vital power. And if he had not the vital power by nature, then he clearly did not have a soul, apart from which no flesh is able to subsist. Therefore he makes the economy appear in the simple form of flesh, but it is not [really] flesh by nature, noetically and rationally animated, hypostatically filled by the Incarnate Word. [And] according to Severus, he did not have a natural will as man. For if he was truly defective in natural will as man, then he was not truly perfect man; and if he was not truly perfect man, neither did he become wholly man. For what existence has an imperfect nature, and [what existence] lacks a logos?
>
> Therefore, the result of Severus, and of those with him, through a particular natural defect, is to exclude the assumed nature from the ineffable union and to confirm the illusion of Manes, the confusion of Apollinarius, and the confusion-of-essence of Eutyches.[13]

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[13]*TP* 3 (PG 91.49A10-C3): Πῶς δὲ γέγονε κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπον σαρκωθεὶς ὁ Λόγος, τοῦ μάλιστα τὴν φύσιν ὡς λογικὴν χαρακτηρίζοντος ἔρημος; Τὸ γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἔφεσιν ὀρεκτικῆς ἐστερημένον κινήσεως, καὶ πάσης ζωτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀμοιρήσειεν ἄν. Τὸ δὲ ζωτικὴν οὐκ ἔχον ἐκ φύσεως δύναμιν, οὐδὲ τὴν οἱανοῦν δηλονότι ψυχήν, ἧς χωρὶς οὐδὲ σάρξ ὑποσταίη ποτ' ἄν. Οὐκοῦν ψιλῇ μορφώσει σαρκὸς τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἐφάντασεν· ἀλλ' οὐ φύσει σαρκός, νοερῶς τε καὶ λογικῶς ἐψυχωμένης καθ' ὑΡπόστασιν σαρκωθεὶς ὁ Λόγος πεπλήρωκε, θέλημα φυσικὸν κατὰ Σευῆρον οὐκ ἔχων ὡς ἄνθρωπος. Εἰ γὰρ φυσικῶι θελήματι κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἦν ἐλλιπής, τέλειος κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὐ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος· εἰ δὲ τέλειος κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὐ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, οὐδ' ὅλως ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν. Τίς γὰρ ἀτελοῦς φύσεως ὕπαρξις, ἧς οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστί;

The issue in Monotheletism, then, is not academic. Whether or not Christ has a human will impinges upon the efficacy of the whole economy of salvation. This is why Monotheletism is important, especially because it was by will that man fell in the first place, and to leave the faculty of will unredeemed is to maintain a grossly incomplete economy. The soteriological implications of Monotheletism help to explain why Maximus was willing to endure mutilation and exile for his Dyothelite views. "Rien ne touche donc plus aux racines de la vie spirituelle que la théologie des deux volontés."[14]

2. Two opposing wills in the same person is impossible

Following immediately upon the first principle is this second one. Pyrrhus says, "It is impossible for two different wills to exist together in one person without opposition."[15] This statement has its antecedent in the *Psephos*, which says, "It is impossible for one and the same Subject to have two contrary wills simultaneously and in the same way."[16]

As we said in Chapter I, to equate a mere *difference* of wills with an *opposition* of wills is an assertion that need not have been made by

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[14]Jean-Luc Marion, "Les deux volontés du Christ selon saint Maxime le Confesseur," *Résurrection* 41 (1973): 65.

[15]*Pyrr* §16 (PG 91.292A3-4): Ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν ἐνὶ προσώπῳ δύο ἀλλήλοις συνυπάρξαι θελήματα ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως.

[16]See Chapter I.C.4.b, p. 62 above. We recall that this particular sentence was dropped from the *Ekthesis* and replaced with a more thorough-going Monotheletism, but the idea was retained nevertheless. We will see that Gregory the Theologian is in fact an earlier antecedent to Pyrrhus' thought on this point.

the Monothelites.[17] Maximus nevertheless takes the ball and runs with

it:

> If it is not possible for two wills to be in one and the same
> person without opposition, then by [your reasoning], it *is*
> possible [for them to exist] *with* opposition. And if this is so,
> you have confessed that there are two [wills]; and you do not
> quibble over the number [of wills], but only over their
> opposition. So it remains [for us] to discover the cause of the
> conflict. What do you say it is, the natural will, or sin? If you
> say it is the natural will, we know that God and no other is the
> cause of this, then by [your reasoning], God will be the Author
> of the conflict. But if [the cause is] sin, and [Christ] commits
> no sin, then the Incarnate God will have no opposition in his
> natural wills. For clearly, there is no result where there is no
> cause.[18]

Two points. First, Maximus shows that by this argument, Pyrrhus has

not rejected two *simple* wills in Christ, but only two opposed, or

contrary, wills. Because Pyrrhus insists on saying that two wills in one

subject must be opposing, he is led to aver that in reality there can be

only one will, for it is impossible for two opposing wills to exist in the

same subject.

Second, Maximus offers a way out of Pyrrhus' logic by searching

for the cause of the opposition of wills which Pyrrhus believes must

obtain. The two alternatives are that the human natural will is

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[17]See p. 61 above.

[18]*Pyrr* §17 (PG 91.292A6-B5): Εἰ ἄνευ ἐναντιώσεως δύο θελήματα ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσώπῳ εἶναι οὐ δυνατόν, ἄρα μετὰ ἐναντιώσεως, κατὰ σέ, δυνατόν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, τέως τὰ δύο εἶναι ὡμολόγησας· καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀριθμὸν οὐ διαφέρῃ, ἀλλ' ἡ μόνον πρὸς τὴν ἐναντιότητα. Οὐκοῦν λείπεται ζητεῖν τὴν ποιητικὴν τῆς μάχης αἰτίαν. Ποίαν οὖν ταύτην φῇς; Ἄρα τὴν κατὰ φύσιν θέλησιν, ἢ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τὴν κατὰ φύσιν εἴπῃς θέλησιν, ταύτης δὲ οὐκ ἄλλον ἢ τὸν Θεὸν γινώσκομεν αἴτιον· ἄρα, κατὰ σέ, τὴν μάχης δημιουργὸς ὁ Θεός. Εἰ δὲ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν· ἁμαρτίαν δὲ οὐκ ἐποίησε, οὐδὲ τὴν οἱανοῦν ἐναντίωσιν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ ὁ σαρκωθεὶς Θεὸς εἶχε θελήμασι. Τοῦ αἰτίου γὰρ οὐκ ὄντος, οὐδὲ τὸ αἰτιατὸν προδήλως ἔσται.

inherently contrary to the divine will, or that opposition results from something which is not inherent in the natural will, namely sin. To say that the natural will is *per se* opposed to the divine will is to make God himself the cause of his creature's opposition to himself. He is, after all, the Creator of all natures and, by extension, of all natural wills. Clearly this is not an acceptable solution, but neither is the other alternative Maximus suggests: that sin is the cause of the opposition of wills. To admit that the two wills of Christ are opposed is to admit that there is sin in Christ. But since Christ is sinless, there is no ground for supposing that his wills are opposed to each other. In brief, Maximus demonstrates that it is possible to conceive of two natural wills in one and the same Subject which are not opposed. How that is possible concerns will as a faculty of nature and how that faculty is hypostatically, or modally, employed, a distinction which we will now undertake to flesh out.

To probe more deeply into this Monenergist principle and its solution, we must turn to *Opuscule* 20. Part of this *opuscule* is concerned with explaining a passage from Gregory the Theologian which the Monothelites were citing in support of their views.[19] The passage is found in *The Fourth Theological Oration*. The significant phrases are given in italics.

> Let them quote in the seventh place that the Son came down
> from heaven, not to do his own will, but the will of him that

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[19]The whole examination of this text of Gregory's is found at PG 91.233B6-37C8. As Sherwood notes (*Date-List*, 41), Maximus comments on this text at least eight times: *TP* 3 (48B), 4 (61Af.), 6 (65B), 7 (81CD), 15 (161A, 176A), 20 (233B, 236B), and *Pyrr* (316C).

sent him. Well, if this had not been said by himself who came down, we should say that the phrase was modeled as issuing from the human nature, not as Him who is conceived of in his character as the Savior, for *his human will cannot be opposed to God, seeing it altogether taken into God* [lit. wholly deified]; but conceived simply as our nature, inasmuch as *the human will does not completely follow the divine, but for the most part struggles against it and resists it.* For we understand in the same way the words, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless not what I will, but thy will prevail." For it is not likely that he did not know whether it was possible or not, or that *he would oppose will to will.* But since, as this is the language of him who assumed our nature (for he it was who came down), and not of the same nature which he assumed, we must meet the objection in this way: that the passage does not mean that the Son has a special will of his own, besides that of the Father, but that he has not.[20]

It is possible to read this passage with Monothelite eyes and do it a great deal of justice. Already we see what may in fact be the authority behind Pyrrhus' claim that two wills cannot exist in the same person without opposition: that "the human will does not completely follow the divine, but for the most part struggles against it and resists it." Moreover, the simple identification of the deified human will of Christ with the "theandric" will of Christ completes the picture acceptably. Let us see how Maximus interprets what Gregory says in *Opuscule* 20.

The part of *Opuscule* 20 we are concerned with opens with a question:

> But if someone, recalling [Gregory's words], asks, "If there is no natural opposition [of wills in Christ], then with regards to our own [human] will (since it is his and not another's), how could [Gregory] not say that it followed the [divine will], but rather that "for the most part [the human will] struggles against it and resists it"? For either being antagonistic [to the divine will] it is not natural, or being natural, it is not antagonistic. And [antagonism] is established as a natural

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[20]Edward R. Hardy, ed., *Christology of the Later Fathers* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), 185.

quality of the will of the Savior's humanity. Since it is
[antagonistic], then it is by no means [natural]; but if it is
[natural], it must be antagonistic.[21]

In other words, given that by definition what is natural is not

antagonistic to God, how could Gregory say that the natural human will

of Christ struggled against the divine will? Why did he not say that

the human will followed the divine will? And if antagonism is made to

be a natural quality of the human will of Christ, one of two things must

obtain: either because his human will is antagonistic, it cannot be

natural; or if it is natural, antagonism is also natural, and God is made

out to be its Author.

Maximus' response is lengthy, so we will divide it up into smaller

parts. He begins,

We say that insofar as [will] is natural, it is not antagonistic;
but insofar as it is not naturally moved in our case, it is surely
antagonistic and "for the most part struggles against" [the
divine will], in which also sin is incurred.[22]

First, Maximus reaffirms the dictum that what is natural is not

antagonistic to God. It is only when will *is not naturally moved* that

antagonism to the divine will occurs, and this is also the motion in

which sin is incurred. Thus, a movement of will that is contrary to

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[21]PG 91.236B9-C4: Εἰ δέ τις ἐρεῖ· Καὶ εἰ μηδὲν φυσικὸν ὑπεναντίον, πῶς
περὶ τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐνφύτου θελήματος, εἴπερ αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλου τυχόν,
ἐμνημόνευσεν ὁ Πατήν, καὶ οὐ πάντως εἴρηκεν ἑπομένου Θεῷ, ἀλλ' "Ἀντιπίπτοντος
ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀντιπαλαίοντος;" Ἢ γὰρ οὐ φυσικὸν ὡς ἀντίπαλον, ἢ οὐκ
ἀντίπαλον ὡς ὃν φυσικόν. Καὶ ἄλλο λοιπὸν ὡς ἐν ποιότητι φυσικῇ πρὸς τὸ θέλειν
τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Σωτῆρα ἀνθρωπίνου καθέστηκεν· εἴπερ τοῦτο μέν, οὐδαμῶς· ἐκεῖνο δέ,
ὑπεναντίον.

[22]PG 91.236C4-7: Φαμέν, ὅτιπερ καθὸ μὲν φυσικόν, οὐχ ὑπεναντίον· καθὸ δὲ
μὴ φυσικῶς πρὸς ἡμῶν κινεῖται, σαφῶς ὑπεναντίον, καὶ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἀντιπίπτον, ᾧ
καὶ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν ἐφέπεται.

nature is a movement of will that is contrary to the divine will and that

is sinful.

> For [sin is incurred] by an abuse in the mode of motion, but
> not by nature in the logos of the faculty, [and] it is resisted
> by reason and by ordinance.[23]

This sentence is dense. Maximus contrasts three pairs of terms: abuse

and nature, mode and logos, motion and faculty. The faculty of will is

natural, a component of nature, and as such corresponds in all things to

the logos by which, and in accordance with which, it moves. The mode

of willing, however, is not natural in the sense that it pertains to

hypostasis instead. It is hypostatically, modally, that the will is actually

exercised and moves, and this motion, not bound by the logos of nature,

is capable of alteration and abuse.[24] This modal alteration and abuse

of the natural faculty of will is resisted by reason (inherent in human

nature) and ordinance (divine prescription).

> Since [our will] is suitably formed and moved, if it does not
> have unity with God, at least it has correspondence and not
> antagonism.[25]

Given that human will is formed and moved in accordance with nature,

inasmuch as it does move in accordance with that nature, it corresponds

to the divine will, even if it is not wholly united with God. Again, there

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[23]PG 91.236C7-10: Τῷ γὰρ κατὰ παράχρησιν τῆς κινήσεως τρόπῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν τῆς δυνάμεως λόγῳ, τὸ παρὰ λόγον καὶ νόμον ὑφίσταται·

[24]The modal alteration and abuse of the will is called gnome (γνώμη), a term we will consider as the last Monothelite principle in section B.9, p. 250 below.

[25]PG 91.236C10-12: ἐπεὶ προσσφυῶς τυπούμενόν τε καὶ κινούμενον, εἰ καὶ τὸ ἡνωμένον πρὸς Θεὸν οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλά γε τὸ συμβαῖνον καὶ μὴ ἀντιπίπτον.

is no natural antagonism of the human will to God, and we are reminded

that nature, being created by God, is good, and therefore to move in

accordance with nature is to do good and to fulfill the divine intention

of the nature.

> For [just as] there is not in nature a logos for what is above
> nature, so neither is there [in the nature a logos] for what is
> against nature and rebels against it.[26]

Just as it is not proper to human nature to deify itself, since there is

in human nature no logos for super-human things, so neither is it

proper to human nature to damn itself, since there is in human nature

no logos for things contrary to nature.

> Whence the Teacher does not concern himself with each and
> every point and explain it, but pruned [his speech], saying,
> "Inasmuch as" and "for the most part," by which he means,
> "when" and "occasionally," on account of the difficulty of
> leading the many up to virtue.[27]

When Gregory says, "*inasmuch as* the human will does not completely

follow the divine, but *for the most part* struggles against it and resists

it," he is not talking about Christ's human will, but our own. And he

says this pastorally and means "*when* the human will does not follow the

divine," and "*occasionally* struggles against it and resists it." And he

says this because it is not easy for most people to ascend to God in

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[26]PG 91.236C12-14: Ὡς γὰρ οὐδείς ἐν τῇ φύσει λόγος τοῦ ὑπὲρ φύσιν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ στασιάζοντος.

[27]PG 91.236C14-D4: Ἔνθεν οὐδὲ ὡς οὐχ ἕπεται πάντῃ τε καὶ πάντως ἀπεφήνατο ὁ διδάσκαλος, ἀλλ' ἐκόλασε φήσας· "Ὡς οὐ πάντως, καὶ ὡς τὰ πολλά," ᾧ προσυπακούεται τὸ, ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ ὀλιγάκις, διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῶν πολλῶν δυσανάγωγον.

virtue, and even when they do, they frequently do not follow the divine will, but struggle against it and resist it along the way.

> For the will of the Savior's humanity, if it were natural (but not naked like ours, just like his humanity [was not naked]), [in a manner] beyond us was utterly deified in the union, to which also his sinlessness may properly be ascribed.[28]

If the will of Christ's humanity is natural, then it is utterly deified in the hypostatic union, and it is to the union that his sinlessness is also properly ascribed. How so? Because the human nature of Christ had a *divine* hypostasis. This is the mode of Christ's humanity that is "beyond us," and this is why his humanity was not "naked." To recall an earlier statement and apply it now to Christ, "[sin is incurred] by an abuse in the mode of motion, but not by nature in the logos of the faculty." If the subject in question is a *human* person, then the hypostatic, modal mode of motion is capable of moving contrary to the logos of nature and of sinning. If, however, the subject in question is a *divine* person, then the hypostatic mode of motion will never move contrary to the logos of nature, but will always move in accordance with it. Why? Because, as we said, nature is good, and motion in accordance with nature is likewise good and the fulfillment of the logos of nature. It is for this reason that Christ's humanity is sinless, it is because of the *hypostatic* union that Christ's humanity is wholly deified, and both sinlessness and deification turn out to be two aspects of the same reality.

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[28]PG 91.236D4-9: Τὸ γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Σωτῆρα ἀνθρωπίνου θέλειν, εἰ καὶ φυσικὸν ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐ ψιλὸν ἦν καθ' ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, ὡς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τῇ ἑνώσει κατάκρον θεωθέν, ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον κυρίως ἐπήρτηται.

> But our [will], as was made clear before, is naked, and not at
> all sinless, because of its capacity for deviation, [and it] does
> not remain in this [state of sinlessness]. Nature is not alter-
> able, but motion is capable of being turned aside, or rather, it
> is more correct to say, its mode changes. And clearly from this
> [changeable mode] one does many things contrary to reason, but
> in no way is [nature] changed from an essential, innate, and
> rational [nature] into an irrational nature [as a result].[29]

Again, in our case, with a human person embodying a human nature, there is a capacity for deviation from what is natural to us, and we do not remain always in a state of sinlessness. But this deviation is not natural, for nature is unalterable; rather, it is modal, and modal changes do not alter nature (e.g., an irrational act does not render our nature irrational).

To summarize, then, the Monothelite principle that two opposing wills in the same person is impossible, we have seen Maximus respond that

1. Pyrrhus is correct, but this principle does not lead to a rejection of a doctrine of two simple wills in Christ, but only to the rejection of a doctrine of two *opposing* wills.

2. The cause of opposition between the wills must be either nature or sin, and in the case of Christ, neither is an acceptable alternative.

3. Thus, it is possible to conceive of two wills in Christ without opposition.

4. Concord of divine and human wills in Christ is not only possible, but is in fact natural.

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[29]PG 91.236D9-14: Τὸ δὲ ἡμέτερον προδήλως ψιλὸν, καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀναμάρτητον, διὰ τὴν τῇδε κἀκεῖσε γινομένην παρέγκλισιν· οὐ φύσιν μὲν παραλλάττουσαν, κίνησιν δὲ παρατρέπουσαν, ἢ μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἀληθέστερον, τὸν ταύτης τρόπον ἀμείβουσαν. Καὶ δῆλον, ἐκ τοῦ πολλὰ παραλόγως ποιεῖν, καὶ μηδαμῶς εἰς ἄλογον μεταπίπτειν οὐσίαν ἐκ τῆς ἐνούσης ἐμφύτου λογικῆς.

5. Sin is a hypostatic, modal motion of will contrary to nature.

6. Since Christ is a divine hypostasis, there is in him no possibility of motion contrary to nature.

7. Thus there is in Christ both a deifying divine will and a deified human will in perfect union and concord.

3. Confusion of will and the object of will

After Maximus answered Pyrrhus' first two principles, the ex-Patriarch seems to be a little more mollified than he was before, and has gained somewhat in understanding, but he is still not without his objections.

> PYR: Willing, therefore, is natural?
> MAX: Yes, the simple willing is natural.
> PYR: If willing is natural, and the more illustrious of the Fathers say that there is one will of God and the Saints, then there will be one nature of God and the Saints.[30]

Maximus addresses the fundamental confusion at work in this Monothelite principle: the confusion of will with its object.

> We said before that it is necessary, when speaking about the truth, to distinguish the meaning of what is being said, because of the deception that arises from equivocation. So I ask you this: do the Saints who say "there is one will of God and the Saints" mean the essential and creative will of God, or the object of will? For the will of the one who wills and the object of that will are not the same, just as the eye of one who sees and what is seen [are not the same]; the former is inherent in it, while the latter is external. If they said this about the essential [will], then not only will the Saints be found to be co-natural and co-creative with God, but they will contradict

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[30]*Pyrr* §§18-20 (PG 91.292B7-13): ΠΥΡ. Φύσεως οὖν τὸ θέλειν;
ΜΑΞ. Ναί, τὸ ἁπλῶς θέλειν, φύσεως.
ΠΥΡ. Εἰ φύσεως τὸ θέλειν· οἱ ἐμφανέστεροι δὲ τῶν Πατέρων ἓν θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων εἶπον· καὶ μία φύσις ἔσται οὕτω γε τῶν ἁγίων καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ.

themselves, for they also said that it is impossible for two things different in essence to have a common will. But if [they said this] about the object of will, the reason is etiological, or, as some like to say, [it was] in the "large sense" that the Fathers called "will" that which was willed. And neither does anything absurd follow from defining the simple will as natural.[31]

The first half of Maximus' response is straightforward and needs no commentary; the second half could endure a little explication. If those illustrious Fathers did mean to speak about the essential will of God when they said "one will of God and the Saints," then Pyrrhus' objection is correct: the Saints would be co-natural and co-creative with God. But such an interpretation of the text flies in the face of another Patristic teaching, which says that two things having different natures must have different wills. (Recall that natures are revealed in their faculties and operations, without which the natures grounding them would be unknowable.) So it is clear that the Fathers could not mean

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[31] *Pyrr* §21 (PG 91.292B14-D2): Καὶ ἀνωτέρω ἐρρέθη, ὅτι δεῖ, τὸν περὶ ἀληθείας λόγον ποιούμενον διαστέλλεσθαι τῶν λεγομένων τὰ σημαινόμενα, διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας πλάνην. Ἀντερήσομαι γάρ σε καὶ αὐτός, ὅτι, οἱ ἓν θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁγίων εἰπόντες ἅγιοι, πρὸς τὸ οὐσιῶδες τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ δημιουργικὸν θέλημα ἀποβλέποντες τοῦτο εἶπον, ἢ πρὸς τὸ θελητόν; Οὐ ταὐτὸν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ θέλοντος θέλημα, καὶ τὸ θελητόν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦ ὁρῶντος ὀπτικὸν, καὶ τὸ ὁρατόν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐσιωδῶς αὐτῷ πρόσεστι, τὸ δὲ ἐκτὸς τυγχάνει. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸς τὸ οὐσιῶδες ἀπιδόντες εἶπον, οὐ μόνον ὁμοφυεῖς καὶ συνδημιουργοὺς εἰσάγοντες εὑρεθήσονται τῷ Θεῷ τοὺς ἁγίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ἐναντιούμενοι, φήσαντες μὴ δύνασθαι τὰ ἑτεροούσια κοινὸν ἔχειν θέλημα. Εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὸ θελητόν, ἄρα αἰτιολογικῶς· ἢ, ὥς τισι φίλον λέγειν, καταχρηστικῶς, τὸ θεληθὲν θέλημα προσηγόρευσαν οἱ Πατέρες· καὶ οὐδὲν ἕψεται ἄτοπον, τῶν φύσεως εἶναι τὸ ἁπλῶς θέλειν ὁριζομένων.

The present author cannot believe that Maximus used καταχρηστικῶς to mean "by misuse of the language." his respect for the *ipsissima verbi* of the Fathers makes it unlikely. In one place, Charles Moeller translates the word as "au sens large," i.e. as opposed to κύριως ("Le chalcédonisme," 681), hence the present translation.

this. It is perfectly coherent and consistent with the Fathers' teaching, however, to understand this saying as referring to the *object* of the will, even if the Fathers called the object of will "will" in a broad, imprecise way.

In *Opuscule* 1, in a section entitled, "That after the Resurrection there will not be one will of the Saints with each other and with God, and one object of will, according to a mode proper to all, as some say,"[32] the Confessor raises the same objection:

> If the divine will and the human will are the same and numerically one, as they say, since God established the ages by his will, there will be the same will of the Creator and the chorus of the Saints, be [that will] natural or intentional; and to put it simply, it is made identical with the divine [will], which is absurd, and, I suppose, the work of a raving mind.[33]

But in the paragraph which precedes this one, Maximus introduces another observation that clarifies the distinction between will and the object of will. He begins by distinguishing the faculty of will and the mode of will that we saw at work in the last principle:

> If the will, in the mode of what is proper to motion, is not one in all men, there will never be one will of God and the saved, as some believe, according to a mode proper to all. [Rather] there is one object of will of God and the Saints: the salvation of them that are saved, the divinely established object, the end pre-conceived before all the ages, about which there will be agreement by will of those who are saved with

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[32]PG 91.21C13-D2: Ὅτι κατὰ πάντα τρόπον οὐκ ἔσται μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐν τὸ θέλημα τῶν ἁγίων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸν Θεόν, κἂν ἐν πᾶσι τὸ θεληθέν, ὅς τινες λέγουσιν.

[33]*TP* 1 (PG 91.25C1-8): Εἰ δὲ ταυτὸν ἔσται καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τό τε θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα, κατὰ τοὺς λέγοντας, ἐπειδὴ θελήματι πάντας ὁ Θεὸς ὑπέστησε τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἔσται τῷ αὐτῷ θελήματι δημιουργὸς καὶ ὁ τῶν ἁγίων χορός, εἴτε φυσικῷ, εἴτε γνωμικῷ· καὶ ἁπλῶς, ᾧ πεφύκασι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ταυτίζεσθαι· ὅπερ ἄτοπον, καὶ μόνης, ὡς οἶμαι, ἐμβαζομένης ἔργον διανοίας ἐστίν.

each other and with the God who saves. [This salvation] is
wholly and generically in all, but the capacity for God is unique
for each one, [for] all are filled in the measure of grace. And
being filled in all [ways], (to respect [established] usage), they
adhere [to God] according to the measure of faith in each one.
For if the will of God is by nature *to save*, and it is [the will]
of man by nature *to be saved*, then that which by nature *saves*
is not the same as that which by nature *is saved*. And there is
one object for both: the salvation of all, put forth by God and
chosen by the Saints.[34]

Since the mode of willing is hypostatic, because there is a multitude of

human hypostases, there cannot be one sole mode of willing for every-

one, and there certainly cannot be one sole mode for everyone and God

as well. Where then is unity of will? In the object of will, which in

this case is the salvation of the saved. The saved are wholly and

completely saved, as Maximus explains, but their capacity for God is

determined by the degree to which each person adheres to God; and

this is a modal consideration. God is naturally able to save, while man

is naturally able to be saved, and the respective wills of both God and

man are realized in one and the same object: the salvation of the saved.

Thus, will is natural, and modally actualized, and is distinct from its

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[34]PG 91.25A8-B12: Εἰ δὲ τρόπῳ τῷ κατὰ τὴν κίνησιν οὐ μία πάντων ἀνθρώπον
ἡ θέλησις· οὐδέποτε μία τοῦ τε Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν σωζομένων, ὥς τισιν ἔδοξε, κατὰ
πάντα τρόπον γενήσεται θέλησις· κἂν ἓν τὸ θεληθέν ἐστι τῷ τε Θεῷ καὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις,
ἡ σωτηρία τῶν σωζομένων· σκοπὸς ὑπάρχουσα θεῖος, ὡς τέλος πάντων προεπινοηθὲν
τῶν αἰώνον· περὶ ὅ, τῶν τε σωζομένων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ Θεοῦ τοῦ σώζοντος, κατὰ
τὴν θέλησιν γενήσεται σύμβασις· ὅλου ἐν πᾶσι γενικῶς, καὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ἰδικῶς
χωρήσαντος τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ τὰ πάντα πληροῦντος τῷ μέτρῳ τῆς χάριτος· καὶ ἐν πᾶσι
πληρουμένου, μελῶν δίκην, κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῳ πίστεως αὐτῷ
συμφυεῖσιν. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν Θεοῦ τὸ θέλημα φύσει σωστικόν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
φύσει σωζόμενον ταυτὸν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ποτὲ τὸ φύσει σῶζον, καὶ τὸ φύσει σωζόμενον·
κἂν εἷς ἀμφοτέρων σκοπός, ἡ σωτηρία τῶν ὅλων καθέστηκεν· ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ
προβεβλημένη· ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἁγίων προῃρημένη.

object. Pyrrhus' objection is a weak one, and there is little more to

say about this Monothelite principle.

4. The faculty of will and its employment are confused

After hearing Maximus distinguish between will and the object of

will, Pyrrhus raises an objection and shows Maximus what he considers

to be the unacceptable result of ascribing will to nature. He says,

> If we differ from ourselves and from each other in our wills--
> and now will this and later do not will it--, and this [will] is
> natural and of the same characteristic logos, not only will we be
> found to differ from each other in nature, but [we will also be
> found] to change our own [nature] infinitely.[35]

In short, if will is natural, every time the will/object of will changes,

the nature will change as well. Not only will human beings differ from

each another by nature, but each individual person will change his own

nature every time he wills something else.

Having distinguished between will and the object of will, Maximus

now finds that he must distinguish between will as a faculty of nature

and the hypostatic employment of that faculty. In his response we find

a clear and classic application of the logos-tropos distinction.

> The will and the mode of willing are not the same, just as sight
> and the mode of seeing are not the same. For will, like sight,
> is natural, and is [so] in all those that are of like nature and
> like origin. But the mode of willing, like the mode of seeing--
> that is, to will to walk or not to will to walk; or to look to the
> right or to the left, or up or down; or to contemplate concupis-
> cence or the logoi which are in things--, this is the mode of

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[35]*Pyrr* §22 (PG 91.292D5-10): Εἰ τοῖς θελήμασι πρός τε ἑαυτοὺς καὶ
ἀλλήλους διαφέρομεν· νῦν μὲν, τοῦτο θέλοντες· νῦν δὲ, τὸ αὐτὸ οὐ θέλοντες·
φύσεως δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦ αὐτῆς χαρακτηριστικοῦ λόγου, οὐ μόνον τῇ φύσει
ἀλλήλων διαφέροντες εὑρεθησόμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπειράκις ταύτην μεταβάλλοντες.

the use of will and sight, [residing] only in the use. And the same distinction [may be applied] to other things, following common usage. If this [will] bears witness to the nature we have, then to will to eat, or not to will to eat, or to will to walk, or not to will [to walk], is not the abolition of the will in itself, but of the mode of willing, i.e. the origin and passing away of the things that are willed. For otherwise, if we suppose that the things created by God, being willed by him, [should] pass away, then his essential and creative will, which is presupposed in those things, [must also] pass away.[36]

Just as there can be no confusion between the faculty of will and the objects of that will, neither can there be a confusion between the will as an innate faculty of nature and the hypostatic, modal employment of that faculty. Pyrrhus' objection falls on the same grounds that much of Monotheletism falls: hypostasis and nature are distinct, not identical.

Pyrrhus attempted to prove that ascribing will to nature is insupportable because every time the will changes, the nature must also change. He now turns the argument around. No longer arguing from the standpoint of a *mutable will*, he argues from the standpoint of an *immutable nature*:

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[36]*Pyrr* §23 (PG 91.292D7-93B3): Οὐ ταὐτὸν τὸ θέλειν καὶ τὸ πῶς θέλειν· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὸ πῶς ὁρᾶν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ θέλειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶν, φύσεως· καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοφυέσι καὶ ὁμογενέσι προσόν· τὸ δὲ πῶς θέλειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πῶς ὁρᾶν, τουτέστι θέλειν περιπατῆσαι, καὶ μὴ θέλειν περιπατῆσαι, καὶ δεξιὰ ὁρᾶν, ἢ ἀριστερά, ἢ ἄνω, ἢ κάτω, ἢ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν, ἢ κατανόησιν τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι λόγων, τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ θέλειν καὶ ὁρᾶν χρήσεως, μόνῳ τῷ κεχρημένῳ προσόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὸν χωρίζον, κατὰ τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην διαφοράν. Εἰ δε τοῦτο μαρτυροῦσαν τὴν φύσιν ἔχομεν, ἄρα τὸ θέλειν φαγεῖν, ἢ μὴ θέλειν φαγεῖν· ἢ τό θέλειν περιπατῆσαι, ἢ μὴ θέλειν· οὐ τοῦ πεφυκέναι θέλειν ἐστὶν ἀναίρεσις, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πῶς θέλειν, τουτέστι, τῶν θελητῶν ἐστι γένεσις καὶ ἀπογένεσις. Οὔτε γάρ, εἰ ὑποθώμεθα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γενόμενα, θελητὰ αὐτοῦ ὄντα, ἀπογενέσθαι, τούτοις καὶ τὸ προεπινοούμενον αὐτῶν, οὐσιῶδες αὐτοῦ καὶ ποιητικὸν θέλημα συναπογενήσεται.

If you say that will is natural, and what is natural is altogether compelled, how can you call the [two] wills in Christ natural [and] not take away all his voluntary motion?[37]

Before, Pyrrhus said, if natural will is mutable, nature is also mutable.

Now he says that if nature is immutable, a natural will must also be immutable.

Maximus' response to this line of reasoning contains four points. First, he denies outright that there is any compulsion in a rational nature.

> Not only does the divine and uncreated nature have no natural compulsion, but neither does the noetic and created [nature]. For what is rational by nature has a natural power, the rational appetite, which is called the faculty of will of the noetic soul, according to which [faculty] we consider what is willed, and considering, we choose what is willed. And willing, we inquire, examine and deliberate, judge, are inclined toward, elect, impel ourselves toward, and employ [something]. But [if], as we said, the rational appetite is natural to us—i.e., willing and consideration—then so too are deliberation and inquiry, examination, choice, judgement, inclination towards, election, impelling ourselves toward, and employment. Thus, the natural things of noetic souls are not compelled.[38]

The Confessor explains that there are several stages to be considered in each act of willing: deliberation, inquiry, examination, and so forth.

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[37]*Pyrr* §24 (PG 91.293B6-9): Εἰ φυσικὸν λέγεις τὸ θέλημα, τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν πάντως καὶ ἠναγκασμένον, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη, φυσικὰ λέγοντας ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ τὰ θελήματα, πᾶσαν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκούσιον ἀναιρεῖν κίνησιν;

[38]*Pyrr* §25 (PG 91.293B11-C8): Οὐ μόνον ἡ θεία καὶ ἄκτιστος φύσις οὐδὲν ἠναγκασμένον ἔχει φυσικόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ νοερὰ καὶ κτιστή. Τὸ γὰρ φύσει λογικόν, δύναμιν ἔχει φυσικὴν τὴν λογικὴν ὄρεξιν, ἥτις καὶ θέλησις καλεῖται τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς· καθ' ἣν θέλοντες λογιζόμεθα· καὶ λογιζόμενοι, θέλοντες βουλόμεθα. Καὶ θέλοντες, ζητοῦμεν, σκεπτόμεθά τε καὶ βουλευόμεθα, καὶ κρίνομεν, καὶ διατιθέμεθα, καὶ προαιρούμεθα, καὶ ὁρῶμεν, καὶ κεχρήμεθα. Κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ἡμῖν, ὡς εἴρηται, προσόντος τοῦ λογικῶς ὀρέγεσθαι, ἤγουν θέλειν, καὶ λογίζεσθαι· βουλεύεσθαί τε καὶ ζητεῖν, καὶ σκέπτεσθαι, καὶ βούλεσθαι, καὶ κρίνειν, καὶ διατίθεσθαι, καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ ὁρμᾶν, καὶ κεχρῆσθαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἠναγκασμένα τὰ τῶν νοερῶν φυσικά.

Because each of these stages is inherent in every act of willing, they are properly seen as natural aspects of will. For will to be compelled, each of these stages in the act of willing must likewise be compelled. It is not the case that our deliberation or our judgement, for example, is compelled when we will to do something. Therefore, since none of these stages is compelled, it is correct to say that the natural will itself is not compelled.

At this point Maximus is not concerned with distinguishing the natural faculty of will from its modal employment in the person. He has just made that distinction. His present concern is simply to prove that rational nature *per se* is essentially volitional, not compelled. Once the volitional character of nature is established, Pyrrhus' objection is refuted.

The second argument which Maximus brings forward against Pyrrhus' claim that what is natural is compelled is to move the Christological argument into the realm of theology to show its absurdity. We have, of course, seen this move before (e.g., in his refutation of the first Monothelite principle above). Maximus says,

> But if it were granted, how could the foregoing premise [of Pyrrhus] not be shown to be the most absurd of all absurdities? For if, according to this [premise], what is natural is compelled, and God is by nature God, and good, and Creator, then God must of necessity be God, and good, and Creator. To think such a thing, much less to speak it, is the utmost blasphemy. For who attributes necessity to God? Consider, if you will, my friend, the blasphemy of this proposition.[39]

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[39]*Pyrr* §25 (PG 91.293C8-D2): Πῶς δὲ καὶ τούτου δοθέντος, οὐ πάσης ἀτοπίας ἀτοπωτέρα ἡ τοιαύτη δειχθήσεται πρότασις; Εἰ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν τὸ φυσικὸν πάντως καὶ ἠναγκασμένον· φύσει δὲ ὁ Θεὸς Θεός, φύσει ἀγαθός, φύσει δημιουργός·

If the two natures in Christ are compelled, then so, too, must be the divine nature. This Maximus calls the utmost blasphemy.

Third, Maximus turns Pyrrhus' logic inside out in order to show that it is ridiculous:

> For if the wills in Christ are said to be natural, [according to your thinking, and] you take away all his voluntary motion, then necessarily the things that naturally will, will have *involuntary* motion; while the things that naturally do *not* will, will have *voluntary* [motion]. And thus, not only God, who is above beings, but also all noetic and rational beings, being volitional in nature, will have involuntary motion; and soulless things, which are not volitional, will have voluntary motion.[40]

This objection is not so profound as to merit analysis.

Lastly, the Confessor turns to Cyril himself for a quotation in support of his views and against Pyrrhus':

> Except that the blessed Cyril, in the third chapter *Against the Refutations of Theodoret*, adequately released us from these considerations when he clearly stated, "Nothing natural in the noetic nature is involuntary." And it is possible for anyone who wants to learn this to do so by taking this chapter into his hands [and reading it].[41]

ἀνάγκῃ ἔσται ὁ Θεὸς Θεός, καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ δημιουργός· ὅπερ καὶ ἐννοεῖν, μήτι γε λέγειν, ἐσχάτης ἐστὶ βλασφημίας. Τίς γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐπάγων; Σκόπει δὲ, εἰ δοκεῖ, ὦ φιλότης, καὶ οὕτω τῆς τοιαύτης προτάσεως τὸ βλάσφημον.

[40]*Pyrr* §25 (PG 91.293D2-9): Εἰ γὰρ ὁ φυσικὰ ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ λέγων τὰ θελήματα, πᾶσαν, κατὰ σὲ, ἑκούσιον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἀναιρεῖ κίνησιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ μὲν φυσικῶς θέλοντα, ἀκούσιον ἔχειν κίνησιν· τὰ δὲ φυσικῶς μὴ θέλοντα, ἑκούσιον. Οὐκοῦν οὐ μόνον Θεός, ὁ ὑπὲρ τὰ ὄντα· ἀλλὰ καὶ νοερὰ πάντα καὶ λογικά, φύσει ὄντα θελητικά, ἀκούσιον ἕξει κίνησιν· ἄψυχα δὲ οὐ θελητικά, ερκούσιον ἕξει κίνησιν . . .

[41]Ibid. (PG 91.293D8-96A3): . . . πλὴν ὅτι ὁ μακάριος Κύριλλος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ κεφαλαίῳ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ Θεοδωρήτου μέμψεις, ἀπήλλαξεν ἡμᾶς περιττῶν πραγμάτων, διαρρήδην ἀποφηνάμενος, *Μηδὲν φυσικὸν εἶναι ἐν τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει ἀκούσιον.* Καὶ τοῦτο ἔξεστι τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν, μετὰ χεῖρας λαβόντι τὸ τοιοῦτο κεφάλαιον.

Thus, all of Maximus' points are driven home because they are shown to be in agreement with the writings of the great Alexandrian Christologist.

5. Will is synthetic

Up to this point in the *Disputation*, Pyrrhus had tried to prove that there could be only one will in Christ, and that to posit two wills in him was beyond the pale of reason. In every case Maximus was able to present an adequate response and not only counter Pyrrhus' difficulties, but construct a positive and coherent Dyothelite Christology as well. Pyrrhus now finds that he must accept as a fact that the wills in Christ are natural; but he is not out of arguments yet. He must simply take up a fresh line of reasoning to continue the debate, and that is what he does:

> It is proper that what has been shown in this inquiry be accepted prudently [and] without reservation. The debate has shown with many [arguments and] with great clarity that the wills in Christ are natural. However, just as we say it is possible for there to be one synthetic [nature] from two natures, so it is also possible to say "one synthetic will from two natural wills." Those who say "two wills" [do so] on account of the natural difference of the natures in Christ, while those who say "one [will]" [do so] on account of the extreme union. Let us no longer quibble with each other over mere terminology since "for us, the truth is not in names," as Gregory, great in theology, says, "but in realities."[42]

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[42]*Pyrr* §26 (PG 91.296A8-B5): Ἐπειδὴ χρὴ τὰ ἐκ τῆς ἐξετάσεως ἀναφαινόμενα ἀληθῆ, εὐγνωμόνως ἀποδέχεσθαι· μετὰ δὲ πολλῆς εὐκρινείας ἔδειξεν ὁ λόγος, φυσικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ θελήματα· δυνατὸν δὲ ὥσπερ ἐκ τῶν δύο φύσεων ἕν τι σύνθετον λέγομεν, οὕτω καὶ ἐκ τῶν δύο φυσικῶν θελημάτων ἕν τι σύνθετον λέγειν· ἵνα καὶ οἱ δύο λέγοντες θελήματα, διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ἐν Χριστῷ φύσεων διαφορὰν, καὶ οἱ ἓν λέγοντες, διὰ τὴν ἄκραν ἕνωσιν, μηκέτι ψιλῶν λέξεων ἕνεκεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφέρωνται· εἴπερ οὐκ ἐν ὀνόμασιν ἡμῖν, φησὶν ὁ μέγας ἐν θεολογίᾳ Γρηγόριος, ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἀλλ' ἐν πράγμασιν.

Two things we must see at the very outset. First, while Pyrrhus has conceded that the wills in Christ are *natural*, he has *not* conceded that there are *two of them*. He still believes that there is but one will in Christ. Second, he takes as his point of departure the tried and true Paleo-Chalcedonian formulae of "one synthetic nature" and "from two natures." He does not mention Chalcedon's "in two natures," nor does he acknowledge the Neo-Chalcedonian "in and from two natures." Pyrrhus' Paleo-Chalcedonian pedigree stands out clearly.

With reference to the move from "one synthetic nature" to "one synthetic will," we recall that Lebon points out with reference to the Monophysites, that since it is possible to speak of μία φύσις (ὑπόστασις) σεσαρκωμένη, σύνθετος, and θεανδρική, it follows that it is also possible to speak of μία ἐνέργεια σεσαρκωμένη, σύνθετος, and θεανδρική.[43] This movement obtained in Monenergism. Now we see that ἓν θέλημα σεσαρκωμένον, σύνθετον, and θεανδρικόν is the next logical and consistent step.

And finally, the eirenic plea, "Let them no longer quibble with each other over mere terminology," is a conciliatory one that hearkens back to the *Psephos*, which tried to paper over real Christological disagreements with the plea to avoid inflammatory language. Pyrrhus wants Maximus to believe that there is no substantial difference between the Monothelite and the Dyothelite positions beyond an emphasis on one or another Christological truth.

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[43]Lebon, "Christologie," 556.

Maximus, however, disagrees with this attitude. At the beginning of
the first *Opuscule*, he prefaces his analysis of the various stages of
willing with this remark:

> I have made a concise account of each of these [stages], but
> only an abbreviated one, after the manner of a chain, and not
> indulging in my own words (for how [could] he who is poor in
> these things [dare to write of them?]), but I have gathered up
> the [work] of others who have labored over these things, that
> we might know that they differ from each other; and I say
> [they differ] in name and in reality.[44]

So for Maximus (as well as for the present author), the issues involved
in Monotheletism are not simply verbal, but real.

In response to Pyrrhus' overtures and his proffered "one synthetic
will," Maximus gives a lengthy answer which we will divide into four
parts for analysis. First, Maximus points out that "synthesis" is
properly ascribed to hypostasis, not to nature:

> Observe that you are deluded in this. You are altogether
> ignorant that the syntheses of things are in the hypostasis, and
> are not conceived of either in another [nature] or in the
> particular logos [of each constitutent nature]. And this is the
> common understanding of everyone, both of the pagan philoso-
> phers, and of the divinely-wise Mystagogues of the Church.[45]

If there were to be a synthetic nature, or a synthesis of anything
natural, it would mean that the synthesis would have to be thought of
either in another nature (the *tertium quid* we have already seen) or in

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[44] *TP* 1 (PG 91.12B13-C3): Ἑκάστου δὲ τούτων καθ' εἱρμὸν τὴν γραφὴν
ποιήσομαι σύντομον, καὶ οἷον ὁριστικήν· οὐκ ἐμοὺς ἐγχαράττων λόγους· πῶς γάρ, ὁ
τούτων πενόμενος, ἀλλὰ τοὺς περὶ τούτων ἄλλοις πονηθέντας ἐρανισάμενος, ἵνα
γνῶμεν ὡς ἀμφοῖν διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ταῦτα· λέγω δὲ κλήσει καὶ πράγατι.

[45] *Pyrr* §27 (PG 91.296B7-12): Ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐκ τούτου πλανᾶσθε, ἐκ τοῦ πάντη
ἀγνοῆσαι ὅτι αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει ὄντων, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐν ἑτέρῳ, καὶ
οὐκ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θεωρουμένων, εἰσί. Καὶ τοῦτο κοινὸν φρόνημα πάντων, καὶ τῶν ἔξω
πιλοσόφων, καὶ τῶν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας θεοσόφων μυσταγωγῶν.

the logos of each of the constitutive natures (which would result in the corruption and alteration of each nature itself). Neither of these two alternatives is acceptable. Synthesis, therefore, pertains, not to nature, but to hypostasis.

Second, if Pyrrhus wants to have a synthetic will, he cannot have *only* a synthetic will:

> If you say [there is] a synthesis of the wills, you will also be forced to say [that there is] a synthesis of all the other natural [faculties, as well]. Indeed, if you want the teaching of your doctrine to hang together well, you [must] show [that there is a synthesis] of the created and the uncreated, the infinite and the finite, the boundless and the circumscribed, the mortal and the immortal, the corruptible and the incorruptible. Thus you are carried away into an absurd opinion.[46]

If one faculty of nature is to be synthetic, then all the faculties of nature must be synthetic as well. And in addition to this, with regard to Christ, a synthesis of the two natures in Christ means that there must be a synthetic "christic" nature which is simultaneously created and uncreated, finite and infinite, and all the other attributes which characterize divinity and humanity. Chalcedon had forbidden the confusion and mixture of the two natures in Christ, yet here we see Pyrrhus advocating it. Elsewhere in the *Disputation* Pyrrhus acknowledges the duality of Christ's natures;[47] at the present time, however, Pyrrhus has wandered out onto very shaky ground.

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[46]Ibid. (PG 91.296B12-C4): Εἰ δὲ τῶν θελημάτων σύνθεσιν λέγετε, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φυσικῶν τὴν σύνθεσιν λέγειν ἐκβιασθήσεσθε· εἴπερ εὐσυνάρτητον τὸν τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος λόγον δεῖξαι βούλεσθε, τουτέστι, τοῦ κτιστοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀκτίστου, τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ τοῦ πεπερασμένου, τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ τοῦ ὡρισμένου, τοῦ θνητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, τοῦ φθαρτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, καὶ εἰς ἀτόπους ἐξενεχθήσεσθε ὑπολήψεις.

[47]*Pyrr* §154 (175) (PG 91.340B2-3).

The correct relationship between all of these characteristics of divinity and humanity is to ascribe them to their respective natures, which are then hypostasized together in the one hypostasis. For as Maximus says, it is hypostasis and not nature which becomes synthetic.

In the third place, Maximus turns directly to the "from two natures" statement that Pyrrhus makes and says,

> What will a will [that is produced] "from two wills" be called? For it is not possible to call a synthetic thing by the designation of its component parts. Indeed, long ago, to call a nature by what is "from [two] natures" was heretical.[48]

To hold to the "from two natures" formula without the corrective of the "in two natures" formula is to risk Monophysitism. Perhaps Maximus has in mind here the eighth Anathema of II Constantinople in 553, which says,

> If anyone confesses that a union has been made "from two natures," divinity and humanity, or speaks about "one incarnate nature of God the Word," but does not understand these things as the Fathers have taught, namely that from the divine and human natures a union was made according to hypostasis, and that one Christ was formed, and from these expressions tries to introduce one nature or essence made of the Godhead and the human flesh of Christ: let him be anathema.[49]

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[48]*Pyrr* §27 (PG 91.296C5-9): Πῶς δὲ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θελημάτων, θέλημα προσαγορευθήσεται; Οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν τὸ σύνθετον τῇ τῶν συντεθειμένων ὀνομάζεσθαι προσηγορίᾳ. Ἢ οὕτω γε καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν φύσεων, φύσις, κατὰ τοὺς πάλαι αἱρετικοὺς προσαγορευθέσεται.

[49]Tanner, 117: Εἴ τις ἐκ δύο φύσεων, θεότητος καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος ὁμολογῶν τὴν ἕνωσιν γεγενῆσθαι, ἢ μίαν φύσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου σεσαρκωμένην λέγων, μὴ οὕτως αὐτὰ λαμβάνῃ, καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ἅγιοι πατέρες ἐδίδαξαν, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς θείας φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τῆς ἑνώσεως καθ' ὑπόστασιν γενομένης, εἷς Χριστὸς ἀπετελέσθη· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων φωνῶν μίαν φύσιν, ἤτοι οὐσίαν, θεότητος καὶ σαρκὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰσάγειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.

Again, it is astonishing that Pyrrhus should lay himself open to such a charge. It is patently obvious that Pyrrhus' Monothelite Christology has slipped away from the moorings of orthodoxy.

And fourth, Maximus says, "Moreover, you divide him in will from the Father, for a synthetic will characterizes only a synthetic nature."[50] Since the Father does not have a synthetic nature, he will be different in nature from the Son and no longer *homoousios*.

In *Opuscule* 24, Maximus uses the same argument against those who call the one will in Christ "theandric." He says,

> If, therefore, the divine will is said to be divine, and the human will is said to be human, to what will the theandric will [be ascribed]? I cannot say, since the Father and the Holy Spirit do not have a theandric will. But [do you dare] to say "synthetic [will]" with boldness? Then, similarly, this [synthetic will] will be common to the Godhead as well. But do you say it is natural? Then you [introduce] Severus' confusion, for two natures or natural wills cannot become one nature or one natural will without confusion. [Do you say, then, that it is] hypostatic? Then, again, the Son will be estranged from the Father, and you introduce three wills that will never come together, jut as the hypostases [will not].[51]

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[50]*Pyrr* §27 (PG 91.296C9-12): Προσεπιτούτοις δὲ καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν θελήμασι τοῦ Πατρὸς χωρίζετε, συνθέτῳ θελήματι σύνθετον καὶ μόνην χαρακτηρίσαντες φύσιν.

[51]*TP* 24 (PG 91.269A1-14): Ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐπειδὴ τὸ θεῖον θέλημα, θεῖον λέγεται, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα, ἀνθρώπινον λέγεται, θεανδρικὸν θέλημα εἴποις τὸν Χριστὸν ἔχειν; οὐ νομίζω. Ἐπειδὴ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα θεανδρικὸν οὐκ ἔχει θέλημα. Ἀλλ' ἄρα σύνθετον τολμήσῃς εἰπεῖν; Ὁμοίως πάλιν καινὸν τῇ Θεότητι τοῦτο. Ἀλλ' ἄρα φυσικὸν εἴπῃς; συγχύσεις καὶ σὺ κατὰ Σευῆρον· δύο γὰρ φύσεις ἢ φυσικὰ θελήματα, μία φύσις, ἢ ἐν φυσικὸν θέλημα γενέσθαι ἄνευ συγχύσεως ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλ' ὑποστατικόν; καὶ πάλιν ἀλλοτριώσεις τὸν Υἱὸν τοῦ Πατρός, καὶ τρεῖς θελήσεις εἰσάγων φανῇσῃ μὴ συμβαινούσας ἀλλήλαις, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ὑποστάσεις.

Maximus also addresses the issue of synthetic will in *TP* 1 (PG 91.25C-28A), 3 (53C), 7 (76A), 8 (92D), and 9 (113A). Incidentally, recall that the Arians used dissimilarity of will between the Father and the Son (e.g., "I come not to do My own will, but the will of him who sent Me") to prove that they were dissimilar in essence.

Here we have a little more to work with. A theandric (or synthetic) will is proper to a theandric nature. Since neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit is theandric in nature, neither can have a theandric will, and the Son will be of a different nature than the Father and the Spirit. If, however, the theandric will is said to be hypostatic, another problem ensues, for all wills must then be said to be hypostatic, and there will be three wills in the Trinity.

6. The confusion of nature and hypostasis

At this point we arrive at what the present author believes to be the central issue underlying the whole *Disputation*, all of Monenergism and Monotheletism, and even their antecedents among the Paleo-Chalcedonian Christologies. That it should appear in the course of the *Disputation* is not surprising. On the model of the "one synthetic nature" and "from two natures," Pyrrhus has just tried to advance the notion of "one synthetic will" also "from two wills." The Confessor refuted him utterly. Pyrrhus now asks, "There is nothing, then, that the natures and their natural [properties] have in common?"[52] One can almost hear the confusion in his voice.

What is he asking? He is asking for a common nature (or an hypostasis conceived of as a nature) to ground the properties of both the divine and the human in Christ. He does not recognize the

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[52] *Pyrr* §28 (PG 91.296C13-14): Οὐδὲν οὖν, καθάπερ αἱ φύσεις, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν φυσικὰ εἶχε κοινόν;

distinction between the hypostasis and the natures in Christ that

Maximus recognizes.

Maximus' response is equally illuminating. Pyrrhus asked, "There is

nothing, then, that the natures and their natural [properties] have in

common?" Maximus responds,

> Nothing, except the hypostasis of the same natures. For just as
> he was the hypostasis [of the same natures without confusion],
> so was he [the hypostasis] of the same natural [properties]
> without confusion.[53]

This answer shows that our assessment of Pyrrhus' question is correct.

Pyrrhus wanted something *natural* to be the common ground of the

properties of each nature; Maximus indicates that there is nothing that

the two natures in Christ--or their respective properties--have in

common. Nothing, that is, except the common hypostasis. And the unity

of Christ, grounded as it is in the hypostasis, does not lead to a

confusion either of natures or of natural properties, because, as we

know, the properties of each nature are grounded in their respective

natures (not in the common hypostasis), and the only thing the natures

have in common is the hypostasis. Pyrrhus' question, presupposing

"one synthetic nature from two natures" and "one synthetic will from

two wills," is far from the Orthodox "one synthetic *hypostasis from* two

natures and *in* two natures" that is the basis for Maximus' response.

As we may expect, Pyrrhus does not care for Maximus' answer and

offers a rebuttal:

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[53]*Pyrr* §29 (PG 91.296D1-3): Οὐδέν, ἢ μόνην τὴν τῶν αὐτῶν φύσεως
ὑπόστασιν. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ὑπόστασις ἦν ὁ αὐτὸς ἀσυγχύτως τῶν αὐτῶν φυσικῶν.

What, then? Do the Fathers, whose words are established as the law and rule of the Church, not say that both the glory and the insult are *common*? "For," they say, "that by which the glory is common is one thing, and that by which the insult [is common] is another."[54]

Again, Pyrrhus is supposing, and arguing for the case, that all of the attributes of each nature are to be ascribed to what is common, which in his mind is a synthetic nature/hypostasis. In short, it is the same argument we have seen from the beginning: will is being ascribed to hypostasis.

Astonishingly, it is a passage from the *Tome* of Leo that Pyrrhus quotes. The Pope had indeed said, "Although in the one Lord Jesus Christ there is one person of God and man, that by which the insult is common to both is one thing, and that by which glory is common [to both] is another."[55] Now it is obvious that Leo is discussing the two natures in Christ, distinguishing the human nature, from which proceeds insult, and the divine nature, from which proceeds glory. Both the divine and the human characteristics accrue to the one hypostasis so that it is possible to say that the one Lord Jesus Christ is immortal and mortal, divine and human, and so forth. In short, this is the

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[54] *Pyrr* §30 (PG 911.296D4-8): Τί οὖν, οἱ Πατέρες, ὧν οἱ λόγοι νόμος καὶ κανὼν Ἐκκλησίας καθέστηκε, καὶ τὴν δόξαν, καὶ τὴν ὕβριν οὐκ εἶπον κοινήν; Ἕτερον γάρ, φησιν, ἐκεῖνο, ἐξ οὗ τῆς δόξης κοινόν· καὶ ἕτερον, ἐξ οὗ τὸ τῆς ὕβρεως.

[55] *Tome* vv. 122-23 (*Concilium Oecumenicorum Decreta*, 80): Quamvis enim in Domino Iesu Christo Dei et hominis una persona sit, aliud tamen est unde in utroque communis est contumelia, aliud unde communis est gloria.

communicatio idiomatum, which, as the Pope says, is a *communicatio* of

natural properties.

But Pyrrhus does not see it this way; otherwise, he would not have

cited this passage in support of his Monotheletism. Pyrrhus seizes upon

the word "common." Not only must both the divine and human proper-

ties *accrue* to the common hypostasis, but the common hypostasis must

also *ground* the properties. A common, synthetic nature/hypostasis must

have a common set of synthetic properties, including a common,

synthetic will.

To Pyrrhus' attempt to misconstrue an orthodox document, Maximus

says,

> The holy Fathers said this [with regard to] the mode of the
> exchange [of attributes]. As it was made clear beforehand, the
> exchange is not of one, but of two—and unequal—things. In
> the exchange, the natural [properties] of Christ accrue to each
> part by means of the ineffable union produced from each [of
> the parts] without either of the parts changing into or being
> confused with the other in natural logos. If, therefore, you say
> that the will is common in the mode of the exchange [of
> attributes], then you will be saying that the wills are not one,
> but two. And thus your cunning has brought you around again
> to [the confession of two wills], from which you hastened to
> flee.[56]

Pyrrhus is not going to be allowed to take this passage out of context.

The *communicatio idiomatum* supports what Maximus says, instead. The

exchange is, first of all, *modal.* That is, it does not concern the logos

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[56]*Pyrr* §31 (PG 91.296D9-97A6): Τῷ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως τρόπῳ τοῦτο ἁγίοις
εἴρηται Πατράσι. Πρόδηλον δὲ ὡς ἡ ἀντίδοσις ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ δύο, καὶ
ἀνίσων· κατ' ἐπαλλαγὴν, τὰ φυσικῶς ἑκατέρῳ μέρει τοῦ Χριστοῦ προσόντα, κατὰ τὴν
ἄρρητον ἕνωσιν θατέρων πεποιημένων χωρὶς τῆς θατέρου μέρους πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον κατὰ
τὸν φυσικὸν λόγον μεταβολῆς καὶ συμφύρσεως. Εἰ οὖν τῷ τῆς ἀντιδόσεως τρόπῳ
κοινὸν λέγεις τὸ θέλημα, οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλὰ δύο λέξεις τὰ θελήματα· καὶ περιετράπη σοι
πάλιν τὸ σοφὸν εἰς ἐκεῖνο, ἐξ οὗ φυγεῖν ἐσπούδασας.

of nature. Nature remains immutable in logos, but its mode is capable of alteration. In this case, it is modally able to take on the properties of another nature. The exchange by mode is made possible through the hypostatic union, in which one hypostasis becomes the common hypostasis of two natures by an enhypostasization of the second nature. In virtue of the hypostatic union, each nature *is* what the other nature *has*, each nature thoroughly interpenetrates with the other, and both natures together form an unconfused hypostatic identity. This is the basis for a true *communicatio idiomatum*; with such an understanding one can say things like, "God suffered in the flesh," and "The Son of Man came down from heaven," and confuse nothing.

It is particularly helpful at this point to recall the whole and parts metaphor illustrated in Chapter II.[57] There we saw that, in the relationship of part to part, each part wholly penetrated the whole and was wholly penetrated by the whole, and that each part wholly penetrated the other part and was wholly penetrated by it. The logos of each part remains inviolable, so that each part remains what it is, but all the same, it is wholly and thoroughly penetrated by the other part, and *vice versa*, without confusion, so much so, that it is proper to speak of an identity of the parts in the whole. This is the kind of relationship of parts to each other that Maximus has in mind when he says,

> In the exchange, the natural [properties] of Christ accrue to each part by means of the ineffable union produced from each

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[57]See p. 78, 196 above.

> [of the parts] without either of the parts changing into or
> being confused with the other in logos of nature.

By Maximus' estimation, Pyrrhus' notion of the exchange involves precisely the synthesizing of a new whole from two parts that does in fact change and confuse the two parts. Again, the competing points of view, of Maximus and Pyrrhus, stand out in bold relief.

7. The human will is moved by the divine will

Pyrrhus continues to deny the duality of wills in Christ. At this point, however, he undertakes a different line of attack which does not flow from the preceding arguments directly. He says, "What, then? Was not the flesh moved by the command of the Word united with it?"[58] This is a clear reference to both the *Psephos* and the *Ekthesis*, which contained the statement that

> . . . never does the noetically ensouled flesh of the Lord
> accomplish its natural motion by its own impulse contrary to the
> command of God the Word hypostatically united with it, but only
> when, and as, and how God the Word wills.[59]

If we read this statement carefully, we see that, not only does the natural human motion never move by its own impulse *contrary* to the command of the Word, but also that the impulse of the human will never moves *at all*, except that the divine will wills it to move. The human will of Christ is the *effect* of the divine will. That is to say, the Logos, by his divine will, wills that there be an impulse of the human will.

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[58]*Pyrr* §32 (PG 91.297A9-10): Τί οὖν;   Οὐ νεύματι τοῦ ἑνωθέντος αὐτῇ Λόγου ἡ σάρξ ἐκινεῖτο;

[59]See Chapter I.C.4.b, p. 63 above.

This is what Pyrrhus is advocating. It is an instrumental notion of the human will of Christ.

Maximus answers Pyrrhus vehemently:

You divide Christ by talking so! For Moses was moved by his will, [as was] David, and all those who became receptive to the divine operation by the suspension of human and fleshly properties. But we, following the holy Fathers in this as in all things, say that the God of all became man without change, and not only did the same will appropriately as God in his divinity, but also as man did the same will appropriately in his humanity. For if the beings which came to be out of non-being have the power to cling to being and not to non-being, [and if] it is proper to these [beings] by nature [to have] the impulse for self-preservation and the repulse for self-corruption, then the super-essential Logos, who has become essence humanly, also has the power of the same humanity to cling to being. Willing the impulse and the repulse he showed by operation: the impulse, in the use of the natural and blameless [human properties], so far as not to be recognized as God by the faithless; the repulse, at the time of the Passion, [when] he voluntarily drew back in the face of death. Therefore, what absurdities does the Church of God [preach] if she confesses along with his human and created nature, the logoi that are placed within [that nature] by him at creation, apart from which it is impossible to be that nature?[60]

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[60]*Pyrr* §33 (PG 91.297A11-C6): Διαιρεῖς τὸ Χριστόν, οὕτω λέγων. Νεύματι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐκινεῖτο καὶ Μωϋσῆς, καὶ Δαβίδ, καὶ ὅσοι τῆς θείας ἐνεργείας χωρητικοί, τῇ ἀποθέσει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ σαρκικῶν ἰδιωμάτων γεγόνασιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῖς ἁγίοις Πατράσιν, ὡς ἐν ἅπασι, κἂν τούτῳ ἐπόμενοι, φαμὲν, ὅτιπερ αὐτὸς ὁ τῶν ὅλων Θεός, ἀτρέπτως γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος, οὐ μόνον ὡς Θεὸς ὁ αὐτὸς καταλλήλως τῇ αὐτοῦ θεότητι ἤθελεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ αὐτὸς καταλλήλως τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπότητι. Εἰ γὰρ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὰ ὄντα γενόμενα, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, οὐ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἔχουσι ἀνθεκτικὴν δύναμιν· ταύτης δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἴδιον ἡ πρὸς τὰ συστατικὰ ὁρμὴ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ φθαρτικὰ ἀφορμή· ἄρα καὶ ὁ ὑπερούσιος Λόγος, ἀνθρωπικῶς οὐσιωθείς, ἔσχε καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀνθρωπότητος τὴν ἀνθεκτικὴν δύναμιν· ἧς τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ ἀφορμὴν θέλων δι' ἐνεργείας ἔδειξε· τὴν μὲν ὁρμὴν ἐν τῷ τοῖς φυσικοῖς καὶ ἀδιαβλήτοις τοσοῦτον χρήσασθαι, ὡς καὶ μὴ Θεὸν τοῖς ἀποίστοις νομίζεσθαι· τὴν δὲ ἀφορμὴν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τοῦ πάθους, ἑκουσίως τὴν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον συστολὴν ποιήσασθαι. Τί οὖν τῶν ἀτόπων ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ πέπραχεν Ἐκκλησία, μετὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης αὐτοῦ καὶ κτιστῆς φύσεως, καὶ τοὺς δημιουργικῶς αὐτῇ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐντεθέντας ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνελλιπῶς ὁμολογοῦσα λόγους, ὧν καὶ ἄνευ εἶναι τὴν φύσιν ἀδύνατον;

The first and most patent result of Pyrrhus' statement is that he divides Christ. The relationship between the divine will and the human will of Christ, according to Pyrrhus' scheme, is one of external influence: Christ does not work *through* the humanity as much as he works *on* it. This, as Maximus goes on to say, is exactly the kind of influence that obtained between God and the prophets and Saints: by giving room for God to work in their lives, by means of the presence of grace, they were able to accomplish things above the abilities of human nature (e.g., prophecy, miracles, and the like). To put forth such an understanding of the relationship of the two naturse in Christ is to confess a grossly inadequate Christology.

The correct and orthodox teaching, as expounded by the holy Fathers, is that Christ willed divinely in his divinity and humanly in his humanity. In short, willing is a function of nature, for every creature, coming as it does from non-being into being, has a power, inherent in its nature, that tends always towards its preservation in being and resists its corruption into non-being. By way of elaborating what the Confessor is saying here, we may recall the definition of natural will given in *Opuscule* 1, which we quoted in section B.1 (p. 196) above:

> It is said that the natural will, i.e. the faculty of will, is an appetitive power of being according to nature which maintains all the essential attributes and properties of nature. For by this [natural will], the essence is naturally compelled and desires the being, life, and motion [proper to it] by sense and intellect: its own natural and full being. Being voluntary in itself, and the sustainer of all that is comprised by it, the nature is established, continuing in the logos of its being, according to which it becomes appetitive.

This is exactly the same teaching that Maximus is putting forth here in the *Disputation*. Christ exhibits both the accepting and the resisting aspect of the same natural will proper to his humanity. The accepting aspect was manifest in all of the blameless, natural properties which he exercised as a bearer of a complete human nature. This fully-exercised humanity was real, and the faithless saw not God, but only a man, Jesus of Nazareth. By way of example we could cite his hunger and thirst, his need for sleep, and his death on the Cross. The resisting aspect was manifest at the time of his Passion, in the Garden of Gethsemane, when he said, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from Me." If Pyrrus is to be believed, then, in Gethsemane, the divine Word willed that his human will reject the cup. Maximus maintains, on the other hand, that the rejection of the cup is in fact the natural response of Christ's human nature in the face of imminent death, since every created nature inherently desires its own preservation and resists destruction.

Thus, there is nothing absurd in professing that the human nature of Christ has all of its inherent, component parts without which it could not properly be called a human nature.

Pyrrhus' subsequent objection gives Maximus an opportunity to explain himself in more detail. Pyrrhus says, "If fear is natural to us, and it is something reprehensible, then according to you, reprehensible things, like sin, will be natural to us."[61] To this, Maximus responds,

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[61]*Pyrr* §34 (PG 91.297C9-11): Εἰ φυσικῶς ἡμῖν πρόσεστιν ἡ δειλία, τῶν διαβεβλημένων δὲ αὕτη, ἄρα καθ' ἡμᾶς φυσικῶς ἡμῖν ἔγκειται τὰ διαβεβλημένα, ἤγουν ἡ ἁμαρτία.

Again you reason falsehood and not the truth by equivocation. For there is both a fear that is according to nature and a fear that is contrary to nature. The natural fear is the power of beings to cling [to being] by drawing back [from non-being]. [The fear which is] contrary to nature is an irrational drawing back. Therefore, the Lord was completely free of that [fear] that is contrary to nature, inasmuch as it [stems] from a betrayal of what is natural. But the natural [fear], indicative of the power that [sustains] being, subsisting in the nature, he demonstrated, willing [it] for our sake, since [it is] good. For the natural [aspects] of the faculty of will are not brought forth in the Lord as they are in us. Even as he truly hungered and thirsted, he did not do so in the mode which is proper to us, for he did so voluntarily. Thus, he truly was afraid, but not as we are; rather, in a manner surpassing us was he afraid. And to speak generally, everything that is natural in Christ has a mode above nature conjoined to the same logos [of nature], so that the nature might be believed through the logos, and the Economy [might be believed] through the mode.[62]

Maximus distinguishes natural from unnatural fear. Natural fear is, again, the inherent power of a nature which preserves it in being and resists non-being. Unnatural fear is simply irrational dread.[63] Thus, while Christ exhibited no irrational fear, he certainly exhibited natural

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[62]*Pyrr* §35 (PG 91.297C13-300A4): Πάλιν ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας ἑαυτόν, οὐ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παραλογίζῃ. Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν δειλία· καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν δειλία ἐστί, δύναμις κατὰ συστολὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἀνθεκτική· παρὰ φύσιν δὲ, παράλογος συστολή. Τὴν οὖν παρὰ φύσιν ὁ Κύριος, ἅτε δι' ἐκ προδοσίας οὖσαν λογισμῶν, ὅλως οὐ προσήκατο· τὴν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης τῇ φύσει ἀντιποιητικῆς τοῦ εἶναι δυνάμεως ἐνδεικτικήν, θέλων δι' ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἀγαθός, ἐδέξατο. Οὐ γὰρ προσηγεῖται ἐν τῷ Κυρίῳ καθάπερ ἐν ἡμῖν, τῆς θελήσεως τὰ φυσικά· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πεινάσας ἀληθῶς, καὶ διψήσας, οὐ τρόπῳ τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐπείνασεν καὶ ἐδίψησεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς· ἑκουσίως γάρ· οὕτω καὶ δειλιάσας ἀληθῶς, οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἐδειλίασε. Καὶ καθόλου φάναι, πᾶν φυσικὸν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ, συνημμένον ἔχει τῷ κατ' αὐτὸ λόγῳ καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ φύσιν τρόπον· ἵνα καὶ ἡ φύσις διὰ τοῦ λόγου πιστωθῇ, καὶ ἡ οἰκονομία διὰ τοῦ τρόπου.

[63]This irrational dread is related to natural fear as the abusive mode of willing is related to the natural will. Both irrational dread and abuse of will are hypostatic, and both are proper to gnome.

fear, for it is constitutive of the human nature he assumed, and since this fear is *natural*, it is good.

Moreover, Maximus goes on to distinguish the way the natural aspects of willing are exercised in Christ and in us. The difference between Christ and us that needs to be seen is that he is a divine hypostasis, while we are human hypostases. Both Christ and we hunger and thirst, but Christ's hunger and thirst are *voluntary*, while ours is not. Because the Logos assumed human nature voluntarily, everything that Christ does in the economy is properly said to be voluntary. In our case, our human nature is hypostasized in a human hypostasis not voluntarily, but by necessity. Thus, we cannot say that our hunger and thirst is voluntary, for indeed, in our case, it is not.

The rubric under which Maximus subscribes this teaching is, of course, that of the logos-tropos distinction. The logos of human nature remains unchanged, while the mode is formed in a manner above nature. That is to say, the human nature of Christ exists *divinely*, just as the divine nature of Christ exists humanly. And it is by means of the unalterable and persistent logos of human nature that the full humanity of Christ is maintained and affirmed, while the mode of the human nature's existence in a divine hypostasis proclaims the reality of the Incarnation of the Word.

8. Human will is appropriated

At this point in the course of the *Disputation*, Pyrrhus seems to have run out of arguments to advance the Monothelite position. He thus tries to retreat into a position of relative safety:

> In order that we might avoid these subtle things which seem insoluble to many, let us flee from this technical jargon and [simply] confess that the same is perfect God and perfect man, and decline [from speaking] about all the rest, since, by [saying] "perfect" one indicates all the natural [properties].[64]

Maximus remonstrates that if Pyrrhus maintains his opinions, even behind cloudy and eirenic postures, he is anathematized by the Councils and the Fathers, who clearly taught a Dyothelite Christology.[65]

Pyrrhus tries again, this time conceding the teaching of the Councils:

> If it is not possible to use the very terms spoken [by the Fathers] because of the insolence of the heretics, let us be satisfied with only the definitions of the Councils, and speak neither of one nor of two wills.[66]

It will be the *Typos* of the Emperor Constans that will ultimately take this position and forbid all discussion of one or two operations, and of one or two wills. Pyrrhus here has prescinded even from the *Ekthesis*, which forbade discussion of one or two operations, but, as we recall,

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[64] *Pyrr* §36 (PG 91.300A7-11): Οὐκοῦν ἵνα λεπτὴν ταύτην, καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δύσληπτον τεχνολογίαν ἐκφύγωμεν, Θεὸν τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἄνθρωπον τέλειον ὁμολογήσωμεν, τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἐκκλόνοντες, ὡς τοῦ τελείου τὰ φυσικὰ παρ' ἑαυτῷ συνεμφαίνοντος.

The phrase "perfect God and perfect man" is an obvious reference to the Chalcedonian definition.

[65] *Pyrr* §37 (PG 91.300A12-B14).

[66] *Pyrr* §38 (PG 91.300C1-4): Εἰ οὐ δυνατόν ἐστι τὰ φωνὰς ταύτας λέγεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν αἱρετιζόντων ἐπήρειαν, ἀρκεσθῶμεν κἂν μόνοις τοῖς συνοδικῶς εἰρημένοις· καὶ μήτε ἓν, μήτε δύο εἴπωμεν τὰ θελήματα.

positively taught one will. Again, Maximus answers that (a) if the writings of the Fathers are not upheld, one could not say "one incarnate nature of God the Word," since it was never adopted by any council; (b) even the Councils themselves teach that the properties of each nature are to be ascribed to their own natures; and (c) the Fifth Council decreed that certain approved Fathers and their correct teachings be accepted by the Church, among which are clear statements of the doctrine of two wills.[67]

There follows a series of brief exchanges in which Pyrrhus accuses Maximus of confusing several different senses of "natural will," and the Confessor defends himself with an appeal to Diadochus of Photike, who defined will as "self-determination" or "freedom".[68] Pyrrhus then acknowledges that the two wills in Christ are natural, but offers this next Monothelite principle, that the human will of Christ is only appropriated by him.

> I am already persuaded by the foregoing [discussion] that the wills in Christ are natural, and I seek no further proof concerning the matter. Not only has it been declared by the divinely-gifted [Fathers], but the very nature of things confesses the teaching that the same was a willer appropriately in [both of] his natures, willing as God and obeying as man, for clearly the natural wills correspond to the natures. The uncreated [will belongs to] the uncreated [nature], and to the created [nature belongs] the created [will]. [And I am persuaded] that it is impossible for [both wills] ever to be digested into one will, even though they are of the same

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[67]*Pyrr* §39 (PG 91.300C5-01A2).

[68]*Pyrr* §40-55 (PG 91.301A4-C12). The passage referred to is the fifth of "One Hundred Texts on Spiritual Knowledge and Discrimination," found in the *Philokalia*, I:254, which begins, "Free will is the power of a deiform soul to direct itself by deliberate choice toward whatever it decides."

[person], for [they are], like the natures, unoriginate and
originate, uncreated and created, maker and made, infinite and
finite, deifying and deified. But there are yet some in
Byzantium who are opposed to the natural wills, and who say
the Fathers taught that the Lord had the human will by
appropriation.[69]

Maximus shows himself to be well-informed on this matter as in all the
others. The reason there are "some in Byzantium who are opposed to
the natural wills" and only attribute a human will to Christ is that
Pyrrhus taught them so!

Maximus begins his attack on this Monothelite principle by
acknowledging its teacher and then proceeds to show the absurdity of
it.

Since you yourself are the head of such a wonderful and
brilliant school, what kind of appropriation do you mean? An
essential one, by which each [nature] has the [properties]
naturally present in it, appropriated because of the nature? Or
a relative one, by which we appropriate to ourselves in a
friendly way the [qualities] of others we like, neither enduring
nor effecting them ourselves?[70]

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[69]*Pyrr* §56 (PG 91.301D1-04A5): Ἐγὼ μὲν ἤδη ἐν τοῖς φθάσασι ἐπείσθην,
φυσικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ θελήματα· καὶ περὶ τούτου ἑτέραν οὐκ ἐπιζητῶ
ἀπόδειξιν. Οὐχ ἧττον γὰρ τῶν θεωδῶς ἐκπεφασμένων, αὐτὴν τῶν ὄντων τὴν φύσιν
ὁ λόγος μαρτυροῦσαν ἔδειξε, ὡς καταλλήλως ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεσιν ὁ αὐτὸς θέλων
ἦν, εὐδοκῶν μὲν ὡς Θεός, ὑπακούων δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὅτι κατάλληλα πάντως τὰ
φυσικὰ θελήματα ταῖς φύσεσιν. Ἄναρχον μὲν τῆς ἀνάρχου, καὶ τῆς ἠργμένης
ἠργμένον· καὶ ὅτι οὐ δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν θέλημά ποτε συμπεσεῖν ἀλλήλοις, κἂν ἑνὸς καὶ
τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ φύσεις, τὸ ἄναρχον καὶ τὸ ἠργμένον, τὸ ἄκτιστον
καὶ τὸ κτιστόν, τὸ ποιῆσαν καὶ τὸ ποιηθέν, τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον, τὸ
θεῶσαν καὶ τὸ θεωθέν. Οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ Βυζαντίῳ, ἔτι πρὸς τὰ φυσικὰ θελήματα
ἀντιστατοῦντες, κατ' οἰκείωσίν φασιν εἰρημέναι τοὺς Πατέρας ἔχειν τὸν Κύριον το
ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα.

[70]*Pyrr* §57 (PG 91.304A8-14): Ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς τῆς τοιαύτης αὐτῶν θαυμαστῆς
καὶ λαμπρᾶς καθηγήσω παιδεύσεως· κατὰ ποίαν οἰκείωσιν τοῦτό φασιν; Ἆρα τὴν
οὐσιώδη, καθ' ἣν τὰ φυσικῶς προσόντα ἕκαστος ἔχων, διὰ τὴν φύσιν οἰκειοῦται· ἢ
τὴν σχετικήν, καθ' ἣν φυλικῶς τὰ ἀλλήλων οἰκειούμεθα καὶ στέργομεν, μηδὲν τούτων
αὐτοὶ ἢ πάσχοντες, ἢ ἐνεργοῦντες;

Even by setting up the two available options in this way Maximus has

led Pyrrhus in the direction he wants to take him. Does Maximus expect

Pyrrhus to say that the appropriation is essential? Probably not, since

that would vindicate what the Confessor had been saying all along.

Hence Pyrrhus answers as expected, and that gives Maximus the oppor-

tunity to hammer down the fact that man has the faculty of will by

nature, which is a necessary premise for his argument.

> PYR: Of course I mean the relative kind.
>
> MAX: Accordingly, [since] this has already been proven to be absurd, would it not be more just to inquire more exactly whether man is volitional by nature or not? For having demonstrated this, the blasphemy of this heresy will become more clear.
>
> PYR: If you want, let us examine this.
>
> MAX: Not only those who have examined [human] nature by reason, and who have surpassed the many, but also the common sense of the vulgar, have said that natural things are not taught. If natural things are not taught, then we have a will without being taught it. Therefore, man is volitional by nature.
>
> And again, if man is rational by nature, then the rational faculty is by nature, and self-determination is by nature, for self-determination, according to the Fathers, is the faculty of will. Therefore, man is volitional by nature.
>
> And again, if nature [is the guide] in irrational beings, it is led in man authoritatively, being moved according to the faculty of will. Therefore, man is volitional by nature.
>
> And again, if man is made according to the image of the blessed and super-essential Divinity, and the divine nature is self-determined, then so also is man, being its image, self-determined by nature. And if he is self-determined by nature, then man is volitional by nature. For we have already seen that the Fathers define will as self-determination.
>
> Yet again, if will belongs to all men, it does not belong to some but not to others, and that which is conceived of as common in all [the members of a species] characterizes the nature of [all] the individual [members] of the same. Therefore, man is volitional by nature.[71]

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[71]*Pyrr* §§58-61 (PG 91.304B4-D5): ΠΥΡ. Τὴν σχετικὴν δηλονότι.

ΜΑΞ. Οὐκοῦν πρὶν τούτου δεῖξαι τὸ ἄτοπον, δικαιότερον ἂν εἴη ἀκριβέστερον ἐξετάσαι, εἴ τε φύσει θελητικός ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, εἴτε καὶ μή. Τούτου γὰρ

None of these demonstrations require any commentary as they are obvious. Pyrrhus, too, accepts them, and Maximus is then able to plunge into the heart of his critique of this principle.

PYR: It has been abundantly demonstrated that man is volitional by nature.

MAX: Since this has been manifestly demonstrated, let us examine, as we proposed to do previously, the absurdity of their proposition.

PYR: Let us examine it.

MAX: If man is volitional by nature, as proven, and they maintain that Christ had the human will appropriatively in a simple condition, then it is incumbent upon them, if [they want to be consistent] with their own principles, to rank [all] our other natural [properties] with the natural will and say they are simply appropriated [by Christ]. And the consideration and doctrine of the whole Economy will be found to be a fantasy. Furthermore, if the decree of Sergius anathematized not only those who say how [there are two wills], but also those who simply affirm two wills (even though they err, who say two wills, because they hold to the appropriation), then those who put forth the appropriation bring upon themselves the [same] anathema. And again, if, according to the proposition they maintain, persons are introduced with the wills, then those who say "two wills" (even though they err because of the appropriation, as we said) [must also affirm] the things introduced with them, according to the same proposition, [and] will say

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διεκνυμένου, σαφέστερον γενήσεται τῆς τοιαύτης αἱρέσεως τὸ βλάσφημον.

ΠΥΡ. Εἰ δοκεῖ, τοῦτο ἐξετάσωμεν.

ΜΑΞ. Ἀδδακτα εἶναι τὰ φυσικά, οὐ μόνον οἱ λόγῳ τὴν φύσιν διασκεψάμενοι, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν διαφέροντες ἔφασαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τῶν χυδαιότερον συνήθεια. Εἰ δὲ τὰ φυσικὰ ἀδίδακτα, ἀδίδακτον δὲ ἔχομεν τὸ θέλειν· οὐδεὶς γάρ ποτε θέλειν διδάσκεται· ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ φύσει λογικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος· τὸ δὲ φύσει λογικὸν καὶ φύσει αὐτεξούσιον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτεξούσιον, κατὰ τοὺς Πατέρας, θέλησίς ἐστιν· ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἄγει μὲν ἡ φύσις· ἄγεται δὲ ἐν τῶι ἀνρθώπῳ ἐξουσιαστικῶς κατὰ θέλησιν κινουμένῳ· ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ κατ' εἰκόνα τῆς μακαρίας καὶ ὑπερουσίου Θεότητος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεγένηται· αὐτεξούσιον δὲ φύσει ἡ θεία φύσις· ἄρα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς αὐτῆς ὄνως εἰκών, αὐτεξούσιος τυγχάνει φύσει· εἰ δὲ αὐτεξούσιος φύσει, θελητικὸς ἄρα φύσει ὁ ἄνθρωπος· εἴρηται γὰρ ἤδη, ὡς τὸ αὐτεξούσιον θέλησιν ὡρίσαντο οἱ Πατέρες. Ἔτι τε, εἰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐνυπάρχει τὸ θέλειν· καὶ οὐ τοῖς μὲν ἐνυπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει· τὸ δὲ κοινῶν πᾶσιν ἐνθεωρούμενον φύσιν χαρακτηρίζει ἐν τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸ ἀτόμοις· ἄρα φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

"[two] persons." And who is able to endure the sundering of the one person into two?[72]

Maximus advances three arguments against the notion that a human will is appropriated by Christ. First, if will is natural to man (as Maximus proved and Pyrrhus agreed), and it is merely appropriated by Christ, then all the other natural human properites must also be merely appropriated by Christ. The result is a thorough-going docetism, for no aspect of Christ's humanity will be really His; rather, all of his humanity will be attributed to him only.

Second, those who say Christ appropriated a human will actually teach a doctrine of two wills, albeit an erroneous one. Thus, the teachers of an appropriated human will in Christ fall under the anathema of the *Ekthesis*, which forbade anyone to affirm two wills.

And third, part of the Monothelite paradigm was the ascription of will to hypostasis, i.e. the foremost principle of Monotheletism. For a

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[72]*Pyrr* §62-65 (PG 91.304D8-05B3): ΠΥΡ. Δέδεικται διὰ πλειόνων φύσει θελητικὸς ὢν ἄνθρωπος.

ΜΑΞ. Τούτου οὖν περιφανῶς δειχθέντος, διασκεψώμεθα, ὡς ἀνωτέρω ὑπεθέμεθα, καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν προτάσεως τὸ ἄτοπον.

ΠΥΡ. Διασκεψώμεθα.

ΜΑΞ. Εἰ φύσει θελητικὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς δέδεικται, κατ' αὐτοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐν ψιλῇ σχέσει οἰκείωσιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον θέλημα εἶχεν ὁ Χριστός, ἀνάγκη αὐτοὺς, εἴπερ ταῖς οἰκείαις ἀρχαῖς στοιχοῦσι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἡμῖν φυσικὰ μετ' αὐτοῦ· φημὶ δὴ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν θελήματος· κατ' οἰκείωσιν ψιλὴν λέγειν· καὶ εὑρεθήσεται αὐτοῖς ἡ τῆς ὅλης οἰκονομίας θεωρία καὶ μύησις, κατὰ φαντασίαν λαμβανομένη. Ἔπειτα, εἰ ἡ ψῆφος Σεργίου, οὐ τοὺς πῶς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἁπλῶς δύο θελήματα εἰπόντας ἀνεθεμάτισε· λέγουσι δὲ οὗτοι δύο, κἂν εἰ ἐσφαλμένως, διὰ τὴν οἰκείωσιν· ἄρα οἱ ταύτης προϊστάμενοι, τῷ κατ' αὐτῶν συνηγοροῦσιν ἀναθέματι. Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ, κατὰ τὴν ὑπ' αὐτῶν διεκδικουμένην πρότασιν, τοῖς θελήμασι πρόσωπα συνεισάγονται· ἄρα δύο θελήματα λέγοντες, καὶ εἰ ἐσφαλμένως, διὰ τὴν οἰκείωσιν, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ σινεισαγόμενα αὐτοῖς, κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην πρότασιν, λέξουσι πρόσωπα. Καὶ τίς οἴσει τὴν εἰς δύο πρόσωπα τοῦ ἑνὸς κατατομήν;

Monothelite to say "two wills" implied that there were two willers, two persons who were willing. Yet those who teach the appropriated wills in Christ, by teaching two wills, must also teach two persons in Christ, which is, as Maximus says, unendurable.

Pyrrhus presses on, but he is already caught by this dilemma:

> PYR: What, then? Did not the Fathers say it was *our* will that Christ formed in himself?
> MAX: Yes, it was ours.
> PYR: Therefore, [will] does not refer to what is in him by nature through the humanity, but what he received by appropriation.
> MAX: Since [the Fathers] say he took upon himself our nature in the same way, then according to these [Monothelites], he will be found to have the same nature by a simple appropriation [also]. For if the former [proposition] is true, so is the latter; but if the latter is false, so is the former.[73]

Pyrrhus is exasperatingly stuck in the contradictions of his position, which is crumbling all around him. He doggedly maintains that will is hypostatic. Given this premise, it is logical to say that by assuming a human nature, Christ assumed no human will. And if Christ is to form *our* will in himself, he cannot do so but by appropriation, since *really* to assume it would mean that he would also have to assume our *hypostases* as well.

Maximus simply points out the incongruity of Pyrrhus' logic from the Dyothelite point of view. Christ assumed a human nature in the

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[73]*Pyrr* §§66-69 (PG 91.305B6-C3): ΠΥΡ. Τί οὖν οἱ Πατέρες; οὐχ ἡμέτερον εἶπον εἶναι, ὅπερ ὁ Χριστὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐτύπωσε θέλημα;

ΜΑΞ. Ναί, ἡμέτερον.

ΠΥΡ. Οὐκοῦν οὐ τὸ προσὸν αὐτῷ φύσει διὰ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου ἐσήμαναν; ἀλλ' ὅπερ κατ' οἰκείωσιν ἀνεδέξατο.

ΜΑΞ. Ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν ὡσαύτως ἀνειληφέναι αὐτὸν ἔφασαν, ἆρα κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν κατ' οἰκείωσιν ψιλὴν ἔχων εὑρεθήσεται. Εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἀληθές, καὶ τοῦτο· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ψευδές, κἀκεῖνο.

same way that he assumed a human natural will, i.e., really. So, if the will is said to be appropriated, then the whole human nature must be appropriated by him also. But if he really assumed human nature, then he really assumed a human will, too. The difference between the two sides of the debate once again stands out clearly.

Pyrrhus, however, continues to be astonished at what Maximus is saying:

> PYR: What?! When [the Fathers] said he formed *our* [will] in himself, they were referring to what is in him *by nature*?
> MAX: Yes.
> PYR: How can you say that?
> MAX: Because the same was whole God with his humanity, and the same was whole man with his divinity. The same, as man, in himself and through himself subjected his humanity to God the Father, giving to us the best type and pattern to imitate, in order that we also, looking toward him as the Author of our salvation, might voluntarily bring near to God what is ours [i.e. our will], apart from whom it [shall] no longer will except what he wills.[74]

Maximus' response is not all that straightforward, but it is loaded with implication. We may ask with Pyrrhus, how can he say that? Only by presupposing the Dyotheletism we have seen to be at work in all of his Christology does this response make sense.

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[74] *Pyrr* §70-73 (PG 91.305C5-D4): ΠΥΡ. Τί οὖν; τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐν ἑαυτῷ τυπῶσαι εἰπόντες, τὸ αὐτῶι φύσει προσὸν ἐσήμαναν;

MAΞ. Ναί.

ΠΥΡ. Πῶς τοῦτό φης;

MAΞ. Ἐπειδὴ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅλος ἦν Θεὸς μετὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, καὶ ὅλος ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος μετὰ τὴν θεότητος· αὐτός, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ὑπέταξε τῷ Θεῷ καὶ Πατρί, τύπον ἡμῖν ἑαυτὸν ἄριστον καὶ ὑπογραμμὸν διδοὺς πρὸς μίμησιν, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς ἀρχηγὸν τῆς ἡμῶν ἀφορῶντες σωτηρίας, τὸ ἡμέτερον ἐκουσίως προσχωρήσωμεν τῷ Θεῷ, ἐκ τοῦ μηκέτι θέλειν παρ' ὃ αὐτὸς θέλει.

The affirmation that Christ is "whole God in his humanity" and "whole man in his divinity" is an affirmation of the hypostatic union of two whole natures in the one hypostasis. "The same," of course, refers to the person of Christ, the hypostasis, who in his humanity subjected himself to God the Father. His submission is a model for all Christians, who should submit their wills to God in order that they might will nothing apart from what God wills. Such an act of submission on the part of Christ and on the part of man can be accomplished only if will is a faculty of nature and there is hypostatic control over nature. We know from the foregoing debate that will is natural; and we know that both the Word and man exercise hypostatic control over their natures, for the Confessor said so in *Pyrr* §61, quoted above: "if nature [is the guide] in irrational beings, it is led in man authoritatively, being moved according to the faculty of will." Pyrrhus' position lead to absurdity, for if Christ formed in himself our wills, and our wills are hypostatic, how are we able to will to follow Christ, or to reject him?

This is as far as the debate on the appropriated human will goes, at least in the *Disputation*. The discussion now turns to a particular qualification of the one will maintained by the Monothelites, which will be the last subject for our analysis in this chapter. However, before we turn to the principle that will is intentional, we must take account of *Opuscule* 19, which contains several arguments on appropriation not found in the *Disputation*.

We may begin again with Pyrrhus' statement that "there are some in Byzantium who say the Fathers taught that the Lord had the human will

by appropriation." Who are these in Byzantium who are teaching such a thing? Among them is surely Theodore, the Byzantine Deacon and Rhetor, the *Synodicarion* of Archbishop Paul of Constantinople, who acceded to the Patriarchal throne when Pyrrhus fled to Africa in 641. *Opuscule* 19 contains two "difficulties" by Theodore and the responses Maximus gives to them. The first difficulty is the one that concerns us, and it reads as follows:

> If the Fathers predicate ignorance to Christ [in the same way that] they predicate will [to him], then those who say the will in Christ must not be contemplated in him by appropriation must also say he is ignorant. And how can God not know what is to happen? But this makes him out to be a mere man, following the already condemned heresy of the Agnoetae. But if one shrinks back from such an absurdity and admits that his ignorance was by appropriation, just like his abandonment [by the Father] and his submission [to his parents], then one must say in like manner that his will [was appropriated]. The Fathers have ranked ignorance together with will, and by this [ranking] guard the rational principle [of both], as Athanasius says in his book against Arius, and Gregory the Theologian in his *First Discourse on the Son*, and others in other writings.[75]

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[75]*TP* 19 (PG 91.216B4-C4): Εἰ κατ' αὐτὸν τῷ θελήματι λόγον, καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν κατηγόρησαν οἱ Πατέρες ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ, ἀνάγκη τοὺς μὴ κατ' οἰκείωσιν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ θεωρεῖσθαι λέγοντας τὸ θέλημα, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὸν λέγειν. Καὶ πῶς Θεός, ὁ τὰ μέλλοντα μὴ εἰδώς; Ἀλλὰ καὶ ψιλὸν αὐτὸν εἰσάγειν ἄνθρωπον, κατὰ τὴν ἤδη τῶν Ἀγνοητῶν κατακριθεῖσαν αἵρεσιν. Εἰ δὲ τὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἀτοπίαν ὑποστελλόμενοι, τὴν ἄγνοιαν κατ' οἰκείωσιν λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὴν ἐγκατάλειψιν, καὶ τὴν ἀνυποταξίαν, κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον καὶ τὸ θέλημα λεγέτωσαν. Τῷ γὰρ θελήματι καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν οἱ Πατέρες συνέταξαν, τὸν αὐτὸν αὐτῇ φυλάξαντες λόγον· ὥς φησιν Ἀθανάσιος μὲν ἐν τῇ κατ' Ἀρειανῶν αὐτοῦ βίβλῳ, Γρηγόριος δὲ ὁ Θεολόγος, ἐν τῷ περὶ Υἱοῦ πρώτῳ λόγῳ, καὶ ἄλλοι ἐν' ἄλλοις συγγράμμασι.

The Greek text in Migne says "non-subjection" where I have given "subjection." The reference is to the *Third Theological Oration*, the *First on the Son*, 18, which lists ignorance, subjection, prayer, asking, increase, and being made perfect, as humiliating statements said of Christ. *Non*-subjection is obviously an error in the text of the *Opuscule*.

The reasoning is really very clever. If ignorance and will are subscribed under the same rubric, i.e., if they can be treated in the same way, then anyone who says Christ *really* has a human will must also say that Christ is *really* ignorant, which Theodore believes is heretical. Instead, piety—and orthodoxy—demand that ignorance be only appropriated by Christ; and if ignorance is appropriated, so, too, must his human will. A great deal could be said about Theodore's assumptions which allow him logically to construct such an argument as he has; suffice it to say that we find here a confusion of the person of Christ with the divine nature, in short, Paleo-Chalcedonianism.

Maximus' response is given under the heading, "Maximus the Monk to Marinus the Priest: Solution to the foregoing difficulties of Theodore, Deacon and Rhetor. Solution One." We will consider about two-thirds of this rather long solution, and as has been our custom, we will divide it into parts for easier analysis and commentary. Maximus does not think there is much substance to this difficulty:

> The difficulties posed by the Rhetor, most holy and God-honored
> Father, do not have much reason [to them], and the error of
> the difficulty is manifest, both from its falsity and from its
> strife aimed at overturning the divine Incarnation of the Only-
> Begotten.[76]

He goes on to deny the basic premise.

> The Fathers do not, as he says, predicate ignorance to Christ
> [in the same way] that they predicate will [to him]. For who is
> able to prove this, if even the [Fathers], as is their custom, not

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[76]PG 91.217B4-8: Αἱ παρὰ τοῦ ῥήτορος πεύσεις, ἁγιώτατε καὶ θεοτίμητε πάτερ, οὐ μᾶλλον τὸ εὔλογον ἔχουσι τῆς ἀπορίας, ἢ τὸ παράλογον ἐνδείκνυνται τῆς ἀπορίας· ἔκ τε τοῦ ψεύδους αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῆς ἐπ' ἀνατροπῇ τῆς θείας τοῦ Μονογενοῦς σαρκώσεως ἔριδος.

only do not fabricate things that do not exist, but [do not] brazenly bring [such things] forth from themselves?[77]

Theodore has culled out of thin air the notion that the Fathers speak of

ignorance and will in the same way.

Maximus proceeds,

Or because the same will be the logos of [both] ignorance and will, he will lead into the same [logos] things that are altogether incompatible (if indeed ignorance is the abolition of the thing [it is predicated of] and will presents the situation of the thing [it is predicated of]), even as habit and privation do not exist in each other. For not even since ignorance [in Christ] was put forward by the Arians (as the divine and great Gregory reckons) was it ever proclaimed to be the same as will.[78]

Ignorance and will cannot be subscribed under the same rubric because

they are not species of the same genus. Ignorance is a privation, a

privation of knowledge, as Maximus says in *Char* 3.29, while will is a

(natural) faculty of the soul. It is for this reason that the two are

"incompatible." Theodore is comparing apples and oranges, which not

even the Arians, who predicated ignorance to Christ, thought to do.

[Gregory] mentioned nothing expressly about the will in the passage in which these things are gone over, "reckon up for me the expressions which make for your ignorant statements, such as 'My God and your God,' or 'greater,' or 'created,' [or 'mode,'] or 'sanctified,'" and what follows. But if, because [Theodore] alone took [will] along with [these other expressions], they

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[77]PG 91.217B8-14: Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ θελήματι λόγον, ὥς φησι, καὶ τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ κατηγόρησαν οἱ Πατέρες. Τίς γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο δεῖξαι δυνάμενος, εἰ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα, καθὼς ἔθος αὐτοῖς, οὐκ ἀναπλάττονται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τολμηρῶς καθ' ἑαυτῶν προκομίζουσιν;

[78]PG 91.217B14-C8: Ἢ οὕτω δ' ἂν ἀγνοίας καὶ θελήματος ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγων ἀλλήλοις τὰ πάντῃ κυρίως ἀσύμβατα· εἴπερ ἡ μὲν, τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἀναίρεσιν· τὸ δὲ, τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέσιν παρίστησιν, ὃ δὴ προδήλως ἀμήχανον, ὡς οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀλλήλαις ἕξις ὑπάρχει καὶ στέρησις. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀρειανῶν προτεινομένην, καὶ ταύτην ὁ θεῖος καὶ μέγας Γρηγόριος καταριθμεῖ· φημὶ δὴ τὴν ἄνοιαν, ἤδη ταὐτὸν οὖσαν ἀπέφηνεν, τῷ θελήματι.

perhaps attempt to lead ignorance to the same [logos] as will,
he must without a doubt [lead to the same logos] also the "My
God and your God," and the "greater," spoken by this Father,
and the "created," and the "sanctified," [which are] as they say
the same as ignorance on account of their order, because,
indeed, these are ordered with ignorance. But if this is
perverted thinking, the one who endeavors to speak or to write
such things is even more perverse than those who [merely]
think the same.[79]

Here we see that Theodore has claimed Gregory spoke about the will in
a place where he did not. The Confessor quotes part of the passage in
question.[80] Moreover, if will is classified with ignorance, then it is
also classified with all the other things that are classified with
ignorance in Christ, and all the statements concerning the humanity of
Christ in the Scriptures must be applied to him by appropriation only.
And this does aim "at overturning the divine Incarnation of the Only-
Begotten," as Maximus says.

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[79]PG 91.217C8-220A2: Τοῦ θελήματος γὰρ ῥητῶς οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸν τόπον
παντελῶς ἐμνημόνευσεν, ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα διέξεισι, "Σὺ δέ μοι, λέγων, καταρίθμει πρὸς
ταῦτα τὰ τῆς ἀγνωμοσύνης ῥήματα, τὸ Θεός μου, καὶ Θεὸς ὑμῶν τὸ μεῖζων, τὸ
ἔκτισεν, τὸ ἡγίασε," καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. Εἰ δὲ ὅτι συμπαρέλαβε μόνον, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἄγειν
τὴν ἄγνοιαν τῷ θελήματι τυχὸν ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἔσται δήπου πάντως, καὶ τὸ, Θεός
μου, καὶ Θεὸς ὑμῶν καὶ τὸ, μεῖζον, παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἰρημένον, καὶ τὸ κτίζειν καὶ
ἀγιάζειν ταὐτὸν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ κατ' αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν σύνταξιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταῦτα τῇ
ἀγνοίᾳ συντέταχεν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο διανοίας καθέστηκε παρατροπή, κἀκεῖνο μειζόνως
ἐκτροπὴ τῶν ταῦτα λογιζομένων, μή τί γε λέγειν ἢ γράφειν ἐπιχειρούντων.

[80]*The Fourth Theological Oration*, the *First on the Son*, 18. The
words in quotation marks refer to Jn 20:17 ("I ascend unto My Father
and your Father; and to My God and your God"), Jn 14:28 ("My Father
is greater than I"), Prv 8.22 ("The Lord made Me in the beginning"),
Acts 2:36 ("God hath made the same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both
Lord and Christ"), and Jn 10:36 ("him, whom the Father hath sanctified,
and sent into the world").

Having shown that Theodore is wrong in his claim that the Fathers spoke of ignorance and will in the same way, Maximus now assumes, for the sake of argument, that Theodore is right:

> Otherwise, if the same logos is appointed for ignorance and will, then either the things that will by nature will be ignorant, or the things that are ignorant by nature will will. Thus, God, who wills by nature, will endure being caught in ignorance, and all soulless things that are ignorant by nature will be naturally moved by will.[81]

Thus, the immediate result of Theodore's argument is senselessness in every case where it is applied. In Christ's case, however, there is an added twist:

> But if this is so, even Christ himself, who exists from divinity and humanity, and who has ignorance and will [in his humanity] by appropriation, as they say, will have, I suppose, ignorance and will in his divinity by nature. And I will be silent [for a moment] as to whether or not they err by appropriation. Notwithstanding, it is shown [to be the case that] those who advocate the very idea [of appropriation] contend against [it], and they establish two wills, one by nature, the other by appropriation, which they acknowledge to be two beforehand, with the same number of ignorances, which is false. No one believes the ignorance of Christ to be double; but everyone rejects it, since wisdom and power are of God.[82]

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[81]PG 91.220A5-10: Ἄλλως τε δὲ, εἰ ἀγνοίας καὶ θελήματος ὁ αὐτὸς καθέστηκε λόγος, ἢ τὰ φύσει θέλοντα πάντως, καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἢ τὰ φύσει ἀγνοοῦντα, πάντως καὶ θέλουσιν· οὐκοῦν καὶ Θεὸς κατὰ φύσιν θέλων, ἀγνοίας περιπεσεῖται πάθει, καὶ ἄψυχα πάντα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγνοοῦντα, θελήματι κινηθήσεται φυσικῷ.

[82]PG 91.220A10-B6: Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ Χριστὸς αὐτὸς ὁ ἐκ θεότητος ὑφεστὼς καὶ ἀνθρωπότητος, κατ' οἰκείωσιν, ὥς φασιν αὐτοί, τήν τε ἄγνοιαν καὶ τὸ θέλημα ἔχων, ἕξει που πάντως φύσει κατὰ τοῦ θείου θελήματος κατὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. Καὶ σιωπῶ λέγειν, ὡς εἰ καὶ διὰ τὴν οἰκείωσιν ἐσφαλμένως· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὗπερ κατηγωνίσαντο συνηγοροῦντες ἐδείχθησαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ δύο συνιστῶντες θελήματα, τό τε κατὰ φύσιν λέγω, καὶ τὸ κατ' οἰκείωσιν· ἅπερ δύο προδήλως τυγχάνουσι, σὺν ταῖς ἰσαρίθμοις ἀγνοίαις, ὃ καὶ παράλογον, διττὴν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ δοξάζειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν, τοῦ μηδὲ μίαν ἔχοντος, πᾶσαν δὲ πάντως ἐξαφανίζοντος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ Θεοῦ σοφία καὶ δύναμις.

That is, if Christ has ignorance and will in his humanity by appropriation, then he also has ignorance and will in his divinity by nature, since he naturally has a will as God. And even if the question of appropriation is left aside for a moment, it still remains the case that because Christ has two wills (one by nature and the other by appropriation), he must also have two ignorances, which is false.

Turning now to consider appropriation itself, Maximus asks,

> But as for appropriation, what kind do they say it is? An essential one, by which he appropriates, on account of the nature, the [attributes] naturally present in each [nature]; or a relational one, by which we naturally enjoy and appropriate the [attributes] of others, neither enduring them nor effecting them ourselves? If they mean the former, they affirm that the Incarnate God is mere man, teaching that he is ignorant. But if they mean the latter, they affirm he is not man at all, but only a fleshless God, teaching that he has the things of the flesh by a mere relation and not appropriating the natural things of man naturally while being and remaining God.[83]

This is the same line of inquiry we saw in the *Disputation*. But here, Maximus addresses immediately the results of Theodore's logic. Obviously, an essential appropriation is the Orthodox teaching, but given the linkage of ignorace and will, for Theodore to say a human will is natural to Christ requires him to say ignorance is also natural to Christ, and that makes Christ a mere man. On the other hand, if Theodore has in

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[83]PG 91.220B9-C5: Οἰκείωσιν δέ, ποίαν ἄρα φασί; Τὴν οὐσιώδη, καθ᾽ ἣν τὰ προσόντα φυσικῶς ἕκαστον ἔχοντα οἰκειοῦται διὰ τὴν φύσιν· ἢ τὴν σχετικήν, καθ᾽ ἣν τὰ ἀλλήλων φυσικῶς στέργομέν τε καὶ οἰκειούμεθα, μηδὲν τούτων αὐτοὶ πάσχοντες ἢ ἐνεργοῦντες; Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν τὴν πρώτην, ἐκεῖνοι μᾶλλον ψιλὸν ἀπέφηναν ἄνθρωπον τὸν σαρκωθέντα Θεόν, ὡς τοῦτον ἀγνοοῦντα φυσικῶς δογματίζοντες. Εἰ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπν ὅλως, ἀλλ᾽ ἄσαρκον μόνον Θεόν, ὡς ἐν ψιλῇ σχέσει τὰ τῆς σαρκός, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀνθρώπου τὰ φυσικὰ φυσικῶς οἰκειούμενον μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ μένειν Θεόν.

mind a relational appropriation, then Christ will be a "fleshless God,"

since he will not have by nature any of the things proper to humanity.

> This teacher [Gregory] wisely appoints ignorance to Christ along
> with all the [other] natural things he reckons of the Incarnate
> God, such as sleep, hunger, thirst, weariness, weeping, the
> agony, submission, the Cross and death; and with these also the
> Resurrection and the Ascension, in which [the others] are
> preserved, voluntarily taking these things upon himself by
> nature and enduring them for our sake. If, therefore, they
> believe these things are in Christ by an appropriation of mere
> relation, and do not respect the things that are natural to the
> Incarnate Word as man, how will they be able to forsake
> Apollinarius and Manes? For they exceed Severus in impiety, or
> rather speak greater [blasphemy than he], not so much for
> contending against the truth, but for abusing the expressions
> for the natural attributes and nullifying the nature of the flesh,
> squeezing the different natures into one.[84]

Here we come to Maximus' positive teaching. Ignorance, along with all

the other attributes of humanity, Gregory ascribes to the human nature

of Christ. All of these things Christ voluntarily took upon himself in

the Incarnation and endured them for our sake. To deny this under-

standing is to risk the Apollinarian and Manichaean heresies. And it

can be said of Severus that he at least retained the human attributes of

Christ in a real (if heterodox) way, while Theodore does not even do

that.

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[84]PG 91.220C5-221A4: Ἐπειδήπερ ἐν ᾧ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τίθησι, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ
πάντα τοῦ σαρκωθέντος Θεοῦ καταριθμεῖ σαφῶς ὁ διδάσκαλος· οἷον τὸ ὑπνοῦν, τὸ
πεινεῖν, τὸ διψεῖν, τὸ κοπιᾶν, τὸ δακρύειν, τὸ ἀγωνιᾶν, τὸ ὑποδύεσθαι, τὸν
σταυρόν, τὸν θάνατον· μεθ' ὧν καὶ τὴν ἔγερσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀνάληψιν, οἷς καὶ σέσωκεν,
ἑκουσίως ταῦτα κατὰ φύσιν δεξάμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ παθόν. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα κατὰ
τὴν ἐν σχέσει ψιλὴν οἰκείωσιν ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ γεγενῆσθαι δοξάζουσι, καὶ οὐ φυσικὰ ὡς
ἀνθρώπου τοῦ σαρκωθέντος εἶναι Λόγου πρεσβεύουσι, τί λοιπὸν Ἀπολιναρίῳ καὶ
Μάνεντι καταλείψωσι; Σεβῆρον γὰρ ὑπερῆραν τῇ ἀσεβείᾳ, μᾶλλον ὑπεραυδήσαντες, ὡς
οὐ τοσοῦτον κατεξαναστάντα τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλὰ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν ἰδιομάτων ῥήσει
προσκεχρημένον, εἰ καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀθετεῖ τῆς σαρκός, πρὸς μίαν τὰς διαφόρους
φύσεις ἐκθλίβων.

We have spent much time on this principle for two reasons: because there is a lot of material on it both in the *Disputation* and in the nineteenth *Opuscule*, and also because it was a teaching that Pyrrhus himself had developed. Having covered all of this material now, we may pass on to the last principle to be considered, that the will of Christ is intentional.

9. Will is intentional (gnomic)[85]

Again we reach a turning point in the course of the *Disputation*. Pyrrhus has lost the initiative and once more tries to retreat into a

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[85] There is a great deal to be said about Maximus' use of the words γνώμη and θέλημα γνωμικόν. Of all the terms in his technical vocabulary, this one has undergone the most radical precision. In an early work Maximus himself attributed gnome to Christ, a teaching he later abandoned as erroneous (see *Commentary on the Our Father* [PG 90.877D4] for the attribution; and *TP* 2 [PG 91.44C7–45A4], 16 [PG 91.192A12–15, 193A1–12], and *Pyrr* 97 [PG 91.312A10–C13] and 135 [152] [PG 91.329D4–12] for texts denying the attribution).

In addition to the Christological use of the term, there are far-reaching anthropological uses, some of which, like the "gnomic emigration" of the soul mentioned in *Amb.* 7 (PG 91.1076B13), involve complicated and subtle teachings. It is a pity that we are not able to cover all of these aspects here. Instead, and for the sake of the argument at hand, we must limit ourselves exclusively to the Confessor's most mature Christological use.

The precise meaning of gnome, or gnomic will, is hard to elucidate. In *TP* 14 (PG 91.153A13–B2) Maximus distinguishes gnome, or gnomic will, from the natural will: "The natural will is the essential desire of things corroborative of nature; the gnomic will is the self-chosen impulse and movement of reason to one thing or another" (Θέλημα φυσικόν ἐστιν, οὐσιώδης τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συστατικῶν ἔφεσις. Θέλημα γνωμικόν ἐστιν, ἡ εφ' ἑκάτερα τοῦ λογισμοῦ αὐθαίρετος ὁρμή τε καὶ κίνησις) (cited in Sherwood, *Earlier Ambigua*, 201). As we shall see, gnome, or gnomic will, is the personal employment of the natural faculty of will. The meaning of gnome will become clearer in what follows. For convenience sake, we will translate "gnome" as "intention," and "gnomic" as "intentional," though "intention" does not fully capture the meaning of "gnome."

position of relative safety. This gives Maximus the chance to sieze the initiative and finish off the dogmatic part of the debate over Monotheletism.

> PYR: Those [Monothelites] do not say ["one will"] out of evil or villainy; rather, they want to express the highest union [in Christ].
> MAX: If this were conceded to the Severans, then as much as the conceded proposition [follows], the rest will (not unreasonably) follow, and they will say, "We do no evil, nor any villainy, by saying 'one nature;' rather, we want, just as you do through the 'one will,' to prove the extreme union." Thus, like David from Goliath, the one party will take weapons from the other. Behold, those who say "one will" agree exactly with those others [the Severans] in both thought and speech! Moreover, what do they want to call this one will? It is only right that they give it some name.[86]

Pyrrhus' eirenic offering serves to underscore the question with which we began this dissertation: how is it possible to conceive of operation and will in a Monophysite way, while conceiving of hypostasis and nature in an Orthodox way? Again, we see that it is not possible, for exactly the same (Paleo-Chalcedonian) presuppositions stand behind both Monotheletism and Monophysitism: the confusion of hypostasis and nature and the ascription of will to hypostasis. Since we covered this ground in Chapter I, there is no need to belabor the point here. We might only reiterate that, as this exchange demonstrates, the debate between

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[86]*Pyrr* §74-75 (PG 91.305D5-08A13): ΠΥΡ. Ἐκεῖνοι οὐ προθέσει κακῇ καὶ πανουργίᾳ τινὶ τοῦτο εἶπον, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενοι τὴν ἄκραν ἕνωσιν δηλῶσαι.

ΜΑΞ. Εἰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἀπὸ Σεβήρου δοθῇ, οὐκ εὐλόγως λοιπόν, ὅσον πρὸς τὸ δοθὲν λῆμμα, κἀκεῖνοι λέξουσιν· ὅτι Οὐ κακῇ προθέσει, ἢ πανουργίᾳ τινί, μίαν λέγομεν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενοι, καθάπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς, διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς θελήματος, τὴν ἄκραν ἕνωσιν δι' αὐτῆς δεῖξαι; Τοῖς γὰρ αὐτῶν κατ' αὐτῶν, ὃν τρόπον καὶ Δαβὶδ κατὰ τοῦ Γολιάθ, χρήσονται ὅπλοις. Ἰδοὺ ἓν [καὶ γὰρ ἓν] θέλημα λέγοντες, ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐννοίαις καὶ φωναῖς συμπίπτουσι. Πλὴν τοῦτο τὸ ἓν θήλημα, τί βούλονται ὀνομάζειν; δίκαιοι γὰρ εἰσι τούτου τὴν προσηγορίαν δοῦναι.

Pyrrhus and Maximus is shown once again to be a conflict of Paleo-versus Neo-Chalcedonian Christologies.

With his question, "What do they want to call this will?," Maximus is fishing for something in particular, and Pyrrhus obligingly provides it: "They say it is intentional."[87] The Confessor is now able to unravel the last Monothelite principle. We shall take several lines of the debate together.

> MAX: Therefore, if it is intentional, it is derivative [of another intention]; and if it is derivative, the intention which is its prototype is an essence.
> PYR: Intention is not an essence.
> MAX: If it is not an essence, it is a quality, and a quality will be found [to be derived] from a quality, which is impossible. What, then, do they say intention is?
> PYR: Intention is nothing else but what the blessed Cyril defined as the "mode of life."
> MAX: The mode of life is, for example, virtuous or evil. Is it present in us by a reasonable [choice] or not?
> PYR: Clearly, by a reasonable [choice].
> MAX: Do we then make reasonable [choices] voluntarily and deliberately, or involuntarily and without deliberation?
> PYR: We acknowledge that it is voluntarily and deliberately.
> MAX: Therefore, intention is nothing else than a certain kind of will that cleaves by relation to certain real or conceived goods.
> PYR: You have given a correct exegesis of the definition of the Father [Cyril].[88]

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[87]*Pyrr* §76 (PG 91.308A14): Γνωμικὸν τοῦτό φασιν.

[88]*Pyrr* §§77-86 (PG 91.308B2-C10): ΜΑΞ. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ γνωμικὸν καὶ παράγωγον· εἰ δὲ παράγωγον, ἡ γνώμη, ὡς πρωτότυπον, οὐσία ἔσται.

ΠΥΡ. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ γνώμη οὐσία.

ΜΑΞ. Εἰ οὐσία οὐκ ἔστι, ποιότης ἐστί· καὶ εὑρεθήσεται ποιότης ἐκ ποιότητος· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. Τί οὖν φασι τὴν γνώμην;

ΠΥΡ. Ἡ γνώμη οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ ὅπερ ὁ μακάριος αὐτὴν ὡρίσατο Κύριλλος, ὅτι τρόπος ζωῆς.

ΜΑΞ. Ὁ τρόπος τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν, φέρε εἰπεῖν, ἢ κακίαν ζωῆς, ἆρα ἐξ ἐπιλογῆς ἡμῖν πρόσεστιν, ἢ οὔ;

ΠΥΡ. Ἐξ ἐπιλογῆς, πάντως.

What is Maximus doing? He is striping away all of the possible interpretations of the word "intention" except one. Intention, or an intentional will, is not an essence, nor is it a quality of an essence. This establishes that it is not proper to *nature*. Intention is, according to Cyril, a "mode of life." The word *mode* should tip us off on where the Confessor is leading the discussion. Further, the definition of intention as "a *certain kind* of will that cleaves by relation to certain real or conceived goods" gives evidence that intention pertains to *hypostasis* instead of to nature. And this is what Maximus goes on to say:

> If this explanation of the Father's definition is correct, it is first of all impossible to call the [natural] will intentional. For how is it possible for a will to be produced from a will? Thus, those who say there is an intention in Christ, as this inquiry has been proving, teach that he is a mere man, comporting himself deliberatively, like we do, in ignorance, doubt, and opposition, since one deliberates only about doubtful things, and not about things free from doubt. We have an appetite by nature for what is simply naturally good; but how we attain the good [comes] by inquiry and deliberation. And for this reason, intention is properly ascribed to us, [since] it is a mode of employment [of the will], not a logos of nature (otherwise the nature will change innumerable times). Thus, the humanity of the Lord does not subsist simply, as it does with us, but divinely, for he was God who, for us and through us, appeared in the flesh, [and] it is impossible to ascribe intention [to him]. For he had being in himself, i.e. he subsisted divinely and he

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ΜΑΞ. Θέλοντες οὖν καὶ βουλευόμενοι ἐπιλεγόμεθα, ἢ ἀθελήτως καὶ ἀβουλεύτως;

ΠΥΡ. Ὁμολογουμένως θέλοντες καὶ βουλευόμενοι.

ΜΑΞ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ γνώμη οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ ποιὰ θέλησις, σχετικῶς τινος ἢ ὄντος ἢ νομιζομένου ἀγαθοῦ ἀντεχομένη.

ΠΥΡ. Ὀρθῶς τὴν τοῦ πατρικοῦ ὅρου ἐποιήσω ἐξήγησιν.

had both an [inclination] toward good and a disinclination toward evil, as the great eye of the Church, Basil, said . . .[89]

Maximus has already established that intention is not an essence, since it is not the product of a prior will. Those that hold that the will of Christ is intentional make him out to be a mere man. How so? To give a clearer answer, we may turn to a couple of the other *Opuscula*, where the teaching on intention is fuller.

In *Opuscule* 1, in a section entitled, "concerning intention," Maximus says,

> Intention is an internal appetite for the things within our power, from which free choice [is made]; or, it is a disposition toward those things within our power about which we deliberate appetitively. For the appetite is disposed to the things that are judged from counsel, [and] this is intention, with which, or rather it is more correct to say, *from* which is free choice. Thus, just as the logos of habit leads to operation, so too does intention lead to free choice.[90]

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[89]*Pyrr* §87 (PG 91.308C11-09A7): Εἰ ὀρθῶς ἡ τοῦ πατρικοῦ ὅρου ἐξάπλωσις γεγένηται, πρῶτον μὲν οὐ δυνατὸν γνωμικὸν λέγειν θέλημα. Πῶς γὰρ ἐκ θελήματος θέλημα πορελθεῖς ἐνδέχεται; Ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ γνώμην λέγοντες ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ, ὡς ἡ περὶ αὐτῆς ἔδειξε ζήτησις, ψιλὸν αὐτὸν δογματίζουσιν ἄνθρωπον, βουλευτικῶς διατιθέμενον καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἀγνοοῦντά τε καὶ ἀμφιβάλλοντα, καὶ ἀντικείμενα ἔχοντα· εἴπερ τις περὶ τῶν ἀμφιβαλλομένων, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἀναμφιβόλου βουλεύεται. Ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς φύσει καλοῦ φυσικῶς ἔχομεν τὴν ὄρεξιν· τοῦ δὲ πῶς καλοῦ πεῖραν διὰ ζητήσεως καὶ βουλῆς. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ γνώμη προσφυῶς λέγεται, τρόπος οὖσα χρήσεως, οὐ λόγος φύσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀπειράκις μετέβαλεν ἡ φύσις. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου τοῦ Κυρίου, οὐ ψιλῶς καθ' ἡμᾶς ὑποστάντος, ἀλλὰ θεϊκῶς· Θεὸς γὰρ ἦν ὁ δι' ἡμᾶς ἐξ ἡμῶν σαρκὶ πεφηνώς, γνώμη λέγεσθαι οὐ δύναται. Αὐτὸ γὰρ [αὐτῷ τῷ] τὸ εἶναι, ἤγουν, τὸ θεϊκῶς ὑποστῆναι, φυσικῶς καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ καλὸν εἶχεν οἰκείωσιν, καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ κακὸν ἀλλοτρίωσιν, καθὼς καὶ ὁ μέγας τῆς Ἐκκλησίας ὀφθαλμὸς Βασίλειος . . . ἔφη . . .

[90]*TP* 1 (PG 91.17C5-11): εἴπερ τὴν γνώμην εἶναί φασιν ὄρεξιν ἐνδιάθετον τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ προαίρεσις· ἢ διάθεσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὀρεκτικῶς βουλευθεῖσι. Διατεθεῖσα γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, γνώμη γέγονε· μεθ' ἥν, ἢ κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ προαίρεσις. Ἕξεως οὖν πρὸς ἐνέργειαν λόγον, ἡ γνώμη πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν.

Intention, then, is an appetite, but it is not general appetitiveness. It

tends only toward those things within our power. It is perhaps easier

to say it is a disposition or an attitude toward certain things, and

based upon this attitude, free choice is exercised concerning those

things. To distinguish general appetitiveness from the specific

intentional appetite, we may turn to a passage in *Opuscule* 3, which

closely resembles *Pyrr* §23, analyzed above. In this passage, Maximus

says,

> Will is natural, an appetitive power of being proper to nature,
> sustaining [all] of the essential properties present in the
> nature, by which the volitional nature always has the capacity
> to will. For the capacity to will and will are not the same, just
> as the capacity to speak and speech are not [the same]. For
> there is always a faculty of speech, but one does not always
> speak. For the one is of essence, sustained by the logos of
> nature; while the other is of counsel, formed by the intention of
> the speaker. Just as the capacity to speak is always natural,
> and the manner of speaking is hypostatic, so also is the
> capacity to will and will. For if the capacity to will and will
> are not the same (for the one, as we said, is of essence, while
> the other exists by the counsel of the willer), then the
> Incarnate Logos as man had the capacity to will, [which was]
> moved and formed by his divine will.[91]

Thus, the will is natural, but its employment is hypostatic. Will pertains

to nature and is sustained by the logos of nature, but intention is

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[91]*TP* 3 (PG 91.45D2-48A14): Θέλημα γάρ ἐστι φυσικόν, δύναμις τοῦ κατὰ
φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτική, καὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προσόντων συνεκτικὴ πάντων
ἰδιωμάτων· καθ' ἣν ἀεὶ τῷ φύσει θελητικῷ, τὸ πεφυκέναι θέλειν, ἐμπέφυκεν· οὐ
ταυτὸν δὲ τὸ πεφυκέναι θέλειν, καὶ θέλειν· ὡς οὐδὲ τὸ πεφυκέναι λαλεῖν, καὶ
λαλεῖν. Πέφυκε κὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ λαλητικόν, λαλεῖ δὲ οὐκ ἀεί· ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν οὐσίας
ἐστὶ λόγῳ φύσεως συνεξόμενον· τὸ δὲ βουλῆς, τῆι τοῦ λαλοῦντος γνώμῃ
τυπούμενον. Ὥστε φύσεωςμὲν τὸ ἀεὶ πεφυκέναι λαλεῖν· ὑποστάσεως δέ, τὸ πῶς
λαλεῖν· ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πεφυκέναι θέλειν καὶ θέλειν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ πεφυκέναι θέλειν,
καὶ θέλειν οὐκ ἐστι ταυτὸν (τὸ μὲν γάρ, ωρς ἔφην, οὐσίας· τὸ δέ, τῆς τοῦ
θέλοντος ὑπάρχει βουλῆς)· εἶχεν ἄρα τὸ πεφυκέναι θέλειν ὁ σαρκωθεὶς Λόγος ὡς
ἄνθρωπος, τῷ αὐτοῦ θεϊκῷ θελήματι κινούμενόν τε καὶ τυπούμενον.

hypostatic and is constitutive of the mode of willing. In this respect, then, Christ can have a human natural will, but he need not have an intentional will, since intention is hypostatic and Christ assumed no human hypostasis.

In point of fact, however, Christ *cannot* have an intentional will at all, and for two reasons. The first reason Maximus gives later on in the same *opuscule*: "If [the will of Christ] is intentional, it is only a characteristic of his hypostasis. For 'intentional' is definitive of a person."[92] Thus, like every other argument for an hypostatic will in Christ, it will result in the teaching that Christ has a will different from his Father and his Mother (i.e., a will that is consubstantial with neither), since neither his Father nor his Mother have a common hypostasis with him.

The second reason Christ's will cannot be intentional is that intention is the hypostatic locus of sin. As the Confessor says in *Opuscule* 16,

> . . . therefore, the [human] nature [of Christ] is perfect, sin only excepted, which is not of nature anyway, but of intention, a motion contrary to the logos and law of nature, a digression and a fall.[93]

And again, in the *Disputation*,

> And at another time [Sergius] admits [the opinion] of those who say [the will of Christ] is freely-choosing and intentional, and establishing authorities for himself, he made the Lord out to be not only a mere man, but a mutable and sinful man as well. For

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[92] *TP* 3 (PG 91.53C8-10): Εἰ δὲ γνωμικόν, μόνης ἔσται τῆς αὐτοῦ χαρακτηριστικὸν ὑποστάσεως. Προσώου γὰρ ἀφοριστικὸν ὑπάρχει τὸ γνωμικόν·

[93] *TP* 16 (PG 91.192A12-15): . . . καὐτῆς τελείως τῆς φύσεως, πλὴν μόνης τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὅτι μηδὲ τῆς φύσεως ἦν, ἀλλὰ γνώμης, παρὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ νόμον κεκινημένης τῆς φύσεως, ἐκτροπὴ καὶ ὀλίσθημα;

intention is a judgement of opposing things, and an inquiry into unknown things, and a choice between uncertain things.[94]

Intention, then, is the hesitant, deliberative, uncertain, wavering attitude toward the available opportunities presented to a person; a movement contrary to nature; the locus of sin; as such it is a characteristic of a created, and fallen, human hypostasis, not an uncreated, divine one. Besides the obvious incongruence of attributing such an intention to the person of the Logos, there is the more strictly theological precept that what is natural is good, and Christ, the Creator of all good things, could do nothing that was not good, and thus could do nothing contrary to nature.

We may note, by the way, that it is in reference to intention that the full meaning of the passage from *Opuscule* 20, quoted in B.2 (p. 203) above, is to be found. In that passage, Maximus says,

> We say that insofar as [will] is natural, it is not antagonistic [to God]; but insofar as it *is not naturally moved in our case*, it is surely antagonistic, and "for the most part struggles against" [the divine will], in which also sin is incurred. For *[sin is incurred] by an abuse in the mode of motion*, but not by nature in the logos of the faculty [of will], and it is resisted by reason and ordinance.[95]

Man, as created in God's image, is free and freely directs his own nature. It is possible for man hypostatically to will and to act contrary to his own nature. This is precisely the meaning of sin. However,

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[94] *Pyrr* §135 (152) (PG 91.329D6-12): ποτὲ δέ, τοὺς προαιρετικὸν καὶ γνωμικὸν αὐτὸ λέγοντας προσλαμβανόμενος, καὶ κυρίου ἑαυτοῦ καθιστῶν, οὐ μόνον ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰσῆγε τὸν Κύριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρεπτὸν καὶ ἁμαρτωλόν· εἴπερ ἡ γνώμη τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστὶ κριτική, καὶ τῶν ἀγνοουμένων ζητητική, καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων βουλευτική·

[95] TP 20 (PG 91.236C4-10).

implicit in what the Confessor says is that man is also able freely to will and to act *in accordance with* his nature. The hesitant, wavering quality of intention is due to the Fall, in which we lost a great deal of knowledge of, and clarity of vision for, divine things and are no longer able undistractedly to follow God. Nevertheless, it remains the case that moral reform is also intentional, and it is by an intention fixed on the good that we are deified. As Maximus says in *Char* 4.90,

> Only God is good by nature; and only the imitator of God is good by intention; for his purpose is to join the wicked to what is good by nature [i.e., himself] that they might become God.[96]

Ultimately, beyond denying an intentional will to Christ, Maximus will not press his positive teaching on the theory of intentional will very far. Even though he has come to a carefully worked out position, "intention" nevertheless remains a very ambiguous term. Pyrrhus makes a good observation: "Hence, those who say there is intention in Christ [utter] a great blasphemy."[97] The great insight here is that it was precisely some of the Fathers who attributed an intention to Christ. Maximus acknowledges the fact:

> We must not pass over [the fact that] this [term] is indefinite, that the word "intention" is used in divers ways and with multiple significations in the holy Scriptures and in the holy Fathers.

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[96]Ceresa-Gastaldo, 234 (=PG 90.1069C6-9): Φύσει ἀγαθός, μόνος ὁ Θεός· καὶ γνώμῃ ἀγαθός, μόνος ὁ θεομίμητος· σκοπὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστι τῷ φύσει ἀγαθῷ τοὺς πονηροὺς συνάψαι, ἵνα γένωνται ἀγαθοί. Διὰ τοῦτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν λοιδορούμενος εὐλογεῖ, διωκόμενος ἀνέχεται, βλασφημούμενος παρακαλεῖ, φονευόμενος ὑπερεύχεται· πάντα ποιεῖ, ἵνα τοῦ σκοποῦ τῆς ἀγάπης μὴ ἐκπέσῃ, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν.

[97]*Pyrr* §96 (PG 91.312A10-11): Μεγίστη ἐντεῦθεν ἀναδέδεικται βλασφημία τοῖς γνώμην ἐπὶ Χριστοῦ λέγουσιν.

. . . And briefly, so as not to go through every meaning one by one, I will pile up the multitude [of meanings] into this: I have discovered twenty-eight meanings of the word "intention" in the holy Scriptures and in the holy Fathers.[98]

After this acknowledgement, Maximus takes up a few other, minor arguments, with which we will not concern ourselves.

C. The Remainder of the Monothelite Debate in the *Disputation*

So as not to leave the debate over Monotheletism hanging, we present here a brief synopsis of the remainder of the anti-Monothelite part of the *Disputation*.

Pyrrhus goes on to call the human will in Christ an aptitude, which Maximus shows must mean a natural aptitude with all that a natural aptitude must entail. The Confessor then goes on to transfer the whole question of a hypostatic will in Christ from economy to the realm of theology and show the absurdities that result when three wills are ascribed to the Trinity because of the three persons, or one person is deduced from the one will.[99]

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[98]*Pyrr* §97 (PG 91.312A13-B3, C4-8): Χρὴ μηδὲ τοῦτο παρελθεῖν ἀπαρασήμαντον, ὅτι πολύτροπον καὶ πολύσημον παρά τε τῇ ἁγίᾳ Γραφῇ καὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις Πατράσιν ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς γνώμης ὄνομα, ὡς τοῖς ἐπιμελῶς ἀναγινώσκουσι δῆλον ὑπάρχει. . . . Καὶ ἁπλῶς, ἵνα μὴ καθ' ἓν τὰ πάντα διεξερχόμενος, ὄχλον ἐπισωρεύσω τῷ λόγῳ, κατὰ εἰκοσιοκτὼ σημαινόμενα παρά τε τῇ ἁγίᾳ Γραφῇ καὶ τοῖς ἁγίοις Πατράσιν ἐπιτηρησάμενος, τὸ τῆς γνώμης εὗρον ὄνομα·

Maximus is much more prodigious in his lexicography than G. W. H. Lampe, who lists only nine meanings, i.e. mind, opinion, view, doctrine, will, choice, motive, decision, and judgement (*A Patristic Greek Lexicon* [Oxford: University Press, 1961-69]: 317-18, s.v. γνώμη.

[99]*Pyrr* §§99-105 (99-110) (PG 91.312D-16B3).

Pyrrhus then advances several Patristic proof texts from the Monothelite arsenal, and Maximus interprets them Dyotheletically:

From Gregory the Theologian, *Fourth Theological Oration*, "For his [human] will was not opposed to God, being wholly deified."[100]

From Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium* 2.13: "The soul wills, the body touches, and the illness flees on account of both."[101]

From ps.-Athanasius, *Contra Apollinarium* 1.20: "The mind of the Lord is not yet the Lord, but will, or choice, or operation towards something."[102]

From ps.-Athanasius, *Contra Apollinarium* 2.10: "Born from a woman, he raised in himself the form of the first-formed man, in showing flesh, apart from fleshly wills and the thoughts of men, in an image of newness."[103]

He then asks for Scriptural passages in support of Dyotheletism, and Maximus provides, with exegesis, ten from the New Testament, two from the Old, and two more from the New.[104]

After this, Pyrrhus turns to contemporary figures whom he says stirred up Monotheletism and whom Maximus is obliged to defend. They are Pope Vigilius of Rome, who supposedly accepted the *Libellus* of

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[100] *Pyrr* §§108-11 (113-16) (PG 91.316C5-D9).

[101] *Pyrr* §§112-13 (117-18) (PG 91.316D11-17A13).

[102] *Pyrr* §§114-15 (119-20) (PG 317A14-20A4).

[103] *Pyrr* §§116-21 (121-26) (PG 91.320A6-C14).

[104] *Pyrr* §§122-25 (127-42) (PG 91.320D1-28A7). The passages Maximus offers are Jn 1.43, 17.24; Mt 27.34; Jn 7.1; Mk 9.30, 7.24; 2 Cor 13.4; Mk 6.48, 14.12; Phil 2.8; Ps 40.6-7; Gen 1.26; Mt 23.37; and Jn 5.21.

Menas; Pope Honorius of Rome, who supposedly taught one will; and Sophronius of Jerusalem, who supposedly demanded that the operations of Christ be discussed, even though it was not prudent to do so.[105]

Thus, having debated the theological and Christological principles, having examined Patristic and Scriptural authorities, and having cleared contemporary figures of the semblance of wrong-doing, the debate over Monotheletism is brought to a close. The discussion then passes over to an examination of the principles of Monenergism, which can be left out of this dissertation, since most of them are simply earlier Monenergist formulations of later Monothelite principles.

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[105] *Pyrr* §§126-37 (143-54) (PG 91.328A8-33B8).

CONCLUSION

The task we set before ourselves at the beginning of this dissertation was three-fold. First, we sought to provide the historical and theological milieu in which Maximus flourished, along with those events that led directly to the Monothelite debates. Thus, we saw that Monenergism was first put forward as Imperial Byzantine policy, the purpose of which was to reconcile to the orthodox Byzantine Church the Monophysites in the eastern provinces which the Emperor Heraclius had returned to Imperial hegemony. The move was (temporarily) successful in Egypt, but orthodox opposition, in the person of Sophronius of Jerusalem, began a series of chameleon-like modifications in the official position: the original Monenergism (that Christ had but one operation), set forth in the Pact of Union, was replaced by the teaching of the *Psephos*, which forbade any discussion of one operation or two, though "one operation" was clearly to be preferred. After this came the *Ekthesis*, which again proscribed all discussion of the number of operations in Christ, but explicitly taught that he had one will, thus inaugurating the Monothelite phase of the debate. Again, since this formula engendered neither theological peace nor ecclesiastical reconciliation, Emperor Constans II put an end to all debate either over one operation or two, or over one will or two, in the *Typos*. It was in this milieu that Maximus articulated both Dyenergism (that there were

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two operations in Christ, divine and human) and the subsequent

Dyotheletism (that there were two wills in Christ, divine and human).

The second part of our task has been to provide the broad scheme

of Maximus' Christology by an examination of the chief themes in that

Christology. Those themes are all different ways of maintaining (or

variously expressing) the central truth in all of the Confessor's

writings, namely the definition of Chalcedon, that Christ was one

hypostasis in two natures, without confusion, without division, without

change, and without separation. To this end we considered two of the

metaphors for unconfused union that appear in the Maximian corpus

(whole and parts, fire and iron), and then went on to examine the

formula the two natures "from which, in which, and which Christ is,"

the distinction between logos and tropos, the enhypostaton, and

perichoresis. These are the clearly identifiable themes of Maximus'

Christology, the categories into which he casts all of his thought, the

keys in which the melody of Chalcedon is sung. In presenting each of

these themes, we considered also some of the antecedents of each one in

earlier Patristic authors. In this way we have established Maximus

within the broad Patristic tradition and demonstrated his fidelity to it.

On the one hand, then, we find a mark of Maximus' genius in the

extraordinary synthesis which he plaited together from a number of

strands: Scripture, Chalcedon, the Cappadocian Fathers, Alexandrian

Christology (especially in the writings of Cyril), and Neo-

Chalcedonianism, not to mention the strands which we have not had

occasion to highlight in this dissertation: Aristotle and Neo-Platonism,

Dionysius the Areopagite, the whole monastic tradition, Origen and Evagrius, and Nemesius of Emessa. All of these he wove into a tapestry of unparalleled coherence, integrity, and beauty. For this feat alone Maximus stands as the watershed of Byzantine theology and the unequalled theologian of the seventh century, East or West. On the other hand, we have seen Maximus carry further the elements of the tradition he received, to deepen and sharpen their meaning, but without altering them; in this resect, the application of the idea of perichoresis to Christology is perhaps the most significant.

When we take all of the themes in Maximus' Christology and hold them together, we discover that all of them can be viewed synoptically. That is, the metaphors as well as the heaviest Christological jargon are all oriented toward the same thing: a clear, orthodox articulation of the Chalcedonian definition. All of them serve the same goal of illuminating Chalcedon and supporting it; all of them exclude the errors of Severus and Nestorius.

And finally, the third part of the task of this dissertation has been to turn from a broad consideration of Maximus' Christology to a narrow application of it in the particular circumstances of the Monothelite debates. In this undertaking we have seen that Maximus' Christology considered in itself provides an adequate response to the claims of Monotheletism. That is to say, in confronting the various principles of Monotheletism, as he did in the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, Maximus was not required to formulate any new teaching. Quite the contrary. Both Dyenergism and Dyotheletism (which were endorsed by the Third Council

of Constantinople in 681) flow naturally from Maximus' Christology. For Maximus to refute Monothelite claims, he was required only to make an application of what was an already worked-out Christology. We have shown that Maximus' Christology was already worked out before he engaged Monenergism or Monotheletism by using in our analyses works written by Maximus *before* the debates began, chief among them the *Ambigua*, but including also the *Centuries on Charity*, the *Questions to Thalassius*, the *Theological and Economic Centuries*, and certain of the *Epistles*. This is important. That Monenergism and Monotheletism elicited no new Christological response demonstrates that there was very little new in it. They were, as we have maintained, simply an expression of the same Paleo-Chalcedonian Christology that had been continuously debated for over 150 years, only this time the debate centered on an aspect of Christology which had not yet risen to prominence: operation and will.

The significance of the work of this dissertation lies in the straightforward articulation of the central elements in Maximus' Christology, elements which have been addressed by others, to be sure, but not within a context where they are the central focus, nor in which they have been viewed synoptically. Especially with regard to the synoptic view, our work stands alone. Of secondary significance is the many texts from Maximus' corpus which have been translated and analyzed here for the first time.

Moreover, no one has undertaken to articulate or analyze all of the principles of Monotheletism systematically. Doucet mentions most of them

in his dissertation,[1] but he gives only a general analysis and back-
ground of Monenergism and Monotheletism, such as we have done more
briefly in Chapter I; Doucet's dissertation remains unpublished at this
time. Léthel offers a rather thorough analysis of two Monothelite
principles, but he makes no attempt to deal with the whole complex of
Monothelite thought.[2] Farrell covers three principles of Monotheletism,
but his analysis of them is one to which we cannot subscribe.[3] In this
dissertation we have not only provided a comprehensive account of all
the principles of Monotheletism, but we have analyzed them and shown
Maximus' response to each one of them. Having done this analysis as a
specific application of Maximus' Christology broadly considered sheds
further light on both the broad themes of his Christology, as well as on
the specific issues of Monotheletism.

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[1]"La dispute," 58-106.

[2]Léthel analyzes the principles that two opposing wills in the same
person is impossible, and that the human will of Christ is appropriated
(*Théologie*, 37-45, 50-54, respectively). His refusal to deal with the
whole complex of Monotheletism severely undermines his work in our
estimation. Léthel should also be read with the correctives that Doucet
provides in "Est-ce que."

[3]Farrell considers the principles that two opposing wills in the
same person are impossible (which he calls the "principle of non-
contradiction"), that will is ascribed to hypostasis, and that the faculty
of will and its employment are confused (which he styles the principle
that "what is natural is compelled"), *Free Choice in St. Maximus the
Confessor* (South Canaan, PA: St. Tikhon's Seminary Press, 1989): 72-84,
153-54; see also Farrell, *Disputation*, xxiii-xxviii. Farrell does not fully
understand the Neo-Chalcedonian enterprise, nor does he appreciate its
role in the Monothelite debates. Moreover, he relies on Léthel's analysis
rather uncritically and thus falls victim to many of the errors that
Doucet points out.

Of further significance is the analysis of the several Monothelite principles in conjunction with the Patristic antecedents of the different themes in Maximus' Christology. By laying out in some detail the Monothelite position, we are able to contrast it not only with the full flower of Maximus' Christology, but also with many of the insights of the Confessor's predecessors, both orthodox and heterodox. While a detailed comparison along these lines is outside the scope of the present work, we feel confident that certain unsettled questions concerning Maximus' "theological pedigree," e.g., his adherence to or avoidance of Neo-Chalcedonian Christology, and his alleged support of Monenergism in his early years (maintained by some scholars), can be satisfactorily laid to rest using the insights developed by this dissertation.

This last point brings us to a consideration of a number of the issues which are available for further study. By way of more circumscribed topics, there is the issue of gnome, or gnomic will. Of all the terms in Maximus' theological lexicon, this term has undergone the most radical precision. The original thrust of this dissertation was an examination of gnomic will, and that work still remains to be done. Little of substance has been written on the subject up to this point. An exposition of all the key texts where the term is used, with a careful eye to the development of Maximus' understanding of it over time, is probably the most judicious approach to take.

Another issue is perichoresis, which, like gnomic will, has broader applications than just Christology. Much more could be said about it, particularly within the framework of Dionysian Neo-Platonism. Stephen

Gersh, in his book, *From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation into the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition*, has begun to work on perichoresis in this way. A full examination of perichoresis would open up the whole of Maximus' metaphysics, as well as his cosmology and soteriology, all of which are not only well-integrated with each other, but form a synthesis of exquisite beauty as well.

The *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, which we have considered in some detail, is the prime document for understanding both Monenergism and Monotheletism. The only modern translation of it is Farrell's, and his translation is frequently inaccurate. A revised, or an entirely new, translation is needed, and one that incorporates an analysis of all the principles of Monenergism and Monotheletism with Maximus' counter-arguments, would be a very useful undertaking. Such a work, with a substantial introduction to the whole Monothelite debate, will probably be the immediate outgrowth of the present dissertation.

In addition to the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*, more work also needs to be done on the early documents relating to the Monenergist phase of the debates, e.g. the fragments of Theodore of Pharan, the *Psephos*, the *Ekthesis*, the *Epistles* of Honorius and Sergius, Maximus' letter to Pyrrhus (*Epistle* 13), the Pact of Union, and the *Synodal Tome* of Sophronius of Jerusalem. Not only do these documents merit study in and of themselves--what attention they have received has not been as thorough as it could be--but a careful analysis of their arguments would help to establish the provenance of Monenergism and the subse-

quent Monotheletism. Charles Moeller, whose views have been widely accepted, states flatly that Monenergism comes from Neo-Chalcedonianism.[4] This dissertation has maintained that, quite the contrary, Maximus' Neo-Chalcedonian Christology afforded the only adequate response to Monothelite claims. Where, then, are the roots of Monotheletism to be found? A more thorough examination of the earlier documents, we believe, would support the veracity of the position we have maintained in this dissertation.

And lastly, the most far-reaching and complex issue that has arisen from the research conducted on this dissertation is that of Neo-Chalcedonianism itself. In the Preface we opted for the interpretation of Neo-Chalcedonian Christology that was articulated by John Meyendorff and treated substantially by Patrick T. R. Gray. Kenneth Wesche, in his dissertation on Leontius of Jerusalem, accepted this interpretation and showed that it bears up under rigorous application to the Christology of Leontius. We have likewise taken up the same interpretation and shown that it bears up under rigorous application to the Christology of Maximus. Still, not all scholars agree with the positive assessment of Neo-Chalcedonianism which we maintain with Meyendorff, Gray and Wesche; many see it as the beginning of the deviation of Byzantine Christology from the earlier catholic consensus. It cannot be denied that the different estimations of Neo-Chalcedonianism fall evenly along

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[4]"Le chalcédonisme et le néo-chalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du VIe siècle," in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, eds. A. Grillmeier and H. Bacht (Würtzburg: Echter-Verlag, 1951), 695, note 167.

confessional lines, with the Orthodox viewing it favorably, while Roman Catholic scholars take a dimmer view. The only way to overcome the difference of opinion is through more work on the Neo-Chalcedonian authors themselves. The writings of John the Grammarian, Ephrem of Amid, the Emperor Justinian, Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem will have to find wider circulation and receive more attention. Otherwise, the opinions of modern scholars will have the last word because the theologians they are writing about will be unknown. It is also important that those who seek to understand Neo-Chalcedonianism not limit themselves only to those theologians who flourished before Second Constantinople (553), when Neo-Chalcedonianism was officially endorsed. Those theologians who followed the Neo-Chalcedonian school after Second Constantinople and contributed to its enterprise must also be considered, chief among them Sophronius and Maximus.

All in all, then, much work remains to be done in post-Chalcedonian Byzantine Christology, not only among those theologians whose work was endorsed at Second Constantinople, but also among those whose work was endorsed at Third Constantinople in 681. These latter are, of course, the Dyothelites, whose undisputed leader was Maximus the Confessor, the examination of whose contribution to Christology we now bring to an end.

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Text: PG 90.960-1080. Combefis.
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    G. Berthold. *Maximus Confessor,* 35-98. (English)
    E. Kadlubovsky, et al. *Early Fathers,* 287-346. (English)
    G. E. H. Palmer, et al. *Philokalia,* 2:53-113. (English)
    J. Pegon. Sources chrétiennes 9. (French)
    P. Sherwood. ACW 21, 136-208. (English)

Capita theologica et oeconomica (CPG 7694)

Text: PG 90.1084-1173. Combefis.
Translations: G. Berthold. *Maximus Confessor,* 129-80. (English)
    G. E. H. Palmer, et al. *Philokalia,* 2:114-63. (English)
    A. Riou. *Le monde et l'église,* 240-61. (French, 1st cent. only)

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Text: PG 90.1177-85. Combefis.
Translations: E. Kadlubovsky, et al., *Early Fathers,* 347-48. (English)
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Computus Ecclesiasticus (CPG 7706)

Text: PG 91.1217-80. Petau.

Disputatio Bizyae (CPG 7735)

Text: PG 90.136-72.
Translation: J.-M. Garrigues, "Le martyre," 427-43, 446-47. (French)

Disputatio cum Pyrrho (CPG 7698)

Text: PG 91.288-353. Combefis.
     Mansi 10.709-60.
Translation: J. Farrell. *Disputation.* (English)

Epistulae XLV (CPG 7699)

Text: PG 91.364-649.

Epistula ad Abbatem Thalassium (Epistle A) (CPG 7702)

Translation: PL 129.583-86. (Latin, by Anastasius Bibliothecarius)

Epistula ad Anastasium monachum discipulum (CPG 7701)

Text: PG 90.132-33. Combefis.
Translation: J.-M. Garrigues, "Le martyre," 444-45. (French)

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Unedited.
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Critical text: P. van Deun, *Maximi Confessoris: Opuscula exegetica duo.*
Text: PG 90.856-72. Combefis.

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Text: PG 90.912-56. Combefis.
Translation: P. Sherwood, ACW 21, 103-35. (English)

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Text: PG 91.657-717. Combefis.
Translations: G. Berthold. *Maximus Confessor,* 181-225. (English)
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Text: PG 91.9-353.
Translations: A. Ceresa-Gastaldo. *Meditazioni.* *(TP* 3, 6, 7, 15, 16, 24).
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   Hypostatic Union and Monotheletism: The Dyothelite Christology of
   St. Maximus the Confessor

Dissertation directed by the Rev. Gerard H. Ettlinger, S.J.

This dissertation articulates Maximus the Confessor's understanding of the hypostatic union in Christ and shows how that understanding provided an adequate response to the claims of Monotheletism. The dissertation begins with a broad survey of the historical, political and theological factors that gave rise to the Monenergist movement and its later transformation into Monotheletism. Then, turning directly to Maximus, his Christology is shown to be a Neo-Chalcedonian exposition of the faith of Chalcedon.

Maximus organizes his thought on the hypostatic union under several rubrics that all illustrate the notion of unconfused union. These rubrics include such classical metaphors as the whole and parts, and fire and iron; a formula: the two natures "from which, in which, and which Christ is;" the distinction between logos and tropos; the enhypostaton; and perichoresis. Each rubric is analyzed separately, and its antecedents in Patristic literature are provided so that Maximus' fidelity to and elaboration of that tradition is made clear. The rubrics are also viewed synoptically to show their harmony and to demonstrate the coherency of Maximus' synthesis.

Finally, having considered Maximus' understanding of the hypostatic union, the focus of the dissertation turns specifically to the principles of Monotheletism. These principles are set forth in a debate preserved as the *Disputation with Pyrrhus*. The dissertation follows the arguments and counter-arguments as they unfold in the course of the *Disputation* and analyzes each of them in turn. The analysis of Monothelite arguments in the *Disputation* shows that Monotheletism was the later flowering of an older, Paleo-Chalcedonian Christology, the weaknesses of which Neo-Chalcedonianism had sought to overcome. In combatting Monotheletism, then, Maximus was not required to formulate any new teaching, but only to apply the Neo-Chalcedonian Christology of which he was an heir to an aspect of Christology that had not yet been addressed, i.e. the issue of Christ's operations and wills.

VITA

Born 20 December 1960, Michael Butler was raised in East Texas. He graduated from Sharyland High School in Mission, Texas, in 1979. In the Fall of the same year he matriculated at the University of Dallas in Irving, Texas, with a partial scholarship. In May of 1983 he received his bachelor's degree *cum laude* from U.D. in Existential Phenomenological Psychology.

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